dissenting.
[¶ 55] I respectfully dissent from parts II, V, and VI of the majority opinion.
I
[¶ 56] At trial, the State offered the testimony of several witnesses, who recounted conversations they allegedly had with Sabrina Zephier or Jolene Zephier. The admissibility of each witness’s testimony was analyzed by the district court prior to trial under either the hearsay or prior bad acts exceptions, and Kalmio’s appeal focuses only on the district court’s hearsay analysis.
[¶ 57] The North Dakota Rules of Evidence prohibit the admission of hearsay— out of court statements offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted — unless the statements meet one of the enumerated exceptions. N.D.R.Ev. 801; 802. In its pretrial order, the district court relied exclusively on the exception to the rule against hearsay found in Rule 803, N.D.R.Ev., which is based on the federal rule and allows statements concerning a declarant’s then-existing state of mind. See N.D.R.Ev. 803(3) and Explanatory Note. The exception for hearsay statements concerning a declarant’s state of mind arose out of the increased trustworthiness of such statements “due to their spontaneous nature.” Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Admissibility of evidence of de-clarant’s then-existing mental, emotional, or physical condition, under Rule 803(3) of Uniform Rules of Evidence and similar formulations, 57 A.L.R.5th 141,141 (1998).
[¶ 58] This Court has held that, “For a statement to be admissible under the state of mind or emotion exception to the hearsay rule, the declarant’s statement must be contemporaneous with the mental or emotional state sought to be proven, there must be no circumstances suggesting a motive for the declarant to misrepresent his or her state of mind, and the declar-ant’s state of mind must be relevant to an issue in the case.” Schumacher v. Schumacher, 2011 ND 75, ¶ 15, 796 N.W.2d 636 (citing Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 803.05[2] (2nd ed.2011)). It is the last of these three requirements — that the declar-ant’s state of mind be relevant to an issue in the case — that is the basis for my dissent.
[¶ 59] This third portion of our state-of-mind exception is broader than Minnesota’s version of the rule, which Kalmio urged this Court and the district court to adopt. Under Minnesota’s rule, evidence of the type at issue in this case is admissible only if the victim’s state of mind is “a relevant issue” in the case. See Bernhardt v. State, 684 N.W.2d 465, 474 (Minn.2004). Thus, Minnesota limits the use of this type *769of testimony to cases where the defendant raises the defense of accident, suicide, or self-defense. Id. The district court and the majority declined to adopt this stricter standard for the admission of state-of-mind evidence, and I do not take issue with that rejection. However, I believe the district court erred and the majority’s analysis is flawed, even under our own, more lenient, standard.
[¶ 60] One important additional caveat to the state-of-mind exception is that the statements admitted cannot be used to prove the truth of the underlying facts. See Schumacher, 2011 ND 75, ¶ 15, 796 N.W.2d 636.
The state-of-mind exception generally excludes a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed.... The hearsay rule would effectively be destroyed if statements indicating a state of mind were admissible to infer the happening of the event which produced the state of mind; consequently, such statements are inadmissible. It has also been held that the state-of[-]mind exception allows only for the admission of statements showing the de-clarant’s state of mind, not statements explaining the declarant’s state of mind.
31A C.J.S. Evidence § 452 (2008) (footnotes omitted). “The exclusion of ‘statements of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed’ is necessary to avoid the virtual destruction of the hearsay rule which would otherwise result from allowing state of mind, provable by a hearsay statement, to serve as the basis for an inference of the happening of the event which produced the state of mind.” Fed. R.Evid. 803, 1972 Advisory Committee Notes (citations omitted).
II
[¶ 61] Terri Zephier’s 803(3) testimony consisted of the introduction of a December 20, 2010 Facebook message from Sabrina Zephier to Terri Zephier, which stated:
Terri, I need you to come get me ASAP. Don’t call because if Omar knows you are calling he will get mad and start hitting me again. My face is fucked up, Terri. Come up here and key the door. But I need you, please, my face is fucked up and my body, please. ASAP when you read this. But if you call he will start hitting me again. Please just come up here, you and mom come, ’kay, he is crazy.
[¶ 62] Amy Dauphinais’s 803(3) testimony was:
Q Do you recall at any time Jolene making any mention to you about Sabrina’s safety?
A Yes.
Q And do you recall approximately when that was?
