I respectfully dissent. In early morning darkness, defendant, driving a stolen vehicle, led police officers on a perilous and extended chase over Fresno County roads. He ran three stop signs and a red light, and even proceeded on the wrong side of a divided highway, while operating the vehicle far in excess of posted speed limits. Finally, as he dashed on city streets toward downtown Fresno at speeds between 80 and 90 miles per hour, he ran a second red light and collided with another vehicle. Both occupants of that car were ejected onto the street. One perished.
*1142As a result of Ms reckless actions, defendant suffered a conviction for violation of VeMcle Code section 2800.2,1 wMch makes it a felony to flee police pursuit by driving with “a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property.” (Id., subd. (a).) Because Ms violation of this law had fatal consequences, defendant was also convicted of second degree murder on a felony-murder theory—i.e., that he caused death in the commission of an inherently dangerous felony. Instructions told the jury that the “willful or wanton disregard” necessary to both convictions required an intentional act performed with a “conscious disregard” for safety.
The majority concede that defendant (1) violated section 2800.2, the reckless flight statute, by “willful[ly] or wanton[ly] disregard[ing]” human safety during a flight from the police, and (2) thereby produced a human fatality. Nonetheless, though two Court of Appeal decisions have concluded otherwise (People v. Sewell (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 690, 693-697 [95 Cal.Rptr.2d 600] (Sewell); People v. Johnson (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 169, 173-174 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 650] (Johnson)), the majority insist that this statute cannot support a felony-murder conviction.
The majority invoke the premise that second degree felony murder only occurs in the commission of a felony which is inherently dangerous in the abstract—one which, by its very nature, cannot be committed without creating a substantial risk, or a high probability, that someone will be killed. (E.g., People v. Hansen (1994) 9 Cal.4th 300, 309 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 609, 885 P.2d 1022] (Hansen).) Relying on the peculiar construction of the reckless flight statute, including its recent amendment, the majority posit that even if defendant violated section 2800.2 in a potentially lethal way, it can be violated without creating a lethal danger to persons.
The majority focus upon subdivision (b) of section 2800.2, which was added in 1996. This subdivision states that “[f]or purposes of [section 2800.2],” driving with “a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property includes . . . driving . . . during which time . . . tiiree or more [traffic] violations that are assigned a traffic violation point count under [s]ection 12810 occur . . . .” The majority reason that, because some statutory “points” violations are not inherently dangerous, one can commit the unitary felony described in both subdivisions of section 2800.2 in a way that does not place human life at risk.
*1143I am not persuaded. Subdivision (a) of section 2800.2 gives clear and specific notice that one who, in order to elude police pursuit, drives with reckless indifference to safety is guilty of a felony. Such reckless driving is, of course, inherently dangerous—by definition, it creates a substantial risk that someone will be killed. Moreover, there is no doubt that defendant committed exactly the reckless endangerment of human life forbidden by the statute. As I explain in further detail below, his conviction for violating section 2800.2, as well as his felony-murder conviction, were unambiguously based on the dangerous recklessness of his flight from the police.
Hence, the principal reason noted by the majority for limiting the second degree felony-murder rule should not bar a felony-murder finding here. The statute’s express words placed defendant on notice that the particular conduct he was committing—recklessly unsafe driving to elude police pursuit—was both felonious and inherently dangerous, and thus a basis for murder liability if death resulted. This is a case where “ ‘society has declared certain inherently dangerous conduct to be felonious,’ ” and “ ‘defendant should [therefore] not be allowed to excuse himself by saying he was unaware of the danger to life because, by declaring the conduct to be felonious, society has warned him of the risk involved.’ ” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1135, quoting People v. Patterson (1989) 49 Cal.3d 615, 626 [262 Cal.Rptr. 195, 778 P.2d 549] (Patterson).)
Conversely, the principal reason for applying the felony-murder rule is present. The purpose of the felony-murder doctrine “ ‘is to deter those engaged in felonies from killing negligently or accidentally.’ ” (Hansen, supra, 9 Cal.4th 300, 308, quoting People v. Satchell (1971) 6 Cal.3d 28, 43 [98 Cal.Rptr. 33, 489 P.2d 1361].) Because the doctrine absolves the prosecution from proving malice, it properly applies when “ ‘the killer is engaged in a felony whose inherent danger to human life renders logical an imputation of malice on the part of all who commit it.’ ” (Ibid.)
Those requirements are met here. It is appropriate to deter persons from killing negligently or accidentally—as did defendant—while engaged—as was defendant—in recklessly unsafe driving to elude police pursuit, a specific form of conduct made felonious by section 2800.2, subdivision (a). Moreover, the inherent danger such conduct poses to human life is so clear that it is logical to impute malice to anyone who commits it.
