IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 13–0673
Filed June 13, 2014
BETH A. MADDEN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CITY OF IOWA CITY,
Appellee,
and
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellant.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Ian K.
Thornhill, Judge.
The State of Iowa seeks interlocutory review of a district court
order permitting the City of Iowa City’s cross-claim against the State.
AFFIRMED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Anne E. Updegraff and
Tyler M. Smith, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellant.
Eric R. Goers, Assistant City Attorney, Iowa City, for appellee.
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APPEL, Justice.
A bicyclist was riding on the sidewalk abutting the grounds of the
University of Iowa in Iowa City when she fell, sustaining an injury. The
bicyclist filed a negligence action against the City for failure to maintain
the sidewalk in a safe condition. The City moved to add the State of Iowa
as a third-party defendant, arguing that it had by ordinance imposed a
requirement on the abutting landowner to maintain the sidewalk and
that the ordinance was permitted under Iowa Code section 364.12(2)(c)
(2009). The City’s motion was granted. The City then filed a cross-
petition against the State alleging entitlement to contribution. The State
filed a motion to dismiss the City’s cross-petition. The district court later
denied the State’s motion to dismiss the City’s cross-claim. The State
filed a motion for interlocutory review, which was granted. For the
reasons expressed below, we affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Beth Madden was riding her bicycle on a sidewalk abutting the
grounds of the University of Iowa in Iowa City. She lost control of her
bicycle, crashed, and sustained an injury. Madden filed suit against the
City, claiming that the City owned or had control over the sidewalk and
that a defect in the sidewalk caused the accident. She claimed the City
was negligent in failing to prevent or remedy the defect, in failing to warn
her of the defect, or in otherwise failing to exercise reasonable care in
maintaining the sidewalk.
Because the university is publicly funded, the City moved to bring
in the State as a third-party defendant. In support of its motion, the City
cited its ordinance requiring an abutting property owner to maintain the
sidewalk in a safe condition and providing that “[t]he abutting property
owner may be liable for damages caused by failure to maintain the
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sidewalk.” Iowa City, Iowa, Code § 16-1A-6 (current through Mar. 4,
2014), available at www.sterlingcodifiers.com/codebook/index.php?book
_id=953. The City maintained that the ordinance was authorized by Iowa
Code section 364.12(2)(c), which expressly authorizes cities to enact
ordinances requiring abutting landowners to maintain property between
the outside property line of the lot and inside the curb lines (which would
include sidewalks). The City argues section 364.12(2)(c) does not
expressly authorize cities to impose liability for damages caused by the
failure of the abutting landowner to maintain the sidewalk. The district
court granted the motion, and the City filed a cross-claim against the
State.
The State then filed a motion to dismiss the City’s cross-claim.
The State raised three arguments in support of the motion. First, the
State claimed Iowa Code section 364.12(2)(c) did not expressly waive
sovereign immunity and had the legislature intended to do so, it would
have done so expressly. Second, the State argued the City’s cross-
petition did not allege a claim under the Iowa Tort Claims Act (ITCA),
Iowa Code chapter 669, because the cross-petition was based upon a
theory of statutory liability, not negligence and therefore immunity was
not waived. Third, the State asserted that to the extent the City sought
contribution from the State, the claim was fatally flawed because while
section 364.12(2)(c) imposes a duty on an abutting property owner to
maintain the sidewalk, it does not impose liability for failure to do so. In
a reply brief, the State further asserted the Iowa City ordinance making
the abutting landowner liable to the injured person for common law
damages “is in effect a tax that is not authorized by the Iowa legislature.”
The district court denied the motion to dismiss concluding the
City’s contribution claim for money damages resulting from Madden’s
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personal injuries was not excluded from the ITCA and that the City’s
cross-petition adequately pled a claim under the ITCA. With respect to
whether the City’s cross-petition was based upon statutory liability, and
thus was not within the scope of the ITCA because it was not based upon
a negligence theory, the district court, pointing to Seeman v. Liberty
Mutual Insurance Co., 322 N.W.2d 35, 37 (Iowa 1982), concluded an
ordinance can establish a duty, the breach of which supports a
negligence claim. Further, the district court concluded the City had pled
a valid contribution claim. The district court reasoned that while section
364.12(2)(c) only expressly authorizes the City to require an abutting
property owner to maintain the sidewalk, the City’s ordinance imposing
liability permissibly set standards and requirements higher or more
stringent than provided in section 364.12(2) and no provision of the state
law provides otherwise. Finally, the district court concluded the Iowa
City ordinance existed in harmony with the Iowa Code. The State sought
interlocutory appeal, which we granted.
II. Standard of Review.
The court reviews the denial of motions to dismiss for errors at law.
McGill v. Fish, 790 N.W.2d 113, 116 (Iowa 2010).
III. Overview of Liability of Abutting Property Owner for
Sidewalk Defects.
At common law, the general rule was that an abutting property
owner was not liable for an injury that resulted from a defective sidewalk.
See, e.g., Sexton v. Brooks, 245 P.2d 496, 498 (Cal. 1952); Mendoza v.
White Stores, Inc., 488 P.2d 90, 92 (Colo. App. 1971); Major v. Fraser, 368
P.2d 369, 370 (Nev. 1962); see also C. P. Jhong, Annotation, Liability of
Abutting Owner or Occupant for Condition of Sidewalk, 88 A.L.R.2d 331
§ 6[a], at 354–57, Supp. 32–34 (1963 and Later Case Service (2009))
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[hereinafter Jhong]; 2 Louis A. Lehr Jr., Premises Liability 3d § 36:18
(2013) [hereinafter Lehr], available at www.westlaw.com; 19 Eugene
McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 54:67, at 232 (3d ed.
2004 rev. vol.). The general rule has sometimes been referred to as the
“Sidewalk Accident Decisions Doctrine.” Contreras v. Anderson, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 69, 73 n.6 (Ct. App. 1997).
There were two generally recognized exceptions to the common law
rule. First, where the owners of property abutting the public sidewalk
contributed to or caused the dangerous condition that was the proximate
cause of the injury, some courts found the abutting landowner liable.
