dissenting.
I dissent from the majority’s opinion for several reasons, as explained in more detail below. At the heart of the issues in this case are the rights of members of either gender *149to associate with only that gender. The import of the majority’s decision is that females must now be admitted to male-only social organizations and males must be admitted to female-only social organizations, or those organizations are in violation of the law. That result is contrary to Oregon statutes, the Oregon Constitution, and the federal constitution for the reasons that follow.
With regard to the applicability of Oregon’s Public Accommodations Act, ORS 30.670 through 30.685,1 the majority reasons,
“The Eagles’ second argument for reconsidering our holding in Lahmann I is based on legislative history, and it reduces to the following proposition: When the act was first passed and when it was amended, private fraternal organizations had a well-established, legislatively recognized presence; the sponsors of the act and those who voted on it knew that fact, and they explicitly averred that the act would not apply to those organizations. It would, however, apply to organizations that called themselves private clubs only as a ruse to avoid allowing African-American patrons or members. The short and sufficient refutation of that argument is this: The trial court found as fact, and the Eagles do not deny, that, due to their nonselective membership practices, their organization is de facto open to the public. Nothing in the legislative history of the act implies that its framers intended to exempt such organizations.”
202 Or App at 131.
The majority’s conclusion that nothing in the legislative history of the 1973 amendments to the Public Accommodations Act implies that its framers intended to exempt organizations like the Eagles is contrary to the bill’s sponsor’s testimony before the House Committee on State and Federal Affairs regarding the effect of the proposed amendments. The focus of the amendments was on commercial establishments such as restaurants or other locations that offered their goods and services to the public, not on organizations that provide *150fraternal benefits. Then-Representative Vera Katz, the sponsor of the bill, was careful to tell the House Committee on State and Federal Affairs, “And men have the right to congregate, if they want to, without women. They’ve got their private clubs to do that. We’re not forcing anybody to integrate, but we’re trying to avoid segregation. This bill does not talk to private clubs [.]” Tape Recording, House Committee on State and Federal Affairs, HB 2116, March 2, 1973, Tape 4, Side 2. Another advocate in favor of the same bill, Jane Edwards, representing the American Civil Liberties Union, explained to the House Committee on State and Federal Affairs that,
“[t]hose who oppose laws prohibiting discrimination generally argue men (or women) have the right to congregate together without members of the opposite sex. This of course is true. However, this bill is not trying to force people to integrate but to prevent public places from segregating. Nothing in the bill precludes private clubs from segregating or precludes people from inviting only members of one sex or the other to their homes.”
Testimony, House Committee on State and Federal Affairs, HB 2116, March 2, 1973, Ex 6.
So, in light of the above legislative history, how did the majority arrive at the destination of declaring that nothing in the legislative history of the act implies that its framers intended to exempt organizations like the Eagles? Some judicial sleight of hand is at work to turn the intent of the legislature on its head.
In a letter opinion to the parties, the trial court wrote:
“While some members were interested in charitable work to some degree, it was clear that the driving force for becoming a member of the Eagles was social activities. The witnesses and the exhibits heavily emphasized friendship, dancing, food and the bar. It is this Court’s opinion that the Eagles is mainly a social club.”