Under such circumstances, it perverts reason to refuse to apply the felony-murder rule simply because subdivision (b) of section 2800.2 may additionally describe a nondangerous felony. Where society has warned, in plain statutory words, that the particular conduct committed by the defendant *1144is both dangerous and felonious, it should not matter that the statute may forbid nondangerous conduct as well.2
It is worth noting that, although the Legislature elected to include subdivision (b) as part of section 2800.2, it could just as easily have added a separate section, establishing a distinct felonious offense of committing three “points” violations while driving to elude a peace officer. This would equally have satisfied the apparent legislative purpose to deter flight from the police by expanding the circumstances under which driving to elude a pursuing police officer would constitute a felony. (See, e.g., Sen. Com. on Crim. Proc., Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1999 (1995-1996 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 29, 1996, p. 6.)
However, neither the Legislature’s desire to create a felony of flight with “points” violations, nor its choice of methodology to accomplish this result, can deprive the reckless conduct described in subdivision (a) of all force as an inherently dangerous felony. If subdivision (a) described an inherently dangerous felony before the addition of subdivision (b) in 1996 (see Johnson, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th 169, 173-174), the unchanged words of that subdivision equally do so following the 1996 amendment (see Sewell, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th 690, 693-697).
In sum, where the defendant committed inherently dangerous conduct expressly made felonious by subdivision (a) of section 2800.2, and was accused, tried, and convicted solely under that subdivision, I submit that subdivision (a) is the provision we should analyze to determine if it qualifies as a basis for felony murder.
As I have indicated above, this is such a case. The prosecution avoided all reliance on subdivision (b) of section 2800.2, and that subdivision was never an issue in the trial below. When referring to section 2800.2, the information cited only the language of subdivision (a), charging that defendant “drove with a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property.” In his testimony, one of the pursuing officers, Gary Stephany, ticked off the numerous Vehicle Code violations defendant had committed during the *1145high-speed chase, but the import of Stephany’s testimony was simply to emphasize defendant’s extreme and ongoing recklessness. The prosecutor never asked Stephany, or any other witness, whether defendant committed “points” violations.
In his argument to the jury concerning section 2800.2, the prosecutor emphasized that defendant’s various reckless traffic violations proved he had acted with “willful or wanton disregard,” i.e., with conscious indifference to the consequences for safety. The entire focus of the prosecutor’s argument was on defendant’s culpable state of mind while fleeing the police, as evidenced by his inherently dangerous driving maneuvers. The prosecutor never suggested that technical “points” violations committed by defendant were a basis for finding him guilty of violating section 2800.2, or of murder.
Most crucially, all reference to subdivision (b) was omitted from the jury instruction on section 2800.2. When describing the elements of a violation of that statute, the instruction said only that “ ‘[wjillful or wanton’ means an act intentionally performed with a conscious disregard for the safety of persons or property. It does not necessarily include an intent to injure.” (Italics added.)
Thus, beyond doubt, the jury convicted defendant of murder based solely on proof that he fled police pursuit by driving with reckless indifference to safety, conduct which is both inherently dangerous and expressly felonious under subdivision (a) of section 2800.2. It follows that the felony underlying defendant’s murder conviction was an inherently dangerous one. Accordingly, I submit, a murder conviction could be premised on his commission of this felony.
But even if section 2800.2 were not an inherently dangerous felony that could support a felony-murder conviction, any error in instructing the jury to the contrary was harmless. Indeed, by remanding to the Court of Appeal for a determination on the issue of prejudice, the majority imply that a no-prejudice conclusion is plausible.
I find such a conclusion inescapable, for two reasons. First, a reasonable jury, properly instructed on an implied malice theory of second degree murder, could not have failed to find, on this evidence, the elements of malicious murder. Second, though this jury received no explicit instructions on malice, it necessarily did find, under the instructions which were given, that defendant killed maliciously.
“ ‘Implied malice, for which the second degree felony-murder doctrine acts as a substitute [fn. omitted], has both a physical and a mental component. . . . *1146The mental component is the requirement that the defendant “knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and . . . acts with a conscious disregard for lifer [Citation].’ ” (People v. Robertson (2004) 34 Cal.4th 156, 165 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 604, 95 P.3d 872], quoting Patterson, supra, 49 Cal.3d 615, 626, italics added.)
In my view, the evidence that defendant acted with actual knowledge and conscious disregard of the lethal probabilities is conclusive. No other inference can be drawn from his decision to maintain his careening flight from the police over highways and streets carrying innocent travelers. During the high-speed chase, he swerved over a median boundary of a divided highway and travelled in lanes reserved for oncoming vehicles, risking a head-on collision. With equal purpose, he ran at least three stop signs and two red lights, forcing cross-traffic to yield and creating the obvious danger of crashes at these controlled intersections. In his frantic efforts to outdistance his pursuers, he “fishtailed” into curves and comers, giving rise to the peril of spin-out accidents that could involve other vehicles. The fatal collision occurred in the midst of this course of conduct, as defendant, still trying to escape, ran a red light at high speed.
