concurring in the judgment: The plain, express words of the statute (The Code, § 707, par. 10), and as well its obvious purpose, exclude and forbid the interpretation that the concurrence of a majority of a simple quorum, or of a majority of one of the whole number of the Justices of the Peace of the county, shall be sufficient to make valid a contract of the Board of Commissioners of the county for the construction or repair of a bridge or bridges that cost exceeding five hundred dollars. The words employed are “with the concurrence of a majority of the Justices of the Peace.” These words are significant and important. They cannot be treated as mere surplusage and meaningless, as they must be, if a majority of a majority of one of the whole number is sufficient; because, if such words had not been employed, such majority would have been required and sufficient. In the absence of such words, and in the absence of all limiting words, a majority of a quorum, or a majority of a simple majority would be necessary when such concurrence might be required. Such is the rule in all deliberative bodies and judicial tribunals. Then what useful, effective purpose does the words cited of the statute serve ?
That these words imply, and were intended to imply, the concurrence of a majority of the whole number of Justices of the Peace of the county further appears in this: the same statute (The Code, §716) prescribes that the Justices of the Peace “ shall assemble at the court-house of their respective counties, and a majority being present (at the time desig*691nated) shall proceed to the election of not ldss than three nor more than five persons, to be chosen from the body of the county, who shall be styled the Board of Commissioners for the count}’-,” etc. Here, in an important respect, it is plainly contemjolated that a majority of abare majority may elect. Why were the words “a majority of the Justices of the Peace concurring,” or like pertinent words, omitted in this connection, and employed in other important connections in the same statute? It is further provided, in paragraph fourteen, that “the action of the board in creating or altering townships shall not be operative until approved by the Justices of the Peace at a regular meeting.” Why were these words, “ a majority of the Justices of the Peace concurring,” etc., omitted in this connection?
The Legislature was clearly advertent to distinctions and differences made as to the voice of the Justices of the Peace. It cannot reasonably be said that it incautiously and carelessly made such difference with no practical purpose in view.
The same statute (The Code, §717) further prescribes that “ for the proper discharge of their duties, the Justices of the Peace shall meet annually with the Board of Commissioners on the first Monday in June, unless they shall be oftener convened by the Board of Commissioners, which is empowered to call together the Justices of the Peace not oftener than once in three months.”
It is further prescribed (section 707, par. 1) that at such annual meeting, “ the Board of Commissioners is authorized, with the concurrence of a majority of the Justices of the Peace sitting with them, to levy, in like manner with the State taxes, the necessary taxes for county purposes,” etc. It is further provided, in paragraph nine of the same section, that “with the concurrence of a majority of the Justices of the Peace,” the Commissioners may “erect and repair the necessary county buildings, and to raise by taxation the moneys there*692for,” etc. It is further prescribed, in paragraph eleven of the same section, that the Commissioners shall have power “to borrow money for the necessary expenses of the county, with the assent of a majority of the Justices of the Peace therein, and not otherwise, to provide for its payment.” In paragraph seventeen it is provided that, “ with the concurrence of a majority of the Justices of the Peace,” the “Commissioners may make provision for the erection in each countj’' of a house of correction.” It will be, hence, observed that the “concurrence of a majority of the Justices of the Peace” is expressly required only whenever taxes are to be levied, debts are to be contracted, and obligations incurred in and by the counties. In respect to other m atters, whenever they are to co-operate with- the Commissioners, it is only requisite that a majority of a bare majority shall concur. Thus it appears that the Legislature had a settled purpose to make distinctions and differences as indicated, the object being to secure the larger voice and more reliable judgment of the county authorities in the very important matters of levying taxes and creating county obligations to pay money. It was not intended that the County Commissioners and a simple majority of a bare majority of the Justices of the Peace should exercise such authority. Such legislation was cautious and wise, and deemed a proper restraint upon the wild and reckless spirit of the times manifested in the creation of public debts. It is very apparent that the Legislature had in view, and followed up, the spirit and purpose of the Constitution as expressed in Art. 7, sec. 7, which provides that “ no county, city, town or other municipal corporation shall contract any debt, pledge its faith or loan its credit, nor shall any tax be levied or collected by any officers of the same, except for the necessary expenses thereof, unless by a vote of the majority of the qualified voters therein.” The statutory provisions above referred to requiring the concurrence or assent of a majority of the Justices *693of the Peace simply, in effect, extended this wholesale provision of the Constitution to the levying of taxes and the creation of debts for the “ necessary expenses ” of counties. This purpose is obvious, and hence the words of the statute, “the concurrence of a majority of the Justices of the Peace,” should receive the ■ same interpretation as the substantially similar words, “by a vote of the majority of the qualified voters therein,” of the constitutional provision just cited. The language of the two phraseologies, are in effect, the same, except as to the difference in their application. In the one, the language material here is, “the majority of the qualified voters”; in the other, it is the “majority of the Justices of the Peace.” Can the reasonable mind see substantial difference? The clause of the Constitution just cited has been interpreted by this Court in numerous cases, and it is firmly settled that the “ majority of the qualified voters” required by it is a majority of all the qualified voters of the county, city, town or other municipal corporation. Southerland v. Goldsboro, 96 N. C., 49; Duke v. Brown, ibid., 127; McDowell v. Construction Co., ibid., 514; Wood v. Oxford, 97 N. C., 227; Rigsbee v. Durham, 98 N. C., 81 and 99, N. C., 341, and there are other cases to the same effect.
