concurring and dissenting.
[¶ 22] I agree with adoption of the Dis-ciplináis Board’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Majority opinion at ¶ 13. I reluctantly agree with the sanctions because the failure to adopt the Board’s recommendations would require additional proceedings that would delay imposition of discipline.
[¶ 23] In two of the three cases before us, Matson accepted retainers. Majority opinion at ¶¶5 and 6. The Disciplinary Board found Matson and his clients agreed Matson would charge an hourly fee. Id. The Board also found the retainers were supposed to be applied toward earned fees and reimbursement of costs. Id. at ¶ 7. The fee agreements stated the retainers were non-refundable and also stated that the retainers would be applied toward earned fees and reimbursement for costs. Id. The agreements did not state the fees were earned upon receipt, were a minimum fee or were to retain Matson’s availability for future representation. Id.
[¶ 24] According to the Findings which we adopt, Matson’s fee agreements were inadequate to qualify as earned-when-received retainers that became Matson’s property. Majority opinion at ¶ 7; see In re Disciplinary Action Against Hann, 2012 ND 160, ¶ 21, 819 N.W.2d 498. As a result, the money belonged to the clients— not Matson — and needed to be deposited in a trust account rather than in Matson’s operating account until earned by Matson. N.D.R. Prof. Conduct 1.15(a) and (c).
[¶25] The Disciplinary Board found and we accepted the fact Matson did not have a trust account. Majority opinion at ¶ 6. Because Matson had no trust account, the retainers obviously were not deposited in a trust account as required by Rule 1.15(c). Nor were the clients’ funds kept separate from Matson’s funds as required by Rule 1.15(a). Matson therefore violated Rule 1.15.
[¶26] If Matson had a trust account, and if Matson would have deposited the two retainers into the trust account, but then immediately and improperly withdrew the money, I submit we would readily conclude Matson misappropriated client funds in violation of Rule 1.15. For such a knowing misappropriation of client funds, our standards for imposing lawyer discipline provide for disbarment as the appropriate sanction. N.D. Stds. Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 4.11. One collection of cases applying this guideline states:
“Although Standard 4.11 should be applied when courts find a ‘knowing5 conversion, some courts use the mens rea of ‘intentional’ to support a disbarment sanction. Others use the terms ‘intentional’ and ‘knowing1 interchangeably. Regardless of the terminology used, the focus is on deliberate conduct. See In re Discipline of Corey, 274 P.3d 972, 977, 978 (Utah 2012) (lawyer’s conversion of client’s settlement funds for the operational needs of his law firm was ‘knowing and intentional’; ‘Generally our rule is that “intentional misappro-' *133priation of clients funds will result in disbarment unless the lawyer can demonstrate truly compelling mitigating circumstances.” ’) (citation omitted).
“Some courts have established a bright-line rule that disbarment is the only appropriate discipline when a lawyer knowingly converts client funds. In the seminal case of In re Wilson [81 N.J. 451], 409 A.2d 1153 (N.J.1979), the Supreme Court of New Jersey noted that it is commonplace for lawyers’ work to involve possession of their clients’ funds, whether it be a real estate closing, the establishment of a trust, the purchase of a business, the investment of funds, the receipt of proceeds of litigation, or any one of a multitude of other situations. The court said that there are few more egregious acts of which a lawyer can be guilty than misappropriation of those funds and that ‘[r]ecognition of the nature and gravity of the offense suggests only one result disbarment.’ Id. at 1155.”
ABA, Annotated Standards for Imposing Lavyyer Sanctions, pp. 132-33 (2015).
