(dissenting in part). I respectfully dissent in part from the majority’s opinion and find that the motion court’s decision should be modified to the extent of denying the motion to dismiss as to Dominica O’Neill, Shawn Callahan and Philip Stein’s claims arising out of the alleged defamatory statement “it is run by the mafia,” but otherwise agree that the remainder of the alleged defamatory statements are not actionable and that the Times Square plaintiffs were properly dismissed.
It is axiomatic that “to prevail in defamation litigation, a plaintiff must establish that it was he or she who was libeled or slandered: that the allegedly defamatory communication was about (‘of and concerning’) him or her” (1 Robert D. Sack, Sack on Defamation § 2:9 at 2-147 [4th ed 2012] [footnotes omitted]; Julian v American Bus. Consultants, 2 NY2d 1, 17 [1956]). It is also well settled that
“ [i] t is unnecessary for an article [or statement] to name a person in order for it to be ‘of and concerning’ that person. If it can be shown either that the implication of the article was that the plaintiff was the person meant or that he or she was understood to be the person spoken about in light of the existence of extrinsic facts not stated in the article, then it is ‘of and concerning’ the plaintiff as though the plaintiff was specifically named.” (1 Robert D. Sack, Sack on Defamation § 2:9.1 at 2-149 [4th ed 2012], citing DeBlasio v North Shore Univ. Hosp., 213 AD2d 584 [2d Dept 1995].)
Further, “[i]t is not necessary that all the world should understand the libel; it is sufficient if those who knew the *91plaintiff can make out that he is the person meant” (Stern v News Corp., 2010 WL 5158635, *5, 2010 US Dist LEXIS 133119, *16 [SD NY, Oct. 14, 2010, No. 08-Civ-7624 (DAB/ RLE)] [internal quotation marks omitted] [applying New York law]; see also NY PJI 3:25, Comment).
Plaintiffs urge that dismissal of their defamation claims at the pleading stage was premature because their claims were adequately pleaded and they were improperly foreclosed from adducing further proof to establish the “of and concerning” prong.
Defendants, on the other hand, argue that dismissal was warranted because the “of and concerning” determination presents a threshold question of law for the court based upon the specific content of the allegedly actionable publication. The defendants’ view is that a “plaintiff who is not named in an allegedly defamatory statement, ‘must sustain the burden of pleading and proving that the defamatory statement referred to him or her’ ” (quoting Chicherchia v Cleary, 207 AD2d 855, 855-856 [2d Dept 1994], citing Prosser & Keeton, Torts § 111 at 783 [5th ed 1984]) and that plaintiffs here failed to sustain their burden.
Relying primarily on Chicherchia and Julian, the motion court stated the following as authority for granting the motion to dismiss:
“The plaintiff’s burden on this element is not a light one. The defamatory matter and the plaintiff must be linked together by a chain of unchallenged proof for the plaintiff to reach the jury on the element ‘of and concerning.’ While reference to the allegedly defamed party may be indirect and may be shown by extrinsic facts, if the plaintiff uses such extrinsic facts, he or she must show that it is reasonable to conclude that the publication refers to the plaintiff, and those facts were known to those who read or heard the publication. Plaintiff cannot use innuendo to enlarge, rather than explain, in an effort to have him or herself identified in the public mind as the target of the alleged defamation” (2013 NY Slip Op 31081[U], *9 [Sup Ct, NY County 2013] [citations omitted]).
While there can be no dispute that a defamation plaintiff ultimately has the heavy burden of proving the “of and concerning” prong, the question raised by this appeal is what burden *92does the plaintiff, who is not named directly and must rely on extrinsic evidence, have at the pleading stage to overcome a motion to dismiss based on the assertion that the statements were not “of and concerning” plaintiff.
