SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
en banc
Carla Baker, )
)
Respondent, )
)
vs. ) No. SC93451
)
Bristol Care, Inc., d/b/a Bristol Manor, )
and David Furnell, )
)
Appellants. )
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DEKALB COUNTY
Honorable R. Brent Elliott, Judge
Opinion issued August 19, 2014
Bristol Care Inc. and David Furnell (Appellants) appeal an order overruling their
motion to compel arbitration. They contend that the circuit court erred by not compelling
arbitration because the arbitration agreement between Bristol and its employee, Carla
Baker, is valid and enforceable.
This Court affirms the circuit court’s order because there was no consideration to
create a valid arbitration agreement. 1 First, Baker’s continued at-will employment does
not provide consideration for the arbitration agreement. Second, the fact that Bristol
retroactively could modify, amend or revoke the agreement means that Bristol’s promise
1
The lack of an enforceable arbitration agreement between Bristol and Baker renders it
unnecessary to consider the remaining points on appeal. Those points consist of
Appellants’ argument that the agreement was not unconscionable and that it did not apply
to Furnell as Bristol’s president.
to arbitrate is illusory and does not constitute consideration for Baker’s agreement to
arbitrate.
FACTS
Bristol promoted Baker from her position as an hourly employee to a salaried
managerial position at one of Bristol’s long-term care facilities. Bristol drafted an
employment agreement and arbitration agreement for Baker to sign. The parties signed
the agreements contemporaneously at the time of Baker’s promotion.
The employment agreement provided that Baker’s employment would “continue
indefinitely” unless Baker gave 60 days notice or Bristol elected to terminate her
employment in one of four ways: (1) with five days’ written notice “at [Bristol’s] sole
option;” (2) without notice if Bristol paid Baker five days’ compensation; (3) without
notice if, in Bristol’s “sole opinion,” Baker violates the employment agreement in a way
that “jeopardizes the general operation of the facility or the care, comfort or security of its
residents;” or (4) without notice for “dishonesty, insubordination, moral turpitude or
incompetence.” The employment agreement also provided that Baker would receive
increased pay and employment benefits, including a license to live in the facility rent-
free.
The arbitration agreement provides that all legal claims the parties may have
against one another will be resolved by binding arbitration. The arbitration agreement
provides that consideration consists of Baker’s continued employment and mutual
promises to resolve claims through arbitration. Section 3 of the arbitration agreement,
titled “Employment-At-Will,” provides:
This Agreement is not, and shall not be construed to create, a contract
of employment, express or implied, and does not alter Employee’s
status as an at-will employee. Notwithstanding this Agreement, either
Employee or Company can terminate the employment . . . at any time,
for any reason, with or without cause at the option of the Employee or
the Company.
Finally, the arbitration agreement provides that Bristol specifically “reserves the right to
amend, modify or revoke this agreement upon thirty (30) days’ prior written notice to the
Employee.”
Bristol terminated Baker from her position as administrator of the long-term care
facility. Baker filed a class action lawsuit against Appellants seeking compensation for
allegedly unpaid overtime hours. Appellants filed a motion to compel arbitration. The
circuit court overruled the motion. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
Section 435.440, RSMo 2000, 2 provides that an appeal may be taken from an
order denying an application to compel arbitration made under section 435.355. The
order denying Bristol’s motion to compel arbitration is appealable.
I. Validity of the arbitration agreement is determined by the courts
Appellants assert that the arbitrator should decide any questions of enforceability
because both Bristol Care and Baker agreed to have the arbitrator do so in the arbitration
agreement. The arbitration agreement provides: “The arbitrator has exclusive authority to
resolve any dispute relating to applicability or enforceability of this Agreement.”
2
All references to statutes are to RSMo 2000.
3
Appellants rely on Rent-A-Ctr, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010). In
Rent-A-Center, the arbitration agreement provided that the arbitrator “shall have
exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the interpretation, applicability,
enforceability or formation of this Agreement.” Id. at 2775. (Emphasis added). The
employee argued that the agreement was not enforceable because it was unconscionable
under Nevada law. Id. The United States Supreme Court held that the delegation
provision vested the arbitrator, not the courts, with the authority to determine whether the
agreement was unconscionable. Id. at 2778-79.
The arbitration agreement in this case provides that the arbitrator will resolve
disputes “relating to the applicability or enforceability” of the agreement. Unlike the
agreement at issue in Rent-A-Center, the arbitration agreement in this case does not
delegate to the arbitrator disputes regarding contract formation. A dispute “relating to the
applicability or enforceability” of the agreement presupposes the formation of a contract.
Baker’s argument that there was no consideration to create a valid agreement raises a
contract formation issue rather than an applicability or enforceability issue.
Although federal law preempts state laws that invalidate arbitration agreements on
public policy grounds, state courts are permitted to apply state law defenses to the
formation of the particular contract at issue. Brewer v. Missouri Title Loans, 364 S.W.3d
486, 492 (Mo. banc 2012); Robinson v. Title Lenders, Inc., 364 S.W.3d 505, 510 (Mo.
banc 2012). Baker’s claim raises a contract formation issue that is subject to resolution
by Missouri state courts.
4
II. Validity of Arbitration Agreement
The issue of whether arbitration should be compelled is a question of law subject
to de novo review. State ex rel. Vincent v. Schneider, 194 S.W.3d 853, 856 (Mo. banc
2006). “Missouri contract law applies to determine whether the parties have entered a
valid agreement to arbitrate.” Id. “The essential elements of any contract, including one
for arbitration, are “‘offer, acceptance, and bargained for consideration.’” Johnson v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 745 S.W.2d 661, 662 (Mo. banc 1988). Consideration
“consists either of a promise (to do or refrain from doing something) or the transfer or
giving up of something of value to the other party.” Morrow v. Hallmark Cards, Inc.,
273 S.W.3d 15, 25 (Mo. App. 2008).
Appellants argue that there are two sources of consideration for the arbitration
agreement: (1) Baker’s promotion, continued employment and attendant benefits; and (2)
Bristol’s promise to arbitrate its claims arising out of the employment relationship
between it and Baker and to assume the costs of arbitration. “If two considerations are
given for a promise, one of them being legally sufficient to support a promise and the
other not sufficient, the promise is enforceable.” Earl v. St. Louis Univ., 875 S.W.2d 234,
236-237 (Mo. App. 1994) (citing 1 Corbin on Contracts, § 126 (1963)). The arbitration
contract, therefore, is enforceable if either source of consideration is valid.
A. Continued Employment
Bristol argues that Baker’s acceptance of continued employment, with the
attendant increase in salary and benefits, plus the limits on Bristol’s right to terminate her
employment, constitute consideration to support the arbitration agreement. Baker argues
5
that her employment remained at-will and that continued at-will employment does not
constitute valid consideration to support the arbitration agreement.
The Missouri Court of Appeals has held that continued at-will employment is not
valid consideration to support an agreement requiring the employee to arbitrate his or her
claims against the employer. See, e.g., Whitworth v. McBride & Son Homes, Inc., 334
S.W.3d 730, 741 (Mo. App. 2011); Frye v. Speedway Chevrolet Cadillac, 321 S.W.3d
429, 438-439 (Mo. App. 2010); Morrow, 273 S.W.3d at 26. An offer of continued at-will
employment is not valid consideration because the employer makes no legally
enforceable promise to do or refrain from doing anything it is not already entitled to do.
The employer still can terminate the employee immediately for any reason. Morrow, 273
S.W.3d at 26-27. While the federal courts have reached a different result, this Court
rejects that approach and, instead, adopts the analysis employed by Morrow and
subsequent court of appeals cases, which hold that continued at-will employment is not
valid consideration to create an enforceable contract. 3 The issue becomes whether the
employment and arbitration agreements altered Baker’s status as an at-will employee.