The trial court further observed, “As stated in [ORS 30.675, the statute] setting out requirements for public accommodation, the Eagles provide “ * * * services, * * * amusements or otherwise.” Then, focusing on the majority’s opinion in *151Lahmann I, the trial court inquired whether the Eagles’ membership is so unselective that the organization can fairly be said to offer its services to the public. 180 Or App at 434. Based on the record before it, the court concluded:
“It is also this Court’s opinion that the Eagles met the second criteria as set out in the Court of Appeals opinion. Either the written requirements, or actual practices of this Aerie are so loose and non selective that it can easily be said that the Eagles offer their services to the public. The net effect of these very easy membership requirements is that it cannot be said that the Eagles are “ * * in its nature distinctly private.’ ”
The majority appears to affirm the trial court based on what it characterizes as a finding of fact by the trial court and the perceived notion that the Eagles do not contest that finding. The majority declares that the Eagles “do not deny, that, due to their nonselective membership practices, their organization is de facto open to the public.” 202 Or App at 131. First, a more careful reading of the Eagles’ brief demonstrates that they do in fact deny that they are open to the public. In their summary of argument, they assert, “Oregon’s Public Accommodation Act was not intended to control the membership policies of private fraternal organizations, or to interfere with the right of such organizations to admit members based on criteria of their own choosing.” (Emphasis added.) Later, the Eagles assert, “The FOE [Fraternal Order of the Eagles] is not a business or commercial enterprise, and it is ‘in its nature distinctly private,’ within the meaning of that phrase in [ORS 30.675(2)].” In fact, one of the subheadings of their brief is titled, “The exemption in the Act for a ‘bona fide club * * * which is in its nature distinctly private’ was intended to apply to a fraternal organization, and it does apply to the Eagles.” (Omission in original.) Under that subheading, the Eagles devote seven full pages of their brief to their argument that they are within the “distinctly private” exemption under ORS 30.675(2), and they point to facts such as “the business meetings of an Eagles Aerie are conducted in secrecy, in rooms that ‘are totally enclosed and no one is able to see inside’ “Willamette Aerie owns its own buildings in Salem, and no one has access to meetings of the Aerie or the *152Auxiliary or to the social areas of the building unless they are members”; and some people join the Eagles “precisely because it is a private club.” (Emphasis in original.)
Second, ORS 30.675(2) excludes from the definition of a place of public accommodation “any institution, bona fide club or place of accommodation which is in its nature distinctly private.” Whether that exclusion applies to the Eagles is a mixed question of fact and legislative intent and not, as the majority proposes, just a question of fact. As a factual matter, the trial court found that the Eagles accept only men as members. The trial court also found that, “[u]nder the regulations adopted by the Grand Aerie, in order to become a member, a person must be sponsored by two members, complete an application and be approved by the majority of members at a membership meeting.” Also, the court was critical of the Willamette Aerie because “sometimes only one sponsor is required” and “the emphasis was on obtaining new members and new member approval was being granted in almost all cases.” As noted above, the trial court further found that the Eagles are primarily a social club. For purposes of this opinion, I assume that the trial court’s findings are supported by the evidence.
The subsequent question of law posed by the statute’s requirement is whether the legislature would have considered those facts as disqualifying circumstances for purposes of the exemption in ORS 30.675(2). Nothing in the text of the statute tells us that whether an organization “is in its nature distinctly private” is determined by nonselective membership requirements. In fact, the words of the statute require a different reading when given their ordinary meaning. The word “nature” in context means “(a) the essential character or constitution of something ***[;] (b) the distinguishing qualities or properties of something * * *.” Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 1507 (unabridged ed 2002). The word “distinctly” in context means “(b) with distinctness; not confusedly; without a blending or merging of one thing with another.” Id. at 659. The word “private” in context means “not freely available to the public.” Id. at 1804. Read together, the words of the statute describe an organization that is, in its essential character, not freely available to the public at *153large.2 The trial court found that the Eagles are “mainly a social club.” The benefit of membership in the Eagles, therefore, is the ability to associate with other Eagles, i.e., private association. Regardless of whether the Eagles’ membership policy is considered nonselective, the fact remains that one who joins the Eagles sets himself apart from the general public and, at that point — and only at that point — may participate in private initiation ceremonies, memorialized rituals, and weekly membership meetings. The Eagles are, by the common and ordinary meaning of the words, in their nature distinctly private.