See, e.g., Del Rio v. City of Hialeah, 904 So. 2d 484, 487 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2005) (involving city ordinance that “impose[d] upon the owner of
abutting property liability for injuries sustained by a pedestrian if the
abutting property owner contributed to or caused the dangerous
condition in the sidewalk which was the proximate cause of the
complained of injury”); Ward v. Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 463
N.W.2d 442, 446 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (discussing landowner who
physically intruded on adjacent public way by casting debris upon it,
causing pedestrian’s slip and fall). Second, liability could also be
imposed if the sidewalk in question was constructed in a special manner
for the benefit of the abutting landowner. See, e.g., Peretich v. City of
New York, 693 N.Y.S.2d 576, 578 (App. Div. 1999) (involving heavy use of
sidewalk by trucks making daily deliveries); Nickelsburg v. City of New
York, 34 N.Y.S.2d 1, 2–3 (App. Div. 1942) (finding installation of rails
6
across sidewalk to permit wheeling of refuse to curb gives rise to
liability). 1
Consistent with the common law rule, it has generally been held
that a statute or ordinance that merely imposes a duty to maintain a
sidewalk in good repair does not thrust liability for damages onto the
abutting landowner. See Jhong § 6[a], at 354–57, Supp. 32–34; Lehr §
36:18; McQuillin § 54:67, at 238–39; see also Dreher v. Joseph, 759 A.2d
114, 116–17 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000); Robinson v. Arnold, 985 S.W.2d 801,
803 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998). The no-liability theory is based upon the view
that a requirement that abutting property owners maintain sidewalks is
for the benefit of the municipality, not pedestrians. See Schaefer v.
Lenahan, 146 P.2d 929, 931 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1944) (noting
maintenance statute for the benefit of the city, not for the traveler on the
sidewalk); Denison Parking, Inc. v. Davis, 861 N.E.2d 1276, 1281 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2007) (stating statutory duty to maintain sidewalk free of snow and
ice not for protection of individuals using the streets, but for benefit of
municipalities); Nord v. Butte Water Co., 30 P.2d 809, 812 (Mont. 1934)
(noting that when ordinance requires abutting property owner to keep
sidewalk in repair, city’s duty to the public is not affected and property
owner is joint agent with city officials in performance of city’s duty).
In contrast, an ordinance or statute that expressly makes an
abutting landowner liable for damages occasioned by the defective
1Notably, Pennsylvania has long rejected the prevailing common law rule and
adopted the view that the abutting landowner is primarily liable for the failure to keep
the sidewalk in a safe condition. See Lohr v. Borough of Philipsburg, 27 A. 133, 134 (Pa.
1893). See generally Jhong § 5[a], at 348–52, Supp. 31–32 (discussing the
Pennsylvania rule). The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts recently rejected the
common law rule with respect to accumulations of snow and ice. See Papadopoulos v.
Target Corp., 930 N.E.2d 142, 154 (Mass. 2010).
7
condition of sidewalks may give rise to such liability. See Jhong § 7, at
358–61, Supp. 34–36; Lehr § 36:18; McQuillin § 54:67, at 238–39; see
also Gonzales v. City of San Jose, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 178, 181, 185 (Ct.
App. 2004); Davison v. City of Buffalo, 947 N.Y.S.2d 702, 703 (App. Div.
2012); Pardi v. Barone, 690 N.Y.S.2d 315, 317 (App. Div. 1999);
Bogomolsky v. City of New York, 687 N.Y.S. 2d 176, 177 (App. Div. 1999);
Gangemi v. City of New York, 827 N.Y.S.2d 498, 504 (Sup. Ct. 2006).
Express legislative authorization to shift liability onto abutting
landowners dates back to the late nineteenth century. See, e.g., Morton
v. Smith, 4 N.W. 330, 330 (Wis. 1880) (involving city charter that
obligated abutting property owner to maintain sidewalk and imposed
liability for defects).
Iowa has long followed the established common law rule that an
abutting property owner is not liable in tort for injuries arising from
defects in adjacent sidewalks. See, e.g., City of Keokuk v. Indep. Dist. of
Keokuk, 53 Iowa 352, 355–57, 5 N.W. 503, 506–07 (1880). Further, we
+have also followed the well-established rule that where a statute
requires an abutting property owner to engage in sidewalk maintenance
activities, such as the removal of snow and ice accumulations, such an
affirmative obligation does not give rise to liability for damages. See
Peffers v. City of Des Moines, 299 N.W.2d 675, 677–78 (Iowa 1980),
superseded by statute, 1984 Iowa Acts ch. 1002, § 1 (codified at Iowa
Code § 364.12(2)(b) (1985)), as recognized in Fritz v. Parkison, 397
N.W.2d 714, 717 n.1 (Iowa 1986).
IV. Overview of Relevant Statutes and Ordinances.
We begin with a review of the provisions of Iowa Code chapter 364.
Chapter 364 generally describes the powers and duties of cities under
Iowa law. See Iowa Code ch. 364 (2009). Section 364.12(2) relates to
8
maintaining certain city property, including sidewalks. See Iowa Code
§ 364.12(2). As relevant, section 364.12(2) provides:
A city shall keep all . . . sidewalks . . . in repair, and
free from nuisance, with the following exceptions:
....
(b) The abutting property owner is responsible for the
removal of the natural accumulations of snow and ice from
the sidewalks within a reasonable amount of time and may
be liable for damages caused by the failure of the abutting
property owner to use reasonable care in the removal of the
snow or ice. . . .
(c) The abutting property owner may be required by
ordinance to maintain all property outside the lot and
property lines and inside the curb lines upon the public
streets . . . .
Id.
In light of section 364.12(2)(c), the City enacted an ordinance that
in relevant part, provides that “[t]he abutting property owner shall
maintain the sidewalk in a safe condition, in a state of good repair, and
free from defects.” Iowa City Code § 16-1A-6. The ordinance further
provides that “[t]he abutting property owner may be liable for damages
caused by failure to maintain the sidewalk.” 2 Id.
2The full text of the ordinance is as follows:
The abutting property owner shall maintain all public right of way
located between the edge of the street or curb line and the property line,
and shall keep such area in a safe condition free from defects, debris,
nuisances, obstructions or any other hazard. The abutting property
owner may be liable for damages caused by failure to maintain the public
right of way located between the edge of the street or curb line and the
property line. The abutting property owner shall maintain the sidewalk in
a safe condition, in a state of good repair, and free from defects. The
abutting property owner may be liable for damages caused by failure to
maintain the sidewalk. Notwithstanding the obligations imposed
hereunder, the property owner shall in no event remove diseased trees or
dead wood or plant, trim, remove or treat any tree or plant material on
public right of way without first obtaining a permit from the city forester.