[¶ 27] The second part of Standard 4.11 requires a finding that the client was actually or potentially injured. The majority expressly concludes, “All three clients were injured or potentially injured by Mat-son’s conduct. They were forced to seek new counsel or proceed self-represented, experienced delays, and incurred expenses.” Majority opinion at ¶7. The Board also found Matson violated Rule 1.16 by failing to refund the unearned fees. Id. at ¶¶ 5, 6 and 9. This misconduct is significant either as proof of an independent violation of the Rules or proof that Matson’s conduct injured his clients. The ABA Annotated Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, pp. 139, 149, provides:
“The second element of Standard 4.11 is ‘injury or potential injury to a client.’ In People v. Edwards, 240 P.3d 1287 (Colo.O.P.D.J.2010), citing Standards 4.1 and 4.11, inter alia, the Colorado Supreme Court found in disbarring a lawyer for converting client funds, inter alia, that he caused injury by failing to return an unearned retainer to his client after doing little or no work. The client testified she was forced to borrow substantial sums of money in order to hire another lawyer to represent her and that she attempted with little success to represent herself in court, causing her case to be delayed. See also People v. Adkins, 57 P.3d 750 (Colo.O.P.D.J.2001) (citing Standard 4.11, inter alia, court found the lawyer’s knowing conversion of some $130,000 in estate funds for her own business and/or personal purposes caused undeniably serious potential monetary injury, warranting disbarment); In re Fountain, 913 A.2d 1180 (Del.2006) (citing Standard 4.11, inter alia, and imposing disbarment, the court noted that lawyer’s clients suffered financial injury as a result of lawyer’s conversion of unearned retainers and Medicaid reimbursement check); In re Weaver [294 Kan. 751], 281 P.3d 502 (Kan.2012) (lawyer who caused serious injury after taking money from thousands of vulnerable loan-modification clients, giving most of the money to nonlawyers and then doing nothing on his clients’ behalf, was disbarred under Standard 4.11); Ky. Bar Ass’n v. Edwards, 377 S.W.3d 557, 563 (Ky.2012) (permanent disbarment warranted for lawyer who took ‘advantage óf a highly vulnerable, disabled client’ adjudged incompetent when he wrote $78,000 in checks from her account, described as ‘loans,’ and sold her property without court approval); In re Humphrey, 15 So.3d 960 (La.2009) (multiple acts of misconduct, including lawyer’s refusal to comply with court order to turn over a piece of artwork of a renowned local artist she was to hold in trust, caused *134serious to potentially serious injury under Standard 4.11, inter alia, requiring disbarment); Rayburn v. Bd. of Prof'l Responsibility, 300 S.W.3d 654 (Tenn.2009) (affirming order of disbarment under Standard 4.11, inter alia, court found injury to clients as a result of lawyer’s misuse of client funds when he knowingly and repeatedly deprived his clients of funds to which they were entitled, causing one client to incur considerable expense to recover funds lawyer withheld for more than four years); In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Simmerly [174 Wash.2d 963], 285 P.3d 838, 851 (Wash.2012) (in imposing disbarment, the court affirmed findings that lawyer’s misappropriation of client funds caused potential injury to some clients and actual injury to others, as well as harm to the administration of justice, including the disciplinary process, which is ‘harmed every time a trust account is misused’).”
[¶28] Even if Matson did not knowingly misappropriate client funds, “[suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows or should know that he is dealing improperly with client property and causes injury or potential injury to a client.” Id. at 4.12. One collection of cases applying this guideline explains:
“Courts commonly reserve suspension for lawyers who engage in misconduct that does not amount to knowing misappropriation or conversion of client property but, rather, deal with it improperly. In In re Konopka [126 N.J. 225], 596 A.2d 733 (N.J.1991), the court imposed a six-month suspension for a lawyer who engaged in careless bookkeeping practices and stressed that disbarment should be imposed only if knowing misappropriation of client funds was established by clear and convincing evidence. Rejecting the disciplinary panel’s finding that the lawyer ‘knowingly’ misappropriated clients’ funds, the court relied on evidence that established the lawyer never reconciled his trust account and did not use his trust account for venal purposes.
