concurring in part and dissenting in part.
T1 I agree that, under the unique facts presented in this case, the respondents/ap-pellees have no liability for the injury or death resulting from the high-speed chase instituted here. Nevertheless, I cannot go so far as to extend blanket immunity to all *1206governmental employees and entities where the fleeing individual, allegedly involved in criminal activity, is injured. To do so, would require that we overrule our opinion in State ex rel. Oklahoma Dept. of Public Safety v. Gurich, 2010 OK 56, 288 P.3d 1. It would also put me in the position of ignoring the precise language of 47 0.8.2011 $ 11-106(E) extending protection to "all persons" and to "others" for a pursuit where an officer acts with "reckless disregard" for their safety.
The Teachings of State ex rel. Oklahoma Dept. of Public Safety v. Gurich
T2 Under Gurich, unless there is no evi-denee from which a jury could find a causal nexus between the pursuing officer's decision to give chase and remain in pursuit of the fleeing driver, the question of whether the officer acted with reckless disregard remains one of fact for the trier of fact.1 The last paragraph of the same opinion contains the following sentence:
The exemptions from liability found in the GTCA do not apply to a law enforcement officer's decision to pursue or maintain pursuit of a fleeing driver.
The teachings of Gurick are that: the issue of liability remains a question of fact absent no evidence to the contrary; the Governmental Tort Claims Act's protections do not extend themselves to a "law enforcement officer's decision to pursue or maintain pursuit of a fleeing driver;" and the standard to judge the officer's behavior by is the "reckless disregard" for the safety of others. Despite those teachings, the majority holds "that Law Enforcement Officers engaged in police pursuits do not owe a duty of care to the suspect being pursued."2 I cannot go so far. I would extend the teachings enunciated in Gurich to situations involving fleeing citizens allowing the trier of fact to consider the issue of liability on a case-by-case basis.
Legislature's Utilization of Terms "safety of all persons" and "safety of others" in 47 0.8.2011 § 11-106(E).
3 The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and, if possible, give effect to the intention and purpose of the Legislature as expressed by the statutory language.3 Intent is ascertained from the whole act in light of its general purpose and objective 4 considering relevant provisions together to give full foree and effect to each.5 The Court presumes that the Legislature expressed its intent and that it intended what it expressed.6 Statutes are interpreted to attain that purpose and end.7 Only where the legislative intent cannot be ascertained from the statutory language, i.e. in cases of ambiguity or conflict, are rules of statutory construction employed.8 If the language is plain and clearly expresses the legislative will, farther inquiry is unnecessary.9
4 The language of 47 0.8.2011 § 11-106 is not so clear as to be beyond interpretation. It provides that immunity may extend to drivers of authorized emergency vehicles *1207"when responding to an emergency call or when in the pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law ... subject to the conditions stated herein." [Emphasis provided.] Subsection E of § 11-106 provides, in mandatory language,10 that its provisions "shall not relieve the driver of an authorized emer-geney vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons, nor shall such provisions protect the driver from the consequences of reckless disregard for the safety of others." [Emphasis provided.]
15 In referring to which persons officers were to drive with due regard for, the Legislature utilized the inclusive term "all." "All" is generally understood to mean nothing less than "every."11 In the same sentence of subsection (E), the Legislature stressed that such personnel would not be protected from reckless disregard of "others," a term characterized as relating to the general public12 or anyone.13
16 I do not consider myself as part of a department of government acting as a super-legislature with the power to overrule the Oklahoma Legislature's expressed intent. Neither do I assume that the Legislature does vain and useless acts in promulgating law.14 I most certainly do not believe our Legislature to be inferior in expressing itself to any other legislative body. Therefore, I can only presume that, had the Oklahoma Legislature intended to exclude, in all circumstances, individuals from protection when engaged in criminal activity at the time of their injury while involved in a high-speed chase, it would have done so expressly. The makers of laws in Mississippi have done precisely that with the enactment of the Mississippi Code providing in pertinent part:
(1) A governmental entity and its employees acting within the course and seope of their employment or duties shall not be liable for any claim:
... (c) Arising out of any act or omission of an employee of a governmental entity engaged in the performance or execution of duties or activities relating to police or fire protection unless the employee acted in reckless disregard of the safety and well-being of any person not engaged in criminal activity at the time of injury H
CONCLUSION
T7 I do not believe that there is any evidence of reckless disregard for the safety of the alleged eriminal here or liability for the individual's injury. I do believe that, absent the Legislature's exclusion rather than inclusion of "all persons" and "others" in the protections authorized under Oklahoma's statutory scheme, no blanket rule will be applicable to determine liability. Rather, the causes must be reviewed on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the facts may authorize recovery by a party allegedly involved in criminal activity and injured in a high-speed chase. Here, I concur in the majority's determination of no liability under the facts presented but dissent from the blanket immunity given officials engaged in high-speed chases because the legislative language does not support such a result.
