after stating the case: This action cannot longer be maintained for the purpose for which it was instituted — to restrain the holding of the election on 23 October, 1917 — because the election has already been held. In Sasser v. Harriss, at this term, which was brought to restrain the holding of a primary election, Brown, J., says: “It appears that the primary election has long since been held, and doubtless the candidates now have been duly elected. Nothing can now be accomplished by setting aside the order of Judge Calvert. If his judgment was reversed, this Court could not now order another primary. The question has thus become merely a moot question, and there is nothing for the judgment of the Court to operate upon.”
Nor can the plaintiff assail the contract between the town of Eeidsville and the utilities company on the ground of fraud, or otherwise, in this action, because there was no contract until it was approved by the voters, which was long after the commencement of the action, and “certainly the principal cause of action must exist in all cases at the time the action began. It would be unjust and absurd to bring a party into court to answer the plaintiff before he had a right to sue. The mere fact that the cause of action is introduced into a pending action cannot alter the ease, because this, in effect, makes the action a new one.” Clendenin v. Turner, 96 N. C., 421.
“While courts are liberal in permitting amendments, such as are germane to a cause of action, it has been frequently held that the Court has no power to convert a pending action that cannot be maintained into a new and different action by the process of amendment. Best v. Kinston, 106 N. C., 205; Merrill v. Merrill, 92 N. C., 657; Clendenin v. Turner, 96 N. C., 416.” Bennett v. R. R., 159 N. C., 345.”
The judgment of the Superior Court dismissing the action must therefore be affirmed in any event, but as other questions of public interest, which ought to be settled, have been discussed, we will consider them, first eliminating extraneous matters alleged in the pleadings, which have no bearing on the legal questions presented by the appeal.
Prominent among these are the allegations of collusion between the mayor and commissioners and the utilities company to defraud the citizens of Eeidsville; that the utilities company is subsidiary to the' Southern Power Company; that the utilities company, the Southern Power Company, and the American Tobacco Company have stockholders in common; that the American Tobacco. Company nominated and elected the defendants, and other allegations of improper influences brought to bear on the defendants, dishonest motives oh their part, and fraud.
These cannot be considered because they are denied by the defendants, and the plaintiffs have not only acquiesced in the finding of Judge Harding “that there is not evidence of any corruption or fraud on the part of *522the defendants in entering into the contract set out in the pleadings, or in calling and ordering an election for the ratification of the contract by the said voting citizens of the town of Reidsville,” but they have also-abandoned the exception taken on the trial to the refusal to permit them to introduce evidence to support the allegations of the complaint, which can only be accounted for on the theory that they conld not prove what they alleged, or, if proven, the facts would not, in their opinion, affect a contract made by the people themselves.
The exception is abandoned because not referred to in the brief. Rule 34.
Recognizing this condition of the record, the plaintiffs rely in their brief on their motion for judgment on the admissions of record, and in the pleadings, which is upon three grounds.
(1) That the purchase price of $30,000, when an offer of $50,000 had been made, is so grossly inadequate as to amount to fraud.
(2) That the election is void because two unrelated propositions were-submitted to the voters on one ballot, the sale of the electric light plant and the granting a franchise to the utilities company.
(3) That the sale is void because not made at public auction. '
There might be room for debate as to the first position of the plaintiffs if the only consideration for the contract was the amount of money to be paid in cash, but this is not so. On the contrary, the defendants considered the advantages to the community of securing hydro-electric power offered by the utilities company, instead of steam power offered by Talbott and his associates, the ability of the respective parties to-perform their contracts, the fact that the utilities company could install additions to the plant within ninety days sufficient to furnish a much needed increase of power, while Talbott and his associates had to organize a corporation to- perform their contract, and could not make the necessary additions in less than twelve months; that the expense of pumping would be less under the utilities contract, and concluded that the contract offered by the utilities company was most advantageous to the citizens and taxpayers of Reidsville.
There is, therefore, no admission that the consideration for the con- ' tract is inadequate, and as we are now dealing with a motion for judgment on the admissions of the parties, this contention of the plaintiffs cannot be sustained.
