dissenting.
{¶ 29} Because I believe that the majority’s holding offends the United States Supreme Court’s constitutional commands on a juvenile’s due process and Fifth Amendment rights, our own precedent, and the intent of the General Assembly in enacting R.C. 2151.352,1 must dissent.
The Confession
{¶ 30} In 2009, M.W., a 15-year-old boy, acted as a lookout while his friend, another juvenile male, robbed a victim at gunpoint. We believe this to be true because soon thereafter, M.W. admitted those facts to Cleveland Police.
*317{¶ 31} M.W. confessed after signing a waiver of his rights to an attorney, without the benefit of advice from counsel or his parents or guardian. (Evidently, it is “typical” for the Cleveland Police Department to interview juveniles without their parents being present.) And after doing so, he was interrogated by police without an attorney being present.
{¶ 32} There is no doubt that M.W.’s actions were dangerous and that he is in need of intervention. But there is doubt whether his confession, which was used against him in the subsequent delinquency proceedings, was constitutionally obtained.
{¶ 33} The majority opinion divorces the relevant analyses from the question before us, asserting that there is no need to discuss a juvenile’s constitutional protections because M.W. waived any constitutional right against self-incrimination. Evidently, the majority ignores that the proposition we accepted for review in this appeal clearly refers to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).3
{¶ 34} The majority then asserts that the statute at issue, R.C. 2151.352, is a plainly worded one and that the statutory term “proceedings” cannot be subject to more than one interpretation.
{¶ 35} The majority is mistaken on both counts.
CONTEXT IS EVERYTHING
The Statutory Term “Proceedings” Is Not Clear and Unambiguous
{¶ 36} The term “proceedings” does not have one plain and ordinary meaning.
{¶ 37} The term can certainly refer to an event in civil litigation or criminal prosecution that occurs after the filing of a complaint or an indictment with the court. But that understanding of the word is not the exclusive one, nor is it dispositive here. After all, the majority concedes that the word “proceedings” also refers to “ ‘[a]n act or step that is part of a larger action.’ ” Majority opinion at ¶ 18, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1324 (9th Ed.2009). And certainly an interrogation of a juvenile is an act or step that is part of a larger action, i.e., the process of adjudicating the juvenile as a delinquent.
{¶ 38} Perhaps more compelling, however, is that Black’s recognizes that the term “proceedings” includes “ ‘all ancillary or provisional steps, such as arrest.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Black’s at 1324, quoting Edwin E. Bryant, The Law of *318Pleading under the Codes of Civil Procedure 3^ (2d Ed.1899).4 Notably, that definition is absent from the majority’s opinion, notwithstanding the fact that it appears in the same definition upon which the majority relies.
{¶ 39} Thus, the varied definitions of “proceedings” contradict the majority’s insistence that there is only one plain and ordinary meaning of the word and its conclusion that the only meaning of “proceedings” is a court event that takes place after the filing of a complaint or indictment. Thus, to understand what the General Assembly intended, we must look beyond the statute’s words.
{¶ 40} The majority implicitly agrees that we must look beyond the words of the statute because its analysis does not end with a discussion of the plain and ordinary meaning of “proceeding.” Instead, it attempts to buttress its conclusion with context from our case law. I agree that context controls the analysis here, but I strongly disagree with the context upon which the majority relies.
The Improper Context Used by the Majority
The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel Is Inapplicable in Juvenile Cases
{¶ 41} The majority holds, “ ‘Proceedings’ evokes a court of law, not the investigatory action taken by police prior to the filing of the complaint or a juvenile’s appearance before a tribunal.” Majority opinion at ¶ 18. The majority would be correct if it were addressing an adult criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel in a proceeding, which does not attach until a prosecution commences. See, e.g., McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991). More specifically, in the adult criminal context, the United States Supreme Court has held that a defendant’s right to counsel in a proceeding does not commence until the government initiates “ ‘adversary judicial criminal proceedings — whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.’ ” Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., Tex., 554 U.S. 191, 198, 128 S.Ct. 2578, 171 L.Ed.2d 366 (2008), quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972) (plurality opinion).
{¶ 42} But the Sixth Amendment is not applicable here.
*319 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment Controls in Juvenile Cases
{¶ 43} As we explained in In re C.S., the juvenile’s right to counsel is not governed by the Sixth Amendment, but rather by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 115 Ohio St.3d 267, 2007-Ohio-4919, 874 N.E.2d 1177, ¶ 79, citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967). Because it is founded in due process, the juvenile’s right to counsel in proceedings is a malleable right rather than a rigid one; it is driven by concerns for fundamental fairness. Id. at ¶ 80. It was that sense of fundamental fairness that drove the analysis in In re C.S., a critical point that was evidently lost on the majority.
