STATE ex rel. PRUITT v. NATIVE WHOLESALE SUPPLY

GURICH, J.,

dissenting.

1 1 In the first appeal in this case, State ex rel. Edmondson v. Native Wholesale Supply, 2010 OK 58, 237 P.3d 199 (Native Wholesale Supply 1), this Court decided two issues: 1) "Is an Oklahoma court a constitutionally sanctioned forum for the exercise of personal jurisdiction to adjudicate an alleged violation of a state statute by Native Wholesale Supply, a nonresident corporation that claims to have no minimum contacts with Oklahoma?" and 2) "Does federal law bar Oklahoma from enforcing the Complementary Act against Native Wholesale Supply, a tribally-chartered corporation wholly owned by an individual of Native-American ancestry?" Native Wholesale Supply I, 2010 OK 58, ¶ 1, 287 P.3d at 203.

T2 As to the first question, this Court relied on the stream-of-commerce theory of personal jurisdiction and found that "Native Wholesale Supply does not 'merely set its products adrift on a stormy sea of commerce which randomly [sweeps] the products into' Oklahoma. They arrive here by the purposeful collective acts of the Company and the tribal wholesalers with whom it does business. We hence hold that the minimum contacts segment of due process analysis is satisfied." Id. 125, 237 P.8d at 209. As to the second question, this Court held the Master Settlement Agreement Complementary Act (MSACA) applied to Native Wholesale Supply and that the Indian Commerce Clause did not bar enforcement of the Act against Native Wholesale Supply. Id. TY 48-45, 287 P.3d at 215-16. This Court did not address the merits of the case, i.e., whether Native Wholesale Supply actually violated the MSACA. *

T3 On remand, however, the Attorney General relied on the settled-law-of-the-case doctrine and on several statements from this Court in Native Wholesale Supply I to convince the trial court that no questions of fact were in dispute as to whether Native Wholesale Supply violated the MSACA. At issue now in this second appeal is whether the facts relied on by this Court in Native 'Wholesale Supply I in deciding the jurisdictional issues were binding on the trial court on remand in determining the merits of the case.

The Trial Court Was Not Constrained Under the Settled-Law-of-the-Case Doctrine by Any Factual Findings Made by This Court in Native Wholesale Supply I

T4 The settled-law-of-the-case doctrine bars relitigation of only those issues that have been settled by an appellate opinion. Robert L. Wheeler, Inc. v. Scott, 1991 OK 95, 10, 818 P.2d 475, 479.1 Native Wholesale *627Supply I only settled that the courts of this state may exercise jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant Native Wholesale Supply; Native Wholesale Supply is not immune from suit in state court based on tribal immunity; and the Indian Commerce Clause does not bar enforcement of the MSACA against Native Wholesale Supply. The trial court might have been bound by the factual findings made by this Court in Native Wholesale Supply I had the jurisdictional issues been intertwined with the merits of the case. 2However, neither party argued in Native Wholesale Supply I that the jurisdictional issues were intertwined with the merits of the MSACA claim, and this Court made no such finding. "[A] claim based upon a lack of jurisdiction is usually considered to be a claim not affecting the merits of the controversy." 3

15 Even so, a jurisdictional issue is only intertwined with the merits when jurisdiction is "dependent upon an issue that is also an element to the merits of the cause of action, and the adjudication of the jurisdictional issue necessarily adjudicates a cause of action or defense thereto." Lucas, 2018 OK 14, 18, 297 P.3d at 888. In this case, the adjudication of the jurisdictional issues in Native Wholesale Supply I did not adjudicate any elements of the MSACA claim, contrary to the Attorney General's4 The MSACA provides:

It shall be unlawful for a person to:

a. sell or distribute cigarettes, or
b. acquire, hold, own, possess, transport, import, or cause to be imported cigarettes that the person knows or should know are intended for distribution or sale in the state in violation of the Master Settlement Agreement Complementary Act....

68 0.9. Supp. § 2004 360.7(B).

