dissenting.
42 The majority holds that "Gilbert did not violate [Colorado Rule of Professional Conduct (RPC') ] 1.16(d) by failing to refund the portion of the advance fee to which the Hearing Board determined she was entitled in quantum meruit as compensation for the services she provided before her discharge." Maj. op. 120. The majority's reasoning is premised on a fundamental misunderstanding of the procedural workings of the equitable remedy of quantum meruit Quantum meruit is a quasi-contractual doctrine that permits a party to a contract to recover the reasonable value of her services if the contract fails. In this case, rather than recovering fees not delineated in her written flat-fee contract when her clients terminated her representation, as might be appropriate under quantum meruit, Gilbert unilaterally withheld the fees to which she felt she was entitled and then justified her withholding under the guise of quantum meruit.
143 The majority's holding permits attorneys to unilaterally retain as "earned," in their own business accounts, advance fees that they had not earned by the terms of their written agreement simply because they feel that they would win a quantum meruit case. This inverts the procedural structure of quantum meruit and unjustly shifts the burden onto clients who owe nothing under the terms of the agreement to bring an action against the attorney to resolve the status of the disputed funds. Because a determination of what is "earned" in quantum meruit necessarily requires the party seeking recovery to bring an action as a plaintiff and to prove what she earned, fees cannot properly be considered "earned" in quantum meruit until they have been adjudicated as such. Here, Gilbert did not bring a claim against her clients and secure a court ruling delineating what she had earned in quantum meruit but rather unilaterally withheld funds that she had not earned by the terms of her written agreement without first obtaining a quantum meruit ruling in her favor. Therefore, I would hold that she violated RPC 1.16(d)s requirement that she "refund[ ] any advance payment of fee or expense that has not been earned or incurred" upon termination of representation.1 Because I fear that the majority is doing a disservice to the public by permitting Gilbert's unilateral re*1029tention of advance fees under the guise of quantum meruit, I respectfully dissent.
I. The Relevant Rules of Professional Conduct Contextualized
I 44 RPC 1.16(d), in relevant part, requires that "[uJpon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as ... refunding any advance payment of fee or expense that has not been earned or incurred." Because Gilbert had not previously represented these clients, she was required to communicate, in writing, "the basis or rate of the fee and expenses" that she would charge. Colo. RPC 1.5(b). Gilbert's written agreement with her clients simply established a flat rate that she would charge onee three distinct tasks had all been completed, only one of which she completed prior to her termination. Despite having no agreement regarding hourly recovery upon termination, Gilbert withheld a portion of her clients' advance fees premised on an hourly rate. Thus, whether Gilbert violated RPC 1.16(d) turns on whether the fees to which she unilaterally determined that she was entitled in quantum meruit-based on an hourly rate that was not incorporated or referenced in her written agreement with her clients-were nonetheless "earned" prior to an adjudicative body determining that she was entitled to them.
{45 Under RPC 1.5(f), "[flees are not earned until the lawyer confers a benefit on the client or performs a legal service for the client." But this language is not so clear as the majority makes it seem, see maj. op. 1 83, as is evidenced by the need for a clarifying Comment regarding flat fees. In the context of an advance lump-sum fee, as is at issue here, Comment 12 to RPC 1.5 clarifies that "the lawyer must deposit an advance of unearned fees in the lawyer's trust account" and "[t]he funds may be earned only as the lawyer performs specified legal services or confers benefits on the client as provided for in the written statement of the basis of the fee, if a written statement is required by [RPC] 1.5(b)" (emphasis added). Although the majority correctly observes that "the text of each Rule is authoritative" and that "Comments do not add obligations to the rules," these Comments should be given weight as "guides to interpretation," especially where the rule's language is as general as that of 1.5(f). Colo. RPC, Preamble and Scope, 11 14, 21; see also maj. op. 1 83.