As initially observed by the motion court, “Generally, whether the complaint sufficiently alleges facts to demonstrate a connection between the particular plaintiff and the alleged libel is an issue for the court” (2013 NY Slip Op 31081[U], *8). As Judge Sack explains it, “Whether the complaint alleges facts sufficient reasonably to connect the libel to the plaintiff is a question for the court, although the ultimate determination of whether the libel actually applies to the plaintiff is for the jury” (1 Robert D. Sack, Sack on Defamation § 2:9.3 at 2-155 [4th ed 2012]).1
“When a defamation concerns a group of people, and one or more members of that group bring a libel or slander action, thorny questions are presented as to whether the communication is ‘of and concerning’ the plaintiff or plaintiffs” (1 Robert D. Sack, Sack on Defamation § 2:9.4 at 2-155 [4th ed 2012]). “Under some circumstances, courts have permitted an unnamed member of a group to maintain a claim for defamation where a defamatory statement has been made against the group” (Algarin v Town of Wallkill, 421 F3d 137, 139 [2d Cir 2005]).
Courts look to a number of factors to determine the sufficiency of group defamation allegations. First, “the size of a group is critical to the sufficiency of a claim by an unnamed member of a group” (Algarin, 421 F3d at 139, comparing Neiman-Marcus v Lait, 13 FRD 311, 313, 316 [SD NY 1952] [claim by members of a group of 25 sufficient], with Abramson v Pataki, 278 F3d 93, 102 [2d Cir 2002] [claim by members of a group of more than 1,000 insufficient], citing Restatement *93[Second] of Torts § 564A, Comment b [“It is not possible to set definite limits as to the size of the group or class, but the cases in which recovery has been allowed usually have involved numbers of 25 or fewer”]). In Brady v Ottaway Newspapers (84 AD2d 226 [2d Dept 1981]), the Appellate Division, Second Department, rejected a definitive size limitation and allowed libel claims to proceed for a group of at least 53 police officers out of a department of more than 70 (id. at 228 n 1, 234).2 Relying in part on the Court of Appeals’ language in Gross v Cantor (270 NY 93 [1936]),3 Brady adopted the “intensity of suspicion test”:
“With the intensity of suspicion test, size is a consideration and the probability of recovery diminishes with increasing size[4] Size[,] however, is not the only factor evaluated. It is balanced against the definiteness in number and composition of the group and its degree of organization. This list of balancing factors or reference elements *94is not meant to be exclusive” (id. at 236 [citation omitted]).
The Court went on to note that “the prominence of the group and the prominence of the individual within the group” are other proper “reference elements” (id.).
In addition to these factors, courts also consider “whether the defamatory statement refers to ‘all’ or only ‘some’ members of the group” (Algarin, 421 F3d at 140). In Brady, for example, the statement at issue referred to all members of a relatively small, identifiable group (the 53 unindicted police officers of the City of Newburgh in 1972) (Brady, 84 AD2d at 228, 237), as opposed to a statement that only refers to “some” members of a group, making it less likely for an individual plaintiff to be linked to the statement (see e.g. Owens v Clark, 154 Okla 108, 6 P2d 755 [1931]; see also 1 Robert D. Sack, Sack on Defamation § 2:9.4 at 2-156 [4th ed 2012] [“An attack on some is less likely to associate a particular member of the group with the allegations than an attack on all the members of the same group — to say some members of a law firm are incompetent is less likely to injure the reputation of a particular partner than would the allegation that each and every partner was incompetent”]).5
Here, there are sufficient facts pleaded at this early stage in the litigation to reasonably connect the individual plaintiffs with the following statement: “it [meaning Cheetah’s] is run by the mafia.” O’Neill provided an affidavit in which she alleged extrinsic facts that she, Callahan, and Stein were part of a “small and exclusive group of individuals” who ran and managed Cheetah’s, with constant visible contact with customers, officials, dancers, and vendors. Taking these allegations as true, as we must on a motion to dismiss (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]), the individual plaintiffs are members of a small, identifiable group that allegedly “ran” Cheetah’s and are thus implicated in the allegedly defamatory statement. We note that the result might be different had the statement only implicated some of those running Cheetah’s. While we do not know the exact size, organization, composition or prominence of the alleged defamation group at this stage in the litigation, there are enough facts alleged at this time to demonstrate the requisite connection.
*95Whether or not the individual plaintiffs can come forward with evidence to support these allegations and ultimately prove that they were each individually understood to be referred to in light of extrinsic facts not stated in the broadcast, is not to be decided on a pre-answer motion to dismiss.