A I would say probably a year prior to her death, I would say. Several times throughout that year.
Q And did she make any reference to who she was in fear of?
A Sabrina or Jolene?
Q Jolene?
A Omar.
Q Did she ever tell you anything about a tax return argument?
A Absolutely.
Q Do you recall when that took place?
A It was approximately three or four days prior to her murder.
Q And what was this dispute about as told by Jolene?
A Jolene was worried what was going to happen when Omar found out that she had claimed Sabrina and the baby on her tax return.
[¶63] Ashley Counts’ 803(3) testimony concerned a meeting between her and Sa*770brina Zephier on December 22, 2010 at the Domestic Violence Crisis Center:
Q What was the purpose of this meeting?
A The purpose of this meeting was to meet with Sabrina, visit with her about an altercation that occurred the day before between her and her ex-boyfriend.
Q Did you witness any injuries to Sabrina?
A Yes.
Q Where?
A She a black eye and scratches on her back.
Q Did you take photographs?
A I did not.
Q Why?
A I don’t remember.
Q Did she make any mention — or excuse me. Did you make any advisement to her on taking any further action?
A We did discuss options that we could help her with including our safe home, protection order, and then, of course, safety planning.
Q Do you recall being present with Sabrina and if she filled out an assessment form?
A Yes.
Q And you were present during that assessment?
A Yes.
Q Is a copy of that assessment provided to law enforcement and the state’s attorney’s office?
A Yes.
Q I have handed to you what’s been marked as State’s Exhibit 127. Could you please identify that document?
A That document is the assessment that Sabrina and I did that evening.
Q And you were present during that assessment?
A Yes.
Q Do you recall this assessment?
A Yes.
[[Image here]]
Q And if you could, there is some questions that are laid out on this assessment, correct?
A Yes.
Q And do you see how many questions are on there?
A Yes. There are 22.
Q And who is it that makes the notes on this assessment?
A This assessment is done by the client and so the client would be the one that fills it out.
Q And if you would be able to can you indicate her responses on each of the questions?
A Yes.
Q And going through Question 1 are you able to read that?
A Yes.
Q Could you read that and indicate her response?
A Do you fear for your life or, if applicable, for your children’s lives? No.
Q Question 2?
A Threats of homicide or suicide by the abuser? Originally marked yes, scratched off and wrote no. I had her initial that so we knew that that was her change.
Q Question 3?
A Fantasies of homicide or suicide by abuser? No.
Q Question 4?
A The abuser seems depressed? Yes.
[[Image here]]
*771Q Do you recall Sabrina’s demeanor during this meeting?
A Yes.
Q What was that?
[[Image here]]
A Her demeanor coming in was sad, upset, and afraid.
Q And did you speak to her about a possible course of action?
A Yes.
Q What was that?
A We discussed going through paperwork to obtain a protection order.
Q And what were the plans in regards to obtaining a protection order?
A The plans regarding that would be to fill out paperwork at the office, I would type it into the computer, and then they would bring it to the judge to look at at a later time.
Q Did you ever discuss with Sabrina about contacting law enforcement?
A Yes.
Q And did she indicate if she would agree to that?
A She would not.
Q Did Sabrina make any mention about her child?
A Yes.
[¶ 64] Gloria Carbajal’s 803(3) testimony concerned a conversation she had with Jolene Zephier in October 2010:
Q Jolene ever make any threats known to you involving the Defendant?
A Just that she was afraid for her life.
Q So what did she tell you?
A That the guy had threatened her if she had—
Q If I may. Just one moment before you answer that, Miss Carbajal. I am sorry, Miss Carbajal. First would you indicate who this guy is?
A Omar.
Q What was it that Jolene had told you?
A They had an argument because he had been beating her daughter. And she told him if he continued to do that that she was going to go to their parole officer and turn him in.
[[Image here]]
Q Did she ever talk about a tax return dispute involving the Defendant?
A Yes.
Q Do you know what that was about?
A Jolene claimed his daughter for taxes. And he had gave her the wrong social security number and she had confronted him on it. And she was getting a large tax refund back.
Q And to your knowledge did this involve the Defendant’s daughter?
A Yes.
Q That he shared with Sabrina?
A Uh-huh. ,
Q Did she ever mention a specific threat?
A He told her that if she told on him that he would kill her and her whole family.