The principle that unrelated propositions ought not to be submitted to a vote on one ballot, is fully recognized, and it is of the first importance that this principle should be strictly observed as the will of the voter ought not to be coerced, and he ought not to be in the situation where he must vote for a proposition to. which he is opposed in order that he may support one he favors (see Winston v. Bank, 158 N. C., 512; *523Keith v. Lockhart, 171 N. C., 457; Kill v. Lenoir, 176 N. C., 572), but it would seem that the sale of an electric light plant and the grant of a franchise to the purchaser under which it could be operated are parts of one whole, and as closely related as any two questions could be (see Briggs v. Raleigh, 166 N. C., 149), and, if not, the plaintiffs hare admitted “that an election was duly called, at which election there was submitted to the voters of the town of Eeidsville the question as to whether or not the said town, through its commissioners, should make sale of the. electric plant appliances and fixtures of said town to the Southern Public Utilities Company for the sum of $30,000, as provided and set forth in a certain ordinance adopted 11 September, 1917, and the said election so held was confined to this question alone,” thus showing that one and not two propositions were submitted to the voters.
The remaining question involves the power of the town of Eeidsville to sell its light plant at private sale, subject to the approval of the voters, instead of at public auction, and this requires an examination and construction of the following statutes:
Eev., 2978: “By mayor and commissioners at public sale. The mayor and commissioners of any town shall have power at all times to sell at public outcry, after thirty days notice, to the highest bidder, any property, real or personal, belonging to any such town, and apply the proceeds as they may think best.”
Eev., 2916 (6) : “To grant, upon reasonable terms, franchises for .public utilities, such grants not to exceed the period of sixty years, unless renewed at the end of the period granted; also to sell or lease any waterworks, lighting plants, gas or electric, or any other public utility which may be owned by any city or town: Provided, in the event of such sale or lease it shall be approved by a majority of the qualified voters of such city or town, and also to make contracts, for a period not exceeding thirty years, for the supply of light, water, or other public commodity: Provided, this subsection shall not apply to New Hanover and Cumberland counties.”
Oh. 28, Private Laws 1917, see. 1: “That the following provisions of subsection six of section two thousand nine hundred and sixteen of the Eevisal of one thousand nine hundred and five shall not apply to the town of Eeidsville, in Eockingham County, namely: ‘Provided, in the event of such sale or lease it shall be approved by a majority of the qualified voters of such city or town/
“See. 2. That said town of Eeidsville may sell or lease any of its public utilities, such as lighting plants or system mentioned in said subsection : Provided, in the event such' sale or lease, which shall be approved by a majority of the votes cast in any election at which said proposition may be submitted; said election to be held under the same general rules, *524laws, and regulations of elections for town officers in the town of Reids-ville.”
These statutes, relating as they do to the same subject, should be read in connection with each other, as together constituting one law, giving effect to all parts of the statutes if jiossible, and the history of the legislation may be considered in the effort to ascertain the uniform and consistent purpose of the Legislature. 39 Cyc., 1150.
“All statutes are presumed to be enacted by the Legislature with full knowledge of the existing condition of the law, and with reference to it. They are, therefore, to be construed as a part of a general and uniform system of jurisprudence, and their meaning and effect is to be determined :hi connection, not only with the common law and the Constitution, but also in connection with other statutes, on the same'subject, and, under certain circumstances, with statutes on cognate and even different subjects- This rule of construction, however, so far as prior statutes are concerned, is to be restricted to cases where the statute in question is really doubtful; if the statute is clear on its face, prior statutes may not be consulted to create an ambiguity.” 36 Cyc., p. 1146.
Section 2978 of the Revisal, formerly section 3824 of the Code of 1883, requiring a sale at public outcry, was first enacted (ch. 112, Laws 1872-3), and it received authoritative construction in Southport v. Stanley, 125 N. C., 464, as follows:
“The reasonable construction of the statute must be that the town or city authorities can sell any personal property, or sell or lease any real, estate which belongs to the town or city as the surplus of the original acreage ceded for the town or city site, or such land as may have been subsequently acquired or purchased; but in no case can the power be extended to the sale or lease of any real estate, which, by the terms of the act of incorporation, is to be held in trust for the use of the town, or any real estate with or without the buildings on it, which is devoted to the purposes of government, including town or city hall, market houses, houses used for fire departments or for water supply, or' for public squares or parks. To enable the town or city authorities to sell such of the real estate of the town or cities as is mentioned just above, there must be a special act of the General Assembly authorizing such lease or sale.”
The effect of this decision is that property of the city or town, such as parks, markets, city halls, waterworks, lighting plants, etc., held for the use of the public, are not within the provisions of Rev., 2978, and cannot be sold thereunder, and that, if sold at all, additional authority must be conferred by the General Assembly.