The Majority’s Reliance on Inapposite Precedent
{¶ 44} The majority also relies on Ohio case law decided long after the General Assembly enacted R.C. 2151.352. I do not quibble with the import of those cases in other contexts, but they are inapposite here.
{¶ 45} For example, the majority’s reliance on cases like State v. Davis, 132 Ohio St.3d 25, 2012-Ohio-1654, 968 N.E.2d 466, is entirely misplaced.
{¶ 46} In Davis, we rendered a narrow holding interpreting R.C. 2921.04, a modern statute prohibiting intimidation of witnesses. We held, “A police investigation of a crime, without more, is not a proceeding in a court of justice, and it does not invoke the protection of R.C. 2921.04(B) for a person who observes the crime.” Id. at ¶ 19.
{¶ 47} Davis was decided more than 40 years after the General Assembly enacted R.C. 2151.352, and the decision does not interpret R.C. 2151.352 or any other juvenile statute. It does not offer even the smallest glimpse of insight into the legislative thinking on juvenile rights in 1969.5
*320{¶ 48} And notably, while the appeal in Davis was pending, the General Assembly sent a clear message rejecting the courts’ narrow interpretation of R.C. 2921.04, which included the phrase “criminal action or proceeding” when Davis was prosecuted. While the appeal was pending, the General Assembly amended R.C. 2921.04, clarifying that the statutory scheme is designed to protect “any person who has or claims to have knowledge concerning a fact or facts concerning a criminal or delinquent act, whether or not criminal or delinquent child charges are actually filed.” Davis, 132 Ohio St.3d 25, 2012-Ohio-1654, 968 N.E.2d 466, ¶ 3, fn. 1, citing 2011 Sub.H.B. No. 20, effective June 4, 2012. If anything, the General Assembly’s response to Davis militates in favor of holding that the right to counsel precedes the filing of formal charges.
{¶ 49} Further, our holding in Davis was driven in part by the rule that we must construe ambiguity in criminal statutes in favor of the defendant and against the state. That rule does not support the majority’s holding in construing R.C. 2151.352. Rather, it supports the notion that we must generously read R.C. 2151.352 in favor of the juvenile’s rights, including his right to counsel and due process. The majority does the opposite; it reads the statute in favor of the state.
{¶ 50} The majority opinion also relies on State v. Ostrowski, 30 Ohio St.2d 34, 282 N.E.2d 359 (1972), for the proposition that we interpreted an earlier version of R.C. 2151.352 to ensure that juveniles have counsel or their parents present at any hearing. That statement is wholly misleading.
{¶ 51} The full context of the quote used by the majority establishes that in Ostrowski, we were concerned with the sequestration of witnesses, including a juvenile’s parents, and not the right to have those parents, or counsel, present during the proceedings:
Taken as a whole, the purpose of R.C. 2151.352 is to insure to the juvenile his right to counsel and/or his right to have his parents present at any hearing. In our opinion, such a provision is not intended to and does not take away from a trial court its basic right to order a separation of witnesses until such time as such witnesses have testified. During such time the exclusion is not of parents, as such, but instead is the exclusion of witnesses.
Moreover, during such time as the parents were so excluded, the juvenile was fully and adequately represented by two attorneys. Under these circumstances, no possible prejudice to the juvenile could result from such exclusion.
*321(Emphasis sic.) Id. at 43.
{¶ 52} Even if Ostrowski had not been focused on the issue of sequestration, let us be clear that Ostrowski addressed proceedings in court — not custodial interrogations — in which the juvenile at issue had the benefit of two attorneys. Thus, in this case, in which a juvenile had no counsel during a custodial interrogation, Ostrowski is of no value.
{¶ 53} It is a difficult task to attempt to define “proceedings” by looking to cases that analyzed the term in the era in which R.C. 2151.352 was enacted. This is particularly true given that while the General Assembly was crafting R.C. 2151.352, the federal courts were struggling to define and interpret “proceedings” in quasi-judicial proceedings like administrative proceedings.
{¶ 54} In a host of cases, the federal courts interpreted “proceedings” to reach investigations conducted by administrative agencies long before any formal complaint or indictment was filed in court. For example, in 1964, the District of Columbia District Court considered a Securities and Exchange Commission investigation to be a “proceeding.” United States v. Batten, 226 F.Supp. 492, 494 (D.D.C.1964). And soon thereafter, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a conviction for giving false invoices to an investigator in a Federal Trade Commission case, holding that the term “proceeding” has a broad scope, “encompassing both the investigative and adjudicative functions of a department or agency.” United States v. Fruchtman, 421 F.2d 1019, 1021 (6th Cir.1970).
