concurring in the result.
[¶ 22] I reluctantly concur in the result reached by the majority. While I agree in principle with some of the logic in Justice Sandstrom’s dissent, it appears the district court followed the law as it exists.
[¶ 23] As noted by the dissent, N.D.C.C. § 14-09-09.7(4) creates a rebut-table presumption that the amount of child support that would result from application of the child support guidelines is correct. The statute further provides:
The presumption may be rebutted if a preponderance of the evidence in a contested matter establishes, applying criteria established by the child support agency which take into consideration the best interests of the child, that the child support amount established under the guidelines is not the correct amount of child support.
N.D.C.C. § 14-09-09.7(4) (emphasis added). The statute only allows for the presumption .to be rebutted under criteria established by the child support agency. The criteria under the guidelines for rebutting the presumption are set forth in N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-04.1-09, but none of them would apply to the facts and circumstances of this case. The current child support guidelines do not appear to contemplate a child in a residential placement fully covered by Medicaid and Supplemental Security Income, among the criteria for rebutting the presumption.
[¶24] Under previous authority, the district court could have done what the dissent suggests. In Bergman v. Bergman, 486 N.W.2d 243, 245 (N.D.1992), this Court recognized that the child support guidelines could be rebutted by evidence establishing that factors not considered by the guidelines would result in a hardship for the obligor or supported child. However, the version of N.D.C.C. § 14-09-09.7 at the time Bergman was decided was slightly different and provided:
The presumption may be rebutted if a preponderance of the evidence in a contested matter establishes that factors not considered by the guidelines will result in an undue hardship to the obli-gor or a child for whom support is sought.
N.D.C.C. § 14-09-09.7(3) (1989); see also Bergman, 486 N.W.2d at 245 n. 2. It appears the legislature intentionally limited the district court’s discretion, in regard to the presumption, by narrowing the criteria on which the court may rely to deviate from the presumptively correct amount. See Horner v. Horner, 549 N.W.2d 669, 670 (N.D.1996) (discussing the legislature’s 1993 amendments to N.D.C.C. § 14-09-09.7(3) requiring the child support guidelines to establish the available criteria for rebutting the presumptive amount and *441noting N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-04.1-09 plainly limits the factors available for rebuttal to those listed). In In the Interest of L.D.C., this Court stated, “N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-04.1-09(2) lists specific circumstances under which the presumptively correct amount would be rebutted. The list of available criteria is exclusive.” 1997 ND 104, ¶8, 564 N.W.2d 298 (emphasis added) (citing Homer, at 670).
[¶ 25] Under the divorce judgment, Brenda Schiele was awarded primary residential responsibility for the child and the parties have joint decisionmaking authority. The child is voluntarily placed in the Life Skills and Transition Center. Rather than say that neither parent has actual responsibility to provide a home for the child, the more rational outcome would be to award both parents equal residential responsibility, resulting in an offset of income for child support purposes. However, rather than move for equal residential responsibility, Bradley Schiele moved the court to amend the judgment to provide neither party be awarded primary residential responsibility. That motion was denied and has not been appealed. Regardless of what the parties could have or should have done, based on the issues raised on appeal, the majority has correctly concluded that the district court did not err in ordering Bradley Schiele to pay child support nor in failing to offset the obligation based on the benefits the child receives.
[¶ 26] DANIEL J. CROTHERS, J., concurs.