Iowa City Code § 16-1A-6 (emphasis added).
9
The latter-quoted clause gives rise to the controversy in this case.
The State claims the City does not have the power to impose liability on
an abutting property owner, but may only require the abutting property
owner to maintain the sidewalk as expressly permitted by Iowa Code
section 364.12(2)(c).
Finally, Iowa Code section 669.2(3)(a), which defines “claim” for
purposes of the ITCA, generally waives sovereign immunity for
[a]ny claim against the state for Iowa for money only, on
account of damage to or loss of property or on account of
personal injury or death, caused by the negligent or wrongful
act or omission of any employee of the state while acting
within the scope of the employee’s office or employment,
under circumstances where the state, if a private person,
would be liable to the claimant for such damage, loss, injury,
or death.
A contested issue in this case is whether the City’s cross-petition asserts
a claim under this provision.
V. Authority of City to Impose Liability by Ordinance on
Abutting Landowners for Sidewalk Maintenance and Repair.
A. Positions of the Parties.
1. The State. The State contends the language in Iowa Code
section 364.12(2)(c) does not shift liability to abutting property owners for
failure to maintain or repair sidewalks. At common law, the State
observes, there is no negligence action for sidewalk maintenance against
the abutting landowner. See City of Keokuk, 53 Iowa 352 at 355–57, 5
N.W. at 506–07. The State’s position is that the statute does not alter
the common law rule, but only requires an abutting land owner to
maintain the sidewalk. If the abutting property owner fails to repair the
sidewalk after notice, the City may perform the work and bill the
abutting landowner “for collection in the same manner as a property
tax.” Iowa Code § 364.12(2)(d)–(e).
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The State supports its argument by citing the adjacent statutory
provision related to removal of snow and ice found in Iowa Code section
364.12(2)(b). Here, the legislature expressly declared the abutting
property owner “is responsible” for removal of natural accumulations of
snow and ice and “may be liable for damages caused by the failure of the
abutting property owner to use reasonable care in the removal of snow or
ice.” Iowa Code § 364.12(2)(b). The State asserts the language in the
statute authorizing damages for failure to remove snow and ice was
enacted by the legislature in 1984 to nullify this court’s decision in
Peffers. See 1984 Iowa Acts ch. 1002, § 1. In Peffers, we held a
precursor Iowa Code section 364.12(2)(b), which merely stated the
property owner was responsible for prompt removal of snow and ice, did
not establish a right of action for damages upon the abutting landowner.
299 N.W.2d at 676, 679.
The State then addresses the question of whether the City’s
ordinance is a permissible exercise of home-rule powers even if Iowa
Code section 364.12(2)(b) does not expressly authorize a damage remedy.
The City notes that under section 364.12(2), the legislature has stated
that “[a] city shall keep all . . . sidewalks . . . in repair, and free from
nuisance, with the following exceptions” including the exception
authorizing the City to require abutting landowners to maintain
sidewalks in Iowa Code section 364.12(2)(c). The State claims, however,
that the carve-out from primary responsibility for sidewalks is a limited
one that only relates to maintenance and repair, and does not authorize a
carve-out for damages actions. As a result, any liability for damages
remains with the City, which is required to maintain sidewalks subject
only to the narrow statutory exceptions. Any effort by the City to shift
liability for sidewalk maintenance, according to the State, is thus
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inconsistent with the legislative scheme, which imposes responsibility for
maintenance of sidewalks upon the City subject only to certain
exceptions.
2. The City. The City views the statutory scheme differently. The
City views section 364.12(2)(b) as a mandatory section under which an
abutting landowner “is responsible” for snow and ice removal from
sidewalks and “may be liable for damages” regardless of the policy
preference of the City. Iowa Code § 364.12(2)(b). No local ordinance is
required to implement the legislature’s policy of imposing liability for
snow and ice removal from sidewalks on abutting landowners.
The City argues, however, that in contrast to the snow and ice
provision, Iowa Code section 364.12(2)(c) is an optional provision. Under
section 364.12(2)(c), the City argues the question of whether an abutting
landowner is liable for damages arising from maintenance or the failure
to repair defects in sidewalks rests within the discretion of the City. In
other words, the legislature has directed that in all cities, an abutting
landowner may be liable for damages related to snow and ice, but with
respect to general maintenance and repair of sidewalks, the question of
liability of abutting property owners depends upon whether a city elects
to impose such liability by ordinance.
Turning to the home-rule issue, the City asserts that under article
III, section 38A of the Iowa Constitution, as implemented by legislation,
“[a] city may exercise its general powers subject only to limitations
expressly imposed by a state or city law.” Iowa Code § 364.2(2). The City
further notes that “[a]n exercise of a city power is not inconsistent with a
state law unless it is irreconcilable with state law.” Id. § 364.2(3).
The City then analyzes our caselaw determining whether a local
law is inconsistent with state law. The City notes that we have employed
12
a preemption analysis that includes express preemption and two forms of
implied preemption, field preemption and conflict preemption. The City
notes the Iowa Code does not expressly preempt a city’s imposition of
liability for sidewalk maintenance and repair on abutting landowners,
and as a result, the case turns on implied field and conflict preemption.
With respect to field preemption, the City argues the statutes related to
the maintenance of sidewalks are not sufficiently comprehensive to oust
the City’s home-rule authority. Cf. City of Davenport v. Seymour, 755
N.W.2d 533, 543 (Iowa 2008) (noting comprehensive statute may give
rise to field preemption). With respect to conflict preemption, the City
argues an ordinance must be irreconcilable with state law, such as when
local law prohibits an act permitted by statute or permits an act
prohibited by statute. See BeeRite Tire Disposal/Recycling, Inc. v. City of
Rhodes, 646 N.W.2d 857, 859 (Iowa Ct. App. 2002). According to the
City, the imposition of a duty and subsequent liability is a measure for
the “safety, health, welfare, comfort, and convenience of its residents”
and is faithful with the legislative framework established in Iowa Code
chapter 364. Iowa Code § 364.1.