{¶ 55} Admittedly, the statutory schemes at issue in Batten and Fruchtman are not any more akin to R.C. 2151.352 than the cases cited by the majority. But they illustrate that at the time the General Assembly used the word “proceedings” in R.C. 2151.352, the courts were not limiting its definition to the events that occur after the formal filing of charges in a court. Indeed, neither lawmakers nor judges of that era myopically viewed the term “proceedings” in the manner the majority suggests here. As the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals succinctly stated after reviewing cases like Rice and Batten-.
In sum, the term “proceeding” is not, as one might believe, limited to something in the nature of a trial. The growth and expansion of agency activities have resulted in a meaning being given to “proceeding” which is more inclusive and which no longer limits itself to formal activities in a court of law. Rather, the investigation or search for the true facts such as that which is described in the indictment here is not to be ruled a non-proceeding simply because it is preliminary to indictment and trial.
*322United States v. Browning, 572 F.2d 720, 724 (10th Cir.1978).
{¶ 56} Having illustrated the reasons why the majority’s contextualization is improper, I turn to one that accurately illuminates the statute.
The Proper Context
R.C. 2151.352 Codifies and Expands a Juvenile’s Constitutional Rights
{¶ 57} This court recognizes that R.C. 2151.352 is the legislative embodiment of the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Gault. In re C.S., 115 Ohio St.3d 267, 2007-Ohio-4919, 874 N.E.2d 1177, at ¶ 83. “Indeed, through R.C. 2151.352, the legislature provided a statutory right to appointed counsel that goes beyond constitutional requirements.” Id., citing In re Williams, 101 Ohio St.3d 398, 2004-Ohio-1500, 805 N.E.2d 1110, ¶ 15, and State ex rel. Asberry v. Payne, 82 Ohio St.3d 44, 46, 693 N.E.2d 794 (1998).
{¶ 58} We must look to the constitutional requirements that the statute embodies. And after doing so, we must be true to them and to the statutory right that exceeds those requirements.
Relevant Supreme Court Precedent
{¶ 59} The General Assembly enacted our juvenile-delinquency statutes in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decisions in watershed cases like Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966), and Gault. See In re C.S. Those decisions, and their rationales, control here. So, too, do the court’s contemporaneous pronouncements on the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in Miranda, which was announced shortly before Ohio’s enactment of R.C. 2151.352.
{¶ 60} The Fifth Amendment protects an individual from being compelled to be a witness against himself, whether in a custodial interrogation or in court after formal charges have been brought. See Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-543, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897). In Miranda, the Supreme Court explained those rights, holding that a police officer, before questioning a suspect in custody, must warn the suspect of the right to remain silent and that anything said during interrogation could be used against the suspect in court, that the suspect has a right to have an attorney present during questioning, and that if the suspect cannot afford an attorney but desires one, the court will appoint one prior to any questioning. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478-479, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694.
{¶ 61} The Miranda warning is more than fodder for television and movie depictions of police work. Its purpose is “to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings.” Id. at 458. Indeed, the warning concerning a suspect’s *323right to counsel is designed to ensure that the privilege against self-incrimination “remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process.” Id. at 469. That protection is critical for all individuals, but particularly for juveniles.
{¶ 62} As the Supreme Court recently reiterated, by their very nature, custodial police interrogations entail inherently compelling pressures. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2394, 2401, 180 L.Ed.2d 310 (2011), citing Miranda at 467. Those pressures are heightened for juveniles:
Even for an adult, the physical and psychological isolation of custodial interrogation can “undermine the individual’s will to resist and * * * compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.” [Miranda at 467.] Indeed, the pressure of custodial interrogation is so immense that it “can induce a frighteningly high percentage of people to confess to crimes they never committed.” Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303 [321], 129 S.Ct. 1558, 1570, 173 L.Ed.2d 443 (2009) (citing Drizin & Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C.L.Rev. 891, 906-907 (2004)); see also Miranda, 384 U.S., at 455, n. 23, 86 S.Ct. 1602 [16 L.Ed.2d 694], That risk is all the more troubling — and recent studies suggest, all the more acute — when the subject of custodial interrogation is a juvenile.
Id., — U.S. --■, 131 S.Ct. at 2401, 180 L.Ed.2d 310.
