dissenting: The general prohibition law of 1908, prohibiting the manufacture or sale of any spirituous, vinous, fermented, or malt liquors, or intoxicating bitters, makes an exception of “the sale of cider in any quantity by the manufacturer from fruits grown on his lands within the State of North Carolina.” Laws Special Session 1908, ch. 71, sec. 1.
Experience having proven that this act permitted evasions of the law, the “Near-Beer Act,” Laws 1911, ch. 35, sec. 1, provides that “It shall be unlawful for any person or persons, firm or corporation, to sell or dispose of for gain, near-beer, beerine, or other spirituous, vinous, or malt liquors or mixtures, of any kind, and under whatsoever name called, that shall contain alcohol, or cocaine, or morphine, or other opium derivative, except as herein provided.”
This contains the same exceptions as the act of 1908 in regard to the sale of cider, “by the manufacturer from fruits grown on his own lands in this State.” It is settled that every statute should be “con*976strued according to tbe intent of tbe Legislature and so as to repress-the evil and advance tbe remedy.” Tbe special verdict finds that this cider contained more than 4 per cent of alcohol. It was not sold by tbe manufacturer, nor by bis servant, but by tbe defendant, who was-an agent or factor. He was not an employee, but an “agent,” and presumably be was selling on a commission or at a profit above a certain price. This is not authorized by tbe statute.
It is apparent that tbe act of 1908 and all tbe acts subsequent were intended to treat tbe sale of alcohol as contrary to tbe public interest, as a poison of tbe same nature as cocaine and opium, with which it is associated in tbe statute. Tbe grant of tbe privilege to sell cider was intended to be restricted to tbe manufacturer himself, or at tbe very furthest by bis employee or servant. To permit it to be sold by any “agent” is not in the wording of tbe statute, and certainly not within its spirit, for this would permit cider containing “more than 4 per cent alcohol,” as in this case, to be sold all over North Carolina by “agents” of any manufacturer.
This is contrary to tbe letter and spirit of tbe law, which are that tbe prohibition shall be as effective as possible,, which is shown by tbe fact that whenever this Court has found a defect in tbe law tbe next Legislature has always promptly cured tbe defect. It is also contrary to tbe general spirit of such legislation which has been shown not only by tbe almost world-wide restriction of tbe sale of alcohol and other intoxicants, but by tbe fact that in twenty-five States and in tbe great territory of Alaska total prohibition has been voted, and in all the other States (except two) there are large areas of local prohibition,' so that 90 per cent of tbe area of tbe Union and more than 80 per cent of its population is now under total prohibition. It being tbe evident intent of legislation to make prohibition more general and entirely effective, is it a reasonable construction to place upon tbe privilege given a manufacturer to sell cider, “made of bis own fruit, on bis own land in this State,” tbe construction that an agent, tbe defendant here, instead of the manufacturer (or his servant) can sell cider containing more than 4 per cent alcohol anywhere in North Carolina?
Is it not more' consonant with tbe rule, that a statute should be construed according to tbe intent of tbe Legislature, and to advance tbe remedy and to repress tbe evil, to say that tbe privilege to a manufacturer to sell bis own cider made by himself was not intended to go beyond tbe manufacturer himself, or bis servant, or employee under bis supervision. It was intended to be a privilege personal to him, and not to be exercised by tbe defendant or any one else, at any place in North Carolina. *
There is ground for giving a personal privilege to one who makes cider of bis own fruit grown on bis own land, but none whatever to> *977authorize its sale by any kind of an agent, on any kind of terms, anywhere in the State.
This is an abuse of the privilege, and is not authorized by the statute. Upon the special verdict the defendant was “selling for gain,” and he was not “the manufacturer.” If it was not intended to restrict the sale to the manufacturer, the act would have permitted a sale of cider withoiit any restriction.