146 Additionally, "[the standard principles of statutory construction apply to our interpretation of court rules," In re Marriage of Wiggins, 2012 CO 44, ¶ 24, 279 P.3d 1, 7, and statutes must be read "as a whole, construing each provision consistently and in harmony with the overall statutory design," Whitaker v. People, 48 P.3d 555, 558 (Colo.2002). The overarching purpose of RPC 1.5 is to require lawyers to establish clear, reasonable fee agreements with their clients, and in this context, RPC 1.5(f) clarifies that advance fees are not the property of the attorney immediately, but rather only once the attorney performs the work for which the fees were advanced under the agreement. See RPC 1.5. Therefore, 1.5(f) must be read in the greater context of 1.5's regulation of fee agreements, and as its related regulations and Comment 12 amply demonstrate, 1.5(f)'s definition of "earned" is limited to fees contemplated by the fee agreement.2 Furthermore, as I will demonstrate, fees in quantum meruit cannot properly be considered "earned" until they are adjudicated as such.
II. Quantum Meruit Permits Recovery, Not Retention
147 Although an attorney may generally recover the reasonable value of work done when the agreement underlying that work fails, this must be done by filing a claim *1030against the client and obtaining a judgment finding that the fees were earned in quantum meruit, which Gilbert failed to do. The majority repeatedly states that Gilbert did not violate 1.16(d)'s prohibition against retaining advance fees that have not been earned upon termination because she was "entitled" to those fees in quantum meruit Maj. op. 11 20; 27, 41. But Gilbert did not earn fees in quantum meruit simply by saying she did; rather, she earned them only when she proved that she was entitled to them in quantum meruit before the Hearing Board. At the time she initially retained these fees, they were disputed, and Gilbert should have either returned them or placed them in trust and then sought recovery under quantum meruit through litigation. Therefore, since Gilbert did not return all of her clients' advanced and unearned fees until at least thirteen months after her termination,3 she violated RPC 1.16(d)'s requirement that she timely return any advance fees that had "not been earned" upon termination. Colo. RPC 1.16(d); see also In re Sather, 3 P.3d 403, 415 (Colo.2000).
48 Quantum meruit permits an attorney to recover through litigation fees for the reasonable value of services provided when a contract fails, either from the client or from an appropriately established trust fund in which disputed funds are kept, see Melat, Pressman & Higbie, L.L.P. v. Hannon Law Firm, L.L.C., 2012 CO 61, ¶ 19, 287 P.3d 842, 847-not to unilaterally withhold or retain such funds in their own accounts. Black's Law Dictionary alternately defines "recovery" as "[the obtainment of a right to something (esp. damages) by a judgment or decree" and "[aln amount awarded in or collected from a judgment or decree." Black's Law Dictionary 1466 (10th ed.2014) (emphasis added). Here, however, Gilbert improperly relied on quantum meruit to justify her unilateral withholding of her clients' advanced and unearned fees with no adjudication and no basis in her written fee agreement. This interpretation inverts the doe-trine. Quantum meruit is not an affirmative defense against wrongful withholding of a client's funds upon termination. Rather, it provides an equitable cause of action for attorneys (and others) to seek compensation for work performed when the contract underlying that work fails. Melat, ¶ 19, 287 P.3d at 847.
€ 49 Our recent discussion of quantum me-ruit in Melat highlights this distinction:
Quantum meruit is an equitable theory of recovery that arises out of the need to avoid unjust enrichment to a party in the absence of an actual agreement to pay for services rendered. Quantum meruit a/lows a party to recover the reasonable value of the services provided when the parties either have no express contract or have abrogated it. To recover in quantum meruit, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) at plaintiffs expense, (2) defendant received a benefit, (8) under cireumstances that would make it unjust for the defendant to retain the benefit without paying. Whether retention of the benefit is unjust is a fact-intensive inquiry in which courts look to, among other things, the intentions, expectations, and behavior of the parties.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Thus, proper application of the theory in the context of an attorney-client dispute requires that the attorney either return the unearned funds to the client or maintain the disputed funds in a neutral trust account, see Colo. RPC 1.15(c), 1.16(d), then seek to recover those funds by satisfying the three-prong test before a court, Melat, ¶ 19, 287 P.3d at 847. °
150 Crucially, the burden to prove that funds have been earned under quantum me-ruit falls upon the attorney. But in this case, Gilbert never pursued recovery in quantum meruit. Rather, under the guise of quantum meruit, she simply withheld-in her own business account-her clients' advance fees that she had not earned upon termination under the written agreement, and she then claimed quantum meruit as a defense against charges that she failed to return unearned fees as required by RPC 1.16(d) Such a *1031reversal of the burden of proof under quantum meruit is not supported by our precedent, and by allowing Gilbert to unilaterally declare fees as "earned" in quantum meruit, the majority inverts the doctrine and destroys the procedural foundations upon which quantum meruit is erected. More importantly, the majority's approval of Gilbert's retention of these funds both grants attorneys unprecedented power over the advance fees of their clients and unjustifiably burdens those clients with the need to then seek recovery of funds that no one but the attorney herself has deemed "earned." This result strains the term "earned" to its breaking point and erodes an attorney's duties to her client as a fiduciary.