. State ex rel. Oklahoma Dept. of Public Safety v. Gurich, 2010 OK 56, ¶¶ 17 and 24, 238 P.3d 1.
. Because Vice Chief Justice Reif's position as it relates to a fleeing violator, in his concurring in part and dissenting in part opinion, also adopts the position of the majority, I cannot join therein.
. White v. Lim, 2009 OK 79, ¶12, 224 P.3d 679; Head v. McCracken, 2004 OK 84, ¶13, 102 P.3d 670; Balfour v. Nelson, 1994 OK 149, ¶8, 890 P.2d 916.
. Keating v. Edmondson, 2001 OK 110, ¶8, 37 P.3d 882; McSorley v. Hertz Corp., 1994 OK 120, 16, 885 P.2d 1343; Oglesby v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 1992 OK 61, ¶ 8, 832 P.2d 834.
. Haney v. State, 1993 OK 41, 15, 850 P.2d 1087; Public Serv. Co. of Oklahoma v. State ex rel. Corp. Comm'n, 1992 OK 153, ¶ 8, 842 P.2d 750.
. Minie v. Hudson, 1997 OK 26, ¶7, 934 P.2d 1082; Fuller v. Odom, 1987 OK 64, ¶ 4, 741 P.2d 449; Darnell v. Chrysler Corp., 1984 OK 57, 5, 687 P.2d 132.
. Oklahoma Ass'n for Equitable Taxation v. City of Oklahoma City, 1995 OK 62, ¶5, 901 P.2d 800, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1029, 116 S.Ct. 674, 133 L.Ed.2d 523 (1995); Wilson v. State of Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 1979 OK 62, 15, 594 P.2d 1210.
. Haggard v. Haggard, 1998 OK 124, ¶1, 975 P.2d 439; Price v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 1991 OK 50, ¶17, 812 P.2d 1355.
. White v. Lim, see note 3, supra; Rout v. Crescent Public Works Auth., 1994 OK 85, ¶10, 878 P.2d 1045.
. "Shall" is ordinarily interpreted as implying a command or mandate and "may" generally denotes permissive or discretional authority. Nevertheless, it there are situations where "shall" may be interpreted as directory rather than mandatory. Howard v. Zimmer, Inc., 2013 OK 17, fn. 24, 299 P.3d 463; State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Mothershed, 2011 OK 84, ¶ 62, 264 P.3d 1197; Woods Development Co. v. Meurer Abstract & Title Co., 1985 OK 106, ¶11, 712 P.2d 30.
. See, JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Specialty Restaurants, Inc., 2010 OK 65, ¶16, 243 P.3d 8; State ex rel. Porter v. Ferrell, 1998 OK 41, ¶ 9, 959 P.2d 576.
. See, Franks v. Independent Production Co., 2004 WY 97, 96 P.3d 484.
. Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Morowitz, 388 Fed. Appx. 874 (Fla.2010).
. Surety Bail Bondsmen of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Insurance Comm'r, 2010 OK 73, 126, 243 P.3d 1177; Johnson v. City of Woodward, 2001 OK 85, ¶ 14, 38 P.3d 218.