In reaching a contrary conclusion, the trial court and the majority commit an error of statutory construction. Rather than construing the plain meaning of the act, the trial court and the majority essentially substitute the word “selective” for the word “private” in ORS 30.675(2). Moreover, they conflate subsections (1) and (2) of ORS 30.675. ORS 30.675(2) provides that an organization that offers its services to the public is exempt from the act if it is “in its nature distinctly private.” Yet the trial court and the majority appear to assume that, if an organization offers its services to the public and is nonselective as to whom it offers its services, it cannot be “in its nature distinctly private.”3 That reading effectively renders subsection (2) superfluous; if the only *154organizations that come within subsection (2) are organizations that do not offer services to the public under subsection (1) — and therefore are not within the meaning of the act— subsection (2) is read out of existence. See Keller v. SAIF, 175 Or App 78, 82, 27 P3d 1064 (2001), rev den, 333 Or 260 (2002) (“We will not construe a statute in a way that renders its provisions superfluous.”). If the exemption for “private” organizations under subsection (2) is to have any effect, whether an organization is “in its nature distinctly private” cannot depend exclusively on whether its services are offered to the public. The focus of the inquiry must instead be on the nature of the benefits offered and the purpose of the organization. In this case, the Eagles offer a benefit of private association for social pin-poses and are, in their nature, distinctly private.4
Assuming that there is some ambiguity in the phrase “in its nature distinctly private,” that ambiguity is resolved by the legislative history of the Public Accommodations Act. As described above, the bill’s sponsor expressly represented to the legislature that “men have the right to congregate, if they want to, without women.” Nothing in the text of the act or its legislative history suggests that an organization that allows individuals to congregate exclusively with members of the opposite sex is somehow covered by the act if the organization is otherwise unselective. The trial court found that the driving force for becoming a member of the Eagles was to be involved in social activities, and that finding is supported by the evidence. In sum, the majority by judicial fiat effectively holds that, without additional selective membership criteria, men no longer have the right to congregate for social activities outside the presence of women under the *155Public Accommodations Act. I dissent because the majority has rewritten ORS 30.675(2) to mean something that the legislature never intended.
The second ground on which I dissent is the majority’s holding that Article I, section 26, of the Oregon Constitution does not extend protection to the members of the Eagles to assemble to engage in what are primarily social activities. Article I, section 26, provides:
“No law shall be passed restraining any of the inhabitants of the State from assembling together in a peaceable manner to consult for their common good; nor from instructing their Representatives; nor from applying to the Legislature for redress of greviances (sic).”
According to the majority, “the framers intended the assembly clause to accomplish what it recited, that is, to ensure the right to assemble in order to deliberate on matters of public concern as a part of the political process.” 202 Or App at 142 (emphasis added). It follows, under the majority’s reasoning, that Article I, section 26, does not confer “a right of association that applies to organizations such as the Eagles.” Id.
The majority writes a limitation into Article I, section 26, that is not contained within the text of the provision. Under the majority’s view, the right to assemble is limited to assembly to deliberate on matters that are part of the political process. In Priest v. Pearce, 314 Or 411, 415-16, 840 P2d 65 (1992), the Oregon Supreme Court established the methodology for ascertaining the intent of the framers of a constitutional provision:
“There are three levels on which [the] constitutional provision [at issue] must be addressed: Its specific wording, the case law surrounding it, and the historical circumstances that led to its creation.”
The validity of the majority’s proposed limitation on the scope of section 26 does not survive scrutiny under that methodology.
The text of section 26 does not limit its guarantee to assembly only for purposes of political discourse. Rather, the section guarantees the right to assemble “in a peaceable manner to consult for [the] common good.” As the majority *156appropriately observes, section 26 differs in text and context from its federal First Amendment counterpart, and therefore its meaning must be separately analyzed under the Priest methodology. The phrase “to consult for [the] common good” would have been understood at the time of the adoption of the constitution to be broader in scope than if the phrase guaranteed a right to assemble to consult only “as a part of the political process.” The word “common” at that time had an ordinary meaning in the context in which it is used in section 26; it meant and means, “1. Belonging equally to more than one, or to many indefinitely; as, life and sense are common to man and beast; the common privileges of citizens; the common wants of men.” Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language 42 (1828). The word “good” also had an ordinary meaning when used in the context of section 26. It meant and means, ‘Welfare; prosperity; advancement of interest or happiness. He labored for the good of the state. The good of the whole community can be promoted only by advancing the good of each of the members composing it. Federalist, Jay.” Webster, An American Dictionary at 93. Fraternal organizations, formed for a common good (in this case, socializing with members of the same gender), fall within the plain language of the section as it would have been understood by its framers.
