concurring in the partial allowance of the petition and dissenting from its dismissal in part:
The opinion heretofore filed in this case imputes to the statute a meaning not warranted by its terms. The construction is a forced one. It is conceded on all hands that if the tax is laid on the privilege of taking orders for goods to be shipped in interstate commerce, the act offends against the Constitution of the United States.
The provision of the act is that: “Every person, firm, or corporation, not being a regular retail merchant in the State of North Carolina, who shall display samples, goods, wares, or merchandise in any hotel room, or in any house rented or occupied temporarily for the purpose of securing orders for the retail sale of such goods, wares, or merchandise so displayed, shall apply for in advance and procure a State license from the Commissioner of Bevenue for the privilege of displaying such samples, goods, wares, or merchandise, and shall pay an annual privilege tax *136of two hundred fifty dollars ($250.00), which license shall entitle such person, firm, or corporation to display such samples, goods, wares, or merchandise in any county in this State.” Public Laws 1937, ch. 127, sec. 121, subsec. (e).
This is the exact language of the statute. It admits only of the interpretation that it is a tax on the privilege of taking orders for goods to be shipped in interstate commerce. The authorities are one in holding that such legislation is unconstitutional.
Nor can the construction heretofore given to the statute save it from constitutional offense. If the tax imposed be a “use tax,” it is discriminatory. Leonard v. Maxwell, 216 N. C., 89.
Stacy, C. J., and BaeNHIll, J., join in this opinion.