Barrera v. Apple American Group LLC

Filed 8/31/23
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

MARIO BARRERA, et al.,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
A165445
v.
APPLE AMERICAN GROUP LLC, (Marin County
et al., Super. Ct. No. CIV2003539)
Defendants and Appellants.

Plaintiffs Mario Barrera and Francisco Varguez sued defendants—a
nationwide restaurant chain—to recover civil penalties under the Private
Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.) 1 for various
Labor Code violations suffered by them and by other employees. Defendants
moved to compel arbitration. The trial court denied the motion and
defendants appealed.
Based on Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. ___,
[142 S.Ct. 1906] (Viking River) and the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)
(9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.), we conclude the parties’ agreements require arbitration
of plaintiffs’ PAGA claims that seek to recover civil penalties for Labor Code
violations committed against plaintiffs. On an issue of California law that
the California Supreme Court has recently resolved, we conclude plaintiffs’
PAGA claims that seek to recover civil penalties for Labor Code violations

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Labor Code.

1
committed against employees other than plaintiffs may be pursued by
plaintiffs in the trial court. (Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023)
14 Cal.5th 1104 (Adolph).)
Therefore, the order denying defendants’ motion to compel arbitration
is reversed in part and affirmed in part.
BACKGROUND
The Parties and the General Setting
Defendants and appellants are Apple American Group LLC; Apple
American Group II LLC; Apple Mid Cal LLC; Apple Mid Cal II, LLC; Apple
NorCal LLC; Apple SoCal LLC; Apple SoCal II LLC; Flynn Restaurant Group
LP; Flynn Restaurant Group LLC; and Winecountry Apple, LLC (collectively,
defendants). According to the operative complaint, defendants are related
companies that together own and operate 460 Applebee’s restaurants in
California and other states.
Plaintiffs and respondents are Mario Barrera and Francisco Varguez
(collectively, plaintiffs). Barrera started working as a kitchen manager at an
Applebee’s restaurant in San Rafael in approximately October 2001. Varguez
started working as a cook at the same restaurant in approximately
September 2008.
During their employment, plaintiffs were presented with and signed
documents that included an arbitration provision, the details of which will be
described below. Plaintiffs were no longer employed by defendants as of
March 2020.
The Proceedings Below
On December 31, 2020, plaintiffs filed a complaint against defendants,
and on April 15, 2021, a first amended complaint, in which plaintiffs alleged
a single cause of action under PAGA for civil penalties on behalf of

2
themselves and other current and former employees of defendants. The
cause of action is predicated on alleged violations of the Labor Code. 2 The
first amended complaint asserts that plaintiffs are “aggrieved employees” for
purposes of an action under PAGA, and that they complied with the
requirements for commencing a PAGA action.
Initially, the case proceeded in relatively ordinary fashion, with
defendants filing a demurrer, plaintiffs serving discovery requests, and
defendants responding to those requests.
However, in March 2022, defendants filed a motion to compel
arbitration and to stay proceedings. It was accompanied by a memorandum
of points and authorities and several declarations, including of Tina Meyer,
one of defendants’ California human resources business partners.
In her declaration, Meyer stated that in August 2017, defendants
migrated their onboarding process onto an online portal that employees could
log onto using their own usernames and passwords, and access various
employment documents. Barrera, on August 9, 2017, and Varguez, on
August 10, 2017, logged onto the online portal; accessed the employee

2 Plaintiffs alleged: failure to pay overtime wages (§§ 510, 1198);
failure to pay minimum wages (§§ 1182.12, 1194, 1197, 1198); failure to
provide meal and rest periods (§§ 226.7, 512, subd. (a), 516, 1198); failure to
pay timely wages (§ 204); failure to provide accurate and complete wage
statements (§§ 226, subd. (a), 1198); failure to maintain payroll records
(§ 1174, subd. (d)); failure to pay all earned wages during employment and
upon termination (§§ 201 to 204); withholding tips and gratuities (§ 351);
failure to provide suitable seating (§ 1198); failure to pay reporting time pay
(§ 1198); failure to reimburse employees for work-related expenses (§ 2802);
and failure to provide written notice of material information (§ 2810.5, subd.
(a)(1)(A) to (C)). Plaintiffs alleged that these failures also violated “the
applicable Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Order.” They did not specify
the applicable wage order(s) except with respect to a few of the alleged
violations.

3
handbook containing the “Dispute Resolution Program” booklet and the
“Receipt of Dispute Resolution Program Booklet and Agreement to Abide by
Dispute Resolution”; and signed the agreement electronically.
Meyer attached these agreements to her declaration. Under the
paragraph entitled “MUTUAL PROMISE TO RESOLVE CLAIMS BY
BINDING ARBITRATION,” the agreements state: “In signing this
Agreement, both the Company and I agree that all legal claims or disputes
covered by the Agreement must be submitted to binding arbitration and that
this binding arbitration will be the sole and exclusive final remedy for
resolving any such claim or dispute. We also agree that any arbitration
between the Company and me will be on an individual basis and not as a
representative, class or collective action.” (Italics added.)
The agreements then provide: “This is an agreement to arbitrate all
legal claims. Those claims include . . . claims for a violation of any other non-
criminal federal, state or other governmental law, statute, regulation, or
ordinance.” They also state that by entering into the agreement, “I am giving
up my right to have my legal claims against the Company decided in court by
a judge or jury” and also “giving up my rights to pursue a class,
representative or collective action.”
The agreements further state that “the Federal Arbitration Act shall
govern the interpretation, enforcement, and proceedings under this
Agreement.”
Meyer’s declaration then explained that “employees such as
Mr. Barrera and Mr. Varguez may be asked to read and sign the ‘Receipt of
Dispute Resolution Program Booklet and Agreement to Abide by Dispute
Resolution’ during their employment when a new version of the document
was issued or for other record-keeping reasons.” On January 5, 2018,

4
Barrera and Varguez each signed a paper copy of the updated version of the
agreement. A representative of defendants also signed the agreements.
This later version of the agreement contains similar language as the
earlier version signed in 2017, except as follows. The paragraph “MUTUAL
PROMISE TO RESOLVE CLAIMS BY BINDING ARBITRATION” states:
“We also agree that any arbitration between the Company and me will be on
an individual basis and not as a class or collective action.” (Italics added.)
Thus, this version, unlike the earlier version, does not include a reference to
“representative” actions.
Meyer then concludes her declaration by stating: “I am informed and
believe that once an individual is presented with the [Dispute Resolution
Program] or Acknowledgment, there is no limit on the amount of time an
individual may take to review and either reject or accept the Agreement.
Likewise, once and individual is presented with the Employee Handbook,
there is no limit on the amount of time that individual may take to review
and either acknowledge or reject the Employee Handbook.”
In their motion, defendants sought to compel arbitration of plaintiffs’
PAGA claims based on Labor Code violations that plaintiffs suffered
personally (rather than their PAGA claims based on violations suffered by
other employees). According to defendants, “the only obstacle to arbitration
of the claim[s] here” was the California Supreme Court’s decision in
Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348
(Iskanian), which holds that an employee’s pre-dispute agreement to waive
his or her right to bring a PAGA action in any judicial or arbitral forum is
unenforceable. Defendants referred to a pending United States Supreme
Court case, Viking River, in which defendants indicated they expected the
United States Supreme Court to overturn Iskanian. Based on this,

5
defendants requested the court order arbitration of the PAGA claims
predicated on Labor Code violations personally suffered by plaintiffs.
Alternatively, defendants requested that the court stay proceedings pending
the outcome of Viking River.
Plaintiffs opposed the motion, arguing that under then controlling law,
“representative PAGA claims cannot be compelled to individual arbitration”;
that defendants failed to establish the prerequisites for the issuance of a stay;
and that defendants failed to prove the existence of a valid, binding
arbitration clause. On the last point, plaintiffs maintained that the
arbitration agreements they signed in 2018, not in 2017, were the operative
agreements. Plaintiffs asserted that the operative agreements were
unconscionable, and that defendants waived their right to arbitrate by
delaying bringing the motion and litigating the case in court.
Defendants filed a reply, responding to, among other arguments,
plaintiffs’ defenses of unconscionability and waiver.
On May 17, 2022, the motion came on for hearing, prior to which the
trial court had issued a tentative ruling denying the motion and stay request.
Following argument, the court adopted the tentative as the final order. In
denying the motion, the court relied on a rule that pre-dispute agreements to
arbitrate PAGA claims are unenforceable, a rule followed by many California
Courts of Appeal based on language in Iskanian. (Citing Correia v. NB Baker
Electric, Inc. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 602, 622.) In denying the stay request,
the court stated it would not speculate on the outcome of the United States
Supreme Court’s pending decision in Viking River and that the interests of
justice would not be served by further delaying the proceedings.
On June 6, defendants appealed.
On June 15, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in