51 In fact, the concept of an attorney's need to actively seek recovery under quantum meruit is so ingrained in the doctrine that it explicitly underpins every case to which the majority cites except People v. Johnson, 199 Colo. 248, 612 P.2d 1097 (1980) (addressed infra Part III). See LaFond v. Sweeney, 2015 CO 3, ¶ 27, 343 P.3d 989 ("[A] quantum meruit recovery action vis-&-vis the client never properly arose in this case. The underlying basis for applying this equitable doctrine regarding fee recovery is absent here." (emphasis added)); Melat, ¶ 20, 287 P.3d at 847 ("In the context of the attorney-client relationship, an attorney who withdraws before the close of a case may generally recover the reasonable value of his or her services under a quantum meruit theory." (emphasis added); Mullens v. Hansel-Henderson, 65 P.3d 992, 995 (Colo.2002) ("Generally attorneys may recover on an unenforceable contract on the basis of quantum meruit." (emphasis added)); Dudding v. Norton Frickey & Assocs., 11 P.3d 441, 446 (Colo.2000) ("We have permitted quantum meruit recovery in the context of a non- . contingent attorney-client contract when an attorney withdraws for a justifiable reason or a client terminates the attorney without cause." (emphasis added)); Sather, 3 P.3d at 409-10 ("Upon discharge, the attorney must return all unearned fees in a timely manner, even though the attorney may be entitled to quantum meruit recovery for the services that the attorney rendered and for costs incurred on behalf of the client." (emphasis added)); Olsen & Brown v. City of Englewood, 889 P.2d 673, 675 (Colo.1995) ("There is no question that an attorney who withdraws for a justifiable reason or is terminated by a client without cause is entitled to compensation for services rendered. Gener"ally, courts are in agreement that quantum meruit is an appropriate measure of recovery in such cireumstances." (second emphasis added) (citation omitted)); Elliott v. Joyce, 889 P.2d 43, 44 (Colo.1994) ("After the matter was settled, Elliott filed an attorney's lien . seeking recovery of attorney fees ... based on time and effort for services rendered, under the theory of quantum meruit - . [The trial court accepted 'the proceeds of the settlement ... to be held by the court until James Elliotts attorney's lien question is resolved." (first and third emphases added)). As these quotations illustrate, quantum meruit is a theory of recovery, and thus attorneys must seek and be granted recovery in a court before such fees can be properly considered "earned."
Furthermore, these quotes are mere examples-the majority of these cases refer to recovery dozens of times, and none refers to withholding funds under the doctrine or to an attorney being permitted to retain funds under the flag of quantum meruit.4 Even *1032the majority itself acknowledges multiple times that an attorney must recover fees in quantum meruit, see maj. op. 1120-27, 37, but it nevertheless converts this affirmative cause of action into a defense against accusations of wrongfully withholding a client's advance fees, see id. at 11 20, 38-89. In transforming the potential availability of quantum meruit recovery into the right to unilaterally retain advance fees when a written contract fails, the majority relies heavily on misreadings of Sather and Johnson. I will now demonstrate that these authorities do not mandate the majority's conclusion.
III. Sather and Johnson Support Returning Fees ,
{ 53 In Sather, in a line that should resolve this case, the court holds that "[ulpon discharge, the attorney must return all unearned fees in a timely manner, even though the attorney may be entitled to quantum meruit recovery for the services that the attorney rendered and for costs incurred on behalf of the client." 3 P.3d at 409-10 (emphasis added) (citing Colo. RPC 1.16(d)). While we also held that "an attorney earns fees by conferring a benefit on or performing a legal service for the client," this holding was intended to bolster the conclusion that the attorney violated RPC 1.15 by labeling advance fees as "non-refundable" and putting them directly into his account rather than maintaining them in trust. Id. at 405. As we observed, requiring that funds be kept in trust "protects the client's right to discharge an attorney." Id. at 409 (citing Colo. RPC 1.16(d) emt.) Thus, Sather confirms that fees earned "by conferring a benefit on or performing a legal service for" a client do not include fees that could potentially be recovered in quantum meruit-at least not before the fees have actually been recovered through litigation. See id. at 410.
