Nov 26 2013, 5:38 am
FOR PUBLICATION
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
PATRICIA CARESS McMATH GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Marion County Public Defender Agency Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
JODI KATHRYN STEIN
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
EVAN LEEDY, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A04-1303-CR-102
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Kurt M. Eisgruber, Judge
Cause No. 49G01-1203-FB-17254
November 26, 2013
OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION
CRONE, Judge
Case Summary
The State charged Evan Leedy with four felony counts of operating while intoxicated
(“OWI”) stemming from an automobile accident in which his girlfriend was killed and
another motorist was seriously injured. The defense sought to have him declared
incompetent to stand trial, and the trial court found him incompetent and committed him to
the Division of Mental Health and Addiction (“DMHA”) pursuant to Indiana Code Section
35-36-3-1. Leedy sought review via interlocutory appeal, and the trial court stayed his
commitment pending our review. Finding that the trial court followed the statutory
procedure and that the statute does not run afoul of Leedy’s due process rights, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
Late one night in February 2012, Leedy was driving about eighty miles per hour with
his girlfriend on an Indianapolis street. His blood alcohol content (“BAC”) was .15, and he
ran a red light, colliding with a pickup truck. Leedy’s girlfriend died shortly thereafter, and
the driver of the truck suffered serious injuries. Leedy suffered a brain injury and was
comatose for about a month. The State charged him with class B felony OWI with a BAC of
at least .15 causing death, class C felony OWI causing death, class D felony OWI causing
serious bodily injury, and class D felony OWI with a BAC of at least .08 causing serious
bodily injury.
In May 2012, Leedy filed a motion for competency and sanity evaluation to determine
whether he was competent to stand trial.1 He underwent mental evaluations with court-
1
During the pendency of the proceedings, Leedy was living at home with his mother.
2
appointed psychiatrist Dr. George Parker and court-appointed clinical psychologist Dr.
Shelvy Keglar. The doctors submitted reports to the trial court, which conducted a series of
competency hearings. At the hearings, both doctors testified that Leedy could not understand
the nature of the charges and proceedings against him and could not assist his counsel in
conducting his defense. The doctors testified concerning Leedy’s need of physical and
occupational therapy. They further testified concerning the various services available at the
state psychiatric hospitals, with the Logansport State Hospital (“Logansport”) focusing on
competency evaluations for criminals awaiting trial and housing mostly patients with mental
illness and disability rather than those with traumatic brain injuries. Dr. Parker testified that
he was not optimistic about Leedy’s chances of being restored to competency. Dr. Keglar
testified that with a cognitive rehabilitation program, Leedy could possibly be restored to
competency within one to two years. The trial court took the matter under advisement and
set another hearing to hear testimony from representatives of DMHA.
At a November 2012 hearing, the medical director of Logansport, Dr. Danny
Meadows, testified that although most of the patients at the facility suffer from mental illness
or disability rather than from traumatic brain injury, he and his colleagues had treated patients
similarly situated to Leedy. He also testified that while the success rate for competency
restoration is lower for patients with Leedy’s type of injury than for mental illness patients,
Logansport would be capable of evaluating Leedy and attempting restoration services.
Additionally, he reported that any therapeutic services that Leedy would need that were not
provided at Logansport would be outsourced to area professionals. He stressed that it would
3
be Logansport’s responsibility to meet all of Leedy’s clinical needs and that Logansport
personnel would transport him for outsourced services. Finally, he testified that while the
Larue D. Carter Memorial Hospital (“Larue Carter”) in Indianapolis was more geared to
handle brain injury patients in need of physical or speech therapy, Logansport was
specifically geared toward treating patients awaiting trial on criminal charges and that the
Logansport experts could possibly know within six months whether Leedy could be restored
to competency.
DMHA chief counsel Katherine Gregory testified concerning the procedures for
determining which of the state psychiatric facilities best meets the needs of a given patient.
She stated that although Logansport would be the most routine placement for Leedy, DMHA
would make an effort to place him where his specific needs could best be met. She also
referenced the effect of DMHA’s funding constraints on outpatient restoration services.