6
Viking River. (Viking River, supra, 596 U.S. ___ [142 S.Ct. 1906].) Over one
month later, defendants filed a renewed motion to compel arbitration based
on Viking River. The court requested, and the parties submitted,
supplemental briefs addressing whether the court had jurisdiction to consider
the renewed motion while defendants’ appeal was pending. The court
concluded it did not have jurisdiction to rule on the renewed motion.
DISCUSSION
Introduction to the Analysis
Defendants argue that under either the 2017 or 2018 version of the
arbitration agreement, and based on the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Viking River, plaintiffs must be compelled to arbitrate their PAGA
claims based on Labor Code violations they personally experienced
(i.e., “individual” PAGA claims). Once those claims are compelled to
arbitration, defendants assert, plaintiffs lose standing to pursue in court
their remaining PAGA claims based on Labor Code violations suffered by
other employees (i.e., “non-individual” PAGA claims). Additionally,
defendants ask us to decide in their favor plaintiffs’ defenses of
unconscionability and waiver, issues that the trial court did not reach.
In response, plaintiffs at the outset ask us to dismiss the appeal and to
issue monetary sanctions against defendants for bringing a frivolous appeal.
On the merits, plaintiffs dispute that the “operative” arbitration
agreements—which they contend are the agreements the parties had signed
in 2018—require arbitration of the PAGA claims. But even if their individual
PAGA claims must be arbitrated, plaintiffs contend, they maintain standing
to litigate the non-individual PAGA claims in court. Further, plaintiffs
reassert that defendants waived their right to compel arbitration by delaying
bringing their motion and litigating the case in court. Plaintiffs do not

7
address their claim of unconscionability.
Before we address these arguments, we determine whether the 2017
agreements or the 2018 agreements are the operative agreements. The trial
court did not expressly state which agreements controlled. However, in the
“Background” section of its ruling, the court cited to the 2018 agreements and
stated that “both Plaintiffs Barrera and Varguez signed separate arbitration
agreements with Defendants in which they agreed that ‘by entering into this
Agreement, I am giving up my right to have my legal claims against the
Company decided in court by a judge or jury.” We therefore infer that the
court considered the 2018 agreements to be the operative arbitration
agreements.
Defendants do not challenge this implied finding; indeed, they argue it
makes no difference which set of agreements governs because they are
entitled to their requested relief under either version. Given this, we will
proceed on the understanding that the 2018 agreements are the operative
agreements, which we will refer to as the “Agreements.” (See Jameson v.
Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609 [a trial court’s decision is presumed to be
correct, and the appellant has the burden to demonstrate any error].) 3

3 We also note that neither party raised in their moving and opposing

papers or their appellate briefs the delegation clause in the Agreements,
which state “the arbitrator, and not any . . . court, shall have the exclusive
authority to resolve any dispute relating to the interpretation, arbitrability,
applicability, enforceability or formation of this agreement.” Instead, the
parties proceeded as if the trial court would decide those issues. Thus, even if
we assume the parties did agree to delegate certain issues to the arbitrator,
they have forfeited that contractual right and have submitted the matter to
the court. (Williams v. West Coast Hospitals, Inc. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th
1054, 1071, citing In re Checking Account Overdraft Litigation MDL No. 2036
(11th Cir. 2012) 672 F.3d 1224, 1228 [holding party waived its right to
arbitrate the unconscionability of the arbitration clause by asking the district

8
 Against this backdrop, we turn to the governing legal principles on
compelling arbitration.
Arbitration Generally and the Standard of Review
The governing law is both federal and state in character. We begin
with federal law.
The FAA applies to contracts that involve interstate commerce
(9 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2), but since arbitration is a matter of contract, the FAA also
applies if it is so stated in the agreement. (See Victrola 89, LLC v. Jaman
Properties 8 LLC (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 337, 355.) Here, defendants assert,
and plaintiffs do not dispute, that the FAA applies. We agree, as the
Agreements provide the FAA would control.
Section 2 of the FAA provides in relevant part: “A written provision
in . . . a contract . . . to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising
out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.” (9 U.S.C. § 2.) Under the FAA, there is a strong
policy favoring arbitration. (Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury
Construction (1983) 460 U.S. 1, 24; Engalla v. Permanente Medical
Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 971–972.) “The overarching purpose of the
FAA is to ensure the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to

court to decide the unconscionability challenge, rather than invoking the
delegation clause]; Truly Nolen of America v. Superior Court (2012)
208 Cal.App.4th 487, 515, fn. omitted [holding that party “cannot now
complain about the court’s authority to rule on [certain] issues” where the
party “fail[ed] to ask the court to defer [those issues] to the arbitrator”];
Mendoza v. Trans Valley Transport (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 748, 771
[“Employers forfeited any right to have the arbitrator decide whether the
parties have entered into a contract to arbitrate Mendoza’s underlying claims
by failing to properly preserve those claims in the trial court. They also
waived that right by fully litigating the question there and here”].)

9
their terms . . . .” (AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. 333,
344 (Concepcion).) Therefore, “[a]rbitration is a matter of consent . . . .” (Volt
Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior
University (1989) 489 U.S. 468, 479; Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela (2019)
___ U.S. ___ [139 S.Ct. 1407, 1415–1416].)
“ ‘Although the FAA preempts any state law that stands as an obstacle
to its objective of enforcing arbitration agreements according to their
terms, . . . we apply general California contract law to determine whether the
parties formed a valid agreement to arbitrate their dispute.’ ” (Vaughn v.
Tesla, Inc. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 208, 219; see First Options of Chicago,
Inc. v. Kaplan (1995) 514 U.S. 938, 944.)
“ ‘General contract law principles include that “[t]he basic goal of
contract interpretation is to give effect to the parties’ mutual intent at the
time of contracting. [Citations.] . . . ‘The words of a contract are to be
understood in their ordinary and popular sense.’ ” [Citation.] Furthermore,
“ ‘[t]he whole of a contract is to be taken together, so as to give effect to every
part, if reasonably practicable, each clause helping to interpret the other.’
[Citation.]” ’ [Citation.]” (Vaughn v. Tesla, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 219.)
Also, ambiguities or doubts about the scope of an arbitration agreement must
be resolved in favor of arbitration. (Ericksen, Arbuthnot, McCarthy,
Kearney & Walsh, Inc. v. 100 Oak Street (1983) 35 Cal.3d 312, 323; accord,
Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, supra, ___ U.S. ___ [139 S.Ct. 1407 at p. 1418].)
The party seeking arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence
of an arbitration agreement, and the party opposing arbitration any defense,
such as unconscionability and waiver. (Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v.
Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236
(Pinnacle); see St. Agnes Medical Center v. PacifiCare of California (2003)

10
31 Cal.4th 1187, 1195.)
“Where, as here, the evidence is not in conflict, we review the trial
court’s denial of arbitration de novo. [Citation.]” (Pinnacle, supra, 55 Cal.4th
at p. 236.) 4
Waiver of the Right to Compel Arbitration
Because the issue of waiver is potentially determinative, we address it
first.
Initially, as noted above, plaintiffs opposed arbitration on waiver
grounds, but the trial court did reach the issue. Defendants ask us to decide
the issue in the first instance as a matter of law. Given that the trial court’s
ruling was limited in scope, we could in theory remand to the trial court to
consider the matter. However, we agree with defendants that “because the
issue is purely one of law which we would be reviewing de novo, nothing
would be gained by remanding for this purpose.” (Rayyis v. Superior Court
(2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 138, 150, fn. 10; accord, Higgins v. Superior Court
(2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1251.) We thus resolve the issue here as a
matter of law.
Plaintiffs argue that defendants waived the right to arbitrate by
“litigating this case for over a year” before filing their motion to compel
arbitration. We disagree.
Piplack v. In-N-Out Burgers (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1281, review

4 Plaintiffs argue “the appeal is subject to a heightened standard of

review” because “the parties advanced conflicting views of the facts before the
trial court. . . .” But plaintiffs do not point us to any specific facts they claim
are conflicting. Nor do they specify the “heightened standard of review” they
ask us to apply. In any event, our review of the record and the parties’ briefs
reveals that the issues presented on appeal do not require resolving any
conflicting evidence. Therefore, de novo review applies. (Pinnacle, supra,
55 Cal.4th at p. 236.)

