specially concurring.
[¶ 14] I concur with the majority’s decision in this case because Mr. Lavatai failed to sign and certify his governmental claim under penalty of perjury prior to filing his suit, thereby depriving the district court of subject matter jurisdiction. See e.g., Beaulieu v. Florquist, 2004 WY 31, ¶ 14, 86 P.3d 863, 868 (Wyo.2004); Yoak v. Ide, 2004 WY 32, ¶ 8, 86 P.3d 872, 875 (Wyo.2004). In accordance with my dissents in Wooster v. Carbon County School Dist. No. 1, 2005 WY 47, 109 P.3d 893 (Wyo.2005) and Wilson v. Town of Alpine, 2005 WY 57, 111 P.3d 290 (Wyo.2005), I continue to believe the Beau-lieu decision should not have been applied retroactively. Nevertheless, I recognize, under the doctrine of stare decisis, we are required to follow our precedent.
[¶ 15] I feel compelled, however, to comment about the State’s tactics in this case. The State had numerous opportunities to alert Mr. Lavatai to the problem with his governmental claim, including: in the State risk manager’s initial response; in its answer to his civil complaint; and in its responses to his specific interrogatories. In what appears to be a calculated effort to delay Mr. Lava-tai’s recognition of his technical error until after it was too late to correct it, the State obscured its position on the validity of his governmental claim. Granted, Mr. Lavatai does not direct us to authority showing the State’s risk manager had an affirmative obligation to alert him about the error when she responded, in the first instance, to his governmental claim. Similarly, the question of whether the State’s answer to his complaint, together with the affirmative defense alleging the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, was sufficiently definite is, perhaps, open to argument. See e.g., Harris v. Grizzle, 599 P.2d 580, 583 (Wyo.1979); Romero v. Schulze, 974 P.2d 959, 964 (Wyo.1999).
[¶ 16] However, the State’s obligation to respond to Mr. Lavatai’s interrogatories is a different matter altogether. Mr. Lavatai served each of the defendants with interrogatories on December 31, 2002, including a request for identification of “all facts, ... witnesses, ... and writings ... in support of your affirmative defenses.” W.R.C.P. 33 requires a party served with interrogatories to fully answer all non-objectionable interrogatories within 30 days. Thus, the defendants’ answers were due on or about February 1, 2003. The State defendant wholly failed to respond to Mr. Lavatai’s discovery requests. The individual snowplow operator defendant, who was also represented by the State, responded to Mr. Lavatai’s interrogatory on February 21, 2003, with the following vague answer:
See Defendants’ Answer and Affirmative Defenses, filed 11/26/02. As to the negligence, see Exhibit C and Plaintiffs depiction of facts contained in his deposition. *126Some affirmative defenses are legal and not factual in nature, and will be raised at the appropriate times.
[¶ 17] The two year period for filing a proper claim under the Governmental Claims Act expired on February 27, 2003, and, on February 28, 2003, the State filed and served its summary judgment motion. The State maintained the district court did not have jurisdiction over Mr. Lavatai’s claim because he had not personally signed the claim under penalty of perjury and his claim must be dismissed with prejudice because the two year statute of limitations had expired February 27, 2003. The district court had no choice but to dismiss.
[¶ 18] In response to Mr. Lavatai’s equitable estoppel arguments, the State claims it had no duty to provide legal advice to an opponent and, absent an affirmative misrepresentation or concealment of facts of which it had superior knowledge, it did nothing wrong. It is true that the State was not obligated to provide legal advice to Mr. Lava-tai, but it did have a legal duty to respond to his discovery requests. Mr. Lavatai requested the facts, witnesses, and writings in support of the State’s affirmative defense. Clearly, Mr. Lavatai’s failure to personally sign his governmental claim under penalty of perjury was a fact which supported the State’s affirmative defense that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the matter. W.R.C.P. 33 obligated the State to answer Mr. Lavatai’s interrogatory within 30 days and Rule 3.4 of the Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct placed the responsibility upon the State’s attorneys to “make reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally proper discovery request by an opposing party[.]” The State did not, in good faith, comply with its discovery obligations.
[¶ 19] The record is replete with evidence showing that the State willfully withheld the information about its defense from Mr. Lava-tai, in hopes that the two-year period under the Governmental Claims Act would expire before he realized his mistake. The State did not respond to his interrogatories in accordance with the rules of civil procedure, and, when it did respond on behalf of the snowplow operator defendant, it did so in a consciously oblique manner. The State’s actions, which included conducting discovery, served the purpose of lulling Mr. Lavatai into believing there was no statute of limitations problem. This implication was strengthened at a scheduling conference in January 2003, when the State indicated that it would file a dispositive motion but did not specify that the basis for the motion would be a lack of jurisdiction or expiration of the statute of limitations. Then, immediately after the two year period ran out, the State filed its summary judgment motion challenging the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Obviously, the State deliberately intended to delay Mr. Lavatai’s discovery of the defect in his claim in order to allow the statute of limitations to expire.
[¶ 20] This conduct resulted in a “win” for the State, but at what cost? Of course, an attorney for the State, like any attorney, has the duty to zealously represent his client. See e.g., Brooks v. Zebre, 792 P.2d 196, 200-01 (Wyo.1990). The language we used in Kath v. Western Media, Inc., 684 P.2d 98, 100-01 (Wyo.1984), quoting Virzi v. Grand Trunk Warehouse and Cold Storage Co., 571 F.Supp. 507, 512 (E.D.Mich.1983) is instructive on how an attorney should balance these obligations:
“ * * * Opposing counsel does not have to deal with his adversary as he would deal in 'the marketplace. Standards of ethics require greater honesty, greater candor, and greater disclosure, even though it might not be in the interest of the client or his estate.
The handling of a lawsuit and its progress is not a game. There is an absolute duty of candor and fairness on the part of counsel to both the Court and opposing counsel. At the same time, counsel has a duty to zealously represent his client’s interests. That zealous representation of interest, however, does not justify a withholding of essential information. * * *
* * * [T]he profession should embrace an affirmative ethical standard for attorneys’ professional relationships with courts, other lawyers and the public: The lawyer must act honestly and in good faith. An*127other lawyer lawyer should not need to exercise the same degree of caution that he would if trading for reputedly antique copper jugs in an oriental bazaar. It is inherent in the concept of an ethic, as a principle of good conduct, that it is morally binding on the conscience of the professional, and not merely a rule of the game adopted because other players observe (or fail to adopt) the same rule. Good conduct exacts more than mere convenience. * * * * * who deals with a
⅜ * * » Qan(jor ⅛ not inconsistent with striking a deal on terms favorable to the client, for it is known to all that, at least within limits, that is the purpose to be served. * * * * The distinction between honesty and good faith need not be finely drawn here; all lawyers know that good faith requires conduct beyond simple honesty.”
Kath, 684 P.2d at 100-02 (quoting J. Rubin, A Causerie on Lawyer’s Ethics in Negotiations, 35 La.L.Rev. 577, 589-90 (1975)). I do not believe the State’s actions in this case demonstrate the high standard of candor, honesty, and good faith required by our rules of civil procedure, rules of professional conduct, and precedent.
[¶ 21] I am particularly troubled by the fact that it was the State who engaged in these questionable tactics. State government is representative of the people. As we have recognized in other eases, the government “wins its point whenever justice is done its citizens in the courts.” See Beaugureau v. State, 2002 WY 160, ¶ 16, 56 P.3d 626, 634 (Wyo.2002) (quoting Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60, 68 (Wyo.1989), which quoted Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1197, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963)). I wonder if the State honestly believes Mr. Lavatai was afforded justice in this case.