[¶ 65] Rochelle Greger’s 803(3) testimony concerned two phone conversations she had with Sabrina Zephier, one occurring around August 2010 and one occurring in late December 2010 or early January 2011:
Q And what was it that was discussed about this — Well first of all, do you recall the basis of the phone call?
A She called me and told me that Omar had been beating her and he beat her with a belt.
Q And did she tell you where she was at that time when she made this call?
AI think she was at her mom’s.
Q How did she sound on the phone?
*772A Sad to have to tell me that.
Q Did she indicate any injuries that she had?
A Yeah. Her butt was pretty bruised and welted.
Q Did she tell you how it felt?
A No, I don’t think so.
[[Image here]]
Q I mean as far as, did you have any further phone conversations with Sabrina after this one we are talking about? Not in person, but phone conversations?
A I can’t even think. I don’t know right now.
Q Do you recall Sabrina ever talking to you about trying to find a different place to live?
A Oh, yes.
Q What was it that she told you about that?
A She said she was looking at an apartment that had security doors.
Q Did she say why she was looking for security?
A Because Omar was able to get into her house.
[¶ 66] Joyce Tacan’s 803(3) testimony described a conversation she had with Sabrina Zephier the day before she died:
Q Did she make any special requests to you that night?
A She just asked if I could stay the night with her.
Q And on your understanding where were you supposed to spend the night?
A At her house.
Q Are you talking about her apartment at South Main?
A Yeah.
Q Did she say why she wanted you to spend the night?
A Because she didn’t want to be alone.
Q Did she say anything more about why she was going to be alone?
A She was scared that Omar would come over there.
Q Did she make any mention of her roommate at the time?
A No.
[¶ 67] Elizabeth Lambert’s only Rule 803(3) testimony was “S[abrina] didn’t want to be there alone. She was scared of Omar. And she wasn’t with him no more.” The district court admitted this evidence to show why Sabrina Zephier asked Lambert to stay with her.
Ill
[¶ 68] In its pretrial order, the district court noted that “[i]n the case at bar, a specific state of mind, fear, is attempted to be shown by the State to demonstrate the state of mind of Sabrina and Jolene in the time period before their murders.” The district court analyzed the evidence at issue under North Dakota’s state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule, allowing state-of-mind evidence when the declar-ant’s state of mind is “relevant to an issue in the case.” The court then determined that, with respect to the statements allegedly made by Sabrina Zephier to Ashley Counts, “Sabrina’s fear is relevant to demonstrate why she took certain actions relevant to the case.” (Emphasis added). With respect to similar hearsay evidence from Terri Zephier, Joyce Tacan, and Amy Dquphanais, the court repeatedly held such evidence would be admissible “[depending upon the State’s ability to meet the Schumacher test with regard to con-temporaneousness and relevance to an issue in the case.... ” The court would not rule on the admissibility of Rochelle Gre-ger’s hearsay testimony in its pretrial order. The court ruled the statements made by Jolene Zephier to Gloria Carbajal were *773relevant to show Jolene Zephier’s fear, but did not indicate how this fear was relevant to an issue in the case. In a subsequent order, the court ruled Sabrina Zephier’s statements to Elizabeth Lambert were “relevant to the issue of the reasons behind her request to Lambert to stay with her.” At trial, Kalmio asserted and was granted a standing objection to this evidence, and the district court gave no further explanation for its admission. The district court never ruled on the admissibility of Rochelle Greger’s testimony.
[¶ 69] The district court appears to have been operating under the assumption that the challenged testimony was admissible because Sabrina and Jolene Zephier’s fear was relevant to show why they did what they did before their deaths. But why Sabrina and Jolene Zephier took certain actions is of no relevance to any issue in this case, aside from perhaps adding context to the story. To admit the evidence for that purpose, the judge would have been required to weigh the evidence under N.D.R.Ev. 403, limit the testimony to exclude extraneous facts, and give the jury a limiting instruction that the information was not to be taken as true, which he did not do. See State v. Carlson, 1997 ND 7, ¶¶ 5-9, 559 N.W.2d 802. Kalmio was charged with “intentionally or knowingly causing] the death of another human being,” under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-16-01. It is primarily the actions, intentions, and purpose of Kalmio that are relevant. Thus, the district court’s admission of hearsay evidence — through the testimony of Counts, Terri Zephier, Greger, Tacan, Dauphinais, Carbajal, and Lambert — under the state-of-mind exception on the basis that such evidence was relevant ■ to demonstrate why Sabrina and Jolene Ze-phier took certain actions, was erroneous.
