dissenting.
¶ 1 I dissent from the Majority's Opinion. I adopt the same position expressed in my dissents in Cases No. 112,503 and 112,564 regarding the jurisdictional infirmity in DPS revocation order created by the facially deficient officer's affidavit, an infirmity which subjects the order to vacation by the trial court at any time.
¶ 2 I disagree with the Majority's view in the present case that the statutory mandate of the officer's affidavit of "reasonable grounds" to believe the driver had operated the vehicle under the influence of aleohol is "quasi-jurisdictional." As noted by the Majority, the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Abraham v. Homer, 1924 OK 393, 102 Okla. 12, 226 P. 45, stated, "Facts showing the service of process, facts showing that the matter involved in a suit constitutes a subject-matter consigned by law to the jurisdiction of the court, and facts showing that a particular judgment is rendered in compliance with all existing mandatory law in that regard are known as jurisdictional facts." Id. ¶ 10 (syl. no. 1 by the Court). Further to the point, Abraham clearly holds:
Whenever by a statute which the court has determined to be not merely directory, but absolutely mandatory, the Legislature has required acts to be done, and provides that the court shall not render a particular judgment without the facts showing compliance with such statute, then such facts are jurisdictional to the power of the court to render that particular judgment.
Id. ¶ 2 (subparagraph 8). 3 Without both statutory prerequisites of (1) a blood or breath test report (47 0.8.2011
3 Without both statutory prerequisites of (1) a blood or breath test report (47 0.8.2011 § 754(C)) or the driver's refusal of such a test (47 0.8.2011 $ 758), and (2) the officer's *566sworn report of "reasonable grounds" to believe the driver was driving under the influence, DPS lacked the power to suspend the driver's license. If blood or breath test results (or the driver's refusal of such tests) were lacking, would DPS have the power to revoke this license? My reading of these provisions leads to the conclusion that they are fundamental to DPS' power to act: "Facts showing compliance with such mandatory statute are evidently intended by the lawmakers as material to the existence of the power of the court to render the judgment . and are jurisdictional facts." Abraham, 1924 OK 393, ¶ 2, 226 P. 45 (subparagraph 11}.
¶ 4 Because the officer's affidavit here was, on its face, non-compliant with the clear statutory mandate, DPS lacked jurisdiction to order suspension, and such an order was subject to collateral attack at any time. See Ashikian v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Horse Racing Comm'n, 2008 OK 64, ¶ 10, 188 P.3d 148. The trial court's May 7, 2014, order should be vacated and the case remanded to the trial court with directions to vacate DPS order of suspension for lack of jurisdiction. I respectfully dissent.