dissenting: The question for decision is whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
It is alleged that the plaintiff is a citizen and taxpayer of the Town of Weldon; that "the defendant, P. R. Kitchin, is and was at the times mentioned, a policeman of said town, with several years experience; that on 1 April, 1946, the Mayor and Board of Commissioners of Weldon adopted the following resolution :
“Motion by Mr. Johnson, seconded by Mr. Pierce and carried that the Clerk issue cheek to P. R. Kitchin for $425.00 to take care of estimated expenses to Police Academy. Mr. Kitchin was granted ninety days leave of absence with pay in order that he may attend the Police Academy in Washington, D. C. (The last sentence is presumably a part of the resolution, although somewhat uncertain as the record fails to show any closing quotation marks.)
It is accordingly alleged that pursuant to the above resolution, the defendant, P. R. Kitchin, received from the Town of Weldon the sum of $425 to cover his expenses at the Police Academy in Washington, and an additional sum of $675 as salary while on leave of absence attending said Academy, and that these payments were made from taxes levied on property of the plaintiff and other taxpayers of the Town of Weldon.
It is further alleged that the payments were made without special legislative sanction except as contained in the general law, and without a favorable vote of the qualified voters of the Town, and that said payments “were not necessary expenses of said Town.”
*460The plaintiff made demand on tbe Mayor and Board of Commissioners that they take steps to recover these sums for the Town, which they have refused to do. Hill v. Stansbury, 223 N. C. 193, 25 S. E. (2) 604.
It thus appears that the complaint states a cause of action with accuracy and precision under Art. VII, sec. 7, of the Constitution: “No county, city, town, etc., shall contract any debt, etc., nor shall any tax be levied or collected by any officer of the same except for the necessary expenses thereof, unless by a vote of the majority of the qualified voters therein.”
The office of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of a pleading, admitting, for the purpose, the truth of factual averments well stated and such relevant inferences of fact as may be deduced therefrom. Leonard v. Maxwell, Comr., 216 N. C. 89, 3 S. E. (2) 316; Ins. Co. v. Stadiem, 223 N. C. 49, 25 S. E. (2) 202; Ballinger v. Thomas, 195 N. C. 517, 142 S. E. 761.
In the face of the admission on demurrer that the payments here in question “were not necessary expenses” of the Town of Weldon, we do not reach the question discussed in the majority opinion. Nowhere on the record now before us (complaint and demurrer) does it appear that the Commissioners of Weldon have declared or determined that the instant expenditures are necessary for the governance of the municipality. On the other hand, they have come into court and conceded on demurrer that the expenditures are “not necessary expenses of said Town.” Where the body first charged with responsibility in the matter says the expenditures are not necessary, how can we say otherwise without usurping the powers of the local authorities ? It is only when the question is presented as one of law, stripped of any question of fact, that the courts are authorized to act in the premises. When a case is presented on demurrer, we are required to construe the pleading liberally “with a view to substantial justice between the parties.” G. S. 1-151; Enloe v. Ragle, 195 N. C. 38, 141 S. E. 477. The complaint is good as against the demurrer.
The Commissioners of the Town, to whom is confided the trust of regulating the affairs of the municipality, are first to determine as a matter of fact whether a given expenditure is “for the necessary expenses thereof” before the courts can be called upon to say whether such expenditure falls within the category of necessary governmental expenses. Brodnax v. Groom, 64 N. C. 244; Evans v. Comrs., 89 N. C. 154; Cromartie v. Comrs., 87 N. C. 134; Satterthwaite v. Comrs., 76 N. C. 153.
The decisions are at one in holding that while the courts decide whether a particular municipal expense falls within the category of necessary municipal expenses, the governing authorities of the municipality first determine, in their discretion, whether such a municipal expense is necessary or needed for the designated locality. Insurance Co. v. Guilford *461County, 225 N. C. 293, 34 S. E. (2) 430; Power Co. v. Clay County, 213 N. C. 698, 197 S. E. 603; Sing v. Charlotte, 213 N. C. 60, 195 S. E. 271; Palmer v. Haywood County, 212 N. C. 284, 193 S. E. 668; Starmount Co. v. Hamilton Lakes, 205 N. C. 514, 171 S. E. 909; Black v. Comrs., 129 N. C. 121, 39 S. E. 818; Fawcett v. Mt. Airy, 134 N. C. 125, 45 S. E. 1029; Storm v. Wrightsville Beach, 189 N. C. 681, 128 S. E. 17. There it- no occasion for the courts to consider the matter unless and until the m'ior factual determination has been made by the local authorities.
It was said in Henderson v. Wilmington, 191 N. C. 269, 132 S. E. 25, that the term “necessary expenses,” as here used, “includes law and fact.” The courts decide the one; the local authorities the other. The same expression occurs in a number of cases. Glenn v. Comrs. of Durham, 201 N. C. 233, 159 S. E. 439. Thus, in Wilson v. Charlotte, 74 N. C. 748, it was said : “It was held in Brodnax v. Groom, 64 N. C. 244, that if the object for which the money ivas to be raised came within the class of such as might be necessary for the country, it was left to the County Commissioners to decide whether in fact it was necessary or not, and their decision could not be reviewed by the court. This ivas also held in Mitchell v. Trustees, 71 N. C. 400.” So thoroughly have the decisions settled the question that this has long been considered the accepted and established meaning of the section. Starmount Co. v. Ohio Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 55 F. (2) 649. “What is a necessary expense for one locality may not be a necessary expense for another.” Storm v. Wrightsville Beach, supra.
It may be noted that the resolution authorizing the expenditures in question makes no mention of whether they are for the necessary municipal expenses of the Town of Weldon. In this respect,' the resolution is similar to the one appearing in the case of Wilson v. Charlotte, 206 N. C. 856, 175 S. E. 306, where the expense of a proposed drill tower to train the city’s firemen was under consideration. But the circumstance in the instant case which renders the demurrer bad is the allegation that the expenditures “were not necessary expenses of said Town.” This allegation is taken to be true for the purposes of the demurrer. It is not an allegation of law. but one of fact. Black v. Comrs., supra; Wilson v. Charlotte, 74 N. C. 748. The demurrer should have been overruled, and the defendants put to answer.
ADDENDUM.
After writing the above, the majority added a paragraph to its opinion saying that the allegation in question was not one of fact, but one of law, and hence not admitted by the demurrer.
A concurring dissent was thereupon filed pointing out that the added position of the majority was at variance with all the decided cases on the *462subject, calling special attention to Black’s Case where the identical question was in focus and pronouncement made thereon.
The majority then adds five more paragraphs to its opinion, the last four by way of “summary.”
The first two paragraphs of the summary are new and appear to constitute a negation of the position last taken and to amount to a confession of error. The third immediately executes a volte-face on a supposed presumption which runs counter to the record and the decided cases. The entire summary is devoid of any reference to the crucial allegation and admission on demurrer that the expenses in question “were not necessary expenses of said Town.” No presumption can arise, or be indulged, in the face of a contrary admission on the record. The fourth paragraph of the summary seeks to give assurance of benevolence in respect of the effect of the holding. Then why disrupt a long line of decisions and leave the law in confusion, when clarity and simplicity are so immediate and readily attainable ?
If this Court is not going to follow its own established precedents, or the law as it is written, S. v. Davis, ante, 386, how is the practitioner to know what he can safely advise in legal matters, or the disquietude necessarily engendered thereby to be allayed ? Confidence as well as logic must buttress the Court’s decisions.