IV
[¶ 70] The majority opinion suggests, for the first time in this case, that Sabrina and Jolene Zephier’s fear was relevant because it served as the motive for Kalmio to murder them. The majority relies on this theory as a basis for admitting the testimony of Counts, Terri Zephier, Gre-ger, Tacan, Dauphinais, Carbajal, and Lambert. If this theory were legitimate, then I agree that Sabrina and Jolene Ze-phier’s statements concerning their fear would fall within the exceptions we have set forth in Schumacher. However, the majority’s proffered explanation of the relevancy of Sabrina and Jolene Zephier’s fear is baseless.
Proof that the victim feared the defendant would appear to fall smack within the Rule 803(3) exception and thus be admissible, as many cases have in fact held, since little is more illustrative of a state of mind than the declarant’s statements expressing emotions such as fear. Nevertheless, a statement of threats by the defendant and of concomitant fear on the victim’s part may be irrelevant to proving the case, such as where there was no allegation that the killing was not the defendant’s fault because it was an accident, in self-defense, or a suicide.
Zitter, supra, at 178 (citation omitted).
[¶ 71] As discussed above, the underlying facts of Sabrina and Jolene Zephier’s statements to the witnesses at issue — facts detailing alleged aggressive behavior by Kalmio — cannot be relied upon for their truth. The statements at issue should be considered only to the extent that they show Sabrina and Jolene Zephier’s fear of Kalmio. In deciding whether to admit the statements at issue, the question is whether Sabrina and Jolene Zephier’s fear, in and of itself, provided a motive for Kalmio to kill them.
[¶ 72] The majority cites Schumacher as an analogous case. 2011 ND 75, 796 *774N.W.2d 686. Schumacher involved a motion to modify custody of the parties’ two children. Id. at ¶ 1. In support of his motion, the father offered an affidavit of the children which contained allegations of domestic violence in the mother’s home. Id. at ¶ 13. This Court found the statements admissible under the Rule 803(3) state-of-mind exception to the rule against hearsay, because they “provide[d] competent evidence on how the children were affected by incidents occurring in their home.” Id. at ¶ 16. As the court noted “[a] material change of circumstances can occur if a child’s present environment may endanger the child’s ... emotional health or impair the child’s emotional development.” Id. at ¶ 14 (citation omitted). Thus, the children’s emotional state was directly at issue in that case. Cf. State v. Gray, 129 Idaho 784, 932 P.2d 907, 918 (Idaho Ct.App.1997) (holding the victim’s state of mind of fear was not relevant because her statement that she feared her ex-boyfriend did not show that he possessed an intent to harm her); State v. Downey, 206 N.J.Super. 382, 502 A.2d 1171, 1176 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1986) (holding the state of mind of the victim was not relevant in a murder case).
[¶ 73] In United States v. Tokars, which the majority also cites, the court allowed evidence concerning the defendant’s wife’s intent to divorce the defendant under the Fed.R.Evid. 803(3) state-of-mind exception. 95 F.3d 1520, 1535 (11th Cir.1996). In that case, the defendant, Fredric Tokars, was charged with murder-for-hire, for hiring a man, Lawrence, to murder his wife, Sara Tokars. Id. at 1527-28. The court concluded that evidence of Sara’s state of mind was relevant to the defendant’s motive to kill her in that case, because “Tokars knew of the change in Sara’s state of mind when he asked Lawrence to kill her. The fact that she wanted to divorce him and take all of his money is what apparently prompted him to have her killed.” Id. at 1535. Tokars told Lawrence that Sara’s desire to divorce him was his motive for the murder, and Lawrence testified at Tokars’ trial. Id. at 1528,1535.
