concurring: I concur in the result reached in the well considered opinion delivered by Winborne, J., for the majority of the Court.
I do not understand that on this record the decision goes to the extent of holding that the city is without power, by appropriate resolution, to *69provide for the expenditure of money in its treasury applicable to general municipal expenses when this is done for the purpose of protecting and making essential repairs to property owned by the city and used for a public purpose.
The County Fiscal Control Act is by later statute made applicable to cities and towns, except where the context shows that it was not so intended. The act contains this provision: “No appropriation made by the appropriation resolution, except an appropriation for general county expenses, shall be transferred from one fund to another, and no appropriation for general county expenses shall be transferred to any fund of any subdivision, or vice versa. C. S., 1334 (64). The last clause obviously is inapplicable to cities and towns.
Thus it appears that the transfer by the city of funds appropriated for general municipal expenses to another fund for an authorized municipal purpose, such as the necessary maintenance and repairs to city property, would not seem to be prohibited by the Municipal Fiscal Control Act. Otherwise, the city might be seriously hampered in the performance of its corporate functions, in case of a sudden casualty or emergency, or be caused to incur substantial liability.
This would not involve a violation of Art. VII, sec. 7, of the State Constitution.
Nor is there anything in the holding in Adams v. Durham, 189 N. C., 232, 126 S. E., 611, as interpreted by later decisions, that would invalidate an appropriation from funds already in the treasury for this essential purpose. In Holmes v. Fayetteville, 197 N. C., 740, 150 S. E., 624, upholding the right of the city “to use only such available funds as it has” for the purpose of extending its electric light facilities beyond the city limits, it was said {Adams, J., speaking for the Court) : “This course was pursued in the erection of a building in the city of Durham and was approved by this Court, but the auditorium was in the city and was intended for a public purpose. Adams v. Durham, 189 N. C., 232.”
In Nash v. Monroe, 198 N. C., 306, 151 S. E., 634, it was said {Brogden, J., speaking for the Court) : “Undoubtedly, if the city of Monroe had the money in its treasury, it could purchase equipment for its hospital. Adams v. Durham, 189 N. C., 232.” It was there held that a municipal hospital is not a necessary governmental expense.
In Mewborn v. Kinston, 199 N. C., 72, 154 S. E., 76, we find this language: “The right of the city to use funds on hand for a public purpose is fully sustained by the decisions of this Court. Adams v. Durham, 189 N. C., 232.”
In Burleson v. Board of Aldermen, 200 N. C., 30, 156 S. E., 241, where the application of funds of a town for the maintenance of a hospital, a public purpose but not a necessary expense, was consid*70ered, Connor, J., speaking for tbe Court, uses tbis language: “Under tbe authority of Adams v. Durham, 189 N. C., 232, it may apply for tbat purpose funds already on band in tbe treasury of tbe city or town.”
In Goswick v. Durham, 211 N. C., 687, it was said: “Tbe acquisition of tbe land (for public purpose) from surplus funds was not beyond tbe power of tbe city, and it in no way offended tbe provisions of Art. VII, sec. 7, of tbe Constitution,” citing Adams v. Durham, supra, and Nash v. Monroe, supra.
I concur in tbe view tbat tbe maintenance of an airport may not now be classed as a necessary municipal expense, and tbat, upon tbe facts presented by tbe record in tbis ease and under tbe resolution of tbe city, tbe appropriation of $5,000 from tbe contingent fund of tbe city to tbe airport fund for additional bangar facilities cannot be upheld. To do so would be to open tbe door to appropriations for new and additional construction, and would permit expenditures which would necessarily require tbe levy of taxes indirectly in violation of Art. VII, sec. 7, of tbe Constitution.
Tbe inclusion in tbe budget of a sum to be raised by tbe levy of taxes for tbe maintenance of tbe municipal airport was properly enjoined as in conflict with tbe prohibition contained in tbe above quoted section of tbe State Constitution.