Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Debra A. James, J.), entered October 15, 2014, which, to the extent appealed from, denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment declaring that it is not obligated to provide no-fault coverage to defendant Longevity Medical Supply, Inc. in connection with the October 7, 2012 motor vehicle accident, affirmed, without costs.
Plaintiff failed to establish prima facie that it was entitled to deny defendant Longevity Medical Supply, Inc.’s claim because Longevity’s assignor, defendant Estrella, did not appear for independent medical examinations (IMEs) (see Unitrin Advantage Ins. Co. v Bayshore Physical Therapy, PLLC, 82 AD3d 559 [1st Dept 2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 705 [2011] [to meet its prima facie burden on summary judgment, insurer must establish that it requested IMEs in accordance with the procedures and time frames set forth in the No-Fault implementing regulations, and that the patient did not appear]; see also Interboro Ins. Co. v Perez, 112 AD3d 483 [1st Dept 2013]). Here, although plaintiff established that the notices of the scheduled IMEs were properly mailed and that Estrella did not appear, plaintiff failed to show that the scheduling of the IMEs complied with Insurance Department Regulations (11 NYCRR) § 65-3.5 (d), which prescribes a 30-calendar-day time frame for the holding of IMEs (see W.H.O. Acupuncture, P.C. v Travelers Home & Mar. Ins. Co., 36 Misc. 3d 152[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 51707[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2012]; American Tr. Ins. Co. v Jorge, 2014 NY Slip Op 30720[U] [Sup Ct, NY County 2014]).
Contrary to the position taken by the dissent, the issue of whether plaintiff has failed to establish that the notices for the *842IMEs were timely, pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-3.5 (d), presents a question of law which this Court can review. Unlike the dissent, we find that plaintiff was required to submit proof of the timely notice in order to make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Any belated attempt by plaintiff to cure this deficiency in its prima facie showing by submitting evidence for the first time in reply would have been improper (see DiLapi v Saw Mill Riv., LLC, 122 AD3d 896, 900-901 [2d Dept 2014]; Hawthorne v City of New York, 44 AD3d 544 [2007]; Scansarole v Madison Sq. Garden, L.P., 33 AD3d 517 [1st Dept 2006]).
The dissent mistakenly posits that the majority failed to “cite a single authority for supporting [our] position” that plaintiff was required to submit proof of the timely notice for the IMEs in order to make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. In Unitrin Advantage Ins. Co. v Bay shore Physical Therapy, PLLC, we explicitly held that “[p]laintiff satisfied its prima facie burden on summary judgment of establishing that it requested IMEs in accordance with the procedures and time frames set forth in the no-fault implementing regulations, and that defendants’ assignors did not appear” (82 AD3d at 560 [emphasis added]).
Likewise, the dissent points out that “the majority negates the precedential authority of Lucas.” Contrary to the dissent’s assertion, Lucas does not support its position since in Lucas, the defendant did not argue on appeal that the plaintiff failed to satisfy its prima facie burden on summary judgment of establishing that it requested IMEs in accordance with the procedures and time frames set forth in the no-fault implementing regulations. Here, in contrast, the issue of whether plaintiff met its burden of showing compliance with the applicable time frame was fully briefed on appeal.
Also, contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, defendant was not in the best position to determine whether plaintiff complied with the 30-day requirement. As the dissent acknowledges, the 30-day period with which the IME was supposed to be scheduled is measured from the date on which plaintiff received the prescribed verification form from defendant. Yet, no evidénce in affidavit form or any other form has been submitted by plaintiff indicating the date upon which plaintiff received the verification from defendant. Thus, contrary to the dissent’s assertion, it does not “appear! ] from the record that plaintiff in fact may well have complied with the requirement in question.”
Finally, the dissent argues that a plaintiff’s failure to comply with the 30-day time frame for the scheduling of the IME does *843not affect a plaintiff’s right to deny a claim for services rendered to the insured after the date of the IME for which the insured failed to appear. This contention, however, was never raised by plaintiff in its appellate brief and we therefore decline to consider it.
Concur — Renwick, Moskowitz, Richter and Clark, JJ.