concurring in the result.
[¶ 14] I concur in the result.
[¶ 15] I write separately to note what I perceive to be the failure of the administrative hearing officer to adequately ad*773dress the objections made at the administrative hearing.
[¶ 16] As noted in ¶ 2 of the majority opinion, the arresting officer prematurely terminated the test sequence for the second breath sample and before the Intoxi-lyzer machine had timed itself out. Immediately following this testimony, Keller objected to the admission of the test results. He argued that the approved methods had not been followed. He further argued that no expert testimony was offered to establish that the test had been fairly administered.
[¶ 17] The hearing officer responded to the objection stating, “At this point I — I am denying the request, but — and I am going to ask the arresting officer, who ran the test, if he can explain what did happen that would have led to this entry on the test.” The arresting officer then testified further. He again confirmed that he should have allowed the machine to continue through to the end of the test, but “[w]ithout thinking about it, [he] hit the end test button.” The hearing officer ruled on Keller’s objection stating, “Okay. I’m overruling the objection and admitting Exhibit 1 in its entirety....” No explanation was given which would shed any light on the hearing officer’s factual or legal reasoning for overruling the objection.
[¶ 18] Keller proceeded to cross examine the arresting officer. At the end of that cross examination, he renewed his objection. He again argued that the approved method had not been followed. He argued that expert testimony was required to establish the validity of the test. Keller moved to dismiss the proceeding. The hearing officer responded to the objection and motion explaining, “If there is nothing further for the record I will now prepare a written decision.” Nowhere in the transcript does the hearing officer provide any rationale for her decision to first overrule, and then later ignore Keller’s objections. The hearing officer’s written decision is equally devoid of reasoning. In -her findings of fact she simply writes, “Intoxilyzer testing was done in accordance with the state toxicologist’s approved method.... ” In her conclusions of law she wrote, “Mr. Keller was arrested for DUI, was properly tested to determine his alcohol concentration after the arrest....”
[¶ 19] The objections made by Keller at the administrative hearing went to the very essence of the issue before the hearing officer — whether the test was fairly administered. Yet, the hearing officer failed to make any finding whatsoever regarding the objections either at the hearing or in a written decision. An agency is required to explicitly state its findings of fact and conclusions of law. N.D.C.C. § 28-32-89(1). This need for explicit reasoning is particularly pressing where the disputed issue is material and indeed dis-positive of the case.
[¶ 20] A court reviewing an agency decision, whether at the district court or supreme court level, is held to a limited standard of review. The reviewing court must not make independent findings of fact, weigh the evidence, or supply its judgment for that of the administrative agency. A reviewing court can only apply this limited standard of review if it has the benefit of the hearing officer’s findings and reasoning. The court should not have to speculate about factual findings made by the hearing officer or guess at the legal reasoning for the hearing officer’s decisions. Evans v. Backes, 437 N.W.2d 848, 850-51 (N.D.1989).
[¶ 21] While I concur in the result in this case, in the future, when presented with a hearing officer’s decision which is so *774utterly lacking of reasoning, I believe the better practice would be to do as was done in the Evans case. In Evans, this Court remanded the case back to the hearing officer with instruction to prepare the necessary findings and conclusions in support of the decision. 487 N.W.2d at 851. The option of remand is available at the district court level as well. N.D.C.C. § 28-32-46.
[¶ 22] Gary H. Lee, D.J.