{¶ 63} Given the importance of the Fifth Amendment’s protections against self-incrimination, it is not surprising that the year after the Supreme Court issued Miranda, the court announced its decision in Gault, which held that the concept of Fifth Amendment rights set forth in Miranda applied to juveniles. Gault, 387 U.S. at 55, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527. In doing so, the court made clear that the juvenile’s right to counsel extended to the juvenile’s interactions with police as well as in any courtroom hearings that might follow the interaction with police:
The participation of counsel will, of course, assist the police, Juvenile Courts and appellate tribunals in administering the privilege. If counsel was not present for some permissible reason when an admission was obtained, the greatest care must be taken to assure that the admission was voluntary, in the sense not only that it was not coerced or suggested, but also that it was not the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair.
*324(Emphasis added.) Id.
{¶ 64} The rationale for the Supreme Court’s holdings was not shrouded in mystery. Rather, the court had previously discussed the need for a juvenile to have parents or counsel present during interrogations. “[A juvenile] cannot be compared with an adult in full possession of his senses and knowledgeable of the consequences of his admissions.” Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54, 82 S.Ct. 1209, 8 L.Ed.2d 325 (1962). A juvenile in police custody is often in need of “more mature judgment” from an adult relative or counsel, who can give the juvenile “the protection which his own immaturity could not.” Id.
{¶ 65} That understanding of the limitations on a juvenile’s cognitive abilities and legal capacity was not new to the court or created by it. Indeed, as recognized by Blackstone, the common law is replete with examples of how juveniles are treated differently in the law. J.D.B., -U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. at 2403-2404, 180 L.Ed.2d 310, citing 1 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, *464-465.
The concept of establishing different standards for a juvenile is an accepted legal principle since minors generally hold a subordinate and protected status in our legal system. There are legally and socially recognized differences between the presumed responsibility of adults and minors. Indeed the juvenile justice system, which deals with most offenses committed by those under eighteen, is substantially different in philosophy and procedure from the adult system. This State, like all the others, has recognized the fact that juveniles many times lack the capacity and responsibility to realize the full consequences of their actions. As a result of this recognition minors are unable to execute a binding contract, unable to convey real property, and unable to marry of their own free will. It would indeed be inconsistent and unjust to hold that one whom the State deems incapable of being able to marry, purchase alcoholic beverages, or even donate their own blood, should be compelled to stand on the same footing as an adult when asked to waive important Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights at a time most critical to him and in an atmosphere most foreign and unfamiliar.
(Citations omitted.) Lewis v. State, 259 Ind. 431, 437, 288 N.E.2d 138 (1972).
{¶ 66} In light of the long-held understanding of the unique place juveniles occupy in the law and the Supreme Court’s decisions in Gault and Miranda, state high courts, in the era in which R.C. 2151.352 was enacted, often held that the government may not use a juvenile’s statement or confession at a subsequent trial *325or hearing unless the juvenile and the juvenile’s parents were informed of the juvenile’s rights to counsel and to remain silent. See, e.g., People v. Burton, 6 Cal.3d 375, 99 Cal.Rptr. 1, 491 P.2d 793 (1971); Lems at 438; In re S.H., 61 N.J. 108, 293 A.2d 181 (1972). The decisions of our sister, the Indiana Supreme Court, are illustrative of this history.
{¶ 67} By 1973, the Indiana high court would simply and succinctly announce, “[I]t is clear under the United States Supreme Court rule that a juvenile who is alleged to be delinquent is entitled to the assistance of counsel at any interrogation that may take place, and at the hearing before the juvenile judge at which disposition of this status is made.” Bridges v. State, 260 Ind. 651, 653, 299 N.E.2d 616 (1973). Since then, it properly recognized that juveniles should be afforded safeguards that are in addition to those required by Miranda when subjected to custodial interrogation; those holdings were often codified into state statutes. See, e.g., D.M. v. State, 949 N.E.2d 327, 333 (Ind.2011).
{¶ 68} The Indiana approach is consistent with our decision in In re C.S., in which we more clearly enunciated our protective philosophy of juvenile justice that recognizes the realities of modern delinquency proceedings. That philosophy is not reserved only for our courtrooms. Rather, it permeates custodial interrogation as well, consistent with the Supreme Court’s teachings in Miranda, Gault, and J.D.B., and the fundamental fairness that due process rights are intended to protect.
