concurring: I think the exhaustive opinion of the Court by Justice, Allen demonstrates conclusively that Article Y, section 1, of the State Constitution, establishing an equation between property and poll tax and prescribing a limitation upon the latter, applies only to taxes levied for general purposes by the State and county governments, and does not apply to county taxes levied for a special purpose with the approval of the General Assembly.
It necessarily follows from this construction of the Constitution that the levying of special county taxes is within the sound- discretion of the General Assembly, and may be levied upon property exclusively, or upon both poll and property, as is the case in the act under consideration.
In my opinion, this construction, which has been given to the Constitution by this Court in the several cases cited in the opinion, and by every General Assembly whch has met in this State for the past forty years, is not only the natural meaning and purport of the instrument, but it is that construction which is absolutely essential to the maintenance of our system of county governments and to sustaining their good faith and credit. It has been held that if the poll tax is limited to $2 the property tax must be likewise limited to $2 on $3'00 worth of property. R. R. v. Holden, 63 N. C., 427.
By the express requirement of the Constitution, the poll and property tax are linked together and cannot be divorced, and the former is to be measured by the latter. This is expressly stated by Chief Justice Clark in his opinion in Russell v. Ayer, 120 N. C., 191, who adds: “This provision was inserted in the Constitution of 1868 as a guarantee to the property holders of the State that they would not be oppressed by inordinate taxes laid by representatives elected by newly enfranchised blacks, who had small property to be taxed and whose representatives might otherwise be tempted to levy excessive taxes on property.”
*441If tbe limit of taxation is $2 on tbe poll, tbe same limit must apply to $300 worth of property. If this applies to special taxes for county purposes, as well as general taxes, there can be no special taxes, and it was idle to provide for them, for the General State and county taxes always exhaust the limit. The members of the Convention evidently foresaw that counties must of necessity need large sums of money for the construction of necessary public improvements, such as courthouses, jails, bridges, and roads, and they provided the special taxes to meet such emergencies, and evidently did not intend that the equation and limitation should apply to them, but that the manner of their levy should be left to the sound discretion of the representatives elected by the people to the General Assembly. That is the reason they are termed "special” as distinguished from general taxes.
Relying upon this construction of the Constitution, two-thirds or more of the counties of the State, by legislative authority, have been compelled to levy special taxes in order to pay their current expenses. They have also borrowed millions of dollars with which they have erected courthouses and jails, constructed roads and bridges, and otherwise added to the material wealth and prosperity of their citizens. Purchasers of these bonds in every part of the United States have relied upon the decisions of this Court to protect their investments. If we repudiate this well settled legislative and judicial construction and strike down these special taxes, the counties of the State will have to “go out of business”; their credit will be ruined and that of .the State itself seriously impaired. We may well pause before reaching a conclusion that will inevitably produce such disastrous results.'
The ease of R. R. v. Comrs., 148 N. C., 220, is relied on to support the contention of the plaintiff. There may be some expressions in the opinion that, taken by themselves, have such tendency, but they are mere dicta. The question decided in this case was not presented, because in that case no poll tax was levied — only a property tax that, exceeded the limitation of $2 on $300 worth of property. The statute then under consideration, instead of authorizing a poll tax, forbade it in express terms. The only question decided in that case is that the equation of taxation need not be observed in levying taxes for special purposes — a legislative construction of the Constitution directly in accord with our decision in this case. If the equation need not be observed, why should the limitation ? It is evident from the subsequent writings of Judge Connor, who wrote the opinion in R. R. v. Comrs., that he fully concurs with the majority of this Court. In the Commentaries upon our Constitution he says: “It seems that the proportions and limitations here placed upon taxation apply in all cases of *442State and county taxation, except provisions (1) for the public debt as it existed when the Constitution was adopted, (2) for casual deficits, insurrection and invasion, and (3) for county taxation for special purposes.” Connor and Cheshire on Constitution of North Carolina, page 258.
The case of Perry v. Comrs., 148 N. C., 521, is cited by plaintiffs and strongly relied upon by defendants. In my judgment, it is a direct authority sustaining the opinion of the Court in the case under consideration. It decides that a quasi-municipal corporation may under Article VII, section Y, of the Constitution exceed the limitation on the poll and on property in levying taxes for a “special” purpose when the tax levy has legislative sanction. That section of the Constitution uses the words, “county, city, town, or other municipal corporation,” and declares that a county is on a par with all other municipal corporations. If under that decision a municipal corporation may exceed the limitation on poll and property for a-special purpose, why may not a county do so? I agreed to both of these decisions', and see no reason to change my opinion.
I emphatically deny that this Court is “striking out two provisions from the Constitution,” or amending them. We are but following the construction placed on the Constitution by this Court nearly twenty years ago in Herring v. Dixon, 122 N. C., 420, and in Tate v. Comrs., 122 N. C., 812, in which it was clearly and distinctly held by a unanimous Court that the limitation on the poll and property can be exceeded for a special purpose with the sanction of the Legislature, and that the construction of public roads is a special purpose.. We are but following Crocker v. Moore, 140 N. C., 432, citing the above named cases, and holding that notwithstanding Article V, section 2, which appropriates the State and county poll tax to the purposes of education and support of the poor, a part of the poll tax may be applied to the construction of roads with the permission of the Legislature, as that section of the Constitution does not apply to a poll tax levied for such a “special” purpose. These precedents have been cited and approved by this Court in over a dozen cases cited in the annotated edition, 122 N. C., 815.
