concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Although I concur with most of the majority's opinion, I write separately to dissent from Part L.B. Specifically, I believe the trial court erred in appointing a parenting coordi*824nator without making the findings required by section 14-10-128.1(@2)(a), C.R.S.2007. Accordingly, I believe this part of the court's order should be reversed.
Here, before the decree of dissolution was entered, the parties entered into a parenting plan, which provided in part for the appointment of a special advocate to assist the parents in resolving parenting time disputes. If the parties' mediation with the special advocate failed to resolve a disagreement, the special advocate had decision-making power.
Mother soon became frustrated with the special advocate and moved to terminate her services and overturn her decisions. Accordingly, the trial court terminated the services of the special advocate.
Subsequently, a child and family investigator (CFI) was appointed to make recommendations to the court. The CFI recommended that a parenting coordinator be appointed with decision-making power. Mother objected. Although the trial court ultimately decided to appoint a parenting coordinator, the parenting coordinator was not give decision-making power. Mother appealed, inter alia, the trial court's decision appointing a parenting coordinator.
A parenting coordinator is a neutral third party appointed in contentious post-decree dissolution cases to assist the parties in resolving disputes concerning parental responsibilities. See § 14-10-128.1(1), C.R.S8.2007. Either the parties may agree to the appointment of a parenting coordinator or, if the parties do not agree, a trial court may appoint a parenting coordinator after making three specific findings. See § 14-10-128.1(2), C.R.98.2007. Specifically,
Absent agreement of the parties, a court shall not appoint a parenting coordinator unless the court makes the following findings:
(I) That the parties have failed to adequately implement the parenting plan;
(II) That mediation has been determined by the court to be inappropriate, or, if not inappropriate, that mediation has been attempted and was unsuccessful; and
(III) That the appointment of a parenting coordinator is in the best interests of the child or children involved in the parenting plan.
§ 14-10-128.1(2)(a) (emphasis added).
Here, the trial court did not make specific findings of fact with respect to each consideration. Instead, the court merely found that "It] he requirements of [section] 14-10-128.1(2)(a) are met."
The majority concludes that the trial court's determination sufficiently indicated that it considered the three statutory factors and was persuaded the evidence presented at the hearing satisfied each factor. The majority further concludes that the record supports the trial court's determination. I respectfully disagree.
When we interpret a statute, our goal is to give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. Zab, Inc. v. Berenergy Corp., 136 P.3d 252, 255 (Colo.2006). Well-established principles of statutory construction dictate that we must first examine the plain language of the statute. Snyder Oil Co. v. Embree, 862 P.2d 259, 262 (Colo.1993). Where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we need not resort to interpretive rules of statutory construction. Id. However, if "the statutory language lends itself to alternative constructions and its intended scope is ambiguous or unclear, we then look to legislative history, prior law, the consequences of a given construction, and the goal of the statutory scheme." Sperry v. Field, 186 P.3d 133, 137 (Colo.App.2008).
Section 14-10-128.1(@2)(a) uses the term "findings" without explaining what type of findings should be made. I believe the term "findings" as used in the parenting coordinator statute is ambiguous because it is susceptible of two meanings. First, "findings" could mean findings of fact. Alternatively, "findings" could mean conclusions of law. Indeed, the General Assembly frequently uses the term "findings" without specifying which type of findings should be made. Seq, e.g., § 18-17-102(6), C.R.S8.2007 ("No party who is appearing without an attorney shall be assessed attorney fees unless the court finds that the party clearly knew or reasonably should have known that his action or defense ... was substantially frivolous, sub*825stantially groundless, or substantially vexatious ...." (emphasis added)); § 18-23-104(1), C.R.S.2007 (structured settlement must be based on "express findings" by court or administrative authority on three factors, two of which concern questions of law and one of which requires a finding of fact).
Contrary to the majority's conclusion that a trial court may conclude as a matter of law that the criteria set forth in section 14-10-128.1(2)(a) have been satisfied without making factual findings, I believe section 14-10-128.1(2)(a) requires a trial court to make specific findings of fact with respect to each criterion and, based upon those factual findings, then determine as a matter of law whether a parenting coordinator should be appointed.
The legislative history for section 14-10-128.1 supports my conclusion because it suggests that the General Assembly intended that a trial court make specific factual findings before concluding that a parenting coordinator should be appointed. Statements made before a legislative committee, while less persuasive than a statement of a legislator during a debate, provide guidance in interpreting a statute by helping to illustrate the understanding of legislators. People v. Rockwell, 125 P.3d 410, 419 (Colo.2005).