The at-will employment doctrine is well-established in Missouri law. Margiotta v.
Christian Hosp. Ne. Nw., 315 S.W.3d 342, 345 (Mo. banc 2010) (citing Johnson v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 745 S.W.2d at 661). Absent an employment contract with a
3
The principal federal case is Berkley v. Dillard’s Inc., 450 F.3d 775, 777 (8th Cir. 2006).
In Berkeley, the Eighth Circuit held that continued employment constitutes consideration
and acceptance sufficient to create an enforceable contract. Subsequent federal district
court cases have followed Berkely. See Canterbury v. Parsons Constructors, Inc., 2009
(W.D. Mo. March 27, 2009) (expressly declining to follow Morrow and holding,
consistent with Berkeley, that continued employment is adequate consideration to create
an enforceable arbitration agreement).
6
“definite statement of duration ... an employment at will is created.” Id. citing Luethans
v. Washington Univ., 894 S.W.2d 169 (Mo. banc 1995)). An employer may terminate an
at-will employee “for any reason or for no reason.” Id. (citing Crabtree v. Bugby, 967
S.W.2d 66, 70 (Mo. banc 1998)). Key indicia of at-will employment include indefinite
duration or employment and the employer’s option to terminate the employment
immediately without cause.
The employment agreement provides that Baker’s employment will “continue
indefinitely” unless Bristol elected to terminate Baker by giving her five days’ written
notice “at [Bristol’s] sole option” or terminating her without notice and paying Baker five
days’ compensation. The employment agreement permits Bristol to terminate Baker
immediately without notice for any reason by paying her what amounts to a severance
package worth five days’ pay. There is no guaranteed duration of employment. The lack
of a defined duration of employment is consistent with at-will employment.
The arbitration agreement drafted by Bristol confirms that the parties understood
that Baker was an at-will employee. Section 3 of the arbitration agreement provides that
the agreement “does not alter Employee’s status as an at-will employee.” The agreement
then provides that “[n]otwithstanding this Agreement, either Employee or Company can
terminate the employment . . . at any time, for any reason, with or without cause at the
option of the Employee or the Company.” These provisions amount to an unequivocal,
positive representation by Bristol that Baker’s status is that of “an at-will employee.”
Under these facts, Baker is an at-will employee. The various promises that the parties
exchanged were all incidents of Baker’s continued at-will employment. Neither Baker’s
7
continued at-will employment nor the incidents of that employment provide consideration
supporting an obligation to arbitrate disputes with Bristol.
Bristol asserts that the statement in the arbitration agreement providing that Baker
is “an at-will employee” does not govern because the arbitration agreement is a dispute
resolution document, not an employment agreement. As noted, Bristol drafted an
employment agreement and an arbitration agreement for Baker to sign. The parties
acknowledge that the agreements were executed contemporaneously. Documents that are
executed contemporaneously are considered together as a single agreement. State ex rel
Johnson v. JF Enterprises, LLC, 400 S.W.3d 763, 764 (Mo. banc 2013). If possible, all
provisions in the various documents should be harmonized in order to effectuate the
parties’ intent. Id. at 770 (citing, J. E. Hathman, Inc. v. Sigma Alpha Epsilon Club, 491
S.W.2d 261, 264 (Mo. banc 1973)). When considered together, as one agreement,
Bristol’s argument amounts to an effort to disclaim its specific statement that Baker’s
employment was at-will as well as the fact that Bristol retained the right to terminate
Baker’s employment at any time for any reason. Baker was an at-will employee and
remained so after she signed the employment and arbitration agreements.
Bristol also asserts that Baker’s entitlement to severance pay following
termination without notice constitutes consideration above and beyond continued at-will
employment. Even if Baker had legal recourse to recover her severance pay, the fact
remains that her term of employment was indefinite, Bristol retained the right to
terminate her employment immediately without cause, Baker had no recourse to
challenge her termination beyond the legally recognized exceptions to the at-will
8
employment doctrine, and Bristol affirmatively and unequivocally stated that Baker’s
status is that of “an at-will employee.” Under these circumstances, the obligation to pay
severance is not sufficient to alter Baker’s status as an at-will employee. See Karzin v.
Collet, 562 S.W.2d 397, 400 (Mo. App. 1978) (indicating that employment was at-will
when employee was entitled to severance but could be fired immediately without cause).
Baker’s severance pay was a term and condition of her at-will employment.
B. Mutual Promises to Arbitrate
Appellants contend that the arbitration agreement also is supported by mutual
promises to arbitrate. As the dissent explains at length, bilateral contracts are supported
by consideration and enforceable when each party promises to undertake some legal duty
or liability. Sumners v. Serv. Vending, Co., Inc., 102 S.W.3d 37, 41 (Mo. App. 2003).
These promises, however, must be binding, not illusory. Id. A promise is illusory when
one party retains the unilateral right to amend the agreement and avoid its obligations.
Morrow, 273 S.W.3d at 25.
In this case, Bristol’s alleged mutual promise to arbitrate is conditioned on
Bristol’s unilateral “right to amend, modify or revoke this agreement upon thirty (30)
days’ prior written notice to the Employee.” The quoted language does not limit Bristol’s
authority to modify the arbitration agreement unilaterally and retroactively. If Bristol
retains unilateral authority to amend the agreement retroactively, its promise to arbitrate
is illusory and is not consideration. 4
4
The dissent lists the various arbitration promises that both parties made. The list is accurate.
The list overlooks the fact that each of these arbitration-related promises is subject to unilateral
9
Bristol asserts that the requirement of prior written notice means that any
modifications must apply prospectively only. The fact that Bristol must give prior
written notice of an amendment to the arbitration agreement does not preclude Bristol
from giving Baker prior written notice that, effective in thirty days, Bristol retroactively
is disclaiming a promise made in the arbitration agreement. For instance, if in the course
of an ongoing arbitration process, Bristol concluded that the process was not favorable,
Bristol could provide Baker notice that, effective in 30 days, it no longer would consider
itself bound by the results of the arbitration. While the dissent concludes summarily that
no court would adopt a construction of the agreement allowing Bristol to disclaim or
modify its arbitration promises unilaterally at any time for its own benefit, the fact
remains that the language of the agreement would permit Bristol to do just that.
Appellants cite Pierce v. Kellogg, Brown & Root, Inc., 245 F.Supp. 2d 1212,
1215-16 (E.D. Okla. 2003) for the proposition that the notice requirement in the
arbitration agreement renders the promise sufficiently binding to provide consideration.
Aside from the fact that Pierce is not binding authority on this Court, the case is
distinguishable because the agreement at issue not only required 10 days’ notice to the
employee of any modification, it also expressly provided that any amendment would not
be effective “as to disputes … for which a proceeding ha[d] been initiated pursuant to the
Rules.” (quoting contract language). Unlike this case, the employer in Pierce expressly
was limited to prospective amendment of the arbitration agreement. Contracts, like the
modification or abrogation by Bristol. Just as adding several zeros equals zero, adding several
illusory promises equals an illusory promise.
10
arbitration agreement in this case, that permit unilateral, retroactive amendment are
deemed illusory and do not constitute consideration to create an enforceable contract.
See Frye, 321 S.W.3d at 442-445; see also Morrow, 273 S.W.3d at 20 (Ahuja, J.,
concurring) (quoting Am. Laminates, Inc., v. J.S. Latta, Co., 980 S.W.2d 12, 23 (Mo.
App. 1998)); Carey v. 24 Hour Fitness, USA, Inc., 669 F.3d 202 (5th Cir. 2012)
(provision permitting unilateral amendment to arbitration agreement by employer is an
illusory promise; reasonable advance notice and language denoting prospective
application of amendments are required). Consequently, Bristol’s alleged mutual
promise to arbitrate is not valid consideration to support the arbitration agreement.