At the close of the hearing, the trial court determined that Leedy was incompetent to
stand trial and committed him to DMHA pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-36-3-1(b). The
trial court stayed the commitment order so that the parties could submit briefs concerning
Leedy’s challenge to the constitutionality of the commitment statute. At a hearing on January
4, 2013, the trial court denied Leedy’s motion to declare the statute unconstitutional.
However, the court again stayed the commitment order pending Leedy’s pursuit of an
interlocutory appeal, which we accepted.
4
Discussion and Decision
Leedy contends that his commitment to DMHA pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-
36-3-1 violates his due process rights. Because it presents a question of law, we review a
matter of statutory interpretation using a de novo standard. Sloan v. State, 947 N.E.2d 917,
921 (Ind. 2003). When interpreting a statute, our goal is to determine and give effect to the
legislature’s intent in promulgating it. Ryan v. State, 900 N.E.2d 43, 44-45 (Ind. Ct. App.
2009). Thus, we begin by examining the language of the statute, presuming that the words
were selected to express their common and ordinary meanings. Id. at 45. Where the statute
is unambiguous, we accord each word and phrase its plain, ordinary, and usual meaning,
without having to resort to rules of construction to decipher meanings. Id.
Leedy essentially raises due process challenges to both the statute itself and the trial
court’s action in committing him pursuant to the statute. Indiana Code Section 35-36-3-1
provides a mechanism for determining whether a defendant is competent to stand trial,
stating in pertinent part,
(a) If at any time before the final submission of any criminal case to the
court or the jury trying the case, the court has reasonable grounds for believing
that the defendant lacks the ability to understand the proceedings and assist in
the preparation of a defense, the court shall immediately fix a time for a
hearing to determine whether the defendant has that ability. The court shall
appoint two (2) or three (3) competent, disinterested:
(1) psychiatrists;
(2) psychologists endorsed by the Indiana state board of examiners in
psychology as health service providers in psychology; or
(3) physicians;
5
who have expertise in determining competency.
…. The individuals who are appointed shall examine the defendant and testify
at the hearing as to whether the defendant can understand the proceedings and
assist in the preparation of the defendant’s defense.
(b) At the hearing, other evidence relevant to whether the defendant has
the ability to understand the proceedings and assist in the preparation of the
defendant’s defense may be introduced. If the court finds that the defendant
has the ability to understand the proceedings and assist in the preparation of
the defendant’s defense, the trial shall proceed. If the court finds that the
defendant lacks this ability, it shall delay or continue the trial and order the
defendant committed to [DMHA]. [DMHA] shall provide competency
restoration services or enter into a contract for the provision of competency
restoration services by a third party in the:
(1) location where the defendant currently resides; or
(2) least restrictive setting appropriate to the needs of the defendant and
the safety of the defendant and others.
(Emphasis added.)
Although Leedy acknowledges the mandatory language contained in subsection (b), he
asserts that after the trial court made the incompetency finding,2 it nonetheless violated his
due process rights by ordering his commitment to DMHA. In this vein, Leedy essentially
asserts that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to him.
Involuntary commitment is a clear deprivation of a defendant’s liberty and can only be
justified on the basis of legitimate state interests. Curtis v. State, 948 N.E.2d 1143, 1153
(Ind. 2011).
The State has dual interests in committing an incompetent defendant: (1) to
restore the accused to competency due to the right of the public and the
2
Leedy does not challenge the procedure followed by the trial court in conducting the competency
hearings under subsection (a).
6
defendant to the prompt disposition of criminal charges pending against him
and (2) to protect the defendant against being required to answer to charges
that [he] lacks the capacity to understand or to assist [his] attorney in
defending against [the charges].
Id. at 1154 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Commitment of an accused thus
focuses on the State’s interest in the accused’s restoration to competency and necessarily
entails a finding of probability that the accused can be so restored.” State v. Davis, 898
N.E.2d 281, 289 (Ind. 2008).
The statute clearly states that the determination concerning the probability of restoring
a defendant’s competency is made by DMHA or contracted third party service provider.
Indiana Code Section 35-36-3-3(a) gives the superintendent of the institution where the
defendant is committed or the director of the third party contractor ninety days to certify to
the trial court “whether the defendant has a substantial probability of attaining the ability to
understand the proceedings and assist in the preparation of the defendant’s defense within the
foreseeable future.” Subsection (b) outlines how DMHA or a third party contractor must
proceed if a substantial probability does or does not exist. See Ind. Code § 35-36-3-3(b) (if
substantial probability does not exist, initiate regular commitment proceedings;3 if substantial
probability does exist, retain defendant until he attains competency or for six months,
whichever occurs first).