11
granted June 14, 2023, S279546 (Piplack), a case defendants cite in their
reply brief, is on point. And we agree with its analysis. In Piplack, the
plaintiffs sued the defendant under PAGA. “Initially, the case proceeded in
relatively ordinary fashion, with the filing of answers, demurrers, amended
complaints, and a discovery motion. However, in February 2022, defendant
filed a motion to compel arbitration,” explaining the delayed timing of its
motion was due to then pending United States Supreme Court decision of
Viking, in which the defendant indicated it expected the United States
Supreme Court to overturn or materially alter the California Supreme
Court’s decision in Iskanian. (Piplack, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 1286.)
On appeal, the plaintiffs renewed their argument the defendant waived
the right to arbitrate by litigating the case in the trial court. (Piplack, supra,
88 Cal.App.5th at p. 1289.) Although the trial court did not reach the issue,
the Court of Appeal resolved the issue in favor of the defendant as a matter of
law. (Ibid.) The appellate court analogized the case to Iskanian, which
considered whether the defendant had waived its right to compel arbitration
by failing to pursue its arbitration rights until the United States Supreme
Court issued Concepcion, supra, 563 U.S. 333. (Piplack, at p. 1289, citing
Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at pp. 374–378.) As explained in Piplack: “The
defendant in Iskanian initially filed a petition to compel arbitration at the
outset of the case, then withdrew it after the California Supreme Court
issued Gentry[ v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443 (Gentry)]. (Iskanian,
at p. 376.) But when the United States Supreme Court issued Concepcion
and effectively invalidated Gentry, the defendant renewed its motion for
arbitration, citing the change in the law. (Iskanian, at p. 376.) The
California Supreme Court held this delay, and the cost of the related
intervening proceedings in the trial court, could not constitute waiver

12
because the failure to file a ‘futile’ motion to compel arbitration was not an
unreasonable delay. (Id. at pp. 376–377.)” (Piplack, at p. 1289.)
The Piplack court then observed, “Similarly, in the present case,
defendant raised its right to arbitrate as soon as it had any chance of
success.” (Piplack, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 1289.) “If anything, defendant
moved too quickly by seeking to compel arbitration before the United States
Supreme Court could decide Viking.” (Piplack, at p. 1289, fn. 5.) “The fact
that defendant vigorously defended itself in the trial court makes no
difference because the relevant question is whether there was any
unreasonable delay.” (Id. at p. 1289.)
Likewise here. Defendants moved to compel arbitration soon after it
learned the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Viking River
with respect to the Iskanian rule—which they explained in their motion was
“the only obstacle to arbitration of the claim here” and likely to be overturned
in Viking River. Thus, as in Piplack, defendants “raised [their] right to
arbitrate as soon as [they] had any chance of success.” (Piplack, supra,
88 Cal.App.5th at p. 1289.) Given these circumstances, any delay in bringing
their motion was not unreasonable. Defendants therefore did not waive their
right to arbitrate as a matter of law.
Arbitrability of the PAGA Claims
The Law on Agreements to Arbitrate PAGA Claims
PAGA
PAGA authorizes any “aggrieved employee” to initiate a civil action
against a former employer “on behalf of himself or herself and other current
or former employees” to recover civil penalties for violations of the Labor
Code ordinarily “assessed and collected by the Labor and Workforce
Development Agency . . . .” (§ 2699, subd. (a).)

13
 “An employee suing under PAGA ‘does so as the proxy or agent of the
state’s labor law enforcement agencies.’ [Citation.] . . . Moreover, the civil
penalties a PAGA plaintiff may recover on the state’s behalf are distinct from
the statutory damages or penalties that may be available to employees suing
for individual violations. [Citation.] Relief under PAGA is designed
primarily to benefit the general public, not the party bringing the action.
[Citation.] ‘A PAGA representative action is therefore a type of qui tam
action,’ conforming to all ‘traditional criteria, except that a portion of the
penalty goes not only to the citizen bringing the suit but to all employees
affected by the Labor Code violation.’ [Citation.] The ‘government entity on
whose behalf the plaintiff files suit is always the real party in interest.’ ”
(Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73, 81 (Kim),
italics omitted.)
Iskanian
In Iskanian, the California Supreme Court held “an arbitration
agreement requiring an employee as a condition of employment to give up the
right to bring representative PAGA actions in any forum is contrary to public
policy.” (Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 360.) Iskanian further held that
the FAA does not preempt a rule against waivers of the type described above,
stating: “[A] PAGA claim lies outside the FAA’s coverage because it is not a
dispute between an employer and an employee arising out of their
contractual relationship. It is a dispute between an employer and the state,
which alleges directly or through its agents—either the [Labor and Workforce
Development] Agency or aggrieved employees—that the employer has
violated the Labor Code.” (Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at pp. 386−387.)
Based on Iskanian’s reasoning that the state is the real plaintiff in
interest in a PAGA action, California Courts of Appeal subsequently held

14
that an employee’s pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate PAGA claims is
unenforceable absent a showing the state also consented to the agreement.
(E.g., Herrera v. Doctors Medical Center of Modesto (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th
538, 550, fn. 3; Correia v. NB Baker Electric, Inc., supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at
p. 622; Julian v. Glenair, Inc. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 853, 869–872;
Betancourt v. Prudential Overall Supply (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 439, 445–449;
Tanguilig v. Bloomingdale’s, Inc. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 665, 677–680.)
“This rule and the logic behind it seemed sound—until Viking River.”
(Nickson v. Shemran, Inc. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 121, 128 (Nickson).)
Viking River
In Viking River, the United States Supreme Court considered whether
the FAA preempted certain of Iskanian’s holdings. (Viking River, supra,
596 U.S. at pp. ___, ___ [142 S.Ct. at pp. 1913, 1917].)
The Viking River court began its analysis by explaining PAGA claims
are “representative” in two ways. (Viking River, supra, 596 U.S. at p. ___
[142 S.Ct. at p. 1916].) First, “PAGA actions are ‘representative’ in that they
are brought by employees acting as representatives—that is, as agents or
proxies—of the State.” (Id. at p. ___ [142 S.Ct. at p. 1916].) In that sense,
“ ‘ “every PAGA action is . . . representative” ’ and ‘[t]here is no individual
component to a PAGA action,’ [citations], because every PAGA claim is
asserted in a representative capacity.” (Id. at p. ___ [142 S.Ct. at p. 1916].)
Second, some PAGA actions are “representative” in that they are brought by
one employee to recover civil penalties for Labor Code violations committed
against other employees. (Viking River, at p. ___ [142 S.Ct. at p. 1916].) 5

5 As explained in Galarsa v. Dolgen California, LLC (2023)

88 Cal.App.5th 639, 652–653, review granted May 3, 2023, S279021
(Galarsa): “The United States Supreme Court stated it would endeavor to be