Conclusion
Baker’s continued at-will employment and Bristol’s promise to resolve claims
through arbitration do not provide consideration to form a valid arbitration agreement.
The judgment overruling appellant’s motion to compel arbitration is affirmed.
______________________________________
Richard B. Teitelman, Judge
Russell, C.J., Stith and Draper, JJ., concur;
Wilson, J., dissents in separate opinion filed;
Breckenridge and Fischer, JJ., concur in
opinion of Wilson, J.
11
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
en banc
Carla Baker, )
)
Respondent, )
)
v. ) No. SC93451
)
Bristol Care, Inc., d/b/a Bristol Manor, )
and David Furnell, )
)
Appellants. )
DISSENTING OPINION
The majority opinion holds there was only one agreement between Ms. Baker and
Bristol Care concerning her employment as facility administrator. I agree. Even though
the various promises between the parties are set forth in two separate documents, those
documents were signed at the same time and the parties understood and agreed that, taken
together, these documents reflected the terms on which Bristol Care offered – and
Ms. Baker accepted – the promotion to facility administrator. She emphasizes this point
in her brief, stating that she was “required to sign the employment agreement and the
arbitration agreement as a condition of her employment.” As this Court has recently
held, “when several instruments relating to the same subject are executed at the same
time …, the documents will be construed together, even in the absence of explicit
incorporation, unless the realities of the situation indicate that the parties did not so
intend.” Johnson ex rel. Johnson v. JF Enterprises, LLC, 400 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Mo.
banc 2013) (emphasis in the original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Where I part company with the majority opinion, however, is its conclusion that
no contract 1 was formed between Ms. Baker and Bristol Care because there was no
consideration to make their respective promises legally binding. I disagree on this point
and, therefore, respectfully dissent.
I. Arbitration-Neutral Principles of Missouri Law
Govern Questions of Contract Formation
A promise to arbitrate can be part of a contract limited to that issue, or it can be
contained in a contract that addresses arbitration among many other terms. Here, as
Ms. Baker concedes (and the majority opinion holds), the contract between Ms. Baker
and Bristol Care – if one was formed – deals with arbitration only as one of the terms of
Ms. Baker’s promotion to facility administrator. The enforceability of this arbitration
promise is controlled by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-9 (the “FAA”), but
the FAA looks to state law to decide the threshold questions of contract formation. First
Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995). Accordingly, Ms. Baker’s
claim that none of the promises between the parties is enforceable due to a lack of
1
To avoid confusion, this opinion uses the term “contract” to mean a legally enforceable
promise or collection of promises. Every promise is not a contract, of course, and it is
consideration (among other issues of contract formation) that turns a promise into a contract.
Moreover, courts may refuse to enforce all or part of a contract even though the elements of
contract formation are present. For example, a party may ask that a promise not be enforced
because it is unconscionable or because it was induced by fraud. Such defenses are not questions
of contract formation, however, and do not even arise until the question of formation is decided
in favor of the party claiming the existence of the contract. Accordingly, the word “contract” in
this opinion means only a promise or collection of promises as to which a contract has been
formed, regardless of whether either party may have a valid defense to the enforcement of all or
any one of those promises.
2
consideration raises a question of contract formation that must be resolved under
Missouri law.
The FAA’s deference to state law on questions of contract formation is not
unlimited, however. Given that one of Congress’s purposes in enacting the FAA was to
overcome deeply entrenched judicial hostility toward arbitration contracts, see AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011), the FAA defers only to
principles of state law that apply generally to all contracts. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (providing
that all arbitration promises “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract”). In other words,
state law principles that purport to apply special rules for the formation of contracts
containing promises to arbitrate are preempted by, and must be disregarded under, the
FAA. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987) (any “state-law principle that takes
its meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue does not comport
with” § 2 of the FAA).
Accordingly, Ms. Baker’s consideration claim must be analyzed only under
principles of Missouri law that are “arbitration neutral,” i.e., that treat all contracts the
same regardless of whether they contain a promise to arbitrate. Allied-Bruce Terminix
Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995) (“What States may not do is decide
that a contract is fair enough to enforce all its basic terms (price, service, credit), but not
fair enough to enforce its arbitration clause.”).
3
II. Consideration as an Element of Contract Formation
Ms. Baker does not challenge the formation of her contract with Bristol Care on
the basis that there was no mutual assent, i.e., offer and acceptance. The two documents
plainly reflect the terms on which Bristol Care offered the promotion to facility
administrator, and Ms. Baker’s signatures evidenced her acceptance of and assent to
those terms. Instead, she claims that no contract was formed between herself and Bristol
Care as to those terms because there was no exchange of consideration to make their
respective promises binding. Consideration, like mutual assent, is one of the basic
elements of contract formation. Nat’l Ref. Co. v. McDowell, 201 S.W.2d 342, 347 (Mo.
1947) (“One of the essential elements of a contract is the consideration.”).
There have been numerous opinions from this Court and others on the subject of
consideration, and scholars have filled countless pages in their efforts to explain what
those opinions mean. The subtle nuances in the application of this doctrine at the outer
edges are as complex as any in the common law. Corbin on Contracts (1995), §§ 5.1 and
5.2, pp. 5-6 and 11-13. But no matter how much these nuances may thrill scholars, haunt
courts, and torture first-year law students, they are unnecessary to the decision of this
case. This case requires only the straightforward application of three basic principles of
consideration that have been stated and applied by Missouri courts without hesitation or
qualification for generations.
A. A Bargained-For Exchange
The first relevant principle of consideration is that it is a bargained-for exchange.
In other words, when a promise is given in exchange for a benefit to the promisor, or in
4
exchange for a detriment to the promisee, this bargain supplies the consideration needed
to form a contract. State ex rel. Kansas City v. State Highway Comm’n, 163 S.W.2d 948,
953 (Mo. banc 1942) (“consideration of a contract can consist either in a benefit
conferred upon the promisor or in a legal detriment to the promisee”). In this way,
consideration demonstrates the seriousness of the parties’ bargain and provides assurance
that they intended a promise to be enforceable in a court of law. Corbin on Contracts
(1995), § 5.3, pp. 19-20.
Identifying a bargained-for exchange, therefore, is the key to determining whether
consideration was given. “[C]onsideration may consist of some right, interest, profit or
benefit accruing to [the promisor], or some forbearance, loss or responsibility given,
suffered or undertaken by the [promisee].” Perbal v. Dazor Mfg. Corp., 436 S.W.2d 677,
697 (Mo. 1968). When the consideration consists of a detriment to the promisee, this
“means that the promisee changes his legal position; that is, that he gives up certain
rights, privileges or immunities which he theretofore possessed or assumes certain duties
or liabilities not theretofore imposed upon him.” Kansas City, 163 S.W.2d at 953.
For example, consider the simple contract in which A promises to pay $100 to B if
B mows A’s lawn. When B mows the lawn, A’s promise to pay is binding (i.e., a
contract is formed) because A gave it in exchange for: (1) the benefit to A of having the
lawn mowed (which A otherwise would not have received), or (2) the detriment to B of
having mowed A’s lawn (a chore B otherwise would not have performed). 2
2
Confusion sometimes arises in the context of such unilateral contracts because the offeree’s
performance operates as both the acceptance of the offeror’s offer and the consideration for the
5
The foregoing example is a unilateral contract because the offeror requires the
offeree to manifest acceptance by tendering performance, not by making a promise to
perform. In a bilateral contract, on the other hand, the offeree accepts by making the
promise(s) sought by the offeror. Even though the nature of the exchange between the
parties is different than in a unilateral contract, the consideration analysis remains the
same. In both circumstances, the focus is on identifying a bargained-for exchange
consisting of a benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the promisee.
