concurring.
I concur in the majority’s holding that the trial court’s judgment must be reversed and a take-nothing judgment rendered against Orandy and Saldana. But I cannot agree with the reasons given by the majority in support of its decision to render the judgment against Orandy. Specifically, I disagree with the majority’s statement that an inference can be gained from the verdict that the jury intended to limit Orandy’s monetary award to damages for loss of use of the minivan.
In my opinion, this Court’s holding should properly be founded on the undisputed evidence showing that Auto Check held a valid worker’s lien claim and thus, had a superior right to possession of the minivan. Accordingly, I would sustain Auto Check’s fifth point of error in which it asserts that neither Orandy or Saldana had the status of a bona fide purchaser for value under the provisions of the worker’s lien statute. Tex. PROP. Code Ann. § 70.001(b) (Vernon Supp.2003). That statute, in pertinent part, provides:
If a worker relinquishes possession of a motor vehicle ... in return for a check, ... on which payment is stopped, has been dishonored because of insufficient funds, ..., the lien provided by this section continues to exist and the worker is entitled to possession of the vehicle, *66... until the amount due is paid, unless the vehicle, ... is possessed by a person who became a bona fide purchaser of the vehicle after a stop payment order was made.
(emphasis added).
I agree with Auto Check that neither Orandy or Saldana could have been a bona fide purchaser within the meaning of this statute, because it is undisputed that the check in question was not dishonored because of a “stop payment” order, but rather because of “insufficient funds” in the payor’s account.
In my opinion, the language in this statute is clear and unambiguous. Obviously, the legislature could have inserted statutory language extending the bona fide purchaser protection to any person whose check was dishonored for insufficient funds. The legislature chose, however, to limit such protection to persons placing a stop payment order with the bank. In this regard, I think the legislature might have recognized that stop payment orders are frequently issued to maintain the status quo pending resolution of a disputed item.
For the reasons stated, I concur in the holding of the majority.