If there was any doubt of this being the correct view of the Southport case, it is put at rest by the unanimous opinion of the Court in Church *525v. Dula, 148 N. C., 266, in which. Iiolce, J., speaking for the Court, says : “This view is not affected in any way by the case of Southport v. Stanley, 125 N. C., 464, to which we were referred by plaintiff’s counsel. That decision was to the effect that the general power conferred on the authorities of a town to sell and dispose of town property by section 3824 of the Code of 1883 (Rev., 2978) does not give the right to sell property held in trust for the public; for any such purpose there must be an act of the Legislature conferring special power.”
Under this construction of the statute it became necessary to provide means for selling and leasing property, held for the use of the public, as frequently a sale or lease would be advantageous and would promote the public welfare, and to provide this remedy, section 2916, subsection 6, was enacted, which deals with the property, which the Court said was not embraced in section 2978, and thus understood, the two sections mean .that under section 2978 the mayor and commissioners shall have power to sell at auction any property except that held for a public use, and under section 2916, subsection 6, that they may sell property held for a public use, subject to the approval of the voters.
The two sections are consistent with each other, and in entire harmony. They were enacted at different times, for different purposes, and deal with different classes of property. The General Assembly evidently thought that in the sale of property, not held for a public use, such as a fire engine which had ceased to be of any value to the town on account of changed conditions, it was a sufficient protection to have a sale at public auction, but that when the property belonged to the other class the approval of the voters, the real owners, should be had.
There is no reason for reading into the later section that the sale shall be by public auction, in addition to submitting the question to a vote, and to do so would impose a cumbersome, confusing procedure instead of one that is intelligent and easily understood.
If the position of the plaintiffs should prevail, the governing body of the town or city would have to offer the property at public sale, at which any one could bid, who could comply with the terms of sale, and after the highest bidder is ascertained the whole question would have to be submitted to a vote, while under the other view the governing body can advertise for bids, can consider the needs of the community, the ability to perform for the present and the future, and can present to the voters a mature plan for their approval or disapproval.
The second statute, in our opinion, substitutes a vote of the people as to property held for a public use, for a public sale of other property, and the will of the people having been fairly ascertained, as the plaintiffs admit, and emphatically expressed, as to a sale of their own property there is no reason for setting it aside.
*526If any further authority was needed, it is conferred by chapter 28, section 2, Private Laws 1917, which enacts:
“Sec. 2. That said' town of Reidsville may sell or lease any of its public utilities, such as lighting plants or system mentioned in said subsection: Provided, in the event such sale or lease, which shall be approved by a majority of the votes cast in any election at which said proposition may be submitted; said election to he held under the same general rules, laws, and regulations of elections for town officers in the town of Reidsville.”
There is some confusion in the language, but the intent is clear to give the power to the town of Reidsville to “sell or lease” its lighting plant without other restriction than the apjtroval of the people at the polls, and as the sale has been made, and has been approved by a vote of 392 for the sale, and 68. against it, there is no valid reason for disturbing it.
There is not a scintilla of evidence that the utilities company is seeking to acquire a monopoly, and, on the contrary, it offers in its answer, and renews the offer in this Court, to abandon the contract of purchase.
It has done nothing except to make an offer to purchase the lighting ■ plant for a certain amount of money, and upon certain conditions, which the governing authorities of Reidsville have accepted, and which has been ratified by popular vote on a legal referendum.
We should assume, in the absence of a finding to the contrary, that the mayor and aldermen of Reidsville, elected when the question of a sale of the lighting plant was acutely at issue, have acted in good faith, and that the voters had sufficient intelligence to understand the proposition, which they approved by their vote, and certainly we have no authority to deny to them the right to contract in reference to their own property upon the assumption of superior wisdom and business, ability.
There are allegations of fraud in the complaint, which are denied in the answer, but no evidence to support the allegations has been introduced, and the exception to the refusal to receive such evidence has been abandoned, and is not referred to in the plaintiff’s brief.
It would not, therefore, he just or according to law to base our judgment on unsupported allegations, and to make a part of our permanent records, so serious a reflection on the integrity of the mayor and aider-men of Reidsville as men and public officials without proof.
There can be nothing in the contention that two unrelated questions have been submitted to the voters, because the plaintiffs have agreed, by stipulation filed in the record, that the question of a sale of the lighting jilant was submitted, and that “the election so held was confined to this question alone.”
It is also agreed that the election was “duly called,” and that “the machinery provided for the holding of said election, and the holding thereof, was such as provided by law.”
Affirmed.