For example, consider the following bilateral contract: A promises to pay $100 to
B, and B promises to mow A’s lawn. A’s promise is supported by consideration because
A gave it in exchange for: (1) the benefit to A of obtaining B’s promise to mow the lawn
(which A otherwise had no right to make B give), or (2) the detriment to B of
undertaking the obligation to mow A’s lawn (which B otherwise did not owe). At the
same time, B’s promise to A is supported by consideration because B gave it in exchange
for: (1) the benefit to B of having A’s promise of a $100 payment (which B otherwise
had no right to make A give), or (2) the detriment to A of assuming the obligation to pay
$100 to B (which A otherwise did not owe). 3
offeror’s promise. For example, by mowing A’s lawn (which B had no preexisting obligation to
do), B manifests assent to A’s offer and supplies the consideration to make A’s promise binding.
Jensen v. McCall’s Estate, 426 S.W.2d 52, 57 (Mo. 1968); Williston on Contracts, § 1:17.
3
Again, confusion can arise in bilateral contracts because one party’s promise(s) may (or may
not) be conditional or dependent upon the other party’s performance. For example, A’s
obligation to pay $100 to B may not come due unless and until B mows (or substantially mows)
A’s lawn. But conditional or dependent promises are issues relating to breach and remedy, not
contract formation. Because consideration is determined at the time promises are made, Turner
v. Sch. Dist. of Clayton, 318 S.W.3d 660, 670 (Mo. banc 2010) (consideration “must be
measured at the time the parties enter into their contract”), not performed, B’s promise to mow
6
As this second example shows, bilateral contracts – by definition – are supported
by consideration. “In any bilateral contract, each promise is the consideration for the
other promise. Such is the bargain.” Corbin on Contracts (1995), § 5.20, p. 102. “This
has been true for at least four centuries, ever since bilateral contracts [as relative
newcomers to the law of contracts] were recognized.” Id. § 5.25, p.126 (citing cases
from as early as 1555). This principle is equally well-rooted in Missouri law.
It is the recognized general rule that a promise by one party to a contract is
a sufficient consideration for a promise by the other party. If, therefore,
there is a promise on the part of a purchaser to buy and pay the purchase
price, this itself is a sufficient consideration for the promise of a vendor to
sell and convey.
Ragan v. Schreffler, 306 S.W.2d 494, 499 (Mo. 1957). Thus, it is clear that it is not the
price that supplies the necessary consideration but the offeree’s promise to pay it.
Of course, not every promise will supply consideration. For example, a promise
does not constitute consideration if the performance promised would not, itself, constitute
consideration. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 75 (a promise is not
consideration when the promisor knows at the time the promise is made that the promise
can be performed by an act that would not be consideration for a unilateral contract, e.g.,
payment of a preexisting debt). In the absence of such an exception, however, the
general rule remains: a bargained-for exchange of promises supplies the consideration
A’s lawn supplies the consideration to form a contract as to A’s promise to pay $100 to B
regardless of whether (or how well) B performs that promise. See Corbin on Contracts (1995),
§ 5.34, p. 192-94.
7
needed to bind both parties to their promises. 4 See Braudis v. Helfrich, 265 S.W.2d 371,
372 (Mo. 1954) (“mutual promises constituted sufficient consideration for the bilateral
contract”) (citing Williston on Contracts, § 103F, p. 347; and Restatement (First) of
Contracts, § 77, p. 86); State ex inf. Miller v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 74 S.W.2d 348,
356 (Mo. banc 1934) (in “bilateral contracts the consideration is a return promise”)
(citing Restatement (First) of Contracts, § 75, p.82 (comment(d)); Frye v. Speedway
Chevrolet Cadillac, 321 S.W.3d 429, 438 (Mo. App. 2010) (“It is an elemental principle
of contract law that a contract that contains mutual promises imposing some legal duty or
liability on each promisor is supported by sufficient consideration to form a valid,
enforceable contract.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
B. Courts Do NOT Evaluate Consideration for “Adequacy”
The second relevant principle regarding consideration is that it requires no
qualitative analysis. Consideration either is present (and a contract is formed), or it is
not. Courts have no authority to attempt to value the bargained-for consideration in an
effort to determine whether the promisor is – or is not – receiving “adequate” return for
the promise given.
It is unnecessary that the consideration should be adequate in point of
actual value, the law having no means to decide upon this matter. If the
4
Because both parties to a bilateral contract are promisors and both are promisees, and because
it is the exchange of promises that supplies consideration, it is essential that “each party has the
right at once to hold the other to a positive agreement.” Huttig v. Brennan, 41 S.W.2d 1054,
1062 (Mo. 1931). “Mutuality of contract means that an obligation rests upon each party to do or
permit to be done something in consideration of the act or promise of the other; that is, neither
party is bound unless both are bound.” Aden v. Dalton, 107 S.W.2d 1070, 1073 (Mo. 1937).
Accordingly, either both parties are bound to their respective promises in their bilateral contract
regarding Ms. Baker’s promotion, or neither is bound.
8
least benefit or advantage be received by the promisor from the promisee,
or a third person, or if the promisee sustain any, the least injury or
detriment, it will constitute a sufficient consideration to render the
agreement valid.
Marks v. Bank of Missouri, 8 Mo. 316, 319 (1843) (emphasis added), overruled on other
grounds by Wild v. Howe, 74 Mo. 551, 553 (1881). See also Weinstein v. KLT Telecom,
Inc., 225 S.W.3d 413, 415-16 (Mo. banc 2007) (it is one of the “general principles of
contract law that consideration must be measured at the time the parties enter into their
contract”); Sanger v. Yellow Cab Co., 486 S.W.2d 477, 480 (Mo. banc 1972) (a party
“under no disability and under no compulsion may convey his property or relinquish his
rights for as small consideration as he may decide”); Brown v. Weare, 152 S.W.2d 649,
653-54 (Mo. 1941) (“it is the policy of the law not to weigh the quantum of
consideration, but, refraining from interference with the freedom of contract, suffer the
parties to exercise freely their judgment … and determine for themselves the benefits
derived from their bargains”) (quotations and citations omitted); Doss v. EPIC
Healthcare Mgmt. Co., 901 S.W.2d 216, 220 (Mo. App. 1995) (where the “requirement
of consideration [is] present … the law does not concern itself with the adequacy of the
consideration”); Hackett v. St. Joseph Light & Power Co., 761 S.W.2d 206, 212 (Mo.
App. 1988) (same); Haretuer v. Klocke, 709 S.W.2d 138, 139 (Mo. App. 1986) (“in the
absence of fraud, inadequacy of consideration is not a defense and the courts do not
examine the adequacy of that consideration”).
Accordingly, any bargained-for exchange will supply the consideration needed to
form a contract, regardless of whether a court believes (with the benefit of hindsight) that
9
the promisor gave a promise that was worth more – even far more – than the benefit or
detriment received in the exchange. 5 See Sanger, 486 S.W.2d at 480 (courts do not
attempt to weigh or value consideration); Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 79(b) (“If
the requirement of consideration is met, there is no additional requirement of …
equivalence in the values exchanged.”).
Ms. Baker argues that grossly inadequate consideration may suggest that a
contract is voidable due to fraud, duress, or unconscionability. See Vondera v. Chapman,
180 S.W.2d 704, 705 (Mo. 1944). This may be, but such defenses have nothing to do
with contract formation. In fact, these defenses assume a contract was formed, i.e., that
consideration was bargained for in exchange for each party’s promise(s). See
Restatement (Second) of Contract, § 208, comment c (“Inadequacy of consideration does
not itself invalidate a bargain, but gross disparity … may be an important factor in a
determination that a contract is unconscionable”); Arthur Fels Bond & Mortg. Co. v.