The majority complicates the otherwise plain language of section 26, in part based on the conclusion that “[t]he purpose of the group deliberation, determining and promoting ‘the common good’ of the ‘inhabitants,’ also indicates political objectives.” 202 Or App at 136. The common good can, and often does, involve political objectives and political action. Yet, no one reasonably can deny that the common good, the welfare, and the prosperity of the citizens of Oregon in 1857 concerned more than political issues. The common good certainly included amusement, friendship, and other components of the civic and social fabric of life in Oregon.
Moreover, even assuming that the plain language of the section indicates, as its primary purpose, association for political objectives, that purpose necessarily implies a corresponding right to associate with others for political, social, economic, and cultural ends. If the freedom to assemble to *157petition the government is to be safeguarded, individuals first must be permitted to associate for a variety of nonpolitical reasons, and thereby discover their collective needs. Cf. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 US 609, 622, 104 S Ct 3244, 82 L Ed 2d 462 (1984) (“[W]e have long understood as implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.”). The majority acknowledges that, “at the national level, the Eagles have on occasion apparently been known to support particular political objectives * * *.” 202 Or App at 143. That the Eagles, through the association of members, have identified and pursued political objectives demonstrates exactly why the freedom to associate is essential to the freedom of assembly for political objectives.
The second prong of the Priest methodology for interpreting the Oregon Constitution is an examination of case law. There is no case law surrounding section 26 that supports the majoritys interpretation that the provision is limited to assembly for political discourse.5
The final prong of the Priest methodology concerns the historical circumstances that led to the adoption of section 26. In the absence of documentation about the framers’ purpose for enacting section 26 (or any of its likely models, for that matter), the majority looks to what it describes as “ ‘historical circumstances’ more generally.” 202 Or App at 138. In doing so, the majority focuses not on the circumstances in Oregon at the time of the adoption of section 26, but on the significance of assembly clauses to framers in colonial America. Oregon’s constitution, however, was drafted more than three-quarters of a century later, and the nature of local government and the significance of private associations had changed. As the Eagles aptly point out in their brief, fraternal orders became extremely popular in the nation in the first half of the nineteenth century as its population spread west. *158The very idea of these fraternal organizations was to unify individuals for a common purpose. Active in the territory of Oregon by the 1850s were the Masons and the Independent Order of Odd Fellows (IOOF). Other kinds of organizations soon followed and were formed in the state for purposes of association around a common vocation or theme, such as the Grange or temperance groups. It would have been inconceivable for an Oregon citizen in 1857 to have believed that only political groups assembled for the common good, and that his or her right to discuss matters of common welfare in a group was limited to discourse that was part of the political process.
For those reasons, the majority fails in its duty to interpret section 26 as it was intended by the citizens of Oregon in 1857.
Finally, I disagree with the analysis of the majority under the freedom to assemble provision of the First Amendment because its analysis does not engage meaningfully with the actual nature of the Eagles’ activities, as found by the trial court. The trial court found, and the evidence supports the finding, that the overriding purpose of the Eagles is to provide a forum for social activities. According to the trial court, the organization “heavily emphasize [s] friendship, dancing, food and the bar.” No United States Supreme Court decision has held that a state may require persons who join together for social activities to admit to their membership those of the opposite gender.