B. Analysis. We begin our discussion by making an important
legal distinction. One question raised by the State is whether Iowa Code
section 364.12(2)(c) gives rise to a private cause of action against an
abutting property owner for injuries sustained as a result of a sidewalk
defect. We think the answer to this question is clear, and it is no. As the
State correctly points out, the statute expressly authorizes a damages
action against an abutting landowner for failure to remove snow and ice
in Iowa Code section 364.12(2)(b), but such language is notably absent in
Iowa Code section 364.12(2)(c). The inclusion of an express provision for
a damages action in subsection (b) and the omission of such language in
13
subsection (c) is a strong indicator that we should not imply a damages
action in subsection (c).
Further, the caselaw supports the State’s argument that Iowa Code
section 364.12(2)(c) does not expressly or impliedly provide for a private
cause of action. In Peffers, we considered whether a precursor to the
present statute authorized a damage remedy based on an alleged
negligent failure to remove snow and ice. 299 N.W.2d at 676.
Consistent with the prevailing caselaw across the country, we held that
the statute at the time, which only imposed a duty of maintenance with
respect to sidewalks, did not create a damage remedy. Id. at 677.
In response to Peffers, the legislature amended Iowa Code section
364.12(2)(b) to explicitly provide for a damage remedy in the case of
removal of snow and ice. See 1984 Iowa Acts ch. 1002, § 1. The
legislative action conformed to the generally prevailing view endorsed in
Peffers that a statute or ordinance that imposes a duty of maintenance
does not give rise to a damages action, while, conversely, if a statute or
ordinance does expressly provide for a damages action, liability may
result. 299 N.W.2d at 677.
If the question of whether the statute, standing alone, authorizes a
damages remedy demarcated the end of the legal trail, this case would be
an easy case, and quickly dispatched. But it is not the end of the legal
trail. The City rests its legal argument not on the stand alone authority
of Iowa Code section 364.12(2)(c), but instead upon its local ordinance
which expressly authorizes a damage remedy. In short, the City asserts
it may bring in the State as a third-party defendant under its ordinance
which expressly provides that the abutting landowner has a duty to
maintain the sidewalk and is liable for damages in the case of negligence
arising from a breach of that duty. This is a distinctly different issue
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than was decided in Peffers. In Peffers, the issue was whether a damages
action could be implied from a mere duty to maintain the sidewalk. See
299 N.W.2d at 677. Here, the ordinance goes well beyond the statute at
issue in Peffers and expressly authorizes damages actions. See Iowa City
Code § 16-1A-6. In other words, the central question in this case is
whether the express damages provision in the Iowa City ordinance may
be validly enforced against the State.
In order to determine whether the ordinance is lawful, we begin
with Iowa Constitution article III, section 38A, which generally provides
for home rule for Iowa municipalities. Under our home-rule approach,
except for taxing authority, municipalities ordinarily have the power to
determine local affairs as they see fit unless the legislature has provided
otherwise. See Iowa Const. art. III, § 38A. We must determine whether
the legislature has ousted the City’s power to enact the ordinance
through the various provisions of Iowa Code section 364.12.
In determining whether the legislature has trumped local action,
we engage in what we have called preemption analysis. By way of
general overview, there are two types of preemption: express and implied.
Express preemption occurs where the legislature has explicitly prohibited
local action in a given area. Hensler v. City of Davenport, 790 N.W.2d
569, 585 (Iowa 2010); Seymour, 755 N.W.2d at 538; Goodell v. Humboldt
County, 575 N.W.2d 486, 492 (Iowa 1998). No party here claims the
legislature has expressly prohibited municipalities from seeking to
impose liability on abutting landowners for sidewalk maintenance. As a
result, only implied preemption is available to the State in its effort to
defeat enforcement of the City ordinance.
Implied preemption breaks down into two subcategories, field
preemption and conflict preemption. Hensler, 790 N.W.2d at 585–86;
15
Seymour, 755 N.W.2d at 538–39; Goodell, 575 N.W.2d at 493. No one
has suggested field preemption—which may apply when the legislature
has enacted a comprehensive regulatory framework—applies here.
Hensler, 790 N.W.2d at 585–86; Seymour, 755 N.W.2d at 539. So the
sole issue is whether the City’s ordinance conflicts with a state statute.
If the ordinance conflicts with a statute, it is, of course, invalid. See
Seymour, 755 N.W.2d at 538, 541–42. If it does not conflict, it is a
permitted exercise of home-rule authority.
In considering implied conflict preemption, where possible we seek
to harmonize the state statute with the local ordinance. Seymour, 755
N.W.2d at 539; Goodell, 575 N.W.2d at 500. In order to give rise to
implied conflict preemption, the ordinance must be “irreconcilable” with
state law. Hensler, 790 N.W.2d at 585; Seymour, 755 N.W.2d at 539,
541; BeeRite Tire Disposal, 646 N.W.2d at 859. In applying implied
conflict preemption, we are to “ ‘interpret the state law in such a manner
as to render it harmonious with the ordinance.’ ” Seymour, 755 N.W.2d
at 539 (quoting City of Des Moines v. Gruen, 457 N.W.2d 340, 342 (Iowa
1990)); accord Iowa Grocery Indus. Ass’n v. City of Des Moines, 712
N.W.2d 675, 680 (Iowa 2006). In order to be “irreconcilable,” the conflict
must be “ ‘obvious, unavoidable, and not a matter of reasonable
debate.’ ” Hensler, 790 N.W.2d at 585 (quoting Seymour, 755 N.W.2d at
539).
Although we think it quite clear that Iowa Code section
364.12(2)(b) does not create a stand-alone cause of action for damages
with respect to the failure of an abutting landowner to maintain or repair
sidewalks, nothing in the statute expressly or impliedly prohibits cities
from doing so. The statute indicates an abutting property owner “may be
required” by ordinance to maintain property, Iowa Code § 364.12(2)(c),
16
but does not prohibit an ordinance that also creates a damages remedy,
see Iowa Code § 364.12. While legislative silence on the issue may be a
powerful indicator that the legislature has not created an implied cause
of action under the statute, we do not think legislative silence can be
interpreted as a prohibition of local action under home rule in light of our
obligation to harmonize and reconcile a statute with an ordinance
whenever possible. In order to be irreconcilable, the conflict must be
“obvious, unavoidable, and not a matter of reasonable debate.” Hensler,
790 N.W.2d at 585 (quoting Seymour, 755 N.W.2d at 539). Here, there is
no such conflict between the statute, which relates to maintenance of
sidewalks, and the City’s ordinance, which expressly states that abutting
landowners are liable for damages resulting from sidewalk defects.
