after stating the case: We are unable to distinguish this case from Harrington v. Greenville, 159 N. C., 632, for, on the contrary, we think that the two cases are in every material respect exactly alike, and certainly they are sufficiently so to require that they should be governed by one and the same principle. We may go even further and say that if there is any difference between the two cases, it is favorable to the defendant in this case, and clearly shows that it is not liable for the plaintiff’s unfortunate loss of ber property.
In providing for water at hydrants distributed throughout tbe city, there is no exercise of a private or corporate duty arising out of contract, as where'the city is engaged in business of its own for tbe purpose of gain or profit, but it is exercising a governmental function, and it is not liable for any damage to a citizen if there is a failure to perform it, or to perform it properly or even negligently.
Tbe language of Justice Hoke in the Harrington opinion states a case .so clearly analogous to this one tbat we will do well to quote it: “As we interpret tbe complaint, plaintiff states and intends to state bis grievance in two aspects: (1) That bis property was destroyed by reason of negligent failure of the city of Greenville to abate a nuisance which threatened tbe result; (2) tbat tbe injury arose in whole or in part from negligent default in equipment and operation of a fire department maintained by tbe city for tbe public benefit; and under our decisions both questions must be resolved against him. It is well recognized with us tbat unless a right of action is given by statute, municipal corporations may not be held civilly liable to individuals for ‘neglect to perform or negligence in performing duties which are governmental in their nature,’ and including generally all duties existent or imposed upon them by law solely *751for tbe public benefit,” citing McIlhenny v. Wilmington, 127 N. C., 146; Moffitt v. Asheville, 103 N. C., 237; Hill v. Charlotte, 72 N. C., 55.
This Court has field that a municipal corporation is not civilly liable for the failure to pass ordinances to preserve the public health or otherwise promote the public good nor for any omission to enforce the ordinances enacted under the legislative powers granted in its charter, or to see that they are properly observed by its citizens, or those who may be resident within the corporate limits. Hull v. Roxboro, 142 N. C., 453. And in another case, that an employee of a fire department of a city cannot recover for injuries caused by a hose reel of the city fire department being knowingly allowed to be and remain in unsafe and dangerous condition.” Peterson v. Wilmington, 130 N. C., 76.
It was said in the Harrington case, at p. 635 : “The ruling in the last case (Peterson v. Wilmington, supra) was made to rest on the principle that in maintaining and operating a fire department for the benefit of the public, the city was engaged in the exercise of governmental duties, and therefore not liable to individuals, unless made so by statute, a position in accord with the general current of authority,” citing Wild v. Patterson, 47 N. J. L., 406; Fisher v. Boston, 104 Mass., 87; Jewett v. New Haven, 38 Conn., 368; Torbush v. Norwich, 38 Conn., 225; Long v. Birmingham, 161 Ala., 427; Mayor of New York v. Workman, 67 Fed., 346.
The defendant is not liable in such cases, because it is performing the functions of government, where the whole community is affected in the same way, though not all perhaps in the same degree, and is not performing an act of a business nature for its own benefit. Edgerby v. Concord, 6 N. H., 8.
It was said in Howison v. New Haven (Conn.), 9 Am. Rep., 342: “The acceptance of a special charter by a municipal corporation, authorizing it to perform a strictly governmental duty, does not create a contract between the corporation and the State that it shall be performed, nor make a corporation liable for any omissions to perform or a negligent performance of it.” And in Kirch v. Louisville, 101 S. W., 373, it was held that a city is exercising a purely governmental function when it is supplying water for its public uses, such as watering its streets and parks and extinguishing fires. It was upon the same general principle that the cases of Hipp v. Ferrall, 173 N. C., 167; Hudson v. McArthur, 152 N. C., 445, and Templeton v. Beard, 159 N. C., 63, were decided. See, also, McConnell v. Dewey, 5 Neb., 385; Bates v. Horner, 65 Vt., 471 (22 L. R. A., 824, and note) ; S. v. Harris, 89 N. C., 169, and there are numerous other cases in our Reports of the same kind.
In the case of Moffitt v. Asheville, 103 N. C., 237, Justice Avery states the rule clearly and succinctly. He says: “Where a city, or town is *752exercising the judicial, discretionary or legislative authority conferred by its charter, or is discharging a duty imposed solely for the benefit of the public, it incurs no liability for the negligence of its officers, though acting under color of office, unless some statute (expressly or by necessary implication) subjects the corporation to pecuniary responsibility for such negligence,” citing Hill v. Charlotte, 72 N. C., 55, and many other cases, among them Donohue v. City of Brooklyn, 51 Hun., 563, and Hill v. City of Boston, 122 Mass., 344, in which the authorities are collected.
In this case there was no statutory liability imposed on the defendant, and no special contract with the plaintiff, as she was being served just as were other citizens of the same community, there being no extra charge made to any of them for the use of water at fires, if such a payment would make any difference, which we do not decide, as it is not necessary to do so. The fire department was intended for the common benefit and protection and was maintained at the public expense. There-is no view of the facts disclosed by this record which would justify a recovery by the plaintiff. There are numerous cases cited in the defendant’s brief which show a very strong trend of judicial opinion against, the liability of a municipal corporation in a case like this one. We will add a few authorities, which are taken from those relied on by defendant, to those already cited, as they illustrate the principle that for negligence in the management of its fire department or its apparatus which results in the loss of his property by one of its citizens, the municipality is not responsible. S. F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Keeseville, 148 N. Y., 46; Tainter v. Worcester, 123 Mass., 311; Van Horn v. Des Moines, 63 Iowa, 447; Wright v. Augusta, 78 Ga., 241.
In the last cited case the Court said: “Our attention has been directed, to no case where a municipal corporation has been held liable for damages done to the property of a citizen in consequence of its failure to-provide suitable engines and apparatus, or on account of defective cisterns, or an insufficient supply of water to extinguish the flames, or to-the inefficiency, carelessness, and neglect of its firemen or the officers in-charge of them, and whose duty it is to direct their operations; while-we have been furnished with a number of cases that hold they are not so liable, even when they have authority to levy and collect taxes for that purpose.”
The cases cited by the learned counsel of the plaintiff are not applicable, but are clearly distinguishable. Some of them were actions upon contracts with water companies, and others where the city was furnishing light to private consumers for a consideration accruing to itself alone. Such were Gorrell v. Water Supply Co., 124 N. C., 328; Jones v. Water Co., 135 N. C., 553; Morton v. Water Co., 168 N. C., 582; *753Powell v. Water Co., 171 N. C., 290; Fisher v. Water Co., 128 N. C., 375; Fisher v. New Bern, 140 N. C., 506; Harrington v. Wadesboro, 153 N. C., 437, and Terrell v. Washington, 158 N. C., 281. We need not refer to them more specially, except to say that they rest upon a different principle and upon their own peculiar facts, which are not to be found in this record. We have reached the limit of municipal liability in deciding them and should keep strictly within it, for there would be great danger of serious injury to the public if it should be transcended.
No error.