dissenting.
While I agree with the majority’s decision to reverse the summary judgment which was granted in favor of AgGeorgia, although I do not necessarily agree with everything that was written in support of that conclusion, I must dissent from the majority’s decision that the trial court should have instead granted summary judgment in favor of Donald. In my view, the entirety of this dispute should be resolved in a jury trial. Due to the inherent inconsistency in the applicable clauses in the loan documents, as well as the unique circumstances of this case wherein Donald’s claims have evolved during the litigation to cast himself in a position of even greater harm despite the implicit acknowledgment in his original complaint that some action by Ag-Georgia as to the subject property was proper given his indebtedness thereto, and the fact that ambiguity remains as to both the meaning *82of the contract provisions and the intent of the parties even after the application of the normal rules of construction, I would instead return this case to the trial court to allow the parties to present their claims to a jury to sort out the respective contract rights and equities of the situation.
Decided July 13, 2015. Hall Booth Smith, Joel L. McKie, Andrew K. Hazen, for appellant. Martin Snow, John T. McGoldrick, Jr., Stuart E. Walker, for appellee.I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Barnes and Presiding Judge Phipps join in this dissent.