concurring: The Act of 1891, Chapter 252, authorized the Board of Aldermen of Charlotte to issue coupon bonds for such purposes as in their opinion will promote the general welfare of the city; provided, the whole bonded indebtedness of the city should at no time exceed $500,000, and provided that no debt shall be created nor bonds issued, unless the question of creating the debt and issuing the bonds be approved by a majority of the qualified registered voters, at an election provided for in the Act. It is admitted that such approval was given by the majority, also that, if the bonds for the $250,000 were issued, the whole city indebtedness would be less than $500,000. *606No question of levying a tax to pay saicl bonds was submitted to the people, and has, at no time, been voted on hy the voters. .The question, then, is presented whether the Board, having acquired authority by complying with the provisions of said Act, to contract the debt and issue bonds for paying the same, and having made such contracts, has an implied authority to levy taxes to meet this obligation. I think they have. This is the only question.
I think Article VII, Section I, contains, in substance, two clauses on the condition expressed therein. 1, Authority to contract a debt. 2, Authority to pay the debt by levying a tax, which is the only way a city corporation can pay anything. If the question submitted both clauses, there would be no controversy.
If A owes B $100, it is not necessary for A to promise to pay it. The law implies the promise and compels payment. That is to say, when the indebitatus is legally established, the law implies the assumpsit and compels payment.
Therefore, I conclude when the voters have authorized their agent to contract a debt for their benefit, and it has been done, they are not at liberty to repudiate by voting against a tax levy. In Article VII, Section 7, I see a limitation, when the proposition to contract a debt and levy the tax is made, without the tax payers’ approval, but when he has authorized the debt to be contracted, and the bonds issued, then there is no longer any limitation. I would not like, in the absence of express language, to hold, by construction merely, upon a given state of facts, that the Constitution intends to forbid what is required by general law and equity to be done. Ralls v. U. S., 105 U. S., page 733.
On the question of going behind the ratification of an *607Act of the Assembly and receiving the journals to show that the words “aye” and “nay,” etc., were not entered on the journals, I have fully expressed my opinion in Carr v. Coke, 116 N. C., 223; Bank v. Commissioners, 119 N. C., 214. and Commissioners v. Snuggs, 121 N. C., 394.
The majority of the Court having announced a different opinion, I feel it now my duty to acquiesce in their conclusion.