The majority, like the trial court, determines that the “Eagles’ [First Amendment] claim [can]not meaningfully be distinguished from a similar claim that was rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Roberts.” 202 Or App at 143. In Roberts, the issue was whether a state public accommodations law that compelled the United States Jaycees to accept females as regular members infringed on the organization’s members’ freedom to associate only with members of their own gender. The Court observed that the “[freedom of association therefore plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate.” Roberts, 468 US at 623. The Court then declared that the right to associate for expressive purposes is not, however, absolute. Rather, “[infringements on that right may be justified by regulations adopted to serve compelling *159state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.” Id. Based on those predicate principles, the Court examined the application of the state law to the Jaycees in light of its peculiar activities. The Jaycees’ activities included expression on political, economic, cultural, and social affairs involving a variety of civic, charitable, lobbying, fundraising, and other public activities. The Court concluded that, although those activities are protected by the First Amendment, there was “no basis in the record for concluding that admission of women as full voting members will impede the organization’s ability to engage in these protected activities or to disseminate its preferred views.” Id. at 627.
Although the members of the Willamette Eagles engage in some charitable activities, it is, as the trial court found, “mainly a social club.” That factual difference is important in two respects: (1) it distinguishes the state interest at issue in this case from the interest at issue in Roberts', and (2) it highlights the seriousness of the burden on the Eagles’ expressive activities. I will address these issues in turn.
In Board of Directors of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 US 537, 549, 107 S Ct 1940, 95 L Ed 2d 474 (1987), the Court specifically identified the compelling interest that was at issue in Roberts: “In Roberts we recognized that the [s]tate’s compelling interest in assuring equal access to women extends to the acquisition of leadership skills and business contacts as well as tangible goods and services.” Board of Directors of Rotary Int’l involved that same compelling interest. 481 US at 550. In this case, however, the only interest at stake is assuring women equal access to social interaction with men. The United States Supreme Court has never recognized such an interest as “compelling.”
Moreover, the factual differences between this case oxvdRoberts demonstrate the serious burden the act places on the ability of members of the Eagles to express their beliefs in the intrinsic value of single-gender social interaction. In Roberts, the organizational purpose at play was to take public positions on a number of diverse issues as well as to *160engage in the public activities previously described. 468 US at 626-27. Similarly, in Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l, the stated purposes of the organization were to provide humanitarian service, to encourage high ethical standards in all vocations, and to help build world peace and good will. Rotary International aspired to include a “representative of every worthy and recognized business, professional, or institutional activity in the community.” 481 US at 540 (quoting 2 Rotary Basic Library, Club Service 67-69 (1981)).
The purposes of the above organizations — which exist to provide public service — are in stark contrast to the Eagles, which exists to allow its members to engage in fraternal rites and eat and drink with one another. Part of that social purpose includes secret rituals during which Aerie members address one another as “Brother”; male Eagles pray and sing about “Brotherhood”; and they refer to “the finest traits of a manly character.” Auxiliary members, in their own rituals, refer to “Sisterhood,” and to “Womanhood, to Motherhood, and to Home.” The majority improperly dismisses these separate rituals with the conclusory statement that mixed company would have only a “slight” effect on the entire ritual.6 202 Or App at 146. As the United States Supreme Court stated in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 US 640, 653, 120 S Ct 2446, 147 L Ed 2d 554 (2000), courts must “give deference to an association’s view of what would impair its expression.” Had the Eagles, like the Jaycees and Rotary International, been primarily a business or public service organization, the inclusion of women may have only a slight impact on the expressive activities of its members. However, the Eagles’ primary purpose is social interaction, and admitting members who are not otherwise wanted interferes in the most serious way with that purpose.
*161Ultimately, in cases such as this, “the associational interest in freedom of expression has been set on one side of the scale, and the [s]tate’s interest on the other.” Boy Scouts of America, 530 US at 658-59. The inclusion of unwanted members in the Eagles — a social club — is a most severe intrusion on the Eagles’ rights to freedom of expressive association. Yet the state interest involved — allowing women to participate in social rites with men — does not justify that intrusion. For that reason, the First Amendment prohibits the state from forcing the Eagles to accept female members through the application of the act.