15
 As another preliminary matter, the Supreme Court, in a footnote,
rejected Iskanian’s holding that the FAA does not apply to PAGA claims.
(Viking River, supra, 596 U.S. at p. ___, fn. 4 [142 S.Ct. at p. 1919, fn. 4],
quoting Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 387.) Specifically, it rejected
Iskanian’s reasoning “that a PAGA action lies outside the FAA’s coverage
entirely because § 2 is limited to controversies ‘arising out of’ the contract
between the parties [citation] and a PAGA action ‘is not a dispute between an
employer and an employee arising out of their contractual relationship,’ but
‘a dispute between an employer and the state.’ [Citation.]” (Viking River, at
p. ___, fn. 4 [142 S.Ct. at p. 1919, fn. 4], quoting Iskanian, at p. 387.) Viking
River concluded that “disputes resolved in PAGA actions satisfy this
requirement,” because “[t]he contractual relationship between the parties is a
but-for cause of any justiciable legal controversy between the parties under
PAGA, and ‘arising out of’ language normally refers to a causal relationship.
[Citation.]” (Viking River, at p. ___, fn. 4 [142 S.Ct. at p. 1919, fn. 4].)
Moreover, “nothing in the FAA categorically exempts claims belonging to
sovereigns from the scope of § 2.” (Ibid.)

clear in its use of the term ‘representative’ and would use the phrase ‘
“individual PAGA claim” to refer to claims based on code violations suffered
by the plaintiff.’ [(Viking River, supra, 596 U.S. at p. ___ [142 S.Ct. at
p. 1916].]) In addition, the court used the term ‘non-individual claims’
without explicitly defining it (id. at p. ___ [142 S.Ct. at pp. 1924, 1925]), but
the opinion readily implies such claims are representative claims are pursued
by the plaintiff and based on Labor Code violations suffered by employees
other than the plaintiff.” Here, we will refer to PAGA claims based on code
violations personally suffered by a plaintiff as “individual” claims, and PAGA
claims based on code violations suffered by employees other than the plaintiff
as “non-individual” claims. (See Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1114 [“For
consistency, we use the terms ‘individual’ and ‘non-individual’ claims in
accordance with the high court’s usage in Viking River”].)

16
 Given its conclusion that the FAA applies, the court went on to consider
whether the FAA preempts two of Iskanian’s rules, which it described this
way: “Iskanian’s principal rule prohibits waivers of ‘representative’ PAGA
claims in the first sense. That is, it prevents parties from waiving
representative standing to bring PAGA claims in a judicial or arbitral forum.
But Iskanian also adopted a secondary rule that invalidates agreements to
separately arbitrate or litigate ‘individual PAGA claims for Labor Code
violations that an employee suffered,’ on the theory that resolving victim-
specific claims in separate arbitrations does not serve the deterrent purpose
of PAGA.” (Viking River, supra, 596 U.S. at pp. ___–___ [142 S.Ct. at
pp. 1916–1917].)
The Viking River court determined the FAA does not preempt
Iskanian’s principal rule. (Viking River, supra, 596 U.S. at pp. ___–___, ___–
___ [142 S.Ct. at pp. 1922–1923, 1924–1925].) It reasoned that because the
FAA is concerned with the forum in which disputes are resolved, not with the
substantive law that resolves them, it did not preempt this rule. (Id. at p. ___
[142 S.Ct. at p. 1919].) Thus, even after Viking River, a contractual waiver of
the right to prosecute PAGA claims is unenforceable as against California
public policy.
However, the Viking River court held the FAA preempts Iskanian’s
secondary rule “preclud[ing] [the] division of PAGA actions into individual
and non-individual claims through an agreement to arbitrate.” (Viking River,
supra, 596 U.S. at p. ___ [142 S.Ct. at p. 1924].) If splitting were allowed, the
court reasoned, parties might prefer to resolve higher-stakes nonindividual
claims in court, where appellate review is available to correct errors, but to
arbitrate lower-stakes individual claims. (Ibid.) But Iskanian’s prohibition
on contractual splitting of PAGA claims “circumscribes the freedom of parties

17
to determine ‘the issues subject to arbitration’ and ‘the rules by which they
will arbitrate’ ” by imposing on them an all-or-nothing choice: arbitrate both
individual and non-individual claims or forego arbitration entirely. (Viking
River, at p. ___ [142 S.Ct. at p. 1923].)
The court then turned to the agreement at issue, which required
“arbitrat[ion] [of] any dispute arising out of [the plaintiff’s] employment” and
contained a waiver provision “providing that in any arbitral proceeding, the
parties could not bring any dispute as a class, collective, or representative
PAGA action. . . .” (Viking River, supra, 596 U.S. at p. ___ [142 S.Ct. at
p. 1916].) The agreement also included a “severability clause specifying
that . . . if any ‘portion’ of the waiver remained valid it would be ‘enforced in
arbitration.’ ” (Ibid.) The court relied on that clause in concluding the
defendant was entitled to compel arbitration of the plaintiff’s individual
claim, even though the arbitration agreement was invalid as to the
representative claim. (Id. at p. ___ [142 S.Ct. p. 1925].)
Analysis
With an understanding of Viking River, and by reading the plain
language of the Agreements, we agree with defendants that plaintiffs’
individual PAGA claims must be sent to arbitration.
As noted, the Agreements state: “In signing this Agreement, both the
Company and I agree that all legal claims or disputes covered by the
Agreement must be submitted to binding arbitration and that this binding
arbitration will be the sole and exclusive final remedy for resolving any such
claim or dispute. We also agree that any arbitration between the Company
and me will be on an individual basis and not as a class or collective action.”
Two paragraphs later, the Agreements state: “This is an agreement
to arbitrate all legal claims. Those claims include: . . . claims for a

18
violation of any other non-federal, state or other governmental law, statute,
regulation or ordinance . . . .”
The second paragraph unambiguously mandates arbitration of “all
legal claims,” which include “claims for a violation of [a] . . . state . . . statute.”
These broad provisions no doubt cover plaintiffs’ PAGA claims that are based
on defendants’ alleged Labor Code violations.
The first paragraph does provide a limitation, namely that claims
submitted to arbitration “will be on an individual basis . . . .” (Italics added.)
As noted, Viking River characterized PAGA claims based on violations the
plaintiff personally sustained as “individual” claims, and PAGA claims based
on violations that other employees sustained as “non-individual” claims. (See
Viking River, supra, 596 U.S. at pp. ___, ___–___ [142 S.Ct. at pp. 1916, 1924–
1925].) Based on this, we construe the “individual basis” limitation contained
in the Agreements here as requiring arbitration of only plaintiffs’ individual
PAGA claims, thereby precluding arbitration of the non-individual PAGA
claims. (See, e.g., Parsittie v. Schneider Logistics, Inc. (C.D.Cal. Feb. 8, 2023,
CV 19-03981-MWF (AFMx)) 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21754 at *27 [provision
that “ ‘claims must be submitted [to arbitration] on an individual basis only’ ”
read as requiring arbitration of only the individual PAGA claims, and
precluding arbitration of non-individual claims]; Nickson, supra,
90 Cal.App.5th at p. 130 [provision stating arbitration of covered claims “ ‘can
only be brought . . . on an individual basis’ ” meant that plaintiff’s “individual
PAGA claims can be arbitrated, while his nonindividual . . . claims cannot”].)
And under Viking River, it is permissible for arbitration agreements to split
PAGA claims in this manner. (See Viking River, at p. ___ [142 S.Ct. at
p. 1925].)
Plaintiffs nonetheless argue that the Agreements do not encompass

19
their PAGA claims whatsoever. Preliminarily, we note that plaintiffs present
a number of arguments, but do not do so under appropriate headings.
Plaintiffs’ substantive arguments fall under the heading “Strong Contractual
Reasons Exist for Denying Appellants’ Motion,” and specifically its two
subheadings. However, some of the arguments do not match the subheadings
they fall under. Also, plaintiffs repeat some of the same arguments under the
different subheadings. We are not inclined to repair this situation by
stitching the arguments together and then supplementing them to create
coherent reasoning. Accordingly, we will address the arguments in the order
presented by plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs’ first subheading asserts: “Unlike the Viking River
Agreement, the Proffered Arbitration Agreements Contain No PAGA Waiver
and No Disaggregation of PAGA Claims into ‘Individual’ and ‘Representative’
Components.” Under this subheading, plaintiffs first argue that the
Agreements in this case, “unlike that at issue in Viking River, do[es] not
contain a representative, PAGA, or qui tam action waiver.” They also state
the Agreements do not “disaggregate[ ] [the PAGA claims] into ‘individual’
and ‘representative’ components.” Instead, plaintiffs argue, the Agreements
contain a “a waiver of ‘class and collective’ actions,” which Viking River
explained is not the same as a PAGA claim. Plaintiffs conclude that because
the Agreements contain no PAGA or “representative” waiver, “there is simply
no basis to compel arbitration in this case.”
Plaintiffs do not articulate why the absence of a PAGA waiver in the
Agreements necessarily precludes defendants’ requested relief. But they
seem to suggest the Agreements must expressly include language waiving
the right to arbitrate “representative” or “PAGA” claims before a court may
split PAGA actions into arbitrable and non-arbitrable claims. We reject such