Pollock, 149 S.W.2d 356, 359 (Mo. 1941) (“inadequacy does not constitute a failure of
consideration”).
5
Even if courts (in hindsight) continue to indulge the now-preempted notion that arbitration is
always “bad” for the employee and “good” for the employer, it does not follow that any
employee agreeing to arbitrate her claims has made a bad bargain when viewed at the time the
promise is made, as a consideration analysis demands. A reasonable employee might decide that
promises relating to arbitration and other things which are uncertain ever to occur are easily
given in exchange for promises concerning things such as pay and benefits that have an
immediate and certain value to the employee.
10
C. Separate Consideration is Not Needed for
Each Contemporaneous Promise
The third relevant principle is that all contemporaneous promises by one party are
deemed to have been given in exchange for the aggregate benefit to that party or the
aggregate detriment to the other party. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts, at § 80(1)
(“There is consideration for a set of promises if what is bargained for and given in
exchange would have been consideration for each promise in the set if exchanged for that
promise alone.”); Corbin on Contracts (1995), § 5.12, p. 56 (same). Courts are not
allowed to unravel the parties’ bargain in hindsight, i.e., to allocate the consideration
between and among some – but not all – of the promisor’s undertakings, and then use the
results of this exercise as a basis for refusing to enforce the entirety of the parties’
bargain. Accordingly, there does not have to be separate consideration for each promise
when a collection of promises is given in exchange for a collection of promises.
This principle likely is a corollary of the principle stated above, i.e., that courts
cannot assess the value of the consideration in determining whether consideration existed.
If one or more of several considerations, which are recited as the ground of
a promise, be only frivolous and insufficient, but not illegal, and others are
good and sufficient, then undoubtedly the considerations may be severed,
and those which are void disregarded, while those which are valid will
sustain the promise.
Drummond Realty & Inv. Co. v. W.H. Thompson Trust Co., 178 S.W. 479, 482 (Mo.
1915) (quoting Parsons on Contracts (9th Ed.), Vol. 1, p.455). See also Fullington v.
Ozark Poultry Supply Co., 39 S.W.2d 780, 783-84 (Mo. 1931) (“If, without deciding, the
recited purchase of stock is not a consideration supporting respondent’s hiring of
11
appellant, the other consideration of mutual promises [to hire and to serve] is sufficient
….”) (citing Drummond Realty); Y.W. By & Through Smith v. Nat’l Super Markets, Inc.,
876 S.W.2d 785, 791 (Mo. App. 1994) (“contract which has several items of
consideration, one sufficient and one insufficient, may be upheld on the strength of the
valid consideration”) (citing Calamari & Perillo, Contracts (2d ed. 1977), § 4.23, Corbin,
Corbin on Contracts (1952), § 126); Empire Gas Corp. v. Small’s LP Gas Co., 637
S.W.2d 239, 246 (Mo. App. 1982) (“even if there be partial failure of consideration, yet if
there is a substantial consideration left it will be sufficient to sustain the contract”) (citing
17 C.J.S. Contracts, §§ 129-30, pp. 848-852).
As noted, however, this principle applies only to contemporaneous promises.
When a party makes a new promise after a contract is formed, benefits or detriments
bargained for as part of the original contract cannot serve as consideration for the
subsequent promise. Corbin on Contracts (1995), § 7.1, p. 342. For example, this Court
held that there was no consideration to support an employee’s promise not to compete
with the employer after his employment because the promise was given after – but during
the term of – the beginning of the employment contract. Nat’l Motor Club of Mo., Inc. v.
Noe, 475 S.W.2d 16, 21 (Mo. 1972) (no consideration because employee “did not get a
new position when he signed [the covenant not to compete], or anything new”).
This distinction between multiple promises that are part of an initial contract and
subsequent promises was the focus of Purcell Tire & Rubber Co. v. Executive Beechcraft,
Inc., 59 S.W.3d 505 (Mo. banc 2001). There, Purcell Tire hired Beechcraft to inspect a
plane Purcell Tire was considering buying. Their contract included a cap on Beechcraft’s
12
liability to Purcell Tire in the event Beechcraft either failed to inspect the plane or failed
to inspect it competently. In response to Purcell Tire’s claim that this liability cap or
waiver was invalid for lack of separate consideration, this Court noted the general rule
that, when such a promise is made after the parties’ initial contract is formed, new
consideration is required to make that promise binding. Id. at 509. But Beechcraft’s
liability cap was part of the parties’ original contract. Accordingly, the Court held that no
new or separate consideration was required to make the cap enforceable against Purcell
Tire because it was supported by the same consideration that made all of the other
original terms enforceable. In other words, the liability cap was part of the original
bargained-for exchange because “Beechcraft agreed to survey the plane – subject to a
liability limitation – in exchange for Purcell Tire’s payment of $1,250.” Id. at 509-10. 6
Accordingly, a promise to arbitrate need not be supported by separate
consideration if it is made at the same time as other promises and those promises, viewed
collectively, were supported by consideration. When several promises are given as part
of a bargained-for exchange that results in any benefit to the promisor or any detriment to
the promisee (or both), a contract is formed with respect to all of the promises made.
6
See also Migar Enterprises, Inc. v. DeMent, 817 S.W.2d 911, 913 (Mo. App. 1990) (covenant
not to compete in contract selling business was supported by consideration because, “[w]hile the
contract stated no separate consideration for the non-competition agreement, the $25,000
purchase price was sufficient consideration to support the same”); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Tucker,
768 S.W.2d 595, 601 (Mo. App. 1989) (“Clearly, promotions, additional responsibility, and pay
increases constitute adequate consideration in support of the validity of the service agreement,”
including the promise not to compete made in that agreement.); City Ice & Fuel Co. v. Snell, 57
S.W.2d 440, 442 (Mo. App. 1933) (“it is now well established by the decisions of our Supreme
Court and appellate courts that contracts [with non-compete provisions] similar to the one in this
case are based upon a sufficient consideration, namely, the mutual promises of the parties”).
13
III. There was Consideration for the Parties’ Exchange of Promises
Prior to her promotion as facility administrator, Ms. Baker worked as an hourly
(i.e., “non-exempt”) employee pursuant to a simple unilateral contract. Bristol Care
promised to pay a specified wage if Ms. Baker worked – not promised to work – in
Bristol Care’s facilities. That contract was terminable at any time by either party. The
agreement with respect to Ms. Baker’s promotion to facility administrator, however, was
quite different. As Ms. Baker concedes, she was “required to sign the employment
document and the arbitration document as a condition of her employment” as facility
administrator. The following is a list of some, though not all, of the promises each party
made to the other at the outset of their new arrangement.
Bristol Care promised:
To employ Ms Baker as the Administrator of its facility for an indefinite term,
subject to its right to terminate her employment: (a) without notice for certain
specified grounds, and (b) with either five days’ notice or five days’ pay in all
other circumstances
To pay Ms. Baker a monthly salary for her services
To advance, without interest, $350 to Ms. Baker in the middle of each month
against her salary, which was to be paid at the end of each month
To pay Ms. Baker a bonus if specified financial targets are met, the amount of
which would be increased or decreased based on Ms. Baker’s performance, though
Bristol Care retained the right to eliminate the bonus program without notice
To allow Ms. Baker a specific number of paid vacation days during her first three
and a half years of service and, thereafter, in accordance with company policy
To provide Ms. Baker (and one approved co-habitant) with living
accommodations in the company’s facility during her employment and subject to
stated limitations
To provide all utilities, including basic cable television, for Ms. Baker’s living
accommodations
14
To arbitrate, with specified exceptions, all claims or controversies Ms. Baker may
have against the company arising out of, relating to, or in association with her
employment
To arbitrate, with specified exceptions, all claims or controversies the company
may have against Ms. Baker arising out of, relating to, or in association with her
employment
To initiate and conduct the arbitration of such claims before a single arbitrator
using the procedures (including the arbitrator selection procedures) in the
American Arbitration Association’s Rules for the Resolution of Employment
Disputes in effect at the time the claim is filed
To pay all arbitration fees, including the arbitrator’s fees and expenses, except for
the filing fee for claims initiated by Ms. Baker or the fees and expenses of Ms.