As the wrords of the Constitution under consideration, and the like words of the statute to be interpreted, are substantially the same, and are used for and intended to serve and subserve the same purpose, is it not reasonable, just and necessary that they must and shall receive the like interpretation? It is very difficult to see how any other conclusion can be reached. Hence the words to be interpreted of the statute, “with the concurrence of a majority of the Justices of the Peace,” imply a majority of all the Justices of the of the county.
I, nevertheless, concur in the judgment of. affirmance, because it was clearly within the power of the County Commissioners to contract for the construction of the bridge *694mentioned, if it should cost no more than five hundred dollars, and they might contract for the same for a greater sum than that mentioned, “ with the concurrence of a majority of the Justices of the Peace” of the county. The several statutory provisions pertinent [The Code, §§707 (10), 2014, 2035; Acts 1887, ch. 370], fairly interpreted, imply that the County Commissioners ordinarily contract on the part of the county for the construction and repair of bridges, and if the construction or repair shall cost exceeding five hundred dollars, they must do so subject to the concurrence of a majority of the Justices of the Peace. It is not essential that such contract shall be made at a joint meeting of the County Commissioners and the Justices of the Peace, the party with whom they contract being present — it will be sufficient if such Commissioners contract inchoately with such party at one time, the contract to be afterwards concurred in by the Justices of the Peace at a joint meeting of themselves and the Commissioners. Until such concurrence, the contract would not be complete and binding — it would remain in fieri, open for the concurrence or non-concurrence of the Justices of the Peace. It would be very cumbersome and inc .nvenient for the contracting parties ’ in such case to assemble together at a time and place prescribed by law, and agree upon the terms and details of the contract. It is not contemplated that they shall, but it is intended that the County Commissioners and the party contracted with may make the contract, subject to the simple concurrence of the Justices of the Peace. This is reasonable and practicable, and the statute so contemplates. If the party contracting to construct or repair the bridge should venture to construct or repair the same before such concurrence, he would do so at the hazard of his rights that might arise under the contract. Plence, the contract in question between the defendants and the plaintiffs was not void at the time the Justices of the Peace concurred in the same (if they did); it was until that *695time simply inchoate, and they might concur, or refuse to concur, with the defendants, and concurring with them rendered it complete and effectual: ITence, also, the argument for the defendants, that-the contract was absolutely void and therefore could not be concurred in, is without force.
I am further of opinion that the Justices of the Peace did concur in the contract in question. After the bridge was constructed, and after it was accepted by the defendants, they paid the first installment of the price agreed to be paid for it. Regularly, under and in pursuance of the statute [The Gode, § 707 (1)], a majority of the Justices of the Peace sitting with the defendants must have concurred in levying taxes to pay such installment paid, and thus they informally, but in effect, concurred in the contract for the construction of the bridge. In the absence of allegation and evidence to the contrary it must be taken that they did. A regular formal concurrence would be better aiid more satisfactory, but a concurrence in such joint meeting, appearing by presumption and reasonable implication, is sufficient if nothing to the contrary appears.' It is not to be presumed that the Justices of the Peace at their regular joint meeting with the defendants on the first Monday in June, 1888, for the purpose of levying taxes for county purposes, including bridges, were ignorant of the bridge in question, and the county debt created on account of it, to pay part of which they presumedly made provision. On the contrary, the presumption, is that they knew of it and concurred in the contract under which it arose, and hence concurred in the tax levy to pay part of it, and that, afterwards, the defendants, in the orderly course of their duties, paid that part. Otherwise they would not have made such payment. Such presumption arose from the record of the procedure and pertinent action of the Justices of the Peace in the joint meeting of themselves and the defendants. It had and has permanency and continues until, in some proper way, the contrary *696shall be made to appear.- The debt could not be properly and lawfulty provided for or paid without such concurrence. The presumption further is, that such concurrence was by a majority of the Justices of the Peace, because the statute \_The Code, § 707 (1)] requires that such majority shall concur in the tax levy.