concurring:
I concur in the opinion and judgment of the court,. In view of the People's predictions of dire impact upon the State's hazardous waste laws and program-were we to uphold the judgment of the court of appeals-I explain my view that that the judgment of the court announced today addresses only the General Assembly's intent in the adoption of section 25-15-808(4)(a) & (b), 8 C.R.S. (2002), the statute of limitations provisions, as they apply to criminal prosecutions for violation of Colorado's hazardous waste laws.
In my view, the difference between depriving a person of his or her liberty and/or imposing criminal fines for violation of the state's hazardous waste laws, and requiring the person to perform remediation of a hazardous waste spill, is manifest on the face of the statute and supported by application of criminal versus civil law principles.
Ordinarily, except for certain crimes specified in section 16-5-401(1)(a), 6 C.R.S. (2002), the criminal law does not operate to allow criminal prosecution many years after the accused engages in the proscribed act; as the opinion of the court expresses, the rule of lenity operates in favor of a eriminal defendant against a "continuous violation" reading of an ambiguous criminal statute of limitations absent a specific or necessarily implied legislative intent to the contrary. On the other hand, civil liability in hazardous waste cases under Colorado's law extends to requir*1200ing remediation when soil or ground water contamination is discovered many years after an unpermitted hazardous waste spill has occurred.
The case before us involves the spilling of hazardous waste that occurred earlier than 1986 and a criminal prosecution and conviction that were obtained in the late 1990s. After the spilling occurred, the hazardous waste migrated into the soil and into groundwater.
Section 25-15-808(4)(b), 8 C.R.S. (2002), of the statute of limitations provision at issue in this case, provides that the State of Colorado Department of Health and Environment (Department) may issue a civil remediation order to rectify the results of such a spill, even though section 25-15-808(4)(a), 8 CRS. (2002), would bar criminal punishment. Under section 25-15-308(4)(b), 8 C.R.S. (2002), the Department:
within two years after the date upon which the department discovers such disposal, may issue an order ... requiring action to remediate such disposal. The department is not authorized under these circumstances to seek any administrative, civil, or criminal penalties for such disposal of hazardous waste. (emphasis added).
In my view, this provision specifically answers the question before the court in this appeal: may the defendant be punished criminally for unpermitted acts of spilling hazardous waste that occurred prior to 19867 The People argue that the answer is "yes" on the basis that every day the spilled hazardous waste exists in the environment constitutes a new criminally punishable event. In doing so, the People largely ignore the General Assembly's authorization for a civil remediation order within two years after the date the State of Colorado learns of the presence of the hazardous waste in the environment resulting, for example, from an unpermitted spill or leak from materials handling, as occurred in the case before us.
The General Assembly is quite clear in section 25-15-808(4)(b), 8 C.R.S. (2002), that criminal penalties do not apply in connection with the issuance of a civil remediation order in the cireumstances of a case like the one before us-that is, when the migration of the spilled material through the soil into ground water is discovered many years after the criminally punishable unpermitted acts of disposal occurred. By characterizing the crime as consisting of each day the hazardous waste exists in the environment, the People seek to impose criminal liability despite the prohibition in section 25-15-308(4)(a) & (b), 8 C.R.S. (2002), on criminal punishment when the limitation period has run, and the authorization in section 25-15-8308(4)(b), 8 C.R.S. (2002), for civil remedial orders in such circumstances.
In my view, the General Assembly has addressed, resolved, and avoided the very specter the People raise-the specter that the court of appeals judgment in this case will prevent or severely restrict the State of Colorado from requiring remediation of un-permitted spills. In making this argument, the People ignore the apparent intent of the General Assembly in providing that the Department may require the clean-up of contaminated soil and ground water under the statute long after the unpermitted spills occurred. The General Assembly also provided that the People may not prosecute acts of spilling that occurred more than five years before charges in the case were filed, because the provisions of section 25-15-308(4)(a), 8 C.R.S. (2002), bar such a prosecution (providing that a criminal prosecution may be brought within two years after the date the Department discovers an alleged violation or within five years after the date the violation occurred, "whichever date occurs earlier"). ' Read in combination, these provisions evidence a clear legislative public policy that we should uphold, giving effect to both provisions.
In the case before us, the unpermitted spill occurred more than five years before the initiation of the criminal prosecution. I conclude that the General Assembly intended to make persons criminally responsible for un-permitted spills of hazardous wastes occurring after the effective date of Colorado's hazardous waste act, November 2, 1984, see section 25-15-102(8), 8 C.R.S. (2002), but barred prosecution of spills that occurred five years before the eriminal filing. At the same time, the General Assembly provided for civil *1201remediation orders to be issued long after the hazardous waste spills, so that injurious effects upon the environment would be rectified.
Our recent decision in Hoery v. United States, 64 P.3d 214 (2008), which I joined, imposes continuous tort liability in a case such as the one before us here. Alternatively, or in combination, Department remediation orders under the hazardous waste act and tort liability for soil and ground water contamination address the pernicious effect of unpermitted hazardous waste spills that the dissent rightly decries. Criminal punishment for each day hazardous waste exists in the environment until the contamination is completely cleaned up is not what the General Asserably intended.
In conclusion, I do not aseribe to the carefully written opinion of the court affirming the judgment of the court of appeals any effect other than a statute of limitations restriction on the People bringing eriminal prosecutions under the hazardous waste laws. The opinion's discussion is entirely in the context of the facts applicable in this case-that is, that the prosecution was brought and criminal punishment imposed, illegally, for hazardous waste spills that gc-curred more than five years before the criminal filing occurred. To the extent that the court's discussion of "disposal" is read to extend beyond the narrow context of criminal prosecution and punishment, I disagree. I do not believe that the court's judgment extends that far, and I do not join in a judgment that would have such effect.
Accordingly, I join in the opinion and judgment of the court that the criminal convie-tions for illegal disposal of hazardous waste in this case resulted from a time-barred criminal prosecution. It follows that the judgment of the court of appeals must be affirmed.1
. I recognize that defendant was convicted of separate incidents of hazardous waste storage without a permit and of criminal mischief; I intend nothing in this concurrence to suggest that those convictions were improper.