During the House Judiciary Committee's hearings, a representative from the Family Law Section of the Colorado Bar Association, Beth Hensun, explained, "[I]f the court decides to appoint onel{,] the court must make several findings of fact on the record in order to appoint a parenting coordinator including a finding that the parties have been unable to implement their parenting plan that is already in place." Hearings on H.B. 1171 before the H. Judiciary Comm., 65th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Feb. 24, 2005) (emphasis added).
Furthermore, many witnesses at both the House and Senate Judiciary Committees' hearings, including the bill's sponsor, Representative Jahn, discussed the need to establish statutory authority for the appointment of parenting coordinators. Prior to the enactment of section 14-10-128.1, trial courts had been appointing parenting coordinators in contentious cases. See id.; see also Hearings on H.B. 1171 before the S8. Judiciary Comm., 65th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Mar. 16, 2005). The witnesses also explained that, although trial courts statewide had been appointing parenting coordinators for some time, the authority and duties given to them varied significantly.
Consequently, the legislative history demonstrates that the General Assembly, in passing the bill, intended to (a) provide statutory authority for the appointment of parenting coordinators and (b) ensure consistency in appointments when the parties disagreed by requiring trial courts to make specific factual findings capable of appellate review. If the General Assembly intended only to provide legislative authority to appoint parenting coordinators, it would not have included the criteria set forth in subsection (2)(a).
Moreover, I believe the‘yGeneral Assembly's intent to ensure consistency in appointments by requiring trial courts to make specific factual findings is evident from the cireumstances of this case. Here, mother strongly opposed the appointment of a parenting coordinator, and the evidence presented at trial did not compel the conclusion that a parenting coordinator was necessary.
With respect to the first criterion, which requires a finding "[that the parties have failed to adequately implement the. parenting plan," § 14-10-128.1(2)(a)(I), mother 'contends that no evidence was presented to establish that she and father had failed to adequately implement the parenting plan. She notes in particular that father did not even make allegations to that effect. The majority relies on mother's testimony that she and father repeatedly disagreed about parenting time. However, parties to dissolution of marriage proceedings frequently disagree about parenting time, and disagreements in and of themselves do not necessarily mean that the parties failed to adequately implement a parenting plan. Indeed, it seems that the parties' disagreements here had more to do with the special advocate than with the parenting plan itself. ,
With respect to the second criterion, subsection (I1) requires a finding "[that media*826tion has been determined by the court to be inappropriate, or, if not inappropriate, that mediation has been attempted and was unsuccessful." § 14-10-128.1(2)(a)(II). Mother contends that the parties had not attempted mediation in the past, and the court provided no basis for its implied finding that mediation was inappropriate.
To support its conclusion that the evidence in the record supports a finding that the mediation subsection was satisfied, the majority relies on mother's unequivocal opposition to any form of alternative dispute resolution and all forms of third-party decision-making. However, given her belief that the previously appointed special advocate was partial to father, mother's resistance to the involvement of another third party is understandable. Additionally, the record indicates that mother's reluctance to accept third-party involvement focused on allowing a third party to have decision-making power. Based on this evidence, the trial court could have concluded that mediation was appropriate, especially given the fact that mediators do not have decision-making power.
With respect to the last criterion, mother contends that the appointment of a parenting coordinator was not in the best interests of the child because the previous third party involved-the special advocate-had damaged the parties' relationship. See § 14-10-128.1(2)(a)(III). Here, the special advocate strained the parties' relationship when she went from being a neutral third party to advocating for father by writing a letter on his behalf.
In short, without a trial court making factual findings on the record with respect to each criterion, we are left to speculate as to the basis for the trial court's decision. Such speculation is inconsistent with the General Assembly's intent that a court shall not appoint a parenting coordinator unless it makes three specified findings.
Finally, the trial court's decision to appoint a parenting coordinator is inextricably intertwined with its concededly improper assignment of special master authority to the parenting coordinator. Had the trial court considered whether a parenting coordinator without such authority would be appropriate, it might have declined to appoint a parenting coordinator. Nor did either party request that a decision-maker be appointed pursuant to section 14-10-128.3,
Accordingly, I dissent from the majority's opinion in Part LB and would reverse the trial court's appointment of a parenting coordinator.