Where an ordinance or statute imposes a duty to maintain
sidewalks on abutting landowners, the majority view is that the
obligation of the abutting landowner is one as agent for the municipality,
or, acting for the benefit of the municipality. See Schaefer, 146 P.2d at
930–32; Nord, 30 P.2d at 812–13 (“When . . . the city by ordinance
requires the abutting property owner to keep the sidewalk in repair, the
city’s duty to the public is not affected; it merely makes the individual a
joint agent with the city officials for the performance of the city’s duty.”).3
We therefore conclude that when an ordinance or statute validly imposes
a maintenance obligation and also imposes liability on the abutting
3The City has pled a contribution rather than an indemnification claim. We do
not think the label is a basis for granting summary judgment in this case. Although
indemnification and contribution are not identical concepts, contribution is a lesser-
included liability compared to the liability resulting from indemnification. In any event,
because our statutory interpretation is a question of first impression, we do not believe
that summary judgment should be granted without giving the City an opportunity to
amend its petition to allege indemnity to the extent such an amendment is necessary.
17
landowner, the City is entitled to indemnification from the abutting
landowner for any damages arising out of its failure to maintain the
sidewalk.
We note that at least one other jurisdiction has come to the
conclusion that a similar local ordinance is not preempted by state law.
In Gonzales, the appellate court considered, among other issues, whether
a state statute which required landowners of abutting property to
maintain sidewalks preempted a local ordinance which provided that
abutting landowners could be liable to third parties. 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d at
183–84. The Gonzales court specifically considered whether California
Streets and Highways Code section 5610, which required abutting
landowners to maintain sidewalks preempted the local ordinance. Id. at
182–84. According to the Gonzales court, the statute dealt only with
“maintenance of abutting sidewalks, and the landowner’s duty to the
city, not to pedestrians that use the sidewalk.” Id. at 184. The Gonzales
court reasoned that “silence on the issue of adjacent landowner liability
does not preempt the local ordinance.” Id. We apply similar reasoning in
this case.
For the above reasons, we conclude the Iowa City ordinance
expressly providing for a damage remedy against abutting landowners
with respect to sidewalk defects is not preempted by Iowa Code section
364.12(2).
VI. Whether Potential Imposition of Liability Against the State
is an Unlawful Tax.
A. Positions of the Parties.
1. The State. The State contends the City’s attempt to thrust
liability onto the State amounts to an effort to levy a tax not authorized
by statute. The State cites the Iowa home rule amendment. See Iowa
18
Const. art. III, § 38A. Under the home rule amendment, a municipal
corporation does not have the power “to levy any tax unless expressly
authorized by the general assembly.” Id. The State points out that
nothing in the Iowa Code expressly authorizes the City to shift liability
onto abutting property owners. Further, the State claims that under
Iowa Code section 364.3(2), a city may not impose a penalty in excess of
a fine of five hundred dollars and thirty days’ imprisonment, and under
Iowa Code section 364.3(6), a city may not provide a civil penalty in
excess of seven hundred and fifty dollars for the violation of a municipal
infraction. Imposition of tort damages, the State argues, is the
imposition of an unauthorized tax.
2. The City. The City responds by noting that under our caselaw,
a tax is “ ‘a charge to pay the cost of government without regard to
special benefits conferred,’ meaning its primary purpose is to raise
revenue.” Kragnes v. City of Des Moines, 714 N.W.2d 632, 639 (Iowa
2006) (quoting Home Builders Ass’n of Greater Des Moines v. City of West
Des Moines, 644 N.W.2d 339, 346 (Iowa 2002)). The City maintains the
primary purpose of its ordinance is not to raise revenue for the City, but
to allow a third party injured by a defect in a sidewalk to recover from the
abutting landowner. Further, the City contends nothing in Iowa Code
sections 364.3(2) or 364.3(6) prevents the City from imposing remedies
on property owners that exceed those limitations.
B. Analysis. Although there are few cases of recent vintage, most
of the authorities dealing with ordinances thrusting responsibility for
sidewalks onto abutting owners have been sustained against challenges
that they impose an unlawful tax. See James v. City of Pine Bluff, 4 S.W.
760, 761–62 (Ark. 1887); Palmer v. Way, 6 Colo. 106, 117–18 (1881);
Inhabitants of Palmyra v. Morton, 25 Mo. 593, 595–96 (1857); City of
19
Lincoln v. Janesch, 89 N.W. 280, 281–82 (Neb. 1902); State v. Newark, 37
N.J.L. 415, 422–23 (1874); Mayor & Aldermen v. Maberry, 25 Tenn. (5
Hum.) 368, 372–74 (1845); Cain v. City of Tyler, 261 S.W. 1018, 1021
(Tex. Comm’n App. 1924, judgm’t adopted). There is some authority to
the contrary. See Noonan v. City of Stillwater, 22 N.W. 444, 445–47
(Minn. 1885). See generally J.P.M., Annotation, Constitutionality of State
or Ordinance Imposing upon Abutting Owners or Occupants Duty in
Respect of Care or Condition of Street or Highway, 58 A.L.R. 215 (1929),
available at www.westlaw.com (collecting cases regarding the
constitutionality “of statutes imposing upon abutting owners or
occupants duties in respect of care or condition of street or highway”).
Our cases indicate a tax is a general revenue measure without
benefits conferred. Kragnes, 714 N.W.2d at 639; Home Builders, 644
N.W.2d at 346. We do not believe an ordinance that imposes a liability
on a property owner for injuries arising from sidewalk defects amounts to
a tax. No funds go into the City’s coffers for general purposes.
Taxpayers are not being charged for services that have no benefit to
them. Instead, the ordinance imposes a duty on abutting landowners
and makes them responsible for personal injuries that occur from
sidewalk defects that exist as a result of their breach of a duty
established by the city ordinance. We do not think this case can be
shoehorned into our taxation doctrine. Like the majority of cases from
other jurisdictions, we regard the ordinance as a police regulation not
unlike building or housing codes or protections against public and
private nuisances. We therefore reject the State’s challenge to the Iowa
City ordinance on the ground that it imposes an unauthorized tax.