154 The majority disregards this plain reading of Sather. Initially, it ignores the interrelationship between the rules at issue and dismisses this clear language prohibiting Gilbert's behavior as relating only to "a separate part of the opinion discussing an attorney's obligation under [RPC] 1.15(f) to maintain advance fees in a separate trust account until the fees are earned." Maj. op. 182. Thus, the majority concludes, this plain language citing 1.16(d) is meaningless when considering an attorney's duties under 1.16(d). Instead, the majority focuses on the fact that we sanctioned the attorney in Sather for failing to return the unearned portion of his fees, as is prohibited by 1.16(d), and infers that this ruling "implicitly recognized that the attorney 'earned' and rightfully retained" some portion of the funds in quantum meruit "even though nothing in the opinion suggested that his 'non-refundable' flat fee agreement provided for quantum meruit recovery (or an hourly fee) upon early termination." Id. at ¶ 32. To the majority, the fact that we did not "require the attorney to refund all advance fee payments and then separately seek quantum meruit recovery from his former client" means that we considered quantum meruit fees to have been earned at the moment the attorney decided he should be entitled to them. See id. at 1 82.
155 The majority infers too much. In Sather, the court simply took the term "unearned" from the language of 1.16(d), and since the court determined that the attorney did violate 1.16(d) because some portion of the fees retained as "nonrefundable" was clearly unrecoverable under either quantum meruit or contract, 3 P.3d at 407, 415, the court had no reason to reach the question of whether an attorney violates 1.16(d) by keeping funds in her own account as "earned" under quantum meruit before the funds were adjudicated as such. Additionally, the attorney retained these fees not under the guise of quantum meruit but rather under an unenforceable "non-refundable" fee agreement, and the Hearing Board then validated a portion of the funds as deserved under quantum meruit. See id. at 407-08. The mere fact that the court did not then perform the legal fiction of requiring the attorney to return all the advance fees and then immediately requiring the client to return the funds that the board had adjudicated as deserved in quantum meruit merely reflects judicial efficien*1033cy-it does not destroy the clear language of this case recognizing that an attorney must return advance fees and then pursue recovery in quantum meruit if she so chooses. Hence, the majority's reading of Sather misconstrues the holding to elevate what are at best dicta and at worst unsubstantiated inferences to the status of a substantive holding. In doing so, it ignores the plain language of the holding that directly prohibits the exact misfeasance that Gilbert committed.
156 Similarly, Johnson never actually holds that an attorney has a right to retain funds under quantum meruit simply because she feels that she earned them. In that case, an attorney entered into an oral agreement to represent a criminal defendant and received an advance payment of $1500 before the client terminated representation. Johnson, 612 P.2d at 1098. Because there was no written agreement and no agreement regarding what would happen in the event of early termination, the court determined that the "fee arrangement by necessity was upon a quantum meruit basis." Id. The court then agreed with a grievance committee determination that the attorney "expended no more than 8 or 9 hours on the case" and that the attorney was therefore "entitled on a quantum meruit basis to $500 and that a refund of $1000" was due to his client. Id. at 1099. Notably, this case did not address the procedural requirements of quantum meruit but rather allowed the attorney to retain $500 in quantum meruit of the $1500 advance payment he had been withholding after his client terminated him. Because the attorney failed "to return that portion of the $1500 payment which was unearned," the court found that he violated DR-2-110(A)(8), which was an older iteration of RPC 1.16(d) and required "the prompt refund of unearned parts of a fee when a lawyer withdraws from employment." Id.; see also Canon 2 of Colorado Disciplinary Rules, DR 2-110(A)(8) (Withdrawal from Employment) (adopted and effective Mar. 18, 1976).