Baker, her attorney, and her witnesses
To maintain the confidentiality of the existence, subject, and results of any
arbitration with Ms. Baker
Ms. Baker promised:
To serve as Administrator in Bristol Care’s facility for an indefinite period, subject
to her right to terminate this employment with 60 days prior notice
To operate the facility in accordance with state rules and regulations governing
residential care facilities, as well as the Bristol Care’s Administrative Guide and
other policies, and to manage facility staff in accordance with the Bristol Care
Employee Handbook
To refrain, during her employment and for a period of two years thereafter, from
disseminating any of Bristol Care’s confidential information to individuals outside
the company
To refrain, during her employment and for a period of two years thereafter, from
soliciting or rendering residential care services to persons who were (a) residents
of the facility during the last year of Ms. Baker’s employment, or (b) solicited to
become residents by Ms. Baker during the last six months of her employment
To refrain, during her employment and for a period of two years thereafter, from
disrupting or interfering with contractual or other relationships between Bristol
Care and its residents, managers or vendors
To abide by the policies of Bristol Care and the State of Missouri concerning
residents’ rights and the handling of residents’ funds, and to refrain (and ensure
that all hourly employees at the facility and all of Ms. Baker’s relatives residing
with her at the facility refrain) from engaging in specified transactions with
residents
15
To arbitrate, with specified exceptions, all claims or controversies Bristol Care
may have against her arising out of, relating to, or in association with her
employment
To arbitrate, with specified exceptions, all claims or controversies she may have
against Bristol Care arising out of, relating to, or in association with her
employment
To initiate and conduct the arbitration of such claims before a single arbitrator
using the procedures (including the arbitrator selection procedures) in the
American Arbitration Association’s Rules for the Resolution of Employment
Disputes in effect at the time the claim is filed
To maintain the confidentiality of the existence, subject, and results of any
arbitration with Bristol Care
Applying the principles set forth above, the exchange of promises in this bilateral
contract supplies consideration to make all of the parties’ promises binding. Ms. Baker
concedes that she signed the two agreements – and thus made each of the promises
memorialized in those agreements – in order to receive the collection of promises Bristol
Care was making to her (e.g., the promotion and related benefits). By the same token,
Bristol Care made its collection of promises in exchange for the collection of promises
Ms. Baker made. The amount of consideration is immaterial because any bargained-for
exchange of benefits or detriments, no matter how small, supplies the consideration
needed to make these promises binding.
A. No Separate Consideration Needed for
Ms. Baker’s Arbitration Promise
Ms. Baker contends that her promise to arbitrate specified claims against Bristol is
not enforceable because that promise was not supported by separate consideration. As
explained in Section B, below, this argument is contrary to this Court’s decision in
Purcell Tire, 59 S.W.3d at 509, because it ignores the fact that Ms. Baker’s arbitration
16
promise was just one of the many promises that Bristol Care bargained for – and she gave
– in order to receive the promotion to facility administrator and accompanying benefits.
But, even though Ms. Baker’s claim is based on a faulty premise, it is worth noting that
her claim still cannot succeed.
1. Bristol Care Agreed to Arbitrate Ms. Baker’s Claims
Even if the Court were to treat Ms. Baker’s promise to arbitrate as though it was
made after – and not as part of – the parties’ broader exchange of promises regarding her
promotion to facility administrator (which she concedes it was), that promise was
supported by consideration. In exchange for her promise to arbitrate any specified claims
that she may have against Bristol Care, Ms. Baker received Bristol Care’s promise to
arbitrate her claims as well. 7
As a result of this bargained-for exchange, therefore: (1) Ms. Baker received the
benefit of access to a process that is (or that she reasonably could have expected it could
be) quicker and less expensive than resorting to the administrative review and civil
litigation procedures to which she otherwise was limited, and (2) Bristol Care incurred
the detriment of agreeing prospectively to waive its right to a jury trial on whatever
specified claims Ms. Baker may assert against it and, instead, submit to her arbitration
process and abide by its results. Even viewed in isolation, therefore, this Court’s
7
In State ex rel. Vincent v. Schneider, 194 S.W.3d 853 (Mo. banc 2006), this Court upheld a
one-sided arbitration agreement and rejected claims that it was unenforceable for lack of
“mutuality.” The Court characterized such “mutuality of obligations” arguments as “a dead
letter in contract law.” Id. at 858. Instead, the Court held that as “‘long as the requirement of
consideration is met, mutuality of obligation is present, even if one party is more obligated than
the other.’” Id. at 859 (quoting Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 181 (3d Cir.
1999)).
17
precedents and the basic principles of consideration require this Court to hold that
Ms. Baker’s arbitration promise is supported by consideration.
To hold otherwise is to say that mutual promises are not valid consideration, a
conclusion that is contrary to every case and treatise on the subject. Worse, to find that
there was no consideration for Ms. Baker’s promise is to say that there was absolutely no
benefit to Ms. Baker in being able to arbitrate whatever claims she may have against
Bristol Care in the future and absolutely no cost to Bristol Care in obligating itself to that
process and its results. These conclusions cannot be justified either by the fact that
Ms. Baker has changed her mind about wanting to arbitrate her claims or by any lingering
judicial hostility toward arbitration generally. The former is contrary to law, see Turner,
318 S.W.3d at 670 (consideration “must be measured at the time the parties enter into
their contract”), and the latter is the sort of judicial hostility to arbitration that the FAA
now preempts. Accordingly, even if the Court ignores all of the other benefits to
Ms. Baker and detriments to Bristol Care in the “Mandatory Arbitration Agreement” (not
to mention the remainder of the promises that comprise the parties’ entire contract) and
focuses solely on her promise to arbitrate specified claims against Bristol Care, there is
sufficient benefit to Ms. Baker and detriment to Bristol Care to make that promise
binding.
2. Bristol Care Also Agreed to Arbitrate Its Specified Claims
Such a narrow focus cannot be justified, however. Even ignoring all of the
parties’ promises regarding Ms. Baker’s promotion, there was a substantial exchange of
promises between the parties in the “Mandatory Arbitration Agreement.” Bristol Care
18
not only promised to arbitrate any specified claims that Ms. Baker may assert against it,
but Bristol Care also promised to arbitrate any specified claims it may wish to assert
against her. This Court already has held that arbitration promises need not be mutual in
this way to make an exchange of promises to arbitrate only one party’s claims
enforceable, see Schneider, 194 S.W.3d at 859, but the willingness of Bristol Care and
Ms. Baker to exchange mutual arbitration promises surely supplies the consideration
needed to make those promises binding.
And those are not the only promises Ms. Baker and Bristol Care exchanged in the
“Mandatory Arbitration Agreement.” Both agreed to keep the existence, subject matter,
and results of any future arbitration between them confidential. Because neither party
was required to pledge such confidentiality, the benefit and detriment to each party of the
mutual promises to do so supplies the consideration needed to make those promises
binding. And, if there is consideration for any one promise, that consideration extends to
all of the contemporaneous promises by that party.
Similarly, both parties agreed to abide by the American Arbitration Association’s
Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes (renamed by the AAA as the
“Employment Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures”) in effect at the time a claim
is filed. Because neither party was obligated to agree to these rules, the benefit and
detriment to each party of their mutual promises to do so supplies the consideration
needed to make those promises – and all other contemporaneous promises in the
arbitration agreement – binding.