20
VII. Whether the City’s Cause of Action Against the State is a
“Claim” Under the ITCA.
A. Positions of the Parties.
1. The State. The State maintains that at common law, an injured
party could not seek to recover for damages due to a sidewalk defect from
an abutting landowner. City of Keokuk, 53 Iowa at 355–57, 5 N.W. at
506–07 (holding that city may, by ordinance, require abutting landowner
to repair sidewalk, but that the abutting landowner is not liable in an
action in tort for injuries). The State next maintains that when the ITCA
was enacted in 1966, the statute only waived sovereign immunity for
torts “then existing at common law.” Because liability for injuries due to
a defect in a sidewalk could not at common law be thrust upon an
abutting landowner at the time the ITCA was enacted, the State contends
the State has not waived sovereign immunity on the City’s claim. In
other words, the State asserts that its sovereign immunity has not been
waived with respect to claims arising from any obligations created under
Iowa Code section 364.12(2)(c) or Iowa City Code section 16-1A-6
because these measures were enacted after the ITCA was passed.
In addition to arguing that the ITCA does not waive immunity for
subsequently enacted statutes and ordinances, the State also maintains
that nothing in Iowa Code section 364.12(2)(c) itself amounts to a waiver
of sovereign immunity. In support of its argument that Iowa Code
section 364.12(2)(c) does not waive sovereign immunity, the State cites
two Connecticut cases, Rivers v. City of New Britain, 950 A.2d 1247
(Conn. 2008) (involving case in which the court granted the state’s
motion to dismiss where claim was based on city ordinance that was
authorized by statute generally imposing duty and liability on all
abutting landowners to maintain sidewalk because statute did not
21
expressly waive state’s sovereign immunity), and Gould v. City of
Hartford, 691 A.2d 35 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1995) (same).
2. City. The City argues liability in this case is, in fact, based
upon common law that preexisted the ITCA. According to the City, its
claim is an old-fashioned claim based upon common law negligence. The
City recognizes the duty of care imposed on an abutting landowner to
keep sidewalks free from defects arises under the City’s ordinance, but
contends the cause of action remains the common law tort of negligence.
The City cites Seeman for the proposition that a statutory duty may
establish an essential element of a negligence action, such as the duty of
care, but it does not provide a cause of action. See 322 N.W.2d at 37. In
short, the City contends the State confuses the creation of a duty by
statute with the creation of a cause of action for negligence. The City
notes that once it is understood that its claim sounds in negligence, it is
clear under the ITCA, specifically Iowa Code section 669.2(3)(a), that
sovereign immunity has been waived with respect to liability “caused by
the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the state.”
Iowa Code § 669.2(3)(a).
With respect to the argument that section 364.12(2)(c) does not
expressly waive sovereign immunity for claims arising out of city
ordinances related to sidewalks, the City asserts that no such express
waiver is required because the ITCA provides a general waiver of liability.
The City distinguishes Gould and Rivers on the ground that Connecticut,
unlike Iowa, has no general sovereign immunity statute.
The City then turns to the ITCA to determine whether the State
has waived sovereign immunity for the claims in this case. The City
notes that the contribution claim it is making is based upon a personal
injury. It further asserts that if the abutting property owner was a
22
private person, and if that private person were negligent, liability would
arise. Further, the claim is not excluded by one of the exceptions listed
in Iowa Code section 669.14. Therefore, the City argues that its cause of
action against the State amounts to a “claim” under the ITCA.
B. Analysis. We think the City has the best argument here. The
term “claim” in the ITCA is broadly defined to include any damages
“caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of
the state.” Iowa Code § 669.2(3)(a). We have characterized the ITCA as
establishing a “general waiver” of sovereign immunity subject to the
delineated exceptions in Iowa Code section 669.14. Adam v. State, 380
N.W.2d 716, 724 (Iowa 1986). The State does not claim any of the stated
exceptions are applicable in this case.
Instead, the State argues that because Iowa Code section
364.12(2)(c) and Iowa City Code section 16-1A-6 were enacted after the
ITCA was passed sovereign immunity has not been waived here and
nothing in Iowa Code section 364.12(2)(c) amounts to a waiver of
sovereign immunity. The State misses the distinction between the
source of a duty and a cause of action. As we noted in Seeman:
A statutory duty or standard may thus establish an
essential element for a negligence action. However, it does
not provide the cause of action. . . . The duty or standard of
care, statutory or otherwise, is merely an element of proof
that comes into play after an action has been rightfully
commenced pursuant to the preexisting common-law cause
of action.
322 N.W.2d at 37. Thus, even accepting the State’s analytical
framework, it appears that the cause of action in this case is negligence.
No one contests that a claim of negligence preexisted the passage of the
ITCA.
23
Further, the core purpose of the general waiver of sovereign
immunity in the ITCA, subject of course to the enumerated exceptions
expressly stated in Iowa Code section 669.14, is to allow the State to be
sued “under circumstances where the state, if a private person, would be
liable to the claimant for such damage, loss, injury, or death.” Iowa Code
§ 669.2(3)(a); see also Graham v. Worthington, 259 Iowa 845, 861, 146
N.W.2d 626, 637 (1966) (holding ITCA does not create new causes of
action, but creates acceptance of liability under circumstances that
would bring private liability into existence). As a result of our previous
holdings, we have determined that if the abutting landowner in this case
were a private entity, it could be brought into this case as a third-party
defendant. We thus think permitting the City to bring the State in as a
third-party defendant in this negligence action and treating it as if it were
a private party, fulfills the fundamental purpose of the ITCA. The broad
waiver of sovereign immunity in the ITCA thus makes this case
distinguishable from Gould and Rivers.
We therefore reject the State’s argument that the waiver of
sovereign immunity is somehow limited to claims that would have been
recognized at the time of the passage of the Act. We see nothing in the
Act that suggests potential claims against the state are limited precisely
to those that might have been brought in 1966. Instead, we think the
better view is that the State, subject to the statutory exceptions, stands
in the same shoes as a private party for claims regardless of their
viability at the time the ITCA was enacted. If the State is correct, a tort
regime would develop slowly over time which, after the passage of
decades of legal development, would lead to a dual-track system of
liability, thereby undermining the stated legislative purpose. We do not
think the legislature intended to build into the ITCA a mechanism of
gradual erosion.