157 The majority reads this as impliedly finding that the attorney did not violate DR 2-110(A)(8) by retaining funds that he was eventually deemed to have earned in quantum meruit by the court. See maj. op. 11 28, 32. Much like in Sather, however, the Johnson court never held that the attorney at issue was permitted to make his own determination regarding his entitlement to retain advance fees under quantum meruit; rather, it held that he did violate DR-2-110(A)(8) by not returning the portion of the funds that the court deemed unearned. Johnson, 612 P.2d at 1099. Hence, the court simply ruled that DR 2-110(A)(8) forbade retaining unearned fees, and since some of the fees were clearly unearned, the attorney violated the rule.
[58 Moreover, even if this case is read to have affirmatively approved of the attorney's retention of fees because his unspoken agreement "by necessity was upon a quantum meruit basis," see id. at 1098, this ruling was made before attorneys were required to reduce fee arrangements with new clients to writing under RPC 1.5(b). Compare Colo. RPC 1.5(b) (titled "Fees" and requiring that the basis and rate of fees are communicated to clients that the attorney has not represented regularly in writing), with Canon 2 of Colorado Disciplinary Rules, DR 2-106 (Fees for Legal Services) (reciting the then-existing fee regulations and mirroring RPC 1.5(a)'s prohibition on excessive fees, but never prohibiting oral fee agreements regardless of the attorney's prior business relations with the client). Therefore, this reading of Johnson's holding does not comport with the current iteration of the rules requiring that attorneys communicate "the basis or rate of the fee ... to the client, in writing." Colo. RPC 1.5(b). Thus, even if the court intended to affirmatively endorse retention of fees under the flag of a silent oral agreement regarding quantum meruit, the rules of professional conduct have evolved significantly since this case was decided, rendering the court's logic obsolete.
159 In sum, neither Sather nor Johnson had any reason to reach the question of whether unilateral retention of the portion of fees that the court eventually deemed earned in quantum meruit also violated the rule. That question was not essential to the resolution of either case. Furthermore, the majority's contention that it "would be a waste of resources in these cireumstances to force *1034attorneys to return money to which they are entitled and then bring suit against the client to recover it" misses the point. Maj. op. 182. It would absolutely be a waste of resources for the hearing boards in Sather and Johnson-which had already determined that an attorney improperly retained advance fees but was entitled to a portion of the advance fees in quantum meruit-to then require the parties to perform the legal fiction of "exchanging" those funds that the boards deemed earned. But this is only true after a hearing board has already made the quantum meruit determination. It is by no means a waste of judicial resources for an attorney to be required to prove her quantum meruit case before keeping the funds in quantam meruit. Presiding over such litigation is exactly what the judiciary does, and the majority's alternative of requiring clients to sue their attorneys will both consume the same judicial resources and unjustly burden clients.
IV. Conclusion
60 The majority's assertion that viewing Gilbert's misfeasance here as a violation of RPC 1.16(d) would effectively foreclose the remedy of quantum meruit in cases where flat-fee contracts fail misunderstands Regulation Counsel's central contention. See maj. op. 134. Regulation Counsel does not contend that attorneys camnmot recover in quantum meruit when a flat-fee agreement fails, but rather that they must recover in quantum meruit before such fees can be considered "earned."5 Instead, the majority permits Gilbert and similarly situated attorneys to put the cart before the horse and declare fees as earned under quantum meruit when no quantum meruit proceedings have been held. In so doing, the majority misses the overarching point of this case.
T 61 This case is not about whether Gilbert was entitled to recover in quantum meruit had she followed the proper procedure. I take issue not with the Hearing Board's eventual determination that Gilbert proved the elements of quantum meruit, but with Gilbert retaining the fees under the guise of quantum meruit before the Board considered her claim. Nor is it about punishment. Gilbert does not contest the punishment that she received for her other rule violations, and Regulation Counsel did not request any additional punishment had we held that Gilbert violated RPC 1.16(d). Rather, this case is about whether an attorney is entitled under RPC 1.16(d) to retain fees in her own business account to which she unilaterally determined that she was entitled without any basis in her written agreement with her client and without a court order granting her those fees in quantum meruit. I would hold that an attorney is not so entitled. To deem fees "earned" when an attorney believes she has a viable claim in quantum meruit turns the doctrine on its head, and had Gilbert's clients not pursued their claim, no legal determination would ever have been made regarding whether these fees were earned under quantum meruit or not.