20
a suggestion.
It is true that the provision at issue here is not explicit as the one in
Viking River, which expressly prevented arbitration of “any dispute as a
class, collective, or representative PAGA action.” (Viking River, supra,
596 U.S. at p. ___ [142 S.Ct. at p. 1916], italics added.) However, plaintiffs
virtually ignore the language in the Agreements stating the parties agreed
that “any arbitration . . . . will be on an individual basis . . . .” (Italics added.)
As explained above, given Viking River’s characterization of PAGA claims
based on violations suffered by other employees as “non-individual” claims
(see Viking River, at pp. ___, ___–___ [142 S.Ct. at pp. 1916, 1924–1925]), the
provision referring to arbitration “on an individual basis” indicates that only
individual PAGA claims can be arbitrated. Indeed, as plaintiffs acknowledge
in their summary of Viking River, that decision recognized that “if the parties
contracted for PAGA arbitration on an individual basis . . . , then PAGA
claims can be split into an individual claim that can be sent to
arbitration . . . .”
Next, we address plaintiffs’ passing statement within its discussion of
the lack of a PAGA waiver that the Agreements do not “even mention[]
PAGA.” The suggestion that the Agreements do not cover PAGA claims
because they do specifically mention “PAGA” is simply unpersuasive. As
concluded above, the broad language in the Agreements providing for
arbitration of “all legal claims,” including “claims for a violation of [a] . . .
state . . . statute,” clearly covers PAGA claims.
Plaintiffs then argue that the Agreements do not cover PAGA claims
based on their characterization of a PAGA action as a dispute between the
employer and the state (rather than the employer and employee). Plaintiffs
largely rely on Viking River but, as defendants observe, that decision rejects

21
plaintiffs’ assertion. Specifically, the United States Supreme Court disagreed
with Iskanian’s reasoning “that a PAGA action lies outside the FAA’s
coverage entirely because § 2 is limited to controversies ‘arising out of’ the
contract between the parties [citation] and a PAGA action ‘is not a dispute
between an employer and an employee arising out of their contractual
relationship,” but ‘a dispute between an employer and the state.’ [Citation.]”
(Viking River, supra, 596 U.S. at p. ___, fn. 4 [142 S.Ct. at p. 1919, fn. 4],
quoting Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 387.) Viking River concluded that
“disputes resolved in PAGA actions satisfy this requirement,” because “[t]he
contractual relationship between the parties is a but-for cause of any
justiciable legal controversy between the parties under PAGA, and ‘arising
out of’ language normally refers to a causal relationship. [Citation.]” (Viking
River, at p. ___ [142 S.Ct. at p. 1919, fn. 4].) The court further stated,
“[N]othing in the FAA categorically exempts claims belonging to sovereigns
from the scope of § 2.” (Ibid.)
We move on to plaintiffs’ second subheading: “Because the Agreements
Do Not Contain A Representative Action Waiver, Appellants’ Request for
Relief Is Invalid.” Under this subheading, plaintiffs first argue that even if
the Agreements cover PAGA claims, they require the parties to arbitrate both
the individual and non-individual PAGA claims. Because defendants sought
to compel only the individual PAGA claims, plaintiffs contend, this court
“cannot provide the relief [defendants] seek” and must affirm the order
denying the motion to compel arbitration. We disagree. This argument is
again premised on plaintiffs’ disregard for the Agreements’ provision stating
that “any arbitration . . . will be on an individual basis.”
For this reason, plaintiffs’ reliance on Diaz v. Macy’s West Stores, Inc.
(C.D.Cal. Nov. 23, 2022, CV 19-00303 PSG (MAAx)) 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

22
212825 (Diaz) is misplaced. In Diaz, the defendants argued the plaintiff was
required “to arbitrate her individual PAGA claims against Defendant and
[was] precluded from bringing non-individual PAGA claims against
Defendant in the arbitration.” (Diaz, supra, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 212825,
at *5.) The district court agreed with the first point, but rejected the second.
On the first point, the Diaz court explained that the first paragraph of
the arbitration agreement “unambiguously mandates arbitration for all
employment-related disputes arising out of any law—federal, state, or local—
except where otherwise limited. That broad provision no doubt covers
Plaintiff's individual PAGA claims that are based on Defendant’s alleged
Labor Code violations.” (Diaz, supra, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 212825, at *9.)
Regarding the second point, the Diaz court found that the second
paragraph of the arbitration agreement did “not on its face exclude
representative PAGA claims from being adjudicated in the same arbitration
proceeding.” (Diaz, supra, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 212825, at *10–11.) The
second paragraph provided: “The Arbitrator shall not consolidate claims of
different Associates into one (1) proceeding. Nor shall the Arbitrator have
the power to hear an arbitration as a class or collective action.” (Id. at *9.)
The Diaz court noted that there was no mention of a representative PAGA
claim, which, under Viking River, is distinct from class or collective actions.
(Diaz, at *10–11, citing Viking River, supra, 596 U.S. at p. ___ [142 S.Ct. at
p. 1916].) As such, there was no limitation precluding the representative
PAGA claims from being arbitrated in the same proceeding as the individual
PAGA claims. In other words, “representative PAGA claims f[e]ll within the
capacious language of the first paragraph as an employment-related dispute.”
(Diaz, at *11.)
Here, it is true that the Agreements are similar to that of Diaz in that

23
they broadly describe the types of claims subject to arbitration and include a
waiver of the right to arbitrate “as a class or collective action.” However,
unlike in Diaz, the Agreements here include additional language that
restricts arbitration “on an individual basis.” As such, Diaz is inapposite.
In sum, in defining the scope of arbitrable claims, the Agreements
provide that only individual PAGA claims can be arbitrated. Under Viking
River, this is permissible. Therefore, the order denying defendants’ motion to
compel arbitration is incorrect. Plaintiffs’ individual claims can be
arbitrated—unless the Agreements are unenforceable on some other ground.
Unconscionability
In opposing the motion to compel arbitration, plaintiffs argued the
Agreements are unconscionable. The trial court did not decide the issue. As
with the waiver issue, we may decide the unconscionability issue in the first
instance since our review does not call for the resolution of contested facts.
(See Rayyis v. Superior Court, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 150, fn. 10;
Higgins v. Superior Court, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 1251.)
As another preliminary matter, defendants assert plaintiffs have
abandoned their unconscionability defense by failing to address it in their
respondents’ brief. Despite plaintiffs’ omission, we decline to treat it as a
default or concession and will decide the issue on the record and defendants’
appellate briefs. (Cf. In re Bryce C. (1995) 12 Cal.4th 226, 232–233
[“Although some courts have treated the failure to file a respondent’s brief
as . . . a consent to a reversal, . . . the ‘better rule . . . is to examine the record
on the basis of appellant’s brief and to reverse only if prejudicial error is
found’ ”]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.220(a)(2).)
Turning to the merits, we begin with the applicable law. “A contract is
unconscionable if one of the parties lacked a meaningful choice in deciding