24
VIII. Conclusion.
For all the above reasons, we conclude the Iowa City ordinance is
not preempted by Iowa Code section 364.12(2), the potential imposition
of indemnity under the ordinance does not give rise to an unlawful tax,
and the claim brought against the State is within the scope of ITCA for
purposes of waiver of sovereign immunity. As a result, the decision of
the district court denying the State’s motion to dismiss is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
All justices concur except Waterman and Mansfield, JJ., who
dissent.
25
#13–0673, City of Iowa City v. State
MANSFIELD, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. As I read Iowa Code section 364.12(2), it
requires cities to keep sidewalks in good repair except to the extent the
city has served notice of a needed repair on the abutting property owner,
and even then the property owner’s liability is limited to the cost of
repair. See Iowa Code § 364.12(2) (2009). Iowa City’s ordinance is an
effort by the City to alter this statutory division of responsibility between
city and property owner. Simply stated, the City wants the property
owner to do more to maintain City-owned sidewalks, so that the City may
do less. This conflicts with section 364.12(2). It also conflicts with the
common law of Iowa, which we previously said in Peffers v. City of
Des Moines was not modified by section 364.12(2) in the area of tort
liability. See 299 N.W.2d 675, 677–79 (Iowa 1980), superseded by
statute, 1984 Iowa Acts ch. 1002, §1 (codified at Iowa Code
§ 364.12(2)(b) (1985)). Thus, I believe state law preempts Iowa City’s
ordinance. See Iowa Const. art. III, § 38A (disallowing municipal
ordinances that are “inconsistent with the laws of the general assembly”).
Let me begin with the state law in question. Section 364.12(2)
states in relevant part:
2. A city shall keep all public grounds, streets,
sidewalks, alleys, bridges, culverts, overpasses,
underpasses, grade crossing separations and approaches,
public ways, squares, and commons open, in repair, and free
from nuisance, with the following exceptions:
....
b. The abutting property owner is responsible for the
removal of the natural accumulations of snow and ice from
the sidewalks within a reasonable amount of time and may
be liable for damages caused by the failure of the abutting
property owner to use reasonable care in the removal of the
snow or ice. If damages are to be awarded under this section
against the abutting property owner, the claimant has the
26
burden of proving the amount of the damages. To authorize
recovery of more than a nominal amount, facts must exist
and be shown by the evidence which afford a reasonable
basis for measuring the amount of the claimant’s actual
damages, and the amount of actual damages shall not be
determined by speculation, conjecture, or surmise. All legal
or equitable defenses are available to the abutting property
owner in an action brought pursuant to this paragraph. The
city’s general duty under this subsection does not include a
duty to remove natural accumulations of snow or ice from
the sidewalks. However, when the city is the abutting
property owner it has the specific duty of the abutting
property owner set forth in this paragraph.
c. The abutting property owner may be required by
ordinance to maintain all property outside the lot and
property lines and inside the curb lines upon the public
streets, except that the property owner shall not be required
to remove diseased trees or dead wood on the publicly owned
property or right-of-way.
d. A city may serve notice on the abutting property
owner, by certified mail to the property owner as shown by
the records of the county auditor, requiring the abutting
property owner to repair, replace, or reconstruct sidewalks.
e. If the abutting property owner does not perform an
action required under this subsection within a reasonable
time, a city may perform the required action and assess the
costs against the abutting property for collection in the same
manner as a property tax. This power does not relieve the
abutting property owner of liability imposed under
paragraph “b”.
Iowa Code § 364.12(2) (2009) (emphasis added).
This law seems to me fairly clear. Under the preamble to section 2
and subsection (d), the city has the duty to maintain the sidewalk unless
it “serve[s] notice on the abutting property owner,” directing it to make
repairs. Id. § 364.12(2)(d). On the other hand, under subsection (b), the
abutting property owner is responsible for removing snow from sidewalks
“within a reasonable amount of time” without regard to notice and may
be liable in damages for failing to do so. Id. § 364.12(2)(b). Finally,
under subsection (c), the city has the option of requiring the property
owner to maintain city property that is inside the curb line. Id.
27
§ 364.12(2)(c). This, for example, could be a requirement that the
property owner mow any lawn between the sidewalk and the street. See,
e.g., Goodenow v. City Council, 574 N.W.2d 18, 23 (Iowa 1998). However,
I do not read subsection (c) as covering the subjects of sidewalk snow
removal or sidewalk repair, because they are expressly covered by
subsections (b) and (d). If subsection (c) were meant to cover those
issues, then subsections (b) and (d) would be superfluous. See Iowa
Code § 4.4(2) (setting forth the presumption that “[t]he entire statute is
intended to be effective”); Neal v. Annett Holdings, Inc., 814 N.W.2d 512,
520 (Iowa 2012) (“In interpreting a statute, each term is to be given
effect, and we will not read a statute so that any provision will be
rendered superfluous.” (Citation and internal quotation marks
omitted.)).
This allocation of responsibility between city and property owner is
logical. Snow removal from sidewalks has to be performed several times
each winter. It is relatively inexpensive and convenient for property
owners to clear adjacent sidewalks at the same time they are shoveling
their own driveways and walks. Therefore, it makes sense for property
owners to bear this obligation. It would be inefficient to impose on cities
the duty to inspect sidewalks for snow and ice or to keep them clear of
snow and ice.
On the other hand, sidewalk repairs are a rarer and more costly
undertaking. Determining whether a repair is needed and the kind of
repair needed may involve some engineering or cost-benefit judgment.
Thus, it makes sense for the city to shoulder much of this obligation,
even if the city is given the right to ask the property owner to make the
repairs according to the city’s specifications and, if the property owner
28
does not do so, to charge back the costs of repair to the abutting
property owner. 4
Given the foregoing statutory wording, I see a clear conflict
between state law and Iowa City’s ordinance. The ordinance provides in
relevant part:
The abutting property owners shall maintain the sidewalk in
a safe condition, in a state of good repair, and free from
defects. The abutting property owner may be liable for
damages caused by failure to maintain the sidewalk.
Iowa City, Iowa, Code § 16-1A-6 (current through Mar. 4, 2014),
available at www.sterlingcodifiers.com/codebook/index.php?book_1b=
953.
