concurring and dissenting.
[¶ 27] I concur in Part II of the majority opinion holding the district court did not err by denying Lervold’s request to present testimony by telephone.
*584[¶ 28] I respectfully dissent from the remainder of the decision because I disagree the district court made a legal mistake in determining no material change of circumstances occurred. Majority opinion at ¶ 23. I also disagree with the majority’s reweighing of evidence to make the factual finding a material change of circumstances is established. Id.
[¶ 29] The portion of the statute pertinent to this appeal requires that the mov-ant establish “a material change has occurred in the circumstances of the child or the parties” as proven by “facts that have arisen since the prior order or which were unknown to the court at the time of the prior order.” N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.6(6)(a). The district court’s determination of a material change of circumstances is a finding of fact subject to our clearly erroneous standard of review. Majority opinion at ¶ 15.
[¶ 30] Here, the motion sought to modify primary residential responsibility established by a California court order dated May 13, 2010. The North Dakota hearing focused on six “alleged character flaws and other short comings” that Lervold attributed to Regan. The North Dakota court found the California court “requested and received an evaluation from Janelle Bur-rill, Ph.D., J.D., L.C.S.W.” The North Dakota court also found, “The California Evaluation included lengthy and detailed discussions of all of the above described subjects. Thus none of these areas of concern (whether or not proved) can possibly be deemed to constitute ‘facts that have arisen since the prior Order which were unknown to the court at the time of the prior Order.’ ”
[¶ 31] The district court did note that tensions remain high between the parties and that the child is affected by those tensions. However, the district court weighed those tensions in the context of all of the evidence, including a lengthy Parenting Investigator’s Report and Recommendations. Based on the quantum of evidence, it concluded, “This court does not believe that any previously unknown facts have arisen that would constitute a material (or significant) change in circumstances of the child or the parties.”
[¶ 32] The district court weighed the evidence. Our standard of review permits limited interference with that weighing and requires that we defer to the district court’s credibility assessments. Hammeren v. Hammeren, 2012 ND 225, ¶ 8, 823 N.W.2d 482 (“In applying the clearly erroneous standard, we will not reweigh evidence, reassess witness credibility, retry a custody case, or substitute our judgment for the trial court’s decision merely because this Court may have reached a different result.”). Under the evidence here, the district court properly could have determined that family tensions (although continuing) were not changes since the last order. The district court also properly could have found that the continuing tensions did not rise to a new level so as to be material to the question of changing primary residential responsibility. Either decision is a proper exercise of the district court’s fact-finding function because, while it has authority to change the parent with whom the child resides, the court was acutely aware that — no matter where the child lived — his parents and a grandmother had poisonous relationships causing family tensions. In short, the district court recognized the problem was a hostile and dysfunctional family unit regardless which parent had primary residential responsibility. This reality is evident in the district court’s order:
• [The child] knows far too much about the hostilities between his parents.
• Neither of the parties — nor anyone associated with either party — shall make *585any negative comments about the other nor discuss ongoing litigation with or in the presence of [the child],
• Both of the parties shall demonstrate a more cooperative attitude toward facilitating parenting time and communications.
• [The child’s grandmother] shall have no contact with [the child. The grandmother] is obviously a bitter, angry woman who is determined to advocate against her daughter Simone. No good will come of any contacts between [the child] and his potentially poisonous maternal grandmother. John shall not permit or enable any grandparenting time between [the grandmother and the child].
• The parties must declare a truce and put their energies and resources to work for the best interests of [the child].
Because of the facts and the overall record, I would abide by our standard of review and affirm the district court’s order denying change of primary residential responsibility.
[¶ 33] MARY MUEHLEN MARING, J.S., concurs.