24
whether to agree and the contract contains terms that are unreasonably
favorable to the other party. [Citation.] Under this standard, the
unconscionability doctrine ‘ “has both a procedural and a substantive
element.” ’ [Citation.]” (OTO L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, 125 (OTO).)
“ ‘The procedural element [of the unconscionability doctrine] addresses the
circumstances of contract negotiation and formation, focusing on oppression
or surprise due to unequal bargaining power. [Citations.] Substantive
unconscionability pertains to the fairness of an agreement’s actual terms and
to assessments of whether they are overly harsh or one-sided.’ [Citation.]”
(Ibid.)
“Both procedural unconscionability and substantive unconscionability
must be shown, but ‘they need not be present in the same degree’ and are
evaluated on ‘ “a sliding scale.” ’ [Citation.] ‘[T]he more substantively
oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural
unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is
unenforceable, and vice versa.’ ” (Pinnacle, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 247.)
“The burden of proving unconscionability rests upon the party
asserting it. [Citations.]” (OTO, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 126.)
We first address procedural unconscionability. The extent of plaintiffs’
argument on this issue in their opposing papers is this single paragraph:
“[A]ll of Defendants’ non-exempt employees were forced to sign an arbitration
agreement if they wanted to be hired or continue to work at an Applebee’s
Franchise. Meyer Decl. ¶¶ 5 & 9. The arbitration agreement was one of a
plethora of documents presented to Plaintiffs, and Plaintiffs did not have a
meaningful opportunity to negotiate its terms. Meyer Decl. ¶¶ 5–6 & 9.
Rather, it was presented on a take-it or leave-it basis, along with the other
onboarding documents. Id. Each of these facts favors a finding of procedural

25
unconscionability.”
As just quoted, plaintiffs’ procedural unconscionability arguments
relied solely on the declaration of defendants’ California human resources
business partner, Tina Meyer, attached to the motion to compel arbitration.
Plaintiffs did not present separate evidence. In paragraphs 5 and 6 of her
declaration, Meyer describes how defendants in August 2017 migrated its
onboarding process to an online portal and began directing current and
employees to use the portal “to fill out required employment information and
sign documents”; that although employees may print copies of any documents
they wish to retain in hard copy, they must digitally sign all documents that
require a signature; and that employees “were afforded time (on the clock) to
sign the [employment] documents.” Then, in paragraph 9, Meyer states that
“employees such as [plaintiffs] may be asked to read and sign the ‘Receipt of
Dispute Resolution Program Booklet and Agreement to Abide by Dispute
Resolution’ during their employment when a new version of the document
was issued or for other record-keeping reasons.” Meyer also avers that hand-
signed copies of the updated version of the agreement were contained in
plaintiffs’ personnel files.
The paragraphs cited by plaintiffs establish the general facts that
plaintiffs were presented with versions of the agreement during their
employment and that they signed those documents either digitally or in
paper copy. However, those and other paragraphs of the declaration do not
provide much information on the circumstances surrounding the formation
and negotiation of the Agreements. (See OTO, supra, 8 Cal.5th at pp. 126–
127 [circumstances relevant to establishing oppression include the amount of
time the party is given to consider the proposed contract; amount and type of
pressure exerted on the party to sign the proposed contract; the length of the

26
proposed contract and the length and complexity of the challenged provision;
the education and experience of the party; and whether the party’s review of
the proposed contract was aided by an attorney].) For example, the
declaration does not provide the context in which plaintiffs were presented
with and signed the Agreements, other than the means by which they could
view and sign it (i.e. via the online portal or in hard copy). It does not set
forth any discussions defendants may have had with the plaintiffs before they
were presented with and signed the Agreements. The declaration also does
not shed light on plaintiffs’ ability or inability to negotiate and understand
the terms of the Agreements. What the declaration does state, however, is
that when using the online portal, employees were “afforded time (on the
clock) to sign documents.” It also states “there is no limit on the amount of
time an individual may take to review and either . . . reject [or accept the
Agreement.]”
In view of the above, Meyer’s declaration does not contain any facts or
raise any reasonable inferences that plaintiffs were “forced to sign” the
Agreements, or that they lacked “a meaningful opportunity to negotiate [the]
terms,” or that the Agreements were “presented on a take-it or leave-it basis.”
“Absent any evidence, we cannot just assume there was procedural
unconscionability.” (Performance Team Freight Systems, Inc. v. Aleman
(2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1248.)
But even assuming plaintiffs have shown procedural unconscionability,
they have failed to show substantive unconscionability. Plaintiffs argued
below that “the arbitration agreement[s] [are] substantively unconscionable
on [their] face because [they] contain[ ] an illegal provision that seeks to force
PAGA claims into arbitration.” However, as defendants note, this argument
is foreclosed by Viking River, which upheld the validity of agreements to

27
arbitrate PAGA claims, except to the extent they contained a wholesale
waiver to bring a PAGA action in any forum. (See Viking River, supra,
142 S.Ct. at pp. 1924–1925.)
Accordingly, we conclude as a matter of law that plaintiffs did not meet
their burden in establishing the Agreements are unconscionable.
Standing to Pursue Non-Individual Claims
Having concluded there are valid agreements to arbitrate plaintiffs’
individual PAGA claims, the question, then, is what to do with plaintiffs’ non-
individual PAGA claims.
In Viking River, the United States Supreme Court suggested that once
the plaintiff was required to arbitrate her individual PAGA claim, her non-
individual claim must be dismissed. (Viking River, supra, 596 U.S. at p. ___
[142 S.Ct. at p. 1925].) Viking River reasoned: “Under PAGA’s standing
requirement, a plaintiff can maintain non-individual PAGA claims in an
action only by virtue of also maintaining an individual claim in that action.
[Citation.] When an employee’s own dispute is pared away from a PAGA
action, the employee is no different from a member of the general public, and
PAGA does not allow such persons to maintain suit. [Citation.]” (Viking
River, at p. ___ [142 S.Ct. at p. 1925].)
Defendants argue we should dismiss the non-individual claims for lack
of standing, as suggested in Viking River. Plaintiffs contend this court is not
bound to follow federal decisions interpreting state law, and under the rules
on PAGA standing established by the California Supreme Court in Kim, they
do not lose statutory standing to maintain their non-individual PAGA claims
in court. Plaintiffs prevail, as our Supreme Court has recently held in
Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th 1104.
By way of brief background, since Viking River at least five published

28
California Court of Appeal decisions have squarely addressed the issue of
whether a plaintiff continues to have standing under PAGA to litigate non-
individual claims after the individual claims are compelled to arbitration.
And all five reached the same conclusion: dismissal for lack of standing is
not required by California law. (Nickson, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at pp. 134–
135; Seifu v. Lyft, Inc. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1129, 1139–1141, review
granted June 14, 2023, S279932 (Seifu); Gregg v. Uber Technologies, Inc.
(2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 786, 805–806, review granted June 14, 2023, S279722
(Gregg); Piplack, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 1292, review granted June 14,
2023, S279546; Galarsa, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at pp. 652–653, review
granted May 3, 2023, S279021.) The California Supreme Court recently took
up the issue in Adolph and, citing with approval the five unanimous decisions
of the Courts of Appeal, concluded that “[w]here a plaintiff has brought a
PAGA action comprising individual and non-individual claims, an order
compelling arbitration of the individual claims does not strip the plaintiff of
standing as an aggrieved employee to litigate claims on behalf of other
employees under PAGA.” (Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1114; see id. at
pp. 1120–1123, 1128.) Applying Adolph here, as we must, we conclude that
plaintiffs maintain standing to pursue their non-individual PAGA claims in
court. We now reproduce some of the reasoning employed in Adolph and the
cases cited therein.
As plaintiffs assert, California is not bound by the United States
Supreme Court’s interpretation of PAGA and its standing requirements.
(Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1114.) Indeed, as Justice Sotomayor made
clear in her concurrence, the Supreme Court was opining on what it conceded
could be a mistaken view of California law. (Viking River, supra, 596 U.S. at
p. ___ [142 S.Ct. at p. 1925] (conc. opn. of Sotomayor, J.) [“[I]f this Court’s