Moreover, in reaching its result, the majority usurps the role of the trier of fact by outright deciding the meaning or the “general understanding” of the phrase “run by the mafia.” The majority goes on to assert its understanding of the “colloquial[ ]” meaning of the phrase “to run a business” and states that the public can appreciate the “sinister connotation” of a reference to the “Mafia.” Not only are these clearly questions for a jury, it is unclear why these questions are relevant to the inquiry of whether the statement is “of and concerning” the individual plaintiffs. The majority’s parsing of whether “run” means to have control over an organization or whether it means to merely provide management services is misplaced. The majority argues that “run” must mean having ownership or control of the business and that because the individual plaintiffs do not allege that they have such ownership or control over Cheetah’s, their claim must fail. This argument, which is not set forth by defendants, is unsound. On a motion to dismiss, we must accept the complaint as true, and here it sufficiently alleges that the individual plaintiffs “run” the operations at Cheetah’s. No further inquiry into what that means can properly be made on a pre-answer motion to dismiss.
I agree with the majority that the remaining statements are not actionable by the individual plaintiffs as they only refer to “Cheetah’s,” which is too general a reference to implicate even the individual plaintiffs.
With respect to the Times Square plaintiffs, they have not met their burden of showing that any of the allegedly defamatory statements are “of and concerning” them, as there are no allegations to support a reasonable connection linking these corporate entities to the statements.
Friedman and DeGrasse, JJ., concur with Tom, J.P.; Kapnick, J., dissents in part in a separate opinion in which Richter, J., concurs.Order, Supreme Court, New York County, entered on or about April 18, 2013, affirmed, without costs.
. CPLR 3016 (a) makes it clear that a heightened pleading standard does not apply to “of and concerning” allegations, since it mandates that “[i]n an action for libel or slander, the particular words complained of shall be set forth in the complaint, but their application to the plaintiff may be stated generally” (emphasis added; see also NY PJI 3:25, Comment [“Note that although the reference to the plaintiff may be pleaded generally, the particular words complained of must be pleaded specifically”]). It is interesting to note that in some states it is necessary to plead the extrinsic facts that identified plaintiff to the reader as the defamed party (1 Robert D. Sack, Sack on Defamation § 2:9.1 at 2-151 [4th ed 2012], citing Velle Transcendental Research Assn. v Esquire, Inc., 41 Ill App 3d 799, 803, 354 NE2d 622, 626 [1976] [comparing California procedure, where, by statute, “there is no requirement that plaintiffs plead extrinsic facts to show that the defamatory words apply to the plaintiff,” and Illinois procedure, where there is such a requirement]).
. The First Amendment dictates courts’ long-standing disfavor of group defamation claims. In Brady, the Court explained that “the larger the collectivity named in the libel, the less likely it is that a reader would understand it to refer to a particular individual” (84 AD2d at 228). As a result, the Court reasoned that
“individual harm cannot occur as the result of a group-libelous statement, because the hearer of the statement will make the rational assessment that such a statement is, by its nature, less likely to be true with respect to every member of a large group than it is to be true with respect to a particular individual” (id. at 229).
This reasoning serves to “encourage frank discussions of matters of public concern under the First Amendment guarantees” (id.).
. In Gross, the Court of Appeals held as follows:
“[A]n impersonal reproach of an indeterminate class is not actionable. But if the words may by any reasonable application, import a charge against several individuals, under some general description or general name, the plaintiff has the right to go on to trial, and it is for the jury to decide, whether the charge has the personal application averred by the plaintiff” (270 NY at 96 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).
. Despite the court’s rejection of a group size limitation, it is clear that membership in a small group increases a plaintiff’s chance of recovery:
“[A]n individual belonging to a small group may maintain an action for individual injury resulting from a defamatory comment about the group, by showing that he is a member of the group. Because the group is small and includes few individuals, reference to the individual plaintiff reasonably follows from the statement and the question of reference is left for the jury” (Brady, 84 AD2d at 231 [footnote and citation omitted]).
. The “all” versus “some” distinction is not absolute. In Neiman-Marcus v Lait (13 FRD 311 [SD NY 1952]), the court found that the salesmen plaintiffs did have a cause of action, despite the use of the word “most” instead of “all” (id. at 316).