[¶ 74] In this case, not once did the State argue, nor the district court find, that Sabrina Zephier or Jolene Zephier’s fear, as expressed to the witnesses, was relevant to Kalmio’s alleged motive for the murders. There was never any suggestion that Kalmio killed Sabrina and Jolene Ze-phier because of their fear of him or because others knew of their fear. Similarly, there is no indication that Kalmio knew about the conversations between Sabrina and Jolene Zephier and the witnesses. The lack of evidence in the record to support the majority’s theory is undoubtedly the reason the majority opinion contains speculative language: “logically would know ...,” “could be relevant ...,” “could be at least minimally relevant to the issues of motive or intent.” However, it has always been the case that “the circumstances said to have excited the emotion must be shown to have probably become known to the person; because otherwise it could not have affected his emotions.” State v. Potter, 60 N.D. 183, 233 N.W. 650, 657 (1930) (quoting Wigmore on Evidence, § 389, p. 711).
[¶ 75] Without some basis for the theory that Kalmio killed Sabrina and Jolene Zephier because of their fear, the witnesses’ statements about Sabrina and Jolene Zephier’s fear are not relevant to an issue in this case. To admit the evidence at issue under the guise of corroborating an otherwise unraised and undocumented motive would allow a court to cast aside the entire hearsay rule any time a crafty attorney could hypothesize the attenuated relevance of hearsay evidence. For this reason, I believe it would be erroneous to *775admit the evidence at issue under the majority’s reasoning.
V
[¶ 76] Even if there was support for the theory that Kalmio killed Sabrina and Jolene Zephier because of their fear and the fact that they expressed this fear to other people, the district court’s admission of additional testimony regarding the alleged incidents of physical and verbal confrontation between Kalmio and Sabrina and Jolene Zephier which led to their fear exceeded the scope of Rule 808(3)’s state-of-mind exception.
[Wjhere the victim is no longer available, such as in a murder prosecution, the statements of the victim take on critical importance, since they may be the only recordings of the victim’s thoughts, and since they may shed light on the entire criminal episode. Yet, it is to be stressed that the single most important factor concerning the admissibility of victims’ statements under Rule 803(8) is whether the statements are illustrations of the victims’ thoughts at the time they were made or whether, even at such time, the statements were inadmissible as dealing with memories of preceding events or feelings.
... [A] statement of threats by the defendant and of concomitant fear on the victim’s part ... may reflect more on past incidents involving the defendant and less on the reaction of the victim— that is, fear — so that the statement may prove a fact remembered or believed by the declarant and will not be evidence of a state of mind. Thus, ... courts have found such statements to be inadmissible hearsay despite Rule 803(3).
Zitter, supra, at 178-79 (citation omitted).
[¶ 77] As previously noted, statements admitted under the state-of-mind exception to the rule against hearsay cannot be used to prove the truth of the underlying facts. See Schumacher, 2011 ND 75, ¶ 15, 796 N.W.2d 636.
[¶ 78] To the extent that this Court has previously found hearsay statements to be admissible under the state-of-mind exception, these admissions have excluded extraneous details about the alleged facts that led to the state of mind. In Schumacher, this Court noted: “Inadmissible hearsay statements are not competent evidence. Some of the statements in Schumacker’s affidavit rely on what he was told by the parties’ children and Blair’s mother and are inadmissible hearsay.” Schumacher, 2011 ND 75, ¶ 15, 796 N.W.2d 636. This Court held only the statements “The children told me what had happened, and about the fight” and “The children could hear everything and A.D.S. was crying” were admissible under the state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule. Id. at ¶ 16. Although the affidavit at issue contained more information regarding the alleged incident of domestic violence, this Court did not include these extraneous facts in its Rule 803(3) holding.
[¶ 79] Similarly, in State v. Fulmi-nante, on which the majority relies, the Supreme Court of Arizona held a victim’s state of mind may be relevant to prove the defendant’s motive, but statements of memory or belief are not admissible under the state-of-mind exception. 193 Ariz. 485, 975 P.2d 75, 87-88 (1999). The Court held that the victim’s dislike and fear of her stepfather were permitted under the rule. Id. However, the court found that the statements “He’s going to kill me” and “I’m afraid he’s going to kill me” were inadmissible because they were statements of belief about the defendant’s future conduct. Id. at 88. The court also found a statement which reported a conversation the victim overheard between her stepfather and mother was inadmissible because *776it was a statement of memory. Id.; see also Capano v. State, 781 A.2d 556, 609 (Del.2001) (differentiating, under the state-of-mind exception to the rule against hearsay, between the admissible statement “I am afraid,” and the inadmissible statement “I am afraid of D because he threatened me ”); United States v. Joe, 8 F.3d 1488, 1492-93 (10th Cir.1993) (holding the victim’s assertion of why she was afraid was a statement of memory or belief and was excluded by the state-of-mind exception to the rule against hearsay).
