State v. Marx

DAVIS, J.,

concurring: I agree with the majority’s ultimate conclusion that the district court correctly suppressed the evidence in question here because Deputy Doudican lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop and because the traffic stop was not done for public safety or out of community caretaking concerns. I write separately, however, because I believe that the majority’s analysis of K.S.A. 8-1522(a) results in an unreasonable and unworkable standard for an officer to apply when determining whether there is reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop for failing to maintain a single lane.

K.S.A. 8-l522(a) states: “A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety.” The majority interprets this statute “as estabhshing two separate rules of the road.” The first rule

“requires a driver to keep entirely within a single lane while traveling on a roadway with two or more clearly marked lanes. That rule is temporarily suspended when it becomes impracticable to stay within the lane markers and when the driver is properly effecting a lane change. Proof that driving outside the lane markers created no safety hazard is not a defense to the single lane rule.”

The second rule described by the majority “provides that before a driver may change lanes or move from the current lane of travel to another location, he or she must ascertain that the movement can be made with safety.” The majority concludes that a “traffic *677infraction occurs under K.S.A. 8-1522(a) when either rule of the road is violated.”

My trouble with the majority opinion lies not with its interpretation of this statute, but rather with its conclusion stemming from this interpretation that it was the State’s burden to prove that the defendants failed to maintain a single lane despite the fact that it was not impracticable to do so.

There is no question that the standard articulated by the majority in this case would be the standard if this were a trial on the traffic violation itself. But this is not a hearing to determine whether a traffic violation occurred; instead, we are asked to consider whether it was reasonable for Deputy Doudican to suspect that a traffic violation had occurred and subsequently decide to initiate a traffic stop. See State v. Anderson, 281 Kan. 896, 901, 136 P.3d 406 (2006). These are two very different questions.

The majority correctly states that in order to effectuate a legal traffic stop, Deputy Doudican was required to demonstrate a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a traffic violation had occurred. See Anderson, 281 Kan. at 901; State v. Morris, 276 Kan. 11, 17, 72 P.3d 570 (2003). The United States Supreme Court has described a “reasonable suspicion” as “ ‘a particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity. [Citation omitted.]” Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911, 116 S. Ct. 1657 (1996). Reasonable suspicion is a lower standard than probable cause and requires a fact-centered inquiry based on the “ Totality of the circumstances.’ ” Morris, 276 Kan. at 24 (quoting State v. Slater, 267 Kan. 694, Syl. ¶ 2, 986 P.2d 1038 [1999]).

When an officer can articulate facts demonstrating a reasonable suspicion existed for the officer to suspect that the accused committed a crime (in this case, a traffic violation), the seizure is valid even though it may be pretextual. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996). Thus, when a reasonable suspicion exists to conduct a traffic stop, a court will not invalidate that stop on the basis of the officer’s motives. State v. DeMarco, 263 Kan. 727, 733, 952 P.2d 1276 (1998).

*678Applying these standards, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained that an “initial traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment not only if based on an observed traffic violation, but also if the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring.” United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345, 1348 (10th Cir. 1998). We have similarly espoused that although “[a] traffic violation provides an objectively valid reason to effectuate a traffic stop,” the ultimate test for judging the validity of an initial stop of a moving vehicle is whether an officer has “articulable facts sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion under K.S.A. 22-2402(1) and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968).” Anderson, 281 Kan. at 901.

The question before us is whether the deputy who conducted the traffic stop in this case acted reasonably in initiating that stop. Circumstances may arise, contrary to the majority’s assessment, where an officer may reasonably conclude that a vehicle’s single deviation from a single lane violates K.S.A. 8-1522(a). One such instance was considered by the United States District Court in United States v. Jones, 501 F. Supp. 2d 1284 (D. Kan. 2007). There, a highway patrol trooper observed a vehicle cross the fog line “by at least the width of a tire” while traveling down the interstate early in the morning. 501 F. Supp. 2d at 1285. The trooper initiated a traffic stop because he was concerned that “the driver was drowsy or sleepy based upon the swerve.” 501 F. Supp. 2d at 1285. The court in Jones found that “[a]n extended trip, the likelihood of overnight travel, the pre-dawn hour, and the sudden swerve are enough, though just barely, for a reasonable suspicion that the driver was having difficulty staying awake as to justify a stop for safety reasons.” 501 F. Supp. 2d at 1299.

I find the court’s rationale in Jones to be sound and to exemplify why we employ a fact-specific inquiry in these cases. Officers’ decisions as to whether reasonable suspicion exists, like the more stringent standard of probable cause, are “ ‘not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.’ [Citation *679omitted.]” Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313, 3 L. Ed. 2d 327, 79 S. Ct. 329 (1959).

The court in Jones may have determined after reviewing the evidence that a violation of K.S.A. 8-1522(a) did not actually take place (though it did not do so) for any number of reasons. For example, the court might conclude that the driver swerved to miss an animal or a pothole on the roadway. In other words, the driver could have presented evidence to the court that it was impracticable to stay in his or her lane. But this subsequent judicial determination would not necessarily undermine the reasonableness of the troopers initial belief that a violation had occurred.

The practical effect of the majority’s opinion in this case is to deprive the officer of discretion to determine, under the variety of circumstances that may arise on a multiple-lane roadway, whether a vehicle is violating the single-lane rule. While the majority is correct that K.S.A. 8-1522(a) is not a strict liability offense, it is nevertheless a rule of the road that must be followed and for which violations carry a penalty. Yet the majority’s statements regarding the statute’s flexibility — that the statute requires “compliance that is close to that which is feasible” — coupled with its requirement that the State prove a violation of the statute in order to establish reasonable suspicion creates a standard that will be difficult if not impossible for officers to enforce. I believe the effect of this decision will be hesitancy in, if not an all-out end to, the enforcement of the single-lane requirement. This result would, in my opinion, be contrary to the legislature’s intention in enacting K.S.A. 8-1522(a).

The district court concluded that Deputy Doudican’s testimony that the Marxes’ motor home “crossed the fog line, . . . overcorrected[,] and crossed the center line” was insufficient to establish a reasonable suspicion that the Marxes violated K.S.A. 8-1522(a). I agree with this assessment. As noted by the majority, the officer provided no evidence other than this brief explanation (e.g., evidence of traffic or weather conditions, time of day, or any other observation relating to the practicability of the momentary deviation) to explain his decision to initiate a traffic stop. In the absence of such evidence, it was unreasonable for the deputy to believe that *680the motor home violated the single-lane rule. Because the deputy did not have a reasonable suspicion to support the initial traffic stop, I would affirm the district court’s grant of the defendants’ motion to suppress and, therefore, concur in the majority opinion.

McFarland, C.J., joins in the foregoing concurring opinion.