In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Pastoressa, J.), entered March 24, 2014, as, upon reargument, adhered to a prior determination in an order of the same court dated December 3, 2012, granting that branch of the defendant’s motion which was pursuant to CPLR 501 and 511 to change the venue of the action from Suffolk County to Greene County.
Ordered that the order entered March 24, 2014, is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
On March 19, 2011, the plaintiff sought beginner snowboarding lessons at the defendant’s facility, and signed an “Equipment Rental Form and Release of Liability” that provided, among other things, that “all disputes arising under this contract and/or the use of this equipment and/or the use of the facilities at Hunter Mountain Ski Bowl, shall be litigated exclusively in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Greene, or in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York.” In December 2011, the plaintiff commenced this action in the Supreme Court, Suffolk *1122County, alleging that an instructor employed by the defendant failed to provide him with proper instruction, causing him to sustain injuries while snowboarding at the defendant’s facility. In September 2012, the defendant moved, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 501 and 511 to change the venue of the action from Suffolk County to Greene County.
Upon reargument, the Supreme Court properly adhered to its original determination granting that branch of the defendant’s motion which was pursuant to CPLR 501 and 511 to change the venue of the action from Suffolk County to Greene County. Contrary to the plaintiff’s contentions, the “Equipment Rental Form and Release of Liability” was not an unenforceable contract of adhesion, and enforcement of the forum selection clause contained therein does not contravene public policy (see Molino v Sagamore, 105 AD3d 922, 923 [2013]; KMK Safety Consulting, LLC v Jeffrey M. Brown Assoc., Inc., 72 AD3d 650, 651 [2010]; LSPA Enter., Inc. v Jani-King of N.Y., Inc., 31 AD3d 394, 395 [2006]). Contrary to the plaintiff’s additional contention, the defendant’s motion was timely, inasmuch as it was made within a reasonable time after the commencement of the action (see CPLR 511 [a]; Medina v Gold Crest Care Ctr., Inc., 117 AD3d 633, 634 [2014]; Bonilla v Tishman Interiors Corp., 100 AD3d 673 [2012]).
Leventhal, J.P., Roman, and Hinds-Radix, JJ., concur.