19
Finally, Bristol Care agreed to pay all of the costs of the arbitration, including the
arbitrator’s fees and expenses. As a result, Ms. Baker would be obligated to pay only the
initial filing fee for any arbitration she may initiate (plus the fees and expenses of any
attorneys and/or witnesses she may choose to employ). As noted above, Bristol Care had
no preexisting obligation to assume this uneven share of the costs, and its promise to do
so supplies the consideration needed to form a contract on all of the promises made by
Ms. Baker in return.
3. Bristol Care’s Arbitration Promises are Not Illusory
Ms. Baker argues that none of Bristol Care’s promises in the “Mandatory
Arbitration Agreement,” nor the combined effect of all of those promises, supplies
consideration for the promises she made in that agreement. Because Ms. Baker agreed to
give Bristol Care the right to “amend, modify or revoke this agreement upon thirty (30)
days’ prior written notice to the Employee,” she now insists that right renders all of
Bristol Care’s promises illusory.
Bristol Care counters that, because it is bound to give written notice 30 days
before any change, it agreed to be bound by the “Mandatory Arbitration Agreement” for
at least 30 days. In addition, Bristol Care emphasizes that both parties agreed to be
bound by the AAA rules in effect at the time a claim was filed and, therefore, Bristol
Care had no right to alter the agreement as to any claim pending at the time of – or filed
within 30 days after – any notice from Bristol Care that it was intending to change the
agreement.
20
There is no question that the construction of this provision that Bristol Care offers
is the one this Court would adopt if Bristol Care were trying to realize a retrospective
advantage from some unilateral alteration to the agreement. Nor is there any question
that the construction volunteered by Bristol Care now is the one that any court would
adopt in the future should Bristol Care try to alter its obligations to Ms. Baker under this
agreement with respect to the claims she has already asserted. Accordingly, there is no
justification for refusing to adopt this construction here, especially when the
consequences of that refusal is that none of the promises made by either party – not just
in the “Mandatory Arbitration Agreement” but on any aspect of her promotion to facility
administrator – will be enforceable. See Perbal, 436 S.W.2d 677, 689 (Mo. 1968)
(“Where an agreement is susceptible of two constructions, one of which renders the
contract invalid and the other sustains its validity, the latter construction is preferred”); In
re Binghamton Bridge, 70 U.S. 51, 74 (1865) (“It is not the duty of a court, by legal
subtlety, to overthrow a contract, but rather to uphold it and give it effect”).
Even if the Court is unwilling to read the “Mandatory Arbitration Agreement” as
both parties plainly intended it to be read from the outset, however, this does not mean
that Bristol Care’s promises are illusory and Ms. Baker’s arbitration promise is not
binding. Instead, in section 25 of the parties’ arbitration agreement, Ms. Baker and
Bristol Care expressly agreed that this Court can – and should – “modify … it to render it
enforceable.” [Emphasis added.] Accordingly, the Court should simply modify the
“Mandatory Arbitration Agreement” to provide that no change to the agreement by
Bristol Care can alter Ms. Baker’s rights under the agreement with respect to any claim
21
after she has asserted it. Both parties plainly desired the Court to make such a
modification at the time they entered into this agreement, and this Court cannot now
refuse to make the agreement enforceable with this modification merely because
Ms. Baker no longer wants it to do so.
B. The Parties’ Broad Exchange of Promises Supplies Consideration
Finally, as noted above, Ms. Baker’s efforts to focus the Court’s consideration
analysis solely on her arbitration promise in the “Mandatory Arbitration Agreement,” or
even on the parties’ exchange of arbitration and arbitration-related promises in that
document, misses the forest for the trees. Ms. Baker admits that the arbitration
agreement document was one of two documents she was “required to sign” in order to
receive her promotion to facility administrator and the pay increase and other benefits
that came with this new job. Her arbitration promise, therefore, was only one small part
of a much larger give-and-take. Neither she nor this Court is free now – in hindsight – to
dissect the parties’ bargain and declare that one of the many promises she made cannot be
enforced because of a lack of consideration.
If Ms. Baker’s arbitration promise had been made after – and not as part of – the
parties’ exchange of promises, it nevertheless would be enforceable because it was given
in exchange for one or more of Bristol Care’s arbitration and arbitration-related promises
under the analysis in the preceding section. Otherwise, her promise would not be
enforceable under this Court’s decision in Noe, 475 S.W.2d at 21. But, as explained in
Purcell Tire, such an analysis is not necessary when the promise is given as part of an
original exchange of promises between the parties. Purcell Tire, 59 S.W.3d at 509. The
22
Court is bound by Noe and Purcell Tire and cannot reach a different conclusion merely
because the promise at issue involves arbitration rather than a liability cap or a covenant
not to compete. Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9 (the FAA preempts any “state-law principle
that takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue”).
1. Morrow is Irrelevant
In an effort to avoid the obvious and unavoidable conclusions of a consideration
analysis focusing on the multifaceted exchange of promises between her and Bristol Care
regarding her promotion to facility administrator, Ms. Baker relies heavily on Morrow v.
Hallmark Cards, Inc., 273 S.W.3d 15 (Mo. App. 2008). But Morrow is the antithesis of
this case and provides no authority for her position.
In Morrow, the plaintiff had been working for Hallmark for nearly 20 years when
the company unilaterally imposed a dispute resolution program (including arbitration)
covering all employees and all claims against the company. Hallmark notified its
employees that anyone who continued to work for the company after the effective date of
the new program would be deemed to have agreed to be bound by it. Ms. Morrow did so
and, when she later filed a lawsuit against Hallmark arising out of her termination, the
trial court compelled her to arbitrate that claim. Following arbitration, Ms. Morrow
sought to vacate what she claimed was an inadequate award on the ground that there was
no consideration for her promise to arbitrate. The court of appeals agreed. Id. at 27.
Regardless of whether the analysis in Morrow was proper, it sheds no useful light on the
issues in this case.
23
First, in Morrow, the question was whether plaintiff’s continued employment –
and nothing more – could supply the both the assent and the consideration needed to
make an implied arbitration promise binding. Ms. Morrow’s arbitration promise was not
given in exchange for a promotion, new duties, or a pay raise as part of the type of
bargained-for exchange in which Ms. Baker made her arbitration promise. In fact,
Morrow stresses that the only reason a consideration analysis was needed was that there
were no contemporaneous promises by the employer in exchange for the employee’s
arbitration promise. Id. at 24-25 (“When a contract is not bilateral (when promises do
not flow both ways), there must be good and sufficient consideration flowing from the
non-promising party to support the contract.”) (emphasis added).
Second, even in the absence of any bargained-for exchange of employment-related
promises from Hallmark, Morrow acknowledges there would have been consideration for
the employee’s arbitration promise if Hallmark had made an arbitration promise in return.
Hallmark did not promise to arbitrate its claims against employees, but Bristol Care did.
Id. at 25. Even the “promise by Hallmark to participate in arbitrating employee claims or
in paying arbitrator fees” was not sufficient to supply the needed consideration because
Hallmark had reserved the right to make changes – with no prior notice – to any and all
aspects of the new policy. Id. Again, Bristol Care agreed to give what Hallmark did not
- prior written notice.
Because Hallmark made no arbitration-related promises to Ms. Morrow that were
not illusory, and because it had made no other promises to Ms. Morrow contemporaneous
with and in exchange for her arbitration promise, Morrow turned on a single question:
24
whether the mere continuation of employment – with no new benefit to the employee or
detriment to the employer – supplied consideration to make the employee’s arbitration
promise binding. Id. at 27. Not only is that question not dispositive in the present case
(as it was in Morrow), it is not even relevant.