As a matter of law, I believe, these intentional acts went beyond mere gross negligence or reckless indifference. Defendant—by his own evaluation a skilled driver—must have acted with full awareness that he was thereby placing human life at risk. He cannot evade this responsibility through his inherently implausible testimony that he remembered only bits and pieces of the chase, and could not recall whether the traffic light was red at the fatal intersection when he entered it.
In any event, this jury was told that the felony described in section 2800.2 required a conscious disregard for safety. Hence, in finding that defendant caused death in the commission of this felony, the jury necessarily found that he understood the danger, and chose to act anyway, thus exhibiting implied malice. Under these circumstances, reliance on a felony-murder theory, even if error, must be deemed harmless. (Cf., e.g., People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 720-721 [112 Cal.Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913].)3
Having concluded that defendant’s violation of section 2800.2 was an “inherently dangerous” felony for purposes of the felony-murder rule, I must *1147address his second argument. Defendant urges that he cannot be prosecuted and punished for felony murder in any event because the Legislature intends section 2800.3 as the only statute under which deaths caused by vehicular flight from the police may be prosecuted and punished without proof of malice.4
Defendant invokes the principle that a special statute defining an offense preempts a more general statute encompassing the same conduct. (See, e.g., In re Williamson (1954) 43 Cal.2d 651, 654 [276 P.2d 593].) But this rule applies only “(1) when each element of the general statute corresponds to an element on the face of the special statute, or (2) when it appears from the statutory context that a violation of the special statute will necessarily or commonly result in a violation of the general statute. [Citation.]” (People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290, 295-296 [179 Cal.Rptr. 43, 637 P.2d 279].)
Neither circumstance is present here. Both statutes permit punishment, without proof of malice, for fatalities caused by vehicular flight from the police, but the two statutes do not govern such killings identically. Section 2800.3—in defendant’s view, the more specific death-related statute— sanctions such a homicide regardless of the fleeing motorist’s degree of driving care. By contrast, to be convicted of felony murder under the more “general” statute, section 2800.2, the fleeing motorist must have driven with “a willful or wanton disregard for safety.” Thus, the facial elements of the two statutes differ, and a fatality punishable under section 2800.3 will not necessarily or commonly constitute a felony murder under section 2800.2.
Through an exhaustive analysis of legislative history, defendant argues that the Legislature’s “carefully crafted” scheme for punishment of pursuit-related fatalities precludes prosecution of such homicides as felony murder. His contention lacks merit. Vehicular flight from the police, with its potential for death, injury, and property damage, has been a growing problem. The Legislature has responded over the years by expanding the punishment for such conduct under various circumstances. Among other things, it has provided in section 2800.3 that one whose flight, however carefully conducted, causes death or injury may receive up to five years in prison, a $10,000 fine, or both. But nothing indicates the Legislature intended a similar limitation on the punishment of persons who commit homicides while engaged in the inherently dangerous felony of flight from police pursuit with *1148willful and wanton disregard for safety. Every consideration of logic and common sense suggests that such homicides may properly be treated under the law of felony murder.
For all these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
All further unlabeled statutory references are to the Vehicle Code.
This court has previously indicated that when a felony statute speaks in the disjunctive, describing discrete dangerous and nondangerous means of commission, the felony cannot be considered “inherently dangerous” for purposes of the second degree felony-murder rule. (People v. Burroughs (1984) 35 Cal.3d 824, 830 [201 Cal.Rptr. 319, 678 P.2d 894].) It has also been said that the statute must be examined in isolation from the facts of the case, so as to prevent the unfair possibility that the accused will be deemed to have committed an “inherently dangerous” felony simply because a death resulted. (Ibid.) I find these premises questionable where, as here, it is clear that the accused committed a form of the felony which, by its terms, necessarily endangers life, and that his murder conviction is based on the inherently dangerous form of the felony.
As the majority note, there was evidence that defendant was under the influence of methamphetamines during his reckless flight. But voluntary intoxication cannot negate implied malice. (Pen. Code, § 22, subd. (b).) In any event, the instructions actually alerted the jury to consider defendant’s intoxication on the issue whether he acted intentionally, and with conscious disregard for safety. By its verdicts, the jury necessarily resolved that issue against defendant.
Section 2800.3 provides in pertinent part: “Whenever willful flight or attempt to elude a pursuing peace officer in violation of [s]ection 2800.1 proximately causes death or serious bodily injury to any person, the [fleeing motorist], upon conviction, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for three, four, or five years, by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year, or by a fine of not less than two thousand dollars ($2,000) nor more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or by both that fine and imprisonment.”