29
understanding of state law is wrong, California courts, in an appropriate
case, will have the last word.”].) Also, the Chief Justice, together with
Justices Barrett and Kavanaugh, declined to support the dismissal of the
non-individual PAGA claims. (Id. at p. ___ [142 S.Ct. at p. 1926] (conc. opn.
of Barrett, J.) [Justice Barrett concurring in part and in the judgment,
declining to join part IV, which “addresses disputed state-law questions as
well as arguments not pressed or passed upon in this case”].) Accordingly, we
independently assess the standing requirements for plaintiffs to continue to
pursue their non-individual claims in court.
As noted, PAGA authorizes an “aggrieved employee” to recover civil
penalties for violations of the Labor Code “to be assessed and collected by the
Labor and Workforce Development Agency.” (§ 2699, subd. (a).) “For
purposes of [PAGA], ‘aggrieved employee’ means any person who was
employed by the alleged violator and against whom one or more of the alleged
violations was committed.” (§ 2699, subd. (c).) “ ‘In construing a statute, our
task is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the
purpose of the enactment[,]’ [citation][,] . . . look[ing] first to ‘the words of the
statute, which are the most reliable indications of the Legislature’s intent.’
[Citation.]” (Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1120.)
Relying on its previous decision in Kim, the California Supreme Court
in Adolph reiterated the statutory requirements a plaintiff must satisfy to
have standing to recover civil penalties under PAGA. (See Adolph, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 1120, citing Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 84–91.) As distilled
in Adolph, Kim explained: “ ‘The plain language of section 2699(c) has only
two requirements for PAGA standing.’ (Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 83.) The
plaintiff must allege that he or she is (1) ‘someone “who was employed by the
alleged violator” ’ and someone ‘ “against whom one or more of the alleged

30
violations was committed.” ’ (Id. at pp. 83–84, quoting § 2699, subd. (c).)
“In Kim, we declined to impose additional requirements not found in
the statute. (Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 84–91.) The plaintiff, Kim, sued
his employer, alleging individual claims for damages and a PAGA claim for
civil penalties. (Kim, at p. 82.) Kim settled and dismissed the individual
claims for damages, proceeding only with the PAGA claim. (Kim, at p. 82.)
The employer conceded that Kim had PAGA standing when he filed suit but
argued that Kim’s ‘standing somehow ended’ once his individual claims
settled. (Kim, at p. 84.) According to the employer, PAGA standing is
premised on an unredressed injury, and because Kim received compensation
for his injury, he no longer had the status of an ‘aggrieved employee.’ (Kim,
at p. 84.)
“We rejected this argument, finding it inconsistent with the statutory
language in several respects. (Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 83–86.) First,
‘[t]he Legislature defined PAGA standing in terms of violations . . . . Kim
became an aggrieved employee, and had PAGA standing, when one or more
Labor Code violations were committed against him,’ and ‘[s]ettlement did not
nullify these violations. The remedy for a Labor Code violation, through
settlement or other means, is distinct from the fact of the violation itself,’ and
only the latter is required for PAGA standing. (Kim, at p. 84.) Second,
nothing in the text of the statute requires the plaintiff to have an
unredressed injury; reading such a requirement into the statute would be ‘at
odds with the statutory definition.’ (Id. at p. 85.) Third, allowing post-
violation events to strip an aggrieved employee of the ability to pursue a
PAGA claim ‘would add an expiration element to the statutory definition of
standing.’ (Kim, at p. 85.)” (Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 1120–1121.)
The court in Adolph also found instructive Johnson v. Maxim

31
Healthcare Services, Inc. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 924 (Johnson), which
“similarly declined to read into the statute a standing requirement not
supported by its language.” (Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1121.) In
Johnson, the plaintiff alleged a single cause of action under PAGA. The
employer demurred on the grounds that the plaintiff lacked standing because
her individual PAGA claims were-time barred. The trial court sustained the
demurrer without leave to amend. (Johnson, at p. 927.) Relying on Kim, the
Court of Appeal reversed, explaining the plaintiff had standing to pursue her
PAGA claim because she satisfied the statutory definition of an “ ‘aggrieved
employee.’ ” (Johnson, at p. 930.) “The fact that [the plaintiff’s] individual
claim may be time-barred does not nullify the alleged Labor Code violations
nor strip [the plaintiff] of her standing to pursue PAGA remedies.” (Ibid.)
As observed in Adolph, “Kim and Johnson make clear [that] a worker
becomes an ‘aggrieved employee’ with standing to litigate claims on behalf of
fellow employees upon sustaining a Labor Code violation committed by his or
her employer.” (Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1121, citing Kim, supra,
9 Cal.5th at pp. 84–85; Johnson, supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 930; § 2699,
subd. (c).) The court in Adolph then concluded, “Standing under PAGA is not
affected by enforcement of an agreement to adjudicate a plaintiff’s individual
claim in another forum. Arbitrating a PAGA plaintiff’s individual claim does
not nullify the fact of the violation or extinguish the plaintiff’s status as an
aggrieved employee, any more than the time-barring of remedies did in
Johnson or the settlement of the individual damages claims did in Kim.”
(Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1121, citing Kim, at pp. 84–85; Johnson, at
p. 930.) “In sum, where a plaintiff has filed a PAGA action comprised of
individual and non-individual claims, an order compelling arbitration of
individual claims does not strip the plaintiff of standing to litigate non-

32
individual claims in court.” (Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1123.)
This interpretation, the court stated, also comports with the statute’s
legislative history and purpose, “ ‘which is “to ensure effective code
enforcement.” ’ [Citations.]” (Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1123.) “An
interpretation of the statute that impedes an employee’s ability to prosecute
his or her employer’s violations committed against other employees would
undermine PAGA’s purpose of augmenting enforcement of the Labor Code.”
(Id. at pp. 1122−1123.)
Turning to our case, we apply Kim and Adolph on the question of
PAGA standing and hold that plaintiffs here have established standing to
recover civil penalties under PAGA for Labor Code violations committed
against other employees. In the operative complaint, plaintiffs alleged they
were employed by defendants, that they suffered “one or more” Labor Code
violations on which their PAGA claim is based, and that they seek “to recover
civil penalties . . . on behalf of [themselves] . . . and other current and former
employees who worked for Defendants.” They are therefore “aggrieved
employee[s]” within the meaning of PAGA with standing to assert PAGA
claims on behalf of themselves and other employees. (See Kim, supra, 9
Cal.5th at pp. 84–85; Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1121.) And as Adolph
holds, the requirement that plaintiffs resolve their individual PAGA claims in
arbitration does not strip them of their standing to litigate their non-
individual PAGA claims in court. (Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 1114,
1120–1123, 1128.)
Defendants’ arguments that plaintiffs lack standing to pursue the non-
individual PAGA claims are unpersuasive. In their opening brief, defendants
contend that “[n]othing in PAGA’s statutory text or legislative history
suggests Plaintiffs can still be classified as ‘aggrieved employees’ in a

33
separate action once their PAGA claims are sent to arbitration.” However,
such an interpretation is at odds with that of our Supreme Court in Adolph
and Kim. (See Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 1114, 1120–1123, 1128; Kim,
supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 83–91.) Not surprisingly, defendants’ arguments on
standing in their opening brief do not mention Kim.
Defendants finally confront Kim for the first time in their reply brief, 6
contending that it does not apply here. This is because, they argue, Kim “was
decided under a different legal landscape that could not address the issue
presently before this Court.” Without citation, defendants represent that
“Kim’s premise assumed that PAGA claims could not be sent to arbitration
under Iskanian, which has since been abrogated by Viking River . . . .”
Defendants mischaracterize Kim. Defendants perhaps may be relying on one
sentence in Kim’s summary of the case’s procedural history where it states
that the defendant acknowledged in its motion to compel “that the PAGA
claim could not be waived [citing Iskanian] or arbitrated under the parties’
agreement.” (Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 82.) This sentence does not indicate
Kim “assumed that PAGA claims could not be sent to arbitration under
Iskanian.” Rather, Kim assumed that the PAGA claims could not be
arbitrated based on “the parties’ agreement.” Further, Kim did not even
address the arbitrability of PAGA claims. Thus, defendants offer no
persuasive reason why Kim’s interpretation of PAGA’s standing

6 Kim is controlling law in California on the issue of PAGA standing

and is directly adverse to defendants’ arguments. At least one court has
found it inappropriate for an appellant to raise controlling authority for the
first time in a reply brief. (See Brawerman v. Loeb & Loeb LLP (2022)
81 Cal.App.5th 1106, 1121 & fn. 5 [reminding counsel of duty to disclose legal
authority directly adverse to the client’s position, where that authority was
not cited in appellants’ opening brief, but only “for the first time on the 79th
page of their reply brief”].)