In summary, the majority’s interpretation of the Public Accommodations Act in this case is at odds with the express intention of the sponsor of the 1973 amendments upon which the majority relies. Apparently, then-Representative Vera Katz recognized that there would be constitutional difficulties if the legislature attempted to regulate what she described as the “right of men to congregate, if they want to, without women.” She was right. History demonstrates that Article I, section 26, when evaluated under the Priest criteria, was intended to protect the right of fraternal groups to socialize with members of their own gender. That same right is protected by the First Amendment.7 This court does not have the authority to change the federal and state constitutions, but that is the effect of the majority’s decision.
I dissent for all of the above reasons.
As noted in the majority opinion, ORS 30.670 to 30.685 were renumbered as ORS 659A.400 to 659A.406 in 2001. References to the Public Accommodations Act in this dissent are to the 1999 version unless otherwise noted.
In my dissent in Lahmann I, I stated, “The Eagles are not, at least for purposes of this case, a ‘bona fide club or accommodation which is in its nature distinctly private.’ Some of their activities, including the furnishing of food, beverages, and social amusements, are not distinctly private and, in fact, the evidence shows that those activities are open to both genders.” 180 Or App at 437 (Edmonds, J., dissenting). I erroneously interpreted ORS 30.675(2) in my original dissent. The fact that some of the Eagles’ activities are open to Auxiliary members — who also have chosen an affiliation with the Eagles — does not change the distinctly private nature of the Eagles or prevent the Eagles from deciding that certain other benefits will not be available to Auxiliary members. As further discussed in this dissent, the Eagles, at their core, remain an organization that provides a benefit of association for social purposes not freely available to the public, and have the right under Oregon and federal law to determine which of their rituals will be open solely to its male members.
In its letter opinion, the trial court first concludes that “[e]ither the written requirements, or actual practices of this Aerie are so loose and non selective that it can easily be said that the Eagles offer their services to the public!,]” which is relevant for purposes of determining whether the Eagles come within ORS 30.675(1). *154Yet, in the very next sentence of that opinion, the trial court assumes that the same analysis determines whether the exemption in ORS 30.675(2) applies: “The net effect of these very easy membership requirements is that it cannot be said that the Eagles are * * in its nature distinctly private.’ ”
The “private” nature of the Eagles, an organization that solicits memberships for private association, is in contrast with organizations like Lloyd Lions Club or Costco that, while requiring “membership,” simply use the membership as a tool for selling commercial or business advantages. In Lloyd, Lions Club v. Int. Assoc. of Lions Clubs, 81 Or App 151, 724 P2d 887 (1986), we recognized that an organization that sells memberships in that manner is not a “private” organization. We did not hold in that case, as the majority suggests, 202 Or App at 130, that an organization is not “in its nature distinctly private” simply because it has a nonselective membership policy.
The majority states that, “[w]hen Oregon courts discuss section 26, they do so exclusively in that [political advocacy] context.” 202 Or App 134. The fact that Oregon appellate courts have discussed a constitutional provision in one particular context does not mean that the provision is inapplicable in all other contexts.
The majority states that, “[w]ith the exception of the ritual, which is only occasionally performed, and once-weekly aerie membership meetings, all of the Eagles’ activities are undertaken by both aerie and auxiliary members.” 202 Or App at 146. The majority impermissibly substitutes its own view of the importance of the male-only ritual and weekly aerie meetings for that of the Eagles. The lesson from Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 US 640, 661, 120 S Ct 2446, 147 L Ed 2d 554 (2000), is that an organization’s own views of its message must be respected, and that “public or judicial disapproval of a tenet of an organization’s expression does not justify the [sjtate’s effort to compel the organization to accept members where such acceptance would derogate from the organization’s expressive message.
The majority concludes by stating that, “[a]t this stage in the evolution of our political community,” laws permitting the Eagles to discriminate on the basis of gender “would be cause for alarm.” 202 Or App at 148. This case, however, involves the Eagles’ constitutional rights. The prevailing views of the present political community do not define those rights. As the Supreme Court stated in Boy Scouts of America,
“the fact that an idea may be embraced and advocated by increasing numbers of people is all the more reason to protect the First Amendment rights of those who wish to voice a different view.”
530 US at 660.