dissenting.
[¶ 29] I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion in paragraphs 1 and 26.
[¶ 80] I agree with the majority’s analysis in paragraphs 2 through 25. However, the conclusion the majority reaches does not follow that analysis and does not conform to the language or intent of the judgment which the majority treats as an “instrument” for purposes of applying N.D.C.C. § 47-10-15, the codification of the after-acquired title doctrine.
[¶ 31] Although the facts later proved otherwise, Harry Malloy explicitly represented to Lorraine Malloy in the settlement agreement which was incorporated into the judgment, that he owned specific mineral acres and would take further steps to assure her full acquisition of one-half interest in those mineral acres:
(a)(ii) Harry has represented that he owns 2,222 net mineral acres in the property described and set forth in Exhibit “B”, and Lorraine is to receive one-half of Harry’s interest in and to the mineral acres as set forth in Exhibit “B”, and Harry agrees that he will have executed or execute a deed to Lorraine for one-half of his interest in said mineral acres in a form satisfactory to Lorraine, and he will further execute at the same time necessary assignments of interests and leases currently in effect on the said conveyed mineral interests, and will also give notice to all companies holding leases of the assignment....
Exhibit B to the divorce judgment includes the legal description to the mineral acres at issue. This is not similar to a quitclaim deed in which the grantor is intending to convey “whatever” interest he may have. Rather, Harry Malloy represents that he owns them and he is bound to convey them.
[¶ 32] The language of the judgment, which incorporates a “stipulation settlement executed by the parties,” goes further and invites the application of the after-acquired property statute:
7. Each of the parties hereto hereby agrees to execute and acknowledge, concurrently with the execution hereof, good and sufficient instruments necessary or proper to vest the titles and estates in the respective parties hereto, as here-inabove provided, and hereafter, at any time and from time to time, to execute and acknowledge any and all documents which may be necessary or proper to carry out the purposes of this Agreement and establish of record the sole and separate ownership of the several properties of said parties in the manner herein agreed and provided. If .either party hereto for any reason shall fail or refuse to execute any such documents, then this Agreement shall, and is hereby expressly declared to constitute a full and present transfer, assignment, and conveyance of all rights hereinabove designated to be relinquished and waived.
[¶ 33] The judgment also provides:
*52311. This Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the heirs, executors, administrators, assigns, devisees and grantees of the parties hereto.
[¶ 34] The divorce judgment was recorded in the office of the Register of Deeds of Dunn County on February 15, 1988. It has provided public notice of Lorraine Malloy’s interest in the mineral acres at issue since that recording date.
[¶ 35] The majority notes in paragraph 24 we should focus on the language of the conveying instrument, which in this case is the judgment, to determine the application of the after-acquired title doctrine. Construing the terms of the judgment, its clear intent is that Harry Malloy is to convey one-half the mineral acres, which he. represents he owns, to Lorraine Malloy. He executed an ineffective quitclaim deed to those minerals in November 1983. However, when Harry Malloy re-acquired the minerals in January 1995, the provisions of the judgment should have given Lorraine Malloy her one-half interest under the after-acquired title doctrine:
The after-acquired title doctrine “is one under which title to land acquired by a grantor who previously attempted to convey title to the same land which he did not then own inures automatically to the benefit of his prior grantee.” Torgerson v. Rose, 339 N.W.2d 79, 82 (N.D.1983).(quotation omitted).
Carkuff v. Balmer, 2011 ND 60, ¶ 9, 795 N.W.2d 303.
[¶ 36] I would reverse.
[¶ 37] CAROL RONNING KAPSNER