In other words, the State must prove in this case that Native Wholesale Supply, at the time it sold the cigarettes to the respective wholesalers, knew or should have known that the wholesalers intended for the cigo-rettes to be distributed or sold in violation of the MSACA. While some of the facts discussed in Native Wholesale Supply I might be relevant in proving Native Wholesale Supply's knowledge at the time it sold the cigarettes to the wholesalers, intentionally bringing cigarettes into the Oklahoma marketplace for purposes of stream-of-commerce theory of personal jurisdiction does not equate to knowledge of the wholesalers' intent to sell or distribute the cigarettes in violation of the MSACA.5

*628Even If the Trial Court Was Bound by Factual Findings in Native Wholesale Supply I, Disputed Questions of Fact Remain as to Whether Native Wholesale Supply Violated the MSACA, Making Summary Judgment Improper

T6 The Attorney General's argument on remand that this Court "affirmatively settled that NWS intentionally sold, shipped, and/or caused Seneca cigarettes to be shipped into and within Oklahoma" in violation of the MSACA disregards a critical element of the MSACA claim.6 Although Native Wholesale Supply does not dispute that cigarette sales took place,7 the fact that cigarette sales were made does not prove Native Wholesale Supply knew or should have known at the time it sold the cigarettes to the wholesalers that the wholesalers intended for the cigarettes to be distributed or sold in violation of the MSACA.8 The statute requires proof of such knowledge on the part of Native Wholesale Supply, and disputed questions of fact remain with regard to this issue.

T7 The Attorney General argues it is affirmatively settled that the transactions between Native Wholesale Supply and Musco-gee Creek Nation Wholesale are subject to the MSACA. But as Native Wholesale Supply points out, at the time of the transactions between 2006 and 2010, it was not settled that the transactions were subject to the MSACA. Native Wholesale Supply argued in Native Wholesale Supply I that tribal to tribal transactions were beyond the reach of state regulatory power, and as such, the transactions with Muscogee Creek Nation Wholesale were not subject to the MSACA. Native Wholesale Supply I, 2010 OK 58, 1 48, 237 P.3d at 215. The trial court in Native Wholesale Supply I agreed with this interpretation of the law and initially dismissed the suit finding it was barred by the Indian Commerce Clause. Not until the appeal in Native Wholesale Supply I in 2010 9 did this Court conclusively decide that the MSACA applied to Native Wholesale Supply and that neither tribal immunity nor the Indian Commerce Clause barred enforcement of the MSACA against Native Wholesale Supply. So then, how could Native Wholesale Supply have known at the time of the transactions that Muscogee Creek Nation Wholesale intended for the cigarettes to be distributed or sold in violation of the MSACA when it was not clear whether the MSACA even applied to the transactions?

{8 The Attorney General argues Native Wholesale Supply had knowledge as early as 2003 that the transactions with Muscogee Creek Nation Wholesale were problematic *629under the MSACA.10 But whether or not the State's evidentiary materials prove Native Wholesale Supply knew, or should have known, at the time it sold the cigarettes to the wholesalers that such entities intended for the cigarettes to be distributed or sold in violation of the MSACA is for the trier of fact to decide. Summary judgment is proper only when the pleadings, affidavits, depositions,; admissions or other evidentiary material establish that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. Sullivan v. Buckhorn Ranch Partnership, 2005 OK 141, 36, 119 P.3d 192, 208. I respectfully dissent.11

. "Where, on the judgment's reversal, a cause is remanded, it returns to the trial court as if it had never been decided, save only for the 'settled law' of the case." Smedsrud v. Powell, 2002 OK 87, 113, 61 P.3d 891, 896. "The parties are relegated to their prejudgment status and are free to re-plead or re-press their claims as well as defenses." Id. "The doctrine embodies a call for judicial economy designed to prevent 'rehashing' *627of issues in successive appeals." Id. "In postre-mand summary process the settled-law-of-the-case doctrine operates upon all the facts revealed by the probative materials before the court at the time the law's settling took place." Id.

