Chapter 2, Public Laws 1921, commonly known as the Road Act, when stripped of all bare technicalities and thin-spun dis-criminations, creates certain unmistakable objectives. These objectives may be classified as follows:
First. A certain type of public service for the people of the State, to wit, “the development of agricultural, commercial and natural resources of the State.” Second. For the purpose of making this service effective there was created a definite instrumentality, to wit, a Statewide system of highways of approximately fifty-five hundred miles “of hard-surfaced and other dependable roads.” Third. In order that there might be no confusion as to the immediate objects of this service the act designated them by name, to wit, all county seats, all principal towns, State parks and principal State institutions. Fourth. The highway system should serve these designated institutions by the most “practical routes.”
Let it be observed in passing that the service by the highway system to the designated institutions is the controlling idea, and the “practical route” is subordinate to the larger idea of the service to be rendered.
To the end that there might be no uncertainty as to how the highway system should be made up, the Legislature adopted a map showing in detail the roads which it proposed should “constitute the State highway *59system.” Tte map, therefore, became as solemn and binding legislative declaration as any other paragraph, phrase or clause of the road law.
Having defined the service to be rendered, and having created a system of roads as an instrumentality for promoting and guaranteeing the service contemplated, and having designated the immediate objects of the service, the Legislature created an administrative body known as the Highway Commission to execute its program so formulated.
Realizing that in order to execute with economy and efficiency the program of improvement, it delegated certain discretion to the Highway Commission in these words: “The roads so shown can be changed, altered, added to or discontinued by the State Highway Commission.” Realizing further that this discretion, so delegated, should be limited and safeguarded, in so far as it affected the immediate objects of the service to be rendered by the road system, the Legislature said, in effect, that no road serving a county seat should be altered or discontinued so as to withdraw therefrom the service of the highway system.
The exact language of the limitation is: “Provided, no road shall be changed, altered or discontinued so as to disconnect county seats,” etc.
Acting in obedience to power conferred upon it by the road law, the defendant, Highway Commission, adopted as a part of the State highway system the road between Statesville and Newton and took charge of said road and maintained the same as a part of route 10. This road entered the town of Newton in the southeastern portion and passed by the courthouse and along the principal street through the center of the town, and thence to Hickory over the present hard-surfaced road from Newton to Hickory. The defendant now proposes to abandon this road and to construct a new road from the center of Statesville to connect with the hard-surfaced road running from Newton to Hickory. This proposed road would enter the town of Newton just inside of the corporate limits of said town on the northern side, and at a distance of about 1% of a mile from the courthouse. The plaintiff thereupon instituted this action to restrain the defendant from constructing said road in the manner proposed, alleging in substance that the new road was a total abandonment of the present road, and, in addition thereto, that the new road, as proposed, skirted the town of Newton, touching it only near its northern limits, and that this action was contrary to law and would result in irreparable damage to the plaintiff and deprive it of the benefit to which it was entitled. The trial judge found the facts, which will appear from an examination of the judgment rendered, and which may be recapitulated in brief as follows: (1) That the proposed road, known as the northern route, is 1.39 of a mile shorter than' the present road; that the cost of grading and constructing the road on the northern route would be less than on the southern, but, if the northern *60route were adopted, it would be necessary to build a new bridge across the Catawba River, which would require a considerable expenditure of money. (2) That the said northern route or proposed route runs from the center of Statesville to á point just inside of the corporate limits of the town of Newton and 1% of a mile from the courthouse or center of the town, "leaving the whole town of Newton to the south/’
We now approach the front line trenches of the litigants, where the issue is to be fought out and determined.
The defendant takes up its position behind what is known in the law as the doctrine of discretion, which consists of those discretionary powers which can be exercised by administrative boards and with which the courts cannot interfere. The principle is expressed thus: “In numerous and repeated decisions the principle has been announced and sustained that courts may not interfere with discretionary powers conferred upon these local administrative boards for the public welfare unless their action is so clearly unreasonable as to amount to an oppressive and manifest abuse of discretion.” Newton v. School Committee, 158 N. C., 186. This principle is woven into the law by a long and unbroken line of decisions, beginning with Brodnax v. Groom, 64 N. C., 244. But it must be observed that these discretionary powers must be conferred on the local administrative board or result from necessary implication. The proviso of section 7 of the Road Act, in express language, not only fails to confer a discretion as to county seats, but, in positive language, actually withdraws it. When a statute speaks plainly and in no uncertain or ambiguous terms, the voice of discretion cannot be heard; otherwise administrative boards, under the guise of discretion, could set at nought the legislative will and clothe themselves with the attributes of sovereignty. That this is the correct interpretation of the law appears from the opinion of Adams, J., in the case of Cameron v. Highway Commission, 188 N. C., p. 88, in these words: “As we understand it, the very purpose of this proviso was to exclude the construction that, as to the roads therein described, the defendants should have the discretionary power upon which they now insist. In the exercise of a legal discretion they may determine whether a road shall be changed, altered or discontinued if they observe the mandate of the proviso. But this mandate must be observed; and if it be granted that county seats, State parks, national parks, and forest reserves may be identified ex vi termini, it is not so with respect to ‘principal towns’ or principal State institutions.”