[¶ 80] The hearsay statements offered through Dauphinais, Tacan, and Lambert’s testimony were succinct and dealt only with Sabrina and Jolene Zephier’s states of mind. As previously discussed, I do not believe their states of mind were relevant to any issue in this case. However, if they were, I would not dispute the admissibility of these three witnesses’ testimony on the grounds that it exceeded the scope of the Rule 803(3) exception.
[¶ 81] On the other hand, the testimony of Counts, Terri Zephier, Greger, and Car-bajal go much further than simply explaining Sabrina and Jolene Zephier’s states of mind. The statements detail multiple alleged physical and verbal confrontations between Kalmio and Sabrina and Jolene Zephier. It is clear to me that the real value in this testimony is in the witnesses’ detailed account of the tumultuous relationships between Kalmio and Sabrina and Jolene Zephier and the inference that Kal-mio acted in conformity and killed Sabrina and Jolene Zephier. However, this is precisely the type of information that is not to be relied on under the guise of a state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule. Thus, even if Sabrina and Jolene Zephier’s fear was shown to be relevant to some issue in this case, I believe it was still erroneous for the district court to admit the testimony of Counts, Terri Zephier, Greger, and Carbajal to the extent that it recounted statements by Sabrina and Jolene Zephier about past physical and verbal confrontations between themselves and Kalmio.
[¶ 82] I do not take issue with whatever is left of the testimony of Counts, Terri Zephier, Greger, and Carbajal, because it is first-hand testimony and does not rely on Rule 803(3). The testimony of Kari Salmon, Kenzie Goodhouse, and Natasha Hunts Along was not admitted under Rule 803(3) and was not challenged by Kalmio; therefore, I agree with the majority that this testimony need not be addressed on appeal.
VI
[¶ 83] “The admissibility of state-of-mind hearsay turns on weighing probative value against the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.” 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1179 (Westlaw 2014). In this case, no limiting instruction was ever given to the jury regarding their consideration of the testimony admitted under the state-of-mind exception. As a result, the jury was free to, and likely did, consider these statements as proof that Kalmio had physically and verbally confronted Sabrina and Jolene Zephier in the past. I therefore believe, even if the hearsay evidence had been properly admitted under an exception to the rule against hearsay, admission of this evidence had to be evaluated under the “unfairly prejudicial” criteria of N.D.R.Ev. 403.
VII
[¶ 84] When a trial court errs in admitting evidence, this Court must determine “whether the error was so prejudicial that a defendant’s substantial rights were affected and a different decision would have resulted without the error.” State v. Kelly, 2001 ND 135, ¶ 26, 631 N.W.2d 167. *777“To determine whether error affecting substantial rights of the defendant has been committed, the entire record must be considered and the probable effect of the error determined in the light of all the evidence.” N.D.R.Crim.P. 52, Explanatory Note. If the error was harmless, it will be disregarded. See Kelly, 2001 ND 135, ¶ 26, 631 N.W.2d 167. However, if the error was not harmless, we will reverse the judgment. See State v. Doppler, 2013 ND 54, ¶ 26, 828 N.W.2d 502; State v. Aabrekke, 2011 ND 131, ¶ 16, 800 N.W.2d 284.
[¶ 85] As the State itself noted in its supporting brief before the district court, the State’s case was based largely on circumstantial evidence. No physical evidence tied Kalmio to the crime scene, no witnesses observed.him there, and no murder weapon was ever recovered. Although the State appears to have been attempting to establish a history of domestic abuse between Kalmio and Sabrina Zephier, none of the witnesses directly observed violence. Because of the circumstantial nature of the evidence presented at trial and the pervasiveness of the district court’s error, I do not believe the error in admitting testimony can be considered harmless.
VIII
[¶ 86] Because I believe the district court committed prejudicial error in the admission of hearsay evidence under the state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule, I would reverse the judgments of conviction and remand this case to the district court for a new trial. I note that, on remand, nothing would prohibit the district court from analyzing or admitting the statements at issue, and even their underlying facts, under a different exception to the hearsay rule or as nonhearsay, if applicable.
[¶ 87] MARY MUEHLEN MARING, S.J., concurs.