Leedy essentially argues that Indiana Code Section 35-36-3-1 is unconstitutional as
applied to him because it is specifically geared toward those with mental illness or disability
3
As outlined in Indiana Code Article 12-26.
7
and not to defendants who, like himself, are incompetent due to traumatic brain injury. At
the outset, we note that there is nothing in the statutory language indicating such a distinction
based on the source of a defendant’s incompetency. To the extent that the source of his
incompetency may affect his statistical probability of restoration, it is relevant in making that
determination.
As support for his due process argument, Leedy relies on three cases. In the first,
Davis, our supreme court held that it is a violation of due process not to dismiss criminal
charges against an incompetent defendant where experts opined that the defendant could not
be restored to competency due to her paranoid schizophrenia and where her accrued period of
commitment had exceeded the maximum possible confinement in the event of an eventual
conviction. 898 N.E.2d at 283-84. Here, Leedy does not seek to have the charges dismissed.
Moreover, because the trial court stayed the commitment order pending the filing of this
interlocutory appeal, Leedy is not in the custody of DMHA, but rather is living with his
mother. Finally, as discussed below, the evidence is conflicting concerning Leedy’s chances
of being restored to competence. As such, Davis is factually distinguishable.
Leedy also relies on Curtis, which involved a fifty-nine-year-old developmentally
disabled defendant seeking dismissal of charges of residential entry, battery, and criminal
mischief. 948 N.E.2d at 1146. Although the trial court ordered a competency evaluation in
which one of two experts determined that Curtis could never be restored to competency due
to dementia and the other found restoration unlikely, the trial court never actually made an
8
incompetency finding and never committed the defendant to DMHA.4 Id. at 1153. Curtis
claimed that the failure to dismiss the charges pending against him violated his due process
rights. Id. at 1151. Our supreme court dismissed Curtis’s charges not on due process
grounds, but on the basis of Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C).5 Id. at 1154. With respect to
Curtis’s due process argument, our supreme court specifically stated that our statutes control
the appropriate way to determine incompetency to stand trial and probability of restoration
and that the procedures outlined therein “establish a comprehensive method that balances the
various interests at stake.” Id. at 1153. “If the trial court finds a defendant incompetent, the
trial court must commit the defendant to the DMHA, and the DMHA must provide
competency services.” Id. The Curtis court held that “[t]here is no viable fundamental-
fairness argument when Curtis has not been involuntarily committed and there has been no
appropriate finding [by DMHA] that he will never be restored to competency.” Id. at 1154.
Thus, despite the factual and procedural distinctions between Curtis and the present case,
what we can glean from Curtis is that our supreme court requires adherence to the clear
language of the statute concerning who shall make the determination concerning a
defendant’s probability of regaining competency: DMHA.
In support of his argument that the trial court is nevertheless not required to commit
him to DMHA, Leedy cites a very recent decision by another panel of this Court, State v.
4
Notably, the trial court denied the State’s motion to have Curtis committed to DMHA based on its
determination that the State’s interest in restoring Curtis could not be accomplished.
5
See Ind. Criminal Rule 4(C) (stating that no person shall be held to answer criminal charge for
longer than one year from the date of charge or arrest).
9
Coats, 981 N.E.2d 1273 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. granted. There, an elderly man with
Alzheimer’s disease was charged with the sexual battery of his granddaughter. The experts
assigned to assess the defendant’s competency to stand trial both testified that due to the
progressive nature of his dementia, there was little chance of his ever being restored to
competency. The trial court designated Coats incompetent and found that he “will not return
to competency.” Id. at 1275. The trial court did not commit him to DMHA and determined
that he could continue to reside with his wife. The State did not dispute the finding of
incompetence but challenged the trial court’s decision not to commit Coats to a DMHA
facility, arguing that the mandatory statutory language forecloses any discretion by the trial
court to do anything except commit a defendant once it has made an incompetency finding.