The defendant plants itself behind the Cameron case. It must be observed at the outset, in analyzing the Cameron case, that it was' dealing with the question of “principal towns” only, and not with the question, of county seats. The Cameron case held that “the decision as to *61what are principal towns witbin tbe meaning of the act is a mixed question of law and fact, subject to judicial review as it ordinarily prevails in such, eases,” because “principal towns” cannot be identified ex vi termini. But this reasoning does not apply to county seats because county seats have a fixed meaning in the law and are identified ex vi termini. Therefore, the reasoning of the Cameron case has no application here, and the learned justice who wrote the opinion, had in mind that a different principle of law would apply to a county seat when he used this language: “and if it be granted county seats, State parks, national parks, and forest reservations may be identified ex vi termini, it is not so with respect to principal towns or State institutions.”
It is clear, then, that upon this aspect of the controversy the Cameron case. not only fails to support the defendant’s contention, but actually supports the contrary view.
The Cameron case very properly holds that the road map, adopted by the Legislature as a part of the road law, was tentative, but it also holds that this road map was not tentative in so far as it related to the service to be furnished by the road system to county seats. This idea is thus expressed in the opinion: “The terms of the proviso are positive and mandatory and not uncertain or discretionary. . . . Nothing else appearing, this clause would probably be construed as conferring powers to be exercised in the discretion of the defendant, but immediately following are the words: ‘Provided, no roads shall be changed, altered, or discontinued so as to disconnect county seats,’ ” etc. In other words, the obvious meaning of the statute is that any road shown on the map may be changed or altered in the discretion of the Highway Commission except that no road as shown on the map shall be changed, altered or discontinued so as to disconnect county seats.
The whole proposition, therefore, resolves itself, in the final analysis, to a determination of the question of whether or not the proposed road entering the town of Newton just within its outmost limits or boundaries is in effect disconnecting the county seat.
When the defendant completed its road to Statesville, the next legal objective was Newton because Newton is the next county seat to the west. By the ordinary processes of reasoning, it must be assumed that an objective created by law was of such outstanding, importance as to require and command the full service of the highway, system. The Road Act required these highways to run “to all county seats.” “Running to a county seat” is quite different from running around a county seat. In Farmers Turnpike Road v. Coventry, 10 Johnson (N. Y.), 389, the principle was thus declared: “The plaintiffs, by their charter, were entitled to carry the road To the city of Hudson.’ This did not *62mean that tbe road was to terminate on arriving at tbe north bounds of tbe city, wbicb are tbe middle of Major Abraham’s Creek, and several miles from tbe compact part of tbe city. Tbe words are to receive a more reasonable interpretation, in reference to tbe subject-matter, and tbe public object of tbe grant, wbicb was to open a good road from Troy to tbe compact part of tbe city of Hudson.” Tbis case bas been cited witb approval in People v. Flammer, 137 Mich., 399; Rio Grande R. R. v. Brownsville, 45 Texas, 88; Central Ga. R. R. v. Union Springs R. R. (Ala.) ; 2 L. R. A., N. S., 144.
In reply to tbis proposition, however, tbe defendant insists that when its proposed road actually enters tbe corporate limits at a point just inside thereof, it bas complied witb tbe law, and, to that extent, is just inside tbe law. If tbe reasoning of tbe defendant is sound, in giving a technical, restricted, and literal construction to tbe words: “connecting tbe various county seats,” then there is no necessity for running these highways into tbe corporate limits of tbe county seats at all. Tbe intent of tbe statute, by such reasoning, would be fully complied witb by running these great highways so as to connect witb a road that did connect with tbe street system of tbe town, and therefore a county seat could be “connected” even though tbe highway system did not come within one mile or ten miles of its boundaries. If it be conceded that tbis is a compliance witb tbe letter of tbe law, it must also be borne in mind that “the letter killetb, but tbe spirit givetb life.”
Tbe defendant insists that it would cost approximately two hundred thousand dollars ($200,000) more to build tbe southern route as shown on tbe map, referred to, than tbe northern route wbicb it proposes, and, therefore, that, as a public agency, it should conserve public money. Tbis is undoubtedly a sound proposition. But if tbe road law required these roads to serve tbe county seat, in accordance witb tbe legislative plan, then tbe question of expense is one for the Legislature and not for tbe courts or tbe Highway Commission. In. addition, tbe argument cannot be successfully maintained that, because it is cheaper to disobey tbe law than to observe it, therefore disobedience is justifiable.
It is also urged by tbe defendant that radical departures have been made in other county seats in tbe State. There is no finding of fact in regard to tbis in tbe record; but, assuming that tbis bas been done, prior departures from tbe law cannot be used as a reason for a failure to comply witb tbe mandate of tbe statute.
Tbe final contention of tbe defendant is that the construction of tbe road, as proposed by it, does not disconnect tbe town of Newton.
All tbe county seats in tbe State, including tbe town of Newton, were connected by a road system. Tbe statute itself, speaking through a map, *63made the connection in a definite and certain manner. What the statute hath joined together the defendant cannot put asunder.
We conclude that the Eoad Act itself connected the county seats according to the best judgment of the Legislature. A substantial departure from such connection so made by the sovereign power of the State must, of necessity, constitute a disconnection.
We hold, therefore, that the spirit of the Eoad Act contemplated that all county seats in North Carolina should be served by,the highway system substantially as designated on the map, and that the road, as proposed by the defendant, is not a substantial compliance with the true intent and meaning of the road law.
The trial judge properly held that “the court cannot direct the location of the road.” And while slight deviations might be permissible in the interest of the regulation of traffic or other controlling problems of engineering, yet the plaintiff is entitled, under the law, to the service of the road system, which would logically result from a substantial compliance with the location as fixed by the Legislature. •
Judgment affirmed.