dissenting: The caption of chapter 418, Public Laws 1935, is as follows: “An act to exempt New Hanover County from the provisions of Article Eight of Chapter Sixty-six of Yolume Three of the Consolidated Statutes, known as the Turlington Act.”
*697Art. II, sec. 29, of tbe Constitution of North Carolina, in part: “The General Assembly shall not pass any local, private, or special act or resolution . . . relating to health, sanitation, and the abatement of nuisances . . . regulating labor, trade, mining, or manufacturing, . . . nor shall the General Assembly enact any such local, private, or special act by the partial repeal of a general law, but the General Assembly may at any time repeal local, private, or special laws enacted by it. Any local, private, or special act or resolution passed in violation of the provisions of this section shall be void.”
Sec. 2 of ch. 418, Public Laws 1935, supra, says, in part: “This act shall be deemed an exercise of the police power of the county of New Hanover, for the protection of the . . . health,” etc.
It is in the very word and teeth of the Constitution, above quoted, and therefore unconstitutional. It is a partial repeal of a general law.
My dissent in Newman et al. v. Watkins et al., ante, 675, from Yance, states fully the reasons I think the Pasquotank Act unconstitutional and injunctive relief is the proper remedy, and applies to this case also.
The questions involved on this appeal: (1) Did his Honor err in permitting an election and in making the city of Wilmington a party, having declared the act unconstitutional? I think so. (2) While an appeal is pending to the Supreme Court from an injunction continued to the final hearing, is it proper, after the judge who heard it is through hearing the courts of the district, except by exchange, and while the act is still declared unconstitutional, is it error for the judge to modify his previous injunction, and permit the county commissioners to appoint a liquor board, and the liquor board to open up stores and sell liquor, and put the act, which the same judgment and order holds unconstitutional, into effect? I think so. (3) Was it error for the court to find that there was a balance in the New Hanover County general fund, and that the liquor board, when appointed, could buy upon its own credit, and without pledging the faith and credit of New Hanover County? I think so.
I do not think it necessary to state further my reasons for dissenting, except to say, from an examination of this act that it is a special privilege, far reaching and destructive of constitutional government. It may not be amiss to say that it is to the credit of such well-known and prominent citizens, that they thought it their duty to bring this action to declare this act unconstitutional. They appear as plaintiffs: W. H. Sprunt, Rev. J. A. Sullivan, Roger Moore, Chas. Ruffin, W. F. Moore, J. L. Becton, H. S. McGirt, J. E. Willoughby, E. G. Rose, Wm. Struth-ers, Rev. A. J. Barton, S. J. Ellis, W. A. Walker, Sr., Mary Louise Walker, J. A. McDougall, H. W. Stevens, Sr., and B. B. Pridgen.
Sec. 26 of the act in question: “Nothing herein contained shall be construed so as to permit the manufacture and sale of alcoholic beverages in North Carolina except as herein provided.” Sec. 27: “All laws *698or parts of law inconsistent with, the provisions of this act are hereby repealed.” Nowhere in North Carolina, not even in the counties under the Pasquotank Act, is permitted “the manufacture and sale of alcoholic beverages in North Carolina except as herein provided” — that is, New Hanover County to have the exclusive privilege — the kingly power.
“Upon what meat doth this our Osesar feed,
That he is grown so great?”
( Shakespeare — H amlet.)
For the reasons given, I think the judgment on plaintiffs’ appeal should be reversed — on defendants’ appeal, no error.