concurring specially.
[¶ 25] I agree we affirm. I respectfully disagree with the majority that probable cause supported issuance of the first search warrant, making the evidence *480seized fruit of the poisonous tree unless otherwise saved. Here, the fruit of the first search is saved by the good faith exception. As noted by the majority, the State conceded suppression of the c.ontents of Heather Leavitt’s cell phone obtained under a subsequent warrant; thus that matter is not before us. Majority opinion at ¶ 8.
I
[¶26] Our guiding law on the need for. probable cause is settled, as described in the majority opinion at ¶ 6. Equally important, however, is that “the information provided in the affidavit [supporting application for the search warrant] must be sufficient to establish probable cause to believe contraband will be found in the place to be searched. Mere suspicion that criminal activity is taking place which may warrant further investigation does not rise to a level of probable cause to search.” State v. Nelson, 2005 ND 59, ¶ 19, 693 N.W.2d 910 (citation omitted).
[¶ 27] Here, the only useful evidence in the affidavit was that the attacker had “the same stature” as the victim’s wife and the assailant used a knife identical to that last seen in the possession of the victim’s wife. Majority opinion at ¶ 8. Arguably relevant as a layer in the “laminated total” for consideration of probable cause was that the victim and his wife were in the process of divorce. However, that suggests the untenable proposition that probable cause exists to search the homes of all estranged couples owning cutlery.
[¶ 28] Heather Leavitt argues “ ‘[s]tat-ure’ means height. See, e.g., Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www. merriam-webster.com (last visited Feb. 12, 2015).” Another source states, “[s]tature” means the “natural height (as of a person) in an upright position.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1220 (11th ed.2005). Other sources include “size” or “degree of development attained.” Webster’s New World Dictionary 1392 (2nd College ed.1980) (stature defined as “height or size of body”); The Random House Dictionary of the English Language 1862 (2nd ed.1987) (stature is “degree of development attained”). Whichever vague description was intended by the affiant, it must be weighed against the affiant’s further statement that the victim could not identify his assailant. In fact, he did not know if he was attacked by one or more people. The magistrate was told, “When patrol arrived on scene, they briefly spoke with the victim who is believed to be T.J. Leavitt. Leavitt reported that he woke up to someone or some people in his home and someone attacked him with a knife. He stated that no one should’ve been in his home. He claimed to not know his attacker or attackers.”
[¶ 29] Further regarding identification of the assailant, the magistrate was told, “This affiant spoke with Leavitt at the hospital. He described the attacker as having a pony-tail, the same stature as his wife. The victim could not specifically identify the attacker as his wife.” The magistrate also was told the parties were in the process of divorcing. However, the affiant did not state the divorce was contentious or that the parties were hostile towards each other. To the contrary and without mentioning domestic violence, the affiant noted the parties “were separated, and they were sharing custody of their children.” Majority opinion at ¶ 2.
[¶ 30] The majority cites these facts and others. Id. But the other facts were never connected to either Heather Leavitt or the home to be searched. Therefore, the required nexus between the facts and the place to be searched was glaringly absent and does not support issuance of a warrant. See Nelson, 2005 ND 59, ¶ 20, *481693 N.W.2d 910 (“We conclude, under the totality of the circumstances, [the] affidavit did not contain sufficient reliable information to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe contraband or other evidence sought would probably be found [at the property to be searched].”).
[¶ 31] The facts unconnected to either Heather Leavitt or her home were (1) the. assailant had a pony-tail, (2) the victim was in sole possession of the marital home, (3) bloody footprints were found in the home and throughout adjacent backyards, (4)'a black stocking hat, darker blonde hair and a pony-tail band were found in the home, and (5) a description was provided of Heather Leavitt’s vehicle and her home on the air force base. Majority opinion at ¶ 8.
[¶ 32] These facts were not connected to Heather Leavitt or her home that was searched because the magistrate was provided no evidence Heather Leavitt had a pony-tail. No evidence existed that Heather Leavitt continued to have a means of accessing the marital home, or even that the home was locked before the assault. No evidence showed the bloody footprints matched the size or any characteristic of Heather Leavitt’s feet. The magistrate was offered nothing stating or even suggesting the trail of bloody footprints could have been left only by someone with familiarity with the home or the adjacent neighborhood. Nor was the magistrate given any information that Heather Leavitt owned a black stocking hat, that she had darker blonde hair or that the pony-tail band was used by or belonged to Heather Leavitt. The description of Heather Leavitt’s home and car were statements of openly observable facts, and those common facts were not connected to the crime or the crime scene.
[¶ 33] Faced with this mass of unconnected facts, the majority necessarily “acknowledge[s] the facts alleged in the affidavit supporting this search warrant constitute a marginal case.” Majority opinion at ¶ 11. They nonetheless conclude “there was a fair probability that evidence would be found on Heather Leavitt’s person, in her vehicle, or in her home.” Id. I cannot accede to that conclusion, and instead would hold the warrant was not supported by facts providing a sufficient nexus between the crime or the crime scene and a search of Heather Leavitt’s home.
II
[¶ 34] The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule was recognized by the United States Supreme Court’s holding that exclusion of evidence is not required when law enforcement acts in good faith upon objectively reasonable reliance that a warrant was properly issued by a neutral and detached magistrate. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922-23 (1984). This Court held:
“We have summarized four situations in which reliance cannot be objectively reasonable under Leon-as:
(1) when the issuing magistrate was misled by false information intentionally or negligently given by the affi-ant; (2) when the magistrate totally abandoned her judicial role and failed to act in a neutral and detached manner; (3) when the warrant was based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable; 1 and (4) when a reasonable law enforcement officer could not rely on a facially deficient warrant.”
State v. Dodson, 2003 ND 187, ¶20, 671 N.W.2d 825 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
[¶ 35] The good faith exception recognizes that the exclusionary rule was designed to deter police misconduct and not *482to punish the errors of magistrates. State v. Utvick, 2004 ND 36, ¶26, 675 N.W.2d 387. “[I]f there is no police misconduct to deter, the good-faith exception must apply and suppression is not the appropriate remedy.” Id.
[¶ 36] Here, Heather Leavitt does not allege the issuing magistrate was misled by false information intentionally or negligently given by the affiant. She does claim the affidavit was inaccurate because the parties were separated and not yet divorcing, but that is not a material distinction in this case. Nor does Heather Leavitt argue the magistrate totally abandoned his judicial role and failed to act in a neutral and detached mariner. Rather, she claims the magistrate made a mistake by concluding the affidavit provided probable cause to issue the warrant.
[¶ 37] On the basis of this record, neither the majority nor I conclude the affidavit was so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render belief in its existence entirely unreasonable. Rather, the,majority concludes the affidavit was marginally sufficient and I respectfully suggest otherwise. But neither the majority holds nor do I suggest the affidavit was so lacking as to fail to provide any indicia of probable cause.
[¶ 38] Finally, neither the majority nor I conclude law enforcement unreasonably relied on a facially deficient warrant. Rather, Sergeant Goodman sought and obtained a search warrant from a neutral and detached magistrate. His reliance on that magistrate’s probable cause determination was objectively reasonable and the warrant was not deficient on its face. As a result, no police misconduct exists to deter by suppression. Therefore, I would affirm the district court’s denial of Heather Leav-itt’s motion to suppress based on the good faith exception to the warrant requirement.
[¶ 39] DANIEL J. CROTHERS