This ordinance expands the property owner’s liability well beyond
the confines of Iowa Code section 364.12. The ordinance provides not
only that the property owner will be responsible for the cost of sidewalk
repair if notified by the City that a repair is necessary, but also that it
will be liable to the public for sidewalk accidents whether it was notified
by the City that a repair was necessary or not. See Iowa City Code § 16-
1A-6. As the majority concedes, no such liability exists at common law.
After all, the sidewalk is the property of the City, not the abutting
property owner.
4Notably, Iowa City explains on its website that it inspects the sidewalks
throughout the City regularly on a rotating basis for needed repairs. See City of Iowa
City, Iowa Sidewalk Repair Program, http://www.icgov.org/?id=1911 (last visited
June 6, 2014). When it finds a problem, it sends a notice to the property owner
detailing the repairs needed and specifications for how the repairs need to be
performed. Id. If the property owner fails to make the repair by the deadline, the City
does the repair itself and invoices the property owner for construction costs plus a $25
administrative fee. Id.
Obviously, if the property owner does something that affects the condition of the
sidewalk, then a duty could arise under the common law. See Thompson v. Kaczinski,
774 N.W.2d 829, 835–36 (Iowa 2009).
29
The conflict becomes even more apparent when you consider the
backdrop to the current version of Iowa Code section 364.12. In Peffers,
we held that section 364.12(2)(b), as it read at the time, did not allow
private persons to sue abutting property owners for failure to remove
snow and ice. 299 N.W.2d at 679. We emphasized that at common law,
the city, which owns the sidewalk, and not the property owner, bore this
liability. Id. at 677. We held the statutory language making the abutting
property owner “responsible” for the removal of snow and ice from
sidewalks only made the property owner responsible for its removal vis-à-
vis the city and did not give rise to liability vis-à-vis the public. Id. at
677–79. As we explained,
We assume that the legislature knew of the existing
state of our case law, holding the city rather than the
abutting property owner liable to pedestrians. We find no
clear indication in the present statute that the legislature
intended to change the existing law. First, there is no
language in the statute expressly addressing the issue of
liability to pedestrians. Second, the legislative history of
section 364.12(2) does not evince any intention on the part
of the legislature either to shift to the abutting property
owner or otherwise abrogate the city’s liability to pedestrians
for negligent care of public sidewalks. The preamble to the
legislation states that the purpose of the enactment is to
establish home rule for local government. A careful reading
of the preamble does not reveal anything purporting to alter
the existing state of the law regarding liability to pedestrians.
Id. at 679.
After Peffers was decided, the general assembly amended section
364.12(2) to expressly authorize a damages action under subsection (b)
when the abutting property owner failed to remove snow and ice. 5 See
5At the time of the Peffers decision, subsection (b) read only as follows: “ ‘The
abutting property owner is responsible for the prompt removal of snow, ice, and
accumulations from the sidewalks.’ ” 299 N.W.2d at 676 (quoting Iowa Code
§ 364.12(2)(b) (1979)).
30
1984 Iowa Acts ch. 1002, § 1. However, the legislature did not materially
amend subsections (c) or (d). See id. Thus, I think the Peffers holding
that section 364.12(2) incorporates the common law of torts still applies
to those two subsections. See 299 N.W.2d at 678. Since the prior
language in subsection (b) requiring the abutting landowner to be
“responsible” for snow removal was not enough to establish a legal duty
running from the abutting landowner to the public contrary to common
law, I do not see how the carried-over language in subsection (c) giving
the city the option of requiring the abutting landowner to “maintain”
public property would authorize the city to create a new liability running
from the landowner to the public that is also contrary to common law.
See Iowa Code § 364.12(2)(c); Peffers, 299 N.W.2d at 677. Had the
legislature contemplated a shift from the common law rule that abutting
property owners were not liable to pedestrians in any area other than
snow removal, it would have included language in subsection (c) or (d)
similar to the language it added to subsection (b). See Iowa Code
§ 364.12(2)(b)–(d).
Furthermore, the 1984 legislation added to subsection (e) the
following sentence: “This power does not relieve the abutting property
owner of liability imposed under paragraph b.” See 1984 Iowa Acts ch.
1002, § 1. But doesn’t this addition indicate, implicitly, that the property
owner is not subject to potential liability to the public under the other
subsections? Otherwise, the legislature would have mentioned them.
We follow the statutory interpretation rule in Iowa that “expressio
unius est ex[c]lusio alterius, meaning that ‘legislative intent is expressed
by omission as well as by inclusion.’ ” Staff Mgmt. v. Jimenez, 839
N.W.2d 640, 649 (Iowa 2013). Here, the legislature expressly authorized
liability to pedestrians only in subsection (b). See Iowa Code
31
§ 364.12(2)(b). I think the conclusion is inescapable it did not authorize
it in subsections (c) or (d). Id. § 364.12(2)(c)–(d).
The majority cites a California case that upheld a City of San Jose
ordinance making adjacent landowners liable to pedestrians for unsafe
conditions on sidewalks. See Gonzales v. City of San Jose, 23
Cal. Rptr. 3d 178, 183–84 (Ct. App. 2004). However, California state law
expressly provides that adjacent landowners “shall maintain any
sidewalk in such condition that the sidewalk will not endanger persons
or property.” Id. at 181 n.4 (quoting Cal. Sts. & High. Code § 5610 (West,
Westlaw through Ch. 22 of 2014 Reg. Sess., Res. Ch. 1 of 2013–2014 2d
Ex. Sess., and all propositions on the 6/3/2014 ballot)). This wording is
quite different from Iowa Code section 364.12(2). Cf. Dean v. Yahnke,
670 N.W.2d 28, 32 (Neb. 2003) (finding that a legislative authorization to
make sidewalk repairs and assess the expense to the abutting property
owner did not authorize a second-class city to delegate the duty of
sidewalk maintenance or repair generally or shift liability to the property
owner).
While I do not at all disagree with the majority’s thorough
discussion of preemption principles, the real question here is one of
statutory interpretation. Contrary to the majority, I do not believe the
present case involves “legislative silence.” Rather, Iowa Code section
364.12(2) contains an express legislative determination that the City
should be responsible for sidewalk maintenance subject only to a
particularized right to shift costs of repair to the adjoining property
owner in certain circumstances. Hence, I would reverse and remand
with instructions to grant the State’s motion to dismiss.
Waterman, J., joins this dissent.
Beth A. Madden v. City of Iowa City
Combined Opinion