€62 The majority insists that, in holding that Gilbert did not violate RPC 1.16(d), it does "not intend to suggest that attorneys may unilaterally determine what they believe they are owed in quantum meruit." Maj. op. 'I 40. But that question is precisely what this case is about. If Gilbert was allowed to unilaterally retain fees as "earned" in quantum meruit prior to a court considering the question, then she did not violate RPC 1.16(d); if fees in quantum meruit are not earned until they are adjudicated as such, then Gilbert retained unearned fees and violated 1.16(d). Therefore, by determining that Gilbert did not violate 1.16(d), the majority necessarily holds that 1.16(d) permits attorneys to unilaterally withhold advance fees under quantum meruit based solely on their own estimations of their entitlement-at least in cases such as this where a hearing board eventually agrees with the attorneys' prior unilateral determinations. The majori*1035ty's holding will only operate to encourage attorney overreach and proportionally increase client allegations under RPC 1.16(d). Therefore, because the majority's holding will disserve the public, I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that JUSTICE COATS and JUSTICE EID join in this dissent.
. Gilbert could have complied with RPC 1.16(d) while avoiding the risk that funds returned to her clients and then pursued in quantum meruit would be exhausted prior to recovery simply by complying with the requirement that advance fees be kept in trust. See Colo. RPC 1.15(c) (2013) (repealed and readopted in 2014 as Colo. RPC 1.15A(c)) (requiring that attorneys maintain disputed property separately until the dispute is resolved). This rule permits attorneys to keep disputed funds in the trust account until their quantum meruit claim is resolved, and arguably even to immediately deposit into a trust account disputed funds that they failed to hold in trust initially when a client terminates the representation and the attorney feels entitled to quantum meruit. Had Gilbert taken either of these paths, I would agree that she acted in compliance with RPC 1.16(d). But she did neither, choosing instead to simply withhold the funds in her business account and force the client to bring an action against her. RPC 1.16(d) does not permit such behavior.
. Of more pragmatic concern, under the majority's broad reading of RPC 1.5(f), an attorney who is advanced fees under a written flat-fee agreement can remove funds from that advance for any work that the attorney feels relates to the completion of the agreed-upon task, regardless of the efficiency or necessity of the tasks performed-or theoretically even for work that benefits the client but is wholly unrelated to the agreed-upon task-and then unilaterally retain them upon termination under quantum meruit. This possibility highlights the need to reference the written terms of an agreement when determining whether an attorney "earned" advance fees under 1.5(f).
. The Hearing Board's undisputed findings of fact indicate that Gilbert obtained the court order granting her motion to withdraw by December 26, 2011-the latest point at which her representation could be considered fully terminated- and she did not return the full advance fees until February 11, 2013.
. The court in Melat does refer to "the conduct of Merat [sic]} and Howarth in unjustly retaining all of the recovered attorney fees," ¶ 38, 287 P.3d at 851, but Melat and Howarth were the original defendant firms in the underlying quantum meru-it suit in which the Hannon Law Firm sought recovery of fees that it felt it had earned as withdrawn co-counsel in quantum meruit, see id. at 11 1-3, 287 P.3d at 844.
Similarly, the Mullens court upheld a trial court decision allowing "Mullens to retain fees under quantum meruit." 65 P.3d at 994. In that case, however, the trial court found that Mullens did have an oral agreement for a forty-percent contingency on a bad faith claim, under which he kept his portion of the settlement, but that the agreement was unenforceable under Chapter 23.3's requirement that all contingency agreements be reduced to writing. Id. The court then determined that the amount kept by Mullens under the unenforceable agreement was earned in quantum meruit, so rather than require Mul-lens to return the fees to his' client only to have the client immediately pass the funds back to Mullens under quantum meruit, the court simply allowed Mullens to "retain" the fees. Id. This *1032judicial economy is significantly different from the case at hand, in which Gilbert unilaterally declared herself entitled to funds with no purported contractual basis and no adjudication.
. Regulation Counsel's contention that attorneys do not "earn" a portion of flat-fee agreements merely by "conferring a benefit on or performing a legal service for the client" relates only to earned fees in the context of RPC 1.16(d). Regulation Counsel concedes that Gilbert would have been permitted to "return the entire advance fee and then separately seek quantum meruit recovery against her former clients if she wished," maj. op. 118, and deciding that Gilbert violated 1.16(d) would in no way eliminate quantum me-ruit as a remedy in failed flat-fee agreements.