34
requirements is no longer viable.
Moreover, any attempts to factually distinguish Kim are also
unavailing. To the extent defendants argue Kim applies only when a plaintiff
settles the underlying Labor Code claims, we disagree. The court in Johnson
rejected a similar argument. After noting the plaintiff alleged she was an
“aggrieved employee” under PAGA, the court stated, “[t]he fact that [her]
individual claim may be time-barred does not nullify the alleged Labor Code
violations nor strip [her] of her standing to pursue PAGA remedies.”
(Johnson, supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 930.) “In this sense, we find the fact
that [the plaintiff’s] claim is time-barred places her in a similar situation as a
plaintiff who settles her individual claims or dismisses her individual claims
to pursue a stand-alone PAGA claim.” (Ibid.) Johnson thus rejected the
defendant’s assertion that Kim was limited to the scenario in which a
plaintiff settles the underlying Labor Code claims. (Johnson, at p. 930.)
Defendants also cite several authorities, but none supports its position.
For example, in Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1756, AFL-CIO v.
Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 993, the Supreme Court held that unions do
not have standing under PAGA because they are “not employees” and
therefore “cannot satisfy the express standing requirements of [PAGA].”
(Id. at p. 1005.) But as the Supreme Court in Adolph explained, its “rejection
of associational standing under PAGA [in Amalgamated] has no bearing on
the question here.” (Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1127.)
Defendants also rely on Bodine v. Superior Court (1962) 209 Cal.App.2d
354, but that case is inapposite. There, the appellate court considered
whether the trial court erred by agreeing to empanel a jury in the second half
of a hearing on a probate petition for determining heirship, when the
executor of the estate and the heirs who initially appeared at the hearing

35
previously stipulated to proceed without a jury. (Id. at pp. 356–359.) As
observed in Gregg, although Bodine v. Superior Court “noted severance of a
civil action results in two or more separate cases with distinct judgments,” it
did not “apply this principle in a manner to suggest, let alone hold, that a
plaintiff loses standing to assert non-individual claims under PAGA once he
or she is compelled to arbitrate his or her individual claim.” (Gregg, supra,
89 Cal.App.5th at pp. 805–806.) Indeed, Adolph explained that “[n]othing in
PAGA or any other relevant statute suggests that arbitrating individual
claims effects a severance. When a case includes arbitrable and
nonarbitrable issues, the issues may be adjudicated in different forums while
remaining part of the same action.” (Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1124.)
In short, we are compelled to follow Adolph and Kim and hold that
plaintiffs have standing to litigate their non-individual PAGA claims in court.
This leads us to the parties’ requests for a stay of the non-individual
PAGA claims. Plaintiffs argue that if their non-individual PAGA claims are
not dismissed, they should be stayed pending our Supreme Court’s decision in
Adolph, which had not yet been issued at the time of the parties’ briefing.
However, because Adolph has since been decided, plaintiffs’ stay request is
moot.
In their reply brief, defendants agree that the non-individual PAGA
claims should be stayed, but argue the stay should be imposed until the
arbitration of the individual claims is completed. As support, defendants cite
both the FAA and the California Arbitration Act, which provide that where a
court orders arbitration on an issue in any proceeding before the court, the
court upon application or motion “shall” stay proceedings pending completion
of the arbitration. (9 U.S.C. § 3; Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.4.) Defendants
additionally cite to California case law holding that when “issues subject to

36
litigation under . . . PAGA might overlap those that are the subject to
arbitration of . . . individual claims, the trial court must order an appropriate
stay of trial court proceedings.” (Franco v. Arakelian Enterprises, Inc. (2015)
234 Cal.App.4th 947, 966.)
Here, the trial court denied defendants’ stay request, which was based
on different reasons than the ones they now raise. Specifically, defendants
requested a stay until then pending Viking River was decided, but the trial
court denied the request because it declined to speculate on when and how
Viking River would be decided. Because the court did not have an
opportunity to rule on the stay request based on the reasons now raised by
defendants, we remand the matter for the trial court to determine whether a
stay of plaintiffs’ non-individual PAGA claims would be appropriate under
the circumstances. (Cf. Seifu, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 1143 [because trial
court did not have the opportunity to rule on the defendant’s stay request,
matter was remanded to allow court to determine in the first instance
whether a stay of the plaintiff’s non-individual claims was warranted];
Nickson, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 135 [“We leave management of the
superior court litigation during the pendency of arbitration to the trial court’s
sound discretion”].)
Requests to Dismiss Appeal and Impose Monetary Sanctions
Finally, we consider—and deny—plaintiffs’ requests that we dismiss
the appeal and impose $20,250 in monetary sanctions against defendants for
filing a frivolous appeal.
At the threshold, both requests are procedurally defective because they
were not filed in separate motions in this court, as required by the Rules of
Court. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.54(a)(1) [“a party wanting to make a
motion in a reviewing court must serve and file a written motion”];

37
id., rule 8.276(a) [requiring a party seeking appellate sanctions to file and
serve a motion for sanctions]; see also Eisenberg, et al., Cal. Practice Guide:
Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2022) ¶¶ 5:37a, 5:44, 5:228.3,
11:126.) Plaintiffs’ non-compliance is grounds to deny their requests. (See
Saltonstall v. City of Sacramento (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 837, 858–859;
Eisenberg, supra, ¶¶ 5:44, 11:126.)
Procedural defects aside, plaintiffs’ substantive arguments fail. With
respect to the dismissal request, plaintiffs cite case law setting forth the
principle that appellate courts generally should not resolve factual disputes
in the first instance. However, plaintiffs fail to identify any factual dispute
that we must purportedly resolve in this appeal. In any event, as indicated
above, the issues presented on appeal do not require us to resolve contested
facts.
Plaintiffs also argue that the appeal asks us “to sit in the shoes of a
trial court and conduct a first-pass review of the law” and that “no error was
made by the trial court in applying pre-Viking River law.” Plaintiffs do not
explain, and we fail to see, how an appeal must be dismissed simply because
an appellate court is faced with a change in the law that has intervened after
the underlying trial court decision.
Turning to plaintiffs’ request for sanctions, they argue we should issue
monetary sanctions against defendants for filing a frivolous appeal. (See
Code Civ. Proc., § 907; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.276(a).) An appeal is
frivolous when any reasonable attorney would agree that the appeal is totally
and completely without merit. (In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d
637, 649.) Plaintiffs argue the appeal is frivolous because defendants did not
wait until after the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in
Viking River before filing the underlying motion; refused to dismiss this

38
appeal; and filed a renewed motion to compel arbitration while the appeal
was pending. We disagree. Because the law on arbitration of PAGA claims is
evolving, defendants were presented with somewhat of a moving target in
their efforts to obtain their requested relief. Given this, the manner in which
defendants proceeded in both the trial court and in this court was not
completely meritless. (See Piplack, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 1284, fn. 1
[denying motion to dismiss appeal as frivolous, stating in light of the
pendency of Viking River, “defendant’s appeal presented a good faith
argument for a change in the law”].)
The requests to dismiss the appeal and impose monetary sanctions are
denied.
DISPOSITION
The order denying defendants’ motion to compel arbitration is reversed
in part and affirmed in part. The order is reversed as to plaintiffs’ individual
PAGA claims. The order is affirmed as to plaintiffs’ non-individual PAGA
claims. The matter is remanded with directions to the trial court to enter a
new order requiring plaintiffs to arbitrate their individual PAGA claims and
for further proceedings regarding plaintiffs’ non-individual PAGA claims
consistent with this opinion. The parties are to bear their own costs on
appeal.

39
 _________________________
Richman, Acting P. J.

We concur:

_________________________
Miller, J.

_________________________
Markman, J. *

Barrera v. Apple Amerivan Group LLC (A165445)

*Superior Court of Alameda County, Judge Michael Markman, sitting as
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

40
Trial Court: Marin County Superior Court

Trial Judge: Honorable Stephen Freccero;

Attorney for Plaintiffs and Capstone Law APC, Ryan H. Wu,
Respondents, Mario Barrera, Tyler Curtis Anderson;
Francisco Varguez:
Attorney for Defendants and Reed Smith LLP, Kasey J. Curtis,
Appellants, Apple American Mara D. Curtis, Brittany M.
Group LLC, et al.: Hernandez, Tanner Hendershot.

41