“The most common cases under Standard 4.12 involve lawyers who commingle client funds with their own or fail to remit client funds promptly. See, e.g., Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Au [107 Hawai'i 327], 113 P.3d 203 (Haw. 2005) (citing 4.12, inter alia, court imposed five-year suspension for lawyer whose misconduct included mishandling client funds and client trust account, holding that although misconduct did not appear to have caused actual harm to lawyer’s clients, it did cause potentially serious injury to them and seriously harmed the integrity of the legal system); In re Caskey, 866 So.2d 226, 227 (La.2004) (citing Standard 4.12, court ordered six-month suspension for lawyer who retained attorney’s fees in his client .trust account for several months, resulting in improper commingling of his funds with those of his clients, and stated that ‘it is undisputed that there is no evidence of conversion of client funds, nor is there any evidence respondent’s conduct caused any harm to his clients’); Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. McLaughlin [409 Md. 304], 974 A.2d 315 (Md.2009) (indefinite suspension, rather than disbarment, appropriate for misconduct including operation of law practice from single checkin^escrow account resulting in the commingling of lawyer’s personal funds with client and third-party funds; court found that lawyer lacked dishonest motive, repaid clients, and felt genuine remorse); In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against McKean [148 Wash.2d 849], 64 P.3d 1226, 1233 (Wash.2003) (citing Standard 4.12, court imposed six-month suspension followed by six months of probation on lawyer who, inter alia, commingled client money held in trust with *135his own money, noting ‘Lawyers sometimes forget that the dangers of commingling are not merely that the lawyer will, squander the money “borrowed” from a trust account and not be able to restore it, but that the commingled funds might be subject to attachment by a lawyer’s creditors, thus preempting the lawyer’s ability to do so’) (citation omitted); But see In re Farrar [183 Vt. 592], 949 A.2d 438 (Vt.2008) (although presumptive sanction was suspension under Standard 4.12 for lawyer’s acknowledged practice of commingling client and personal funds in his trust account, court found public reprimand appropriate when lawyer lacked dishonest motive, made full and free disclosure, and expressed remorse).”
ABA, Annotated Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, pp. 141-42.
[¶ 29] Here, if the facts and circumstances prove Matson knowingly converted client funds, he should be disbarred. The Rule 1.15 trust account requirement is decades old. The Haan and In re Disciplinary Action Against Hoffman, 2013 ND 137, 834 N.W.2d 636, cases predate Mat-son’s mishandling of these clients’ funds. Matson nevertheless did not even have a trust account when he agreed to hourly fee representations and accepted thousands of dollars in retainers from these clients. That client money was immediately converted by Matson’s deposit in his business operating account,
[¶ 30] Assuming for discussion that Matson’s case teeters between the “intentional” and “should have known” requirements of Standards 4.11 and 4.12, Matson’s suspension should be for longer than six months and a day. Matson did not have a trust account. He nevertheless accepted client funds as a retainer out of which future legal fees and costs were to be deducted. He immediately took ownership of all of those funds. This is serious misconduct in clear violation of Rule 1.15. Standing alone, this misconduct would call for a serious sanction. But, as the Disciplinary Board found and this Court adopted, Matson’s Rule 1.15 violation does not stand alone. He also violated Rule 1.1 for lack of competence, Rule 1.3 for lack of diligence, Rule 1.4(a) for lack of adequate communications, Rule 1.5(a) for charging unreasonable fees and improperly billing for overhead items, and Rule 1.16(e) for failing to refund unearned fees. Majority opinion at ¶ 9.1 The Disciplinary Board also found the misconduct was accompanied by aggravating circumstances of prior discipline, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct, vulnerability of a victim and failure to pay costs assessed against him in a prior disciplinary matter. Given Matson’s disciplinary history and cocktail of misconduct here, any suspen*136sion should have been years and not months.
[¶ 31] DANIEL J. CROTHERS.
. The Disciplinary Board noted that their Findings and Conclusions regarding multiple Rule violations was not “stacking” of charges or “piling on,” but rather an effort to show the breadth of Matson’s violations. I have written before about what I perceived were unnecessary findings of Rule violations. See In re Disciplinary Action Against Corwin, 2014 ND 50, ¶ 26, 843 N.W.2d 830 (“Members of this Court have discouraged the unnecessary 'stacking' or 'piling on’ of rule violations for the same conduct.”). See Disciplinary Bd. v. Lee, 2013 ND 151, ¶36, 835 N.W.2d 836 (Crothers, J., concurring specially); Disciplinary Bd. v. Rozan, 2011 ND 71, ¶25, 796 N.W.2d 384 (Crothers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Disciplinary Bd. v. Wolff, 2010 ND 175, ¶¶ 28, 34, 788 N.W.2d 594 (Crothers, J., specially concurring.). To be clear, my complaint is not about findings of Rule violations like was done here. My complaint is about finding multiple violations based on identical conduct. For example, the facts here would support findings that Matson violated N.D.R. Prof. Conduct 1.15(a) because he did not hold client property separate from his own. The same facts also support a violation of Rule 1.15(c) that Matson did not deposit the client funds in a trust account. In my view, findings that the identical miscon*136duct violated multiple Rules, or subsections of rules, does not advance the disciplinary process.