. State ex rel. Bd. of Univ. of Okla. v. Lucas, 2013 OK 14, 18, 297 P.3d 378, 383.

. Lucas, 2013 OK 14, 17 & n. 5, 297 P.3d at 383 & n. 5 (citing Ricks Exploration Co. v. Oklahoma Water Res. Bd., 1984 OK 73, 695 P.2d 498; Swan v. Sargent Indus., 1980 OK CIV APP 49, 620 P.2d 473 (approved for publication by Supreme Court); Samson Res. Co. v. Newfield Exploration Mid-Continent, Inc., 2012 OK 68, 281 P.3d 1278) (emphasis added).

. In Native Wholesale Supply I this Court held that personal jurisdiction over Native Wholesale Supply was proper under the stream-of-commerce theory of personal jurisdiction. The Court found:

This is not a case where the defendant is merely aware that its product might be swept into this State and sold to Oklahoma consumers. The sheer volume of cigarettes sold by Native Wholesale Supply to wholesalers in this State shows the Company to be part of a distribution channel for Seneca cigarettes that intentionally brings that product into the Oklahoma marketplace. Native Wholesale Supply is not a passive bystander in this process.

Native Wholesale Supply I, 2010 OK 58, 1 24, 237 P.3d at 208. >

. At the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, the trial court had doubts about the Attorney General's settled-law-of-the-case argument but nevertheless granted summary judgment to the State:

The Court; What I'm trying to understand is I understand the Supreme Court was deciding two issues: One was the personal jurisdiction issue and the other was the Indian Commerce Clause.
Mr. Chaffin: Which apply-
The Court: Forget the Indian Commerce Clause. Personal jurisdiction, they have made a lot of findings in here, a lot conclusions written by Justice Opala-
Mr. Chaffin: Yes.
The Court:-that supports personal jurisdiction, I understand that-
Mr. Chaffin: Yes, sir.
*628The Court:-does that prove your case?
Mr. Chaffin: The-many of those opinions prove that they had knowledge, that it was disingenuous to argue that, that they know-that they have to know it's being sold to the general public. There's no other reasonable conclusion.
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The Court: [I'd like to make the distinction that they're just doing personal jurisdiction, but [the Court] was ... very broad in what [it] said here. I'm bound by that.

Record on Accelerated Appeal, Ex. 8 at 25-26.

. Record on Accelerated Appeal, Ex. 4 at 14.

. Counsel for Native Wholesale Supply stated at the hearing on the motion for summary judgment:

The issue of whether the MSACA applies to my client has been decided. The issue of whether my client has violated the MSACA has not been decided.... The only way to hook us into the lability here is by this one statute, which the cite is 68 0.S. 360.7(E), which specifically says, you know, it's unlawful to sell cigarettes that the person knows or should know are intended for sale in violation of the Act. That's the fact question before you today. Did we sell with knowledge that these cigarettes are intended for sale in violation of the Act[?] ... The fact that we made sales is not evidence of our knowledge of the intent of the people we sold to, to then violate the Act. And there's no evidence that they have presented that demonstrates that particular fact.

Record on Accelerated Appeal, Ex. 8 at 12-13.

. It is also undisputed that Seneca brand cigarettes have not been listed on the Oklahoma Attorney General's Directory since 2006 and have not been approved for sale within the state. See Record on Accelerated Appeal, Ex. 3 at 4; Record on Accelerated Appeal, Ex. 2 at 11.

. The record indicates Native Wholesale Supply ceased selling to Muscogee Creek Nation Wholesale when this Court's opinion issued in July of 2010. See Record on Accelerated Appeal, Ex. 5 at n. 2.

. See Record on Accelerated Appeal, Ex. 6 (filed under seal pursuant to agreed protective order filed January 8, 2013).

. Because summary judgment was improper, I would not address whether the trial court erred by awarding 100% of the gross receipts of Native Wholesale Supply to the State for Native Wholesale Supply's violation of the statute.