The opinions in the three cases above cited not only expressed the well considered judgment of a unanimous Court, but were written by as profound a jurist as Chief Justice Clark. Because their learned author has in recent years seen fit to change his personal views is no reason why those cases should be overruled. I prefer to follow the strong and' convincing reasoning of his former opinions rather than his recent utterance. Judicial decisions should not be lightly set aside. They should be stable and not change with the ebb and flow of every tide.
*443Tbe doctrine of stare decisis is especially applicable to those judgments of tbe Court tbat expound tbe Constitution and give a construction to it wbicb bas been acted upon by tbe State and its counties for many years. Sucb judgments should not be reversed except from overruling necessity.
It is surprising, in view of tbe decisions of this Court, tbat tbe majority should be gravely charged with an attempt to amend tbe State Constitution by judicial decision so as to divert a special poll tax from educational and charitable purposes to tbe construction of public roads. If tbe Constitution needed amending to accomplish tbat result, it bas been done by tbe decisions of this Court in wbicb four of its present members concurred.
In Board of Education v. Comrs., decided in 1904, and concurred in by tbe Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Walker, it was decided in an opinion by Mr. Justice Connor tbat “Poll taxes collected under a special act of tbe General Assembly for highways can not be diverted to schools and tbe support of tbe poor.”
In Crocker v. Moore, supra, decided in 1906, by a unanimous Court, four of whose members are still on it, it was held tbat “The objection to tbe constitutionality of tbe act of 1903, chapter 538, in tbat tbe act applies a part of tbe county capitation tax to tbe use of tbe public, roads in violation of tbe Constitution, Article Y, section 2, wbicb appropriates tbe State and county poll tax to tbe purposes of education and support of tbe poor, cannot be sustained, as tbat provision applies to tbe levy of taxes for general, not special purposes.”
If these decisions do not sustain the conclusion of the majority of this Court in this case, then tbe English language bas failed of its purpose. It bas been said tbat “consistency is a jewel,” and also tbat it is tbe “hobgoblin of weak minds.” I think that in tbe construction of organic law, consistency and stability are important judicial attributes tending greatly to tbe proper administration of tbe State Government.
It may be, as suggested, tbat political agitation will bring about an abolition of the poll tax entirely. Tbat is not a matter for our consideration, and sucb threats have no effect on us. Tbe wisdom of levying a poll tax is for tbe people themselves. Such tax bas been levied in this State from time immemorial, and no one bas stated tbe reasons for levying sucb tax stronger and more lucidly than tbe distinguished Chief Justice of this Court. Russell v. Ayer, supra.
There are thousands of wage earners, artisans, and others in this State who earn fair salaries and wages who have seen fit to acquire but little taxable property. Those persons get tbe full benefit of tbe educational facilities of tbe State and tbe protection and benefits of *444our Government. All that many of them pay for these blessings is a small poll tax of a few dollars per annum. Those persons are not crying out against such taxation. They are not raising a hue and cry against the poll tax. They have too much personal pride and self-respect to desire the benefits of our Government for nothing, and are more than willing to pay the,small tax assessed against them for the benefits they and their children receive.
It should be remembered that we have not decided that the General Assembly must levy a poll, tax in excess of $2 for special purposes. We simply held that under the previous decisions of this Court the General Assembly has the constitutional power to do so in certain instances if it sees fit. It need never levy a poll tax in excess of $2.
It may confine special county taxation to property exclusively. It is a matter within the sound discretion of the Representatives and Senators who come directly every two years from the people. If they can be trusted to levy taxes upon the property of those who elect them, can they not also be trusted not to be oppressive in levying the tax upon the poll? They are directly responsible to the people, and can be trusted to carry out the will of their constituents.
In this case the poll tax was levied by the voters of Alexander County, ■a large majority of whom are liable to poll tax. The same can be said of practically all the counties of the State, with one or two. exceptions, that have voted for special taxes for the construction of good roads and other public improvements. The special poll tax has not been forced on them by the General Assembly, but it has been levied by the votes of those 'citizens who believe in the great benefits accruing to their county from good roads and other public improvements.
I see no reason why this Court should deprive them of that right which they have exercised continuously for nearly forty years. To do so will effectually put a stop to all public improvements in this State. It is very significant that the several actions that have come to this Court involving the validity of the poll tax have not been brought by those who pay the poll tax and but little else, but by property holders who were endeavoring to keep down the taxes on their property by pleading the equation between the property and poll tax.
We have all given this case that careful study and reflection its importance deserves, and I believe that the conclusion reached by the maj’ority is not only in accord with the precedents, but is the construction the framers of the Constitution intended should be placed on it. If I regarded this an open question, I should hold as I now do, for where two. constructions are permissible, I feel bound to. adopt that which in my judgment is absolutely essential to the material prosperity and upbuilding of the State and to the maintenance of its credit.