{¶ 69} The majority opinion defies law, logic, and common sense in suggesting that a statute that goes beyond constitutional requirements must be considered without any consideration of constitutional requirements.6 Thus, the majority casts aside those constitutional commands, as well as our precedent, and reframes the issue before us as simply one of statutory language. In doing so, the majority approach impermissibly fails to consider the protections set forth in Miranda simply because M.W. purportedly waived those rights under the statute.
*326William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Daniel T. Van and Richard Hanrahan, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee, state of Ohio. Timothy Young, State Public Defender, and Amanda J. Powell, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant, M.W. Marsha L. Levick, urging reversal for amicus curiae Juvenile Law Center. Kim Brooks Tandy, urging reversal for amicus curiae Children’s Law Center. Nadia Seeratan, urging reversal for amicus curiae National Juvenile Defender Center. Joshua Tepfer, urging reversal for amicus curiae Center on Wrongful Convictions of Youth. James L. Handiman, urging reversal for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio.Conclusion
{¶ 70} The General Assembly enacted R.C. 2151.352 in response to a series of directives from the United States Supreme Court calling for courts to ensure fundamental fairness in juvenile proceedings, including protecting juveniles’ right, from custodial interrogation through adjudication, not to incriminate themselves. Given those purposes, the majority’s construction of R.C. 2151.352 improperly vitiates the very purpose of the statute and thus violates the canon of statutory construction that forbids reading statutes in a manner that leads to absurd results or that defeats the purpose for which the statute was passed. More importantly, it offends fundamental notions of due process and fairness.
{¶ 71} The majority’s holding implicitly endorses a system in which the rights our federal and state constitutions were designed to protect, as expressed in Miranda, Gault, and C.S., are offended. I cannot countenance such a holding, and thus I strongly dissent.
Pfeifer and McGee Brown, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion.. The question before us is whether a juvenile has the right to counsel at all stages of the proceedings against him, and whether in the interrogation stage, the juvenile must be represented by his parent, guardian, custodian, or an attorney before waiving his right to counsel pursuant to Miranda.
. The majority attempts to support its view by pointing to the definitions that were in Black’s when the statute was enacted in 1969. But 70 years prior to the enactment of the statute, Dean Bryant had explained that an “arrest” is a “proceeding.” We must presume that the General Assembly was aware of that usage of the term “proceeding” in the common law. In re C.S., 116 Ohio St.3d 267, 2007-Ohio-4919, 874 N.E.2d 1177, ¶ 91 (when enacting statutes, we presume the General Assembly was mindful of the common law).
. Rice v. United States, 356 F.2d 709, 710-712 (8th Cir.1966), a case in which union laborers were intimidated into withdrawing grievances they had filed with the National Labor Relations Board, is a far better explanation of how legislative bodies viewed “proceedings” in the context of witness-intimidation statutes at the time. There, the federal appeals court expansively interpreted the term “proceeding” to reach the filing of a preliminary charge filed with an administrative agency even though the agency had never filed a formal complaint. Rice at 712. The court broadly interpreted the term “proceeding” as “a comprehensive term meaning the action of proceeding — a particular step or series of steps, adopted for accomplishing something,” thus including all steps from the inception of an action to its conclusion. Id. In doing so, it noted the importance of understanding the legislative intent behind the word. The court explained that the purpose of the statute at issue in Rice was to punish obstruction of the administrative process by impeding a witness in any proceeding before a governmental agency. The court stressed that the statute reached intimidation “at any stage of the proceedings, be it adjudicative or investigative. Congress did not limit the term ‘proceeding’ as used in [the witness-intimidation statute] to only those acts committed after a formal stage was reached, and we cannot so limit the term.” (Emphasis added.) Id.
. The majority’s opinion is curious, at best, given that its author dissented from the holding in In re C.S. because he concluded that the holding “invades the province of a parent’s role in raising his or her child” and in making important decisions that have significant repercussions in the child’s life. In re C.S., 115 Ohio St.3d 267, 2007-Ohio-4919, 874 N.E.2d 1177, at ¶ 125 (O’Donnell, J., dissenting). Undoubtedly, parents can play a critical role in assisting their minor children during a custodial interrogation, as the Supreme Court has made clear. See, e.g., Gallegos, 370 U.S. at 54, 82 S.Ct. 1209, 8 L.Ed.2d 325; Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599-600, 68 S.Ct. 302, 92 L.Ed. 224 (1948). But the majority’s analysis here does not foreclose the use of a statement made by a 15-year-old boy who did not have the benefit of counsel or his parents or guardian during a custodial interrogation. The custodial interrogation is at least as important as the events that subsequently unfold in court, and given its repercussions, a child must be afforded the right to counsel and parents during that period.