Id. at 1276. The Coats majority affirmed the trial court’s denial of the State’s motion to
commit Coats, specifically noting the procedures outlined in the statute, but holding that “the
purposes of the competency restoration process cannot be met by following those procedures
here.” Id. at 1278. In her dissent, Judge Riley focused on the delineation of duties outlined
in the statute: “The trial court determines whether the defendant is incompetent in the first
instance, but the statutory scheme entrusts the ultimate determination on competency to the
[DMHA] superintendent, who has not only the skills to make such observations but also the
time within which to do so.” Id. at 1280 (Riley, J., dissenting).6
Here, Leedy concedes that “there has not been a finding that [he] is not restorable.”
Appellant’s Br. at 8, n.6. Rather, he asserts that he “must get therapies DMHA cannot
6
Our supreme court heard oral argument on Coats on November 7, 2013.
10
provide if there is to be any hope of restoration.” Id. With respect to the restoration issue,
we note the following: (1) the trial court did not make any specific finding concerning
Leedy’s chances at restoration (assuming arguendo that such a finding would have had any
legal effect, given the language of the statute); (2) the expert testimony presented at the
competency hearing was conflicting concerning the probability of his restoration (with Dr.
Parker stating that he was not optimistic about restoration and Dr. Keglar stating that with a
cognitive rehabilitation program, Leedy had a possibility of restored competency within one
to two years); (3) beyond the fact that there is no specific language in the statute
distinguishing between the various sources of incompetency, i.e., mental illness versus
traumatic brain injury, the experts’ testimony that the restoration success rate is statistically
higher in mental illness patients did not preclude restoration in the cases involving traumatic
brain injury; (4) because the trial court stayed its commitment order pending this
interlocutory appeal, DMHA has not had Leedy in its care and custody, and as such, has not
even had the statutory ninety days during which to evaluate his chances of restoration; and
(5) the evidence was inconclusive regarding the effect of any DMHA funding constraints
upon Leedy’s receipt of therapeutic services necessary to restore his competency (at the
competency hearing, Gregory briefly referenced DMHA funding constraints; however, both
she and Dr. Meadows testified that it is the duty of DMHA and the assigned facility to ensure
that all of Leedy’s clinical needs will be met). Tr. at 142, 157.
Simply put, Leedy’s due process arguments are based on speculation concerning both
DMHA’s ability to provide him with the necessary therapeutic services and his own cognitive
11
responses to those services. Essentially, he has asked us to reweigh evidence and make a
conclusion that the legislature has specifically delegated to experts in the field of mental
competency, a determination that is made after a period of providing services and evaluating
the patient/accused. This is precisely why the General Assembly outlined such specific
procedures, recognizing the delicate balance that exists between the fundamental fairness
owed to the accused and the interests of both the public and the accused in the prompt
disposition of criminal charges. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the commitment
statute is not unconstitutional as applied to Leedy and that the trial court did not violate
Leedy’s due process rights in ordering his commitment to DMHA. Accordingly, we affirm.
Affirmed.
PYLE, J., concurs.
BARNES, J., concurs with separate opinion.
12
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
EVAN LEEDY, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A04-1303-CR-102
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
BARNES, Judge, concurring
I concur with the majority’s analysis. However, I write separately to emphasize and
highlight what I believe are inadequacies that our State’s mental health system displays here.
On the one hand, representatives from Logansport testified that that hospital was capable of
providing the “restorative services” that Leedy requires, albeit it would likely require the use
of third-party providers outside of the hospital itself. That is because Logansport is better-
suited for treatment of mental illness, not traumatic brain injuries. On the other hand, the
chief counsel for DMHA testified regarding the “constraints” her agency faces regarding
outpatient restorative services. In other words, no or very limited money is available for
these services.
13
All agree that the Larue Center in Indianapolis is better-suited to handle the specific
type of brain injuries Leedy sustained. I would respectfully, but strongly, suggest that
DMHA focus on securing the best and most appropriate treatment for Leedy—wherever that
might be. Without providing the best possible services for competency treatment, evaluation,
and restoration (if possible), DMHA and the State would possibly be delaying ultimate
resolution of this case at the expense of Leedy, his family, the victims, and families of the
victims of Leedy’s alleged crimes.
14
Evan Leedy v. State of Indiana
Combined Opinion