Mr. Baker’s arbitration promise was one of many express promises she gave in
order to receive the promotion Bristol Care offered. It bears no resemblance to
Ms. Morrow’s arbitration promise, which she never made expressly and which could be
implied only because she continued to work the same job for the same pay that she had
worked before Hallmark demanded the unilateral arbitration promise from her. Here,
Bristol Care made a collection of promises to Ms. Baker (e.g., a promotion, a pay raise,
living quarters, and its agreement to arbitrate all specified claims against her or by her) in
order to obtain the collection of promises she made to it (e.g., to serve as a facility
administrator, not to quit without 60 days’ notice, not to compete, and to arbitrate all
specified claims against it or by it). In Morrow, Hallmark did not promise anything to the
employee except to pay her the same amount for the same work she had done before.
2. Bristol Care’s Employment Promises are Not Illusory
Ms. Baker tries to make Morrow relevant by arguing that she, too, was an “at will”
employee even after her promotion to facility administrator. In other words, because she
contends (now, at least) that Bristol Care could have terminated her employment at any
time and for any reason, she maintains that all of Bristol Care’s promotion-related
promises were illusory and, therefore, cannot supply the consideration needed to make
her arbitration promise binding. This is a severe distortion of Morrow and an assertion
25
supported by no other case or principle of contract law. See Corbin on Contracts, § 6.13,
pp. 309-10 (when “one party shall have the power to terminate by notice given for some
stated period … the contract should never be held to be rendered invalid thereby for lack
of ‘mutuality’ or for lack of consideration”); and § 6.14, pp. 313-14 (“same is true of a
promise in which the promisor reserves the power to terminate for good cause”).
Morrow does not hold that the arbitration-related promises Hallmark made to the
employee in exchange for her arbitration promise were illusory because the employee
was an “at will” employee. Morrow holds that those promises were illusory because
Hallmark could modify them at any time with no prior notice. Morrow, 273 S.W.3d at
25. The reference in Morrow to the employee’s “at will” status, on the other hand, was
solely in the context of rejecting the idea that continuing such employment – by itself –
could supply consideration when Hallmark could terminate that employment at any time.
Moreover, Morrow recognizes that, for employment not to be “at will,” the
employment contract must contain a specific duration for the employment or “the
contract must be one that places limits on the employer's rights to discharge at will.” Id.
at 26 (emphasis added). Ms. Morrow had no written employment contract and no basis
for claiming any such restrictions on Hallmark’s common law rights to discharge her at
will. Here, on the other hand, there was an extensive written employment agreement
between Bristol Care and Ms. Baker in which Bristol Care agreed to limitations on those
common law rights. It agreed, with specified exceptions, not to terminate Ms. Baker
without five days’ notice or five days’ pay, neither of which it would owe under common
law. As a result, Ms. Baker’s argument that an “at will” employee can still be entitled to
26
severance pay misses the point. It is not the nature of the limitations on Bristol Care’s
common law rights that matters; it is the fact that those limitations remove its promises
from the dustbin of “illusory promises” such that they supplied the consideration needed
to bind Ms. Baker to her promises for which Bristol Care gave its promises in exchange.
3. Missouri Law Recognizes Continued
Employment as Consideration
Even if Ms. Baker were an “at will” employee under the definition in Morrow
despite the limitations on its common law rights to terminate her to which Bristol Care
agreed (and plainly she was not), this Court has never held that such an arrangement fails
to supply the consideration needed to make an employee’s promises given in exchange
for such employment binding, at least to the extent of the employment actually provided.
Moreover, lower courts have rejected that argument repeatedly. See JumboSack Corp. v.
Buyck, 407 S.W.3d 51, 55-56 (Mo. App. 2013) (“Missouri courts have recognized that
continued at-will employment constitutes consideration for a non-compete agreement
where the employer allows the employee ‘by virtue of the employment[,] to have
continued access to [its] protectable assets and relationships.’”) (emphasis in original).
In Computer Sales Int’l, Inc. v. Collins, 723 S.W.2d 450 (Mo. App. 1986), the
court applied this principle, holding:
At all times during Collins’ employment, Collins remained an employee at
will who could have been terminated by Computer Sales for any reason at
any time. In fact, Computer Sales had previously terminated a marketing
representative who had refused to sign the covenant. The continuation of
Collins’ employment for approximately 2½ years after he signed the
restrictive covenant provides consideration for the covenant.
27
Id. at 451-52. In Reed, Roberts Associates, Inc. v. Bailenson, 537 S.W.2d 238 (Mo. App.
1976) , the court explained further:
A continuance by employee in the employment of employer where he is
under no obligation to remain and the continuance by the employer of the
employment where continuance is not required supplies adequate
consideration for a secondary contract.
Id. at 241.
“This view is consistent with Missouri law, and with prevailing authority
generally.” Ranch Hand Foods, Inc. v. Polar Pak Foods, Inc., 690 S.W.2d 437, 442 (Mo.
App. 1985) (employee’s continued work, including a promotion and pay increase, was
consideration for his non-compete promise ). See Easy Returns Midwest, Inc. v. Schultz,
964 S.W.2d 450, 454 (Mo. App. 1998) (“employee’s continuance in employment with
employer, where there is no obligation to remain, and an employer’s continuance of
employment, where continuance is not required, supplies adequate consideration for a
noncompetition agreement”); Cook v. Coldwell Banker, 967 S.W.2d 654, 657 (Mo. App.
1998) (“unilateral contract lacks consideration for want of mutuality, but when the
promisee performs, consideration is supplied, and the contract is enforceable to the extent
performed”).
Missouri courts cannot apply one rule to an employee’s non-compete promises but
apply a different rule if the case involves an employee’s arbitration promise. “A court
may not, then, in assessing the rights of litigants to enforce an arbitration agreement,
construe that agreement in a manner different from that in which it otherwise construes
nonarbitration agreements under state law.” Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9.
28
States may regulate contracts, including arbitration clauses, under general
contract law principles and they may invalidate an arbitration clause ‘upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.’
9 U.S.C. § 2 (emphasis added). What States may not do is decide that a
contract is fair enough to enforce all its basic terms (price, service, credit),
but not fair enough to enforce its arbitration clause. The Act makes any
such state policy unlawful, for that kind of policy would place arbitration
clauses on an unequal ‘footing,’ directly contrary to the Act’s language and
Congress’s intent.
Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686 (1996) (quoting Allied-Bruce,
513 U.S. at 281).
As explained above, the Court need not concern itself with Morrow in this case
because it decided different legal issues on highly dissimilar facts. But, to the extent
Ms. Baker succeeds in bringing that case into the Court’s analysis, the Court cannot adopt
its conclusions. It is not that the Court should not do so, though that is true as well. It is
that the Court cannot do so. Decades of decisions rejecting Morrow’s holding outside the
context of arbitration promises show that any effort by this Court to follow Morrow in the
present case involving an arbitration promise is, in reality, merely the application of a
special rule regarding consideration in employment contracts involving arbitration
promises. The FAA, as construed in Casarotto, Perry, and Allied-Bruce, precludes the
application of such a rule.
29
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, I would hold that Ms. Baker’s arbitration promise
was supported by consideration and, therefore, should be enforced pursuant to Bristol
Care’s motion and the FAA. Because the majority opinion allows Ms. Baker to litigate
her claim in state court despite her having promised not to do so, I respectfully dissent.
________________________________
Paul C. Wilson, Judge
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Carla Baker v. Bristol Care, Inc., d/b/a Bristol Manor, and David Furnell
Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
Date filed: 2014-08-19
Citations: 450 S.W.3d 770, 23 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 598, 2014 WL 4086378, 2014 Mo. LEXIS 207
Copy CitationsCombined Opinion