dissenting.
I believe the majority errs in failing to acknowledge the presumption in favor of the taxing power of the state, and I would reverse. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
Prior to Act 300 of 2014, the statute at issue in this case, Arkansas Code Annotated section 26-52-402, did not include sand and other proppants in its list of items that constituted machinery and equipment specifically exempted from the gross-receipts tax. It did provide, | in“The Director of the Department of Finance and Administration may promulgate rules and regulations for the orderly and efficient administration of this section.” Ark.Code Ann. § 26-52-402(d). The Director promulgated Arkansas Gross Receipts Tax Rule GR-57(E)(5), which characterized proppants as nonexempt. In my view, this was a reasonable interpretation of the statute at issue based on our case law. While hydraulic fracturing is clearly a complex process, and preparing sand to be used in that process may also be considered somewhat complex, the sand itself is not an implement, tool, or device “of some degree of complexity.” Ragland v. Dumas, 292 Ark. 515, 520, 732 S.W.2d 118, 120 (1987).
This court has held that “[tjhere is a presumption in favor of the taxing power of the state, and all tax-exemption provisions must be strictly construed against the exemption.” Weiss v. Bryce Co., LLC, 2009 Ark. 412, at 3, 330 S.W.3d 756, 757. This court has frequently reiterated the phrase “to doubt is to deny the exemption.” Id. (citing, e.g., Citifinancial Retail Servs. v. Weiss, 372 Ark. 128, 133, 271 S.W.3d 494, 498 (2008); Pledger v. C.B. Form Co., 316 Ark. 22, 25, 871 S.W.2d 333, 334 (1994); Pledger v. Baldor Int’l, 309 Ark. 30, 33, 827 S.W.2d 646, 648 (1992)). Here, strictly construing the statute against the exemption, I would hold that the circuit court clearly erred in finding that proppants ■ constitute exempt equipment under the Gross Receipts Act and reverse.
For the reasons outlined above, I respectfully dissent.
Hannah, C.J., and Danielson, J., join.