dissent in a memorandum by Kapnick, J., as follows: I respectfully dissent, and would reverse the motion court’s grant of defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
A school owes a duty of care to the students it takes into its custody and control (see Pratt v Robinson, 39 NY2d 554, 560 [1976]), which includes the duty to adequately supervise (Mirand v City of New York, 84 NY2d 44, 49 [1994]). Schools “will be held liable for foreseeable injuries proximately related to the absence of adequate supervision” (id.). As is the case here, when the student is a very young child who cannot defend himself, a greater duty of supervision is owed (see Garcia v City of New York, 222 AD2d 192, 195-196 [1st Dept 1996], lv denied 89 NY2d 808 [1997]). To determine “whether the duty to provide adequate supervision has been breached in the context of injuries caused by the acts of fellow students, it must be established that school authorities had sufficiently specific knowledge or notice of the dangerous conduct which caused injury; that is, that the third-party acts could reasonably have been anticipated” (Mirand, 84 NY2d at 49).
The record here shows that plaintiff had complained to multiple teachers at his school, including the second-grade teacher in whose class the assault took place, that the assailant had been bullying and teasing him. Further, plaintiff testified that his assailant had previously picked on other children and had hit another friend of his. Plaintiffs mother had also complained to school officials about a student picking on her son, and she testified that the student or other students had stolen from the child’s backpack. She also testified that, after the incident, she was told by other teachers and officials that the assailant had bullied and fought with other students.
*834While the majority construes this evidence narrowly, finding that the school was not on notice that the assailant had a proclivity to engage in physical violence towards plaintiff, I disagree, and find that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff as the opponent of summary judgment (see Branham v Loews Orpheum Cinemas, Inc., 8 NY3d 931 [2007]), it cannot be said as a matter of law that the assailant’s dangerous conduct could not have been reasonably anticipated, especially given the conflicting testimony as to whether the assailant had previously engaged in physical violence against other students.
As to proximate causation, I find, contrary to the majority’s opinion, that an issue of fact has been raised as to whether the assault occurred so suddenly that no amount of supervision could have prevented it, given the evidence that the students had been verbally quarreling before the physical altercation and that the teacher had told them to stop arguing (cf. Sanzo v Solvay Union Free School Dist., 299 AD2d 878, 879 [4th Dept 2002]).
Under these circumstances, triable issues of fact exist as to whether the New York City Department of Education failed to adequately supervise the children and whether plaintiff’s injuries were a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the alleged inadequate supervision (see Garcia, 222 AD2d at 195-197; Shante D. v City of New York, 190 AD2d 356, 361-362 [1st Dept 1993], affd 83 NY2d 948 [1994]; see also Wilson v Vestal Cent. School Dist., 34 AD3d 999 [3d Dept 2006]).