The two questions we are called upon to decide here arise under the motion of the Columbus Discount & Loan Corporation, a defendant, an appellee herein, to dismiss the appeal of Charles E. Robnet and others, plaintiffs, appellants herein, upon the ground the order appealed from is not a final order, and the motion of Robnet and the other plaintiffs, appellants herein, to strike the motion to dismiss from the files as being a sham pleading filed merely for the purposes of delay.
*537Coming to the second question first, we have read the argument of counsel for appellants in which they seek to support their motion to strike from the files the earlier motion of said appellee to dismiss the appeal.
Appellants cite no authority in support of their motion to strike, and it is our opinion that this motion is not well taken and must, therefore, be overruled.
As above stated, the remaining question is whether the motion of the Columbus Discount & Loan Corporation to dismiss the appeal on questions of law filed by the appellants should be sustained.
The petition in this case was filed in the lower court on November 27, 1956, by plaintiffs, Charles E. Robnet and certain others, who brought the suit for themselves and all persons similarly situated. This petition named as defendants, Stanley Miller, four other individuals and three corporations.
At the time of the filing of the petition in the court below, plaintiffs applied for and obtained a temporary restraining order restraining the defendants from taking cognovit judgments or enforcing collection of the notes or transferring or assigning said notes.
Shortly thereafter, defendants moved to dissolve the temporary restraining order, and this came on for hearing before the same judge and was overruled and a temporary injunction was issued.
It is noted that in the prayer of the petition filed on November 27, 1956, and also in the amended petition filed January 25, 1957, the relief sought by the plaintiff incTuded among other things (1) rescission or cancellation of all contracts for freezers so procured by the defendants, Food Fair Budget Plan, Inc., and the National Co-operative Food Service, Inc.; (2) surrender of all cognovit notes in connection with freezer purchase contracts; (3) a restraining order restraining the three defendant corporations from assigning, selling, discounting, negotiating or otherwise disposing of said cognovit notes or from taking cognovit judgment thereon; (4) or otherwise attempting collection upon said notes; (5) reasonable attorney fees and costs; and (6) punitive or exemplary damages in the amount of one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000).
*538Thereafter, a demurrer to the petition was filed. It was based upon an alleged misjoinder of parties plaintiff. Another judge in the court below upheld the demurrer and found that there was a misjoinder of parties plaintiff.
Plaintiffs filed an amended petition. The defendant Co-' lumbus Discount & Loan Corporation filed a motion to dissolve the temporary injunction, and this came on for hearing before a third judge of the court below. The latter sustained it in an order journalized March 1, 1957.
It is from that order that plaintiffs appealed to this court, and a judge of this court has heretofore issued a stay order which later was concurred in by the other two members of the court.
It is upon the foregoing set of facts that this court is asked to pass upon the motion to dismiss filed by defendant Columbus Discount & Loan Corporation, an appellee herein, upon the ground that the order appealed from is not a final order.
Counsel for such defendant cite one case only in support of its motion. It is the case of Roof v. National Surety Corp., 92 Ohio App., 295, 110 N. E. (2d), 159, in which the second paragraph of the syllabus reads as follows:
“2. An order striking from the files a petition which does not state a cause of action is not a final order.”
We have no quarrel with the legal proposition set forth by that case. Unfortunately, it does not dispose of the question now before the court. As above pointed out the prayers of both the original petition and the amended petition seek relief of several kinds. Plaintiffs allege certain fraudulent acts whereby they were induced to enter into contracts, and they now pray for rescission or cancellation of such contracts. They also pray for surrender of certain cognovit notes in connection therewith, for one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) punitive or exemplary damages and, in connection therewith, injunctive relief restraining the defendant corporations from taking steps in connection with the notes, which would in any way prejudice the rights of plaintiffs.
Thus, the question to be determined is whether the dissolving of the restraining order and injunction wa's such a final order as to be appealable. The legislative definition of a final *539order is set forth in Section 2505.02, Revised Code (Section 12223-2, General Code), which as far as pertinent here, is as follows:
“An order affecting a substantial right in an action which in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment, an order affecting a substantial right made in a special proceeding or upon a summary application in an action after judgment, or an order vacating or setting aside a judgment and ordering a new trial is a final order which may be reviewed, affirmed, modified, or reversed, with or without retrial.”
It has been decided by the Supreme Court that an appeal may be prosecuted from an order refusing to dissolve a temporary injunction. In the case of Burke v. Railway Co., 45 Ohio St., 631, 17 N. E., 557, the Supreme Court in a per curiam opinion held as follows:
“An order of the Court of Common Pleas overruling a motion to dissolve an injunction is an order affecting a substantial right made in a special proceeding which may be reviewed on error by the Circuit Court.”
It has also been held that the dissolving of a temporary injunction in an appropriation case may be made the subject of appellate proceedings. In 1888, in the case of Chicago, St. Louis & Pittsburg R. R. Co. v. City of Hamilton, 3 C. C., 455, 2 C. D., 259, it was held in the first paragraph of the syllabus:
“1. An order of the Court of Common Pleas, dissolving a temporary injunction, is reviewable on error before the final disposition of the case in said court.”
At page 457 of the opinion the court says:
“* * * It is an order affecting a substantial right, made in a special proceeding, as much as is an order overruling a motion to dissolve such temporary injunction. It affects the interest of the other party, but that does not alter the principle.”
In the ease of Hersch v. The Home Savings & Loan Co., 59 Ohio App., 145, 17 N. E. (2d), 377, the syllabus is as follows:
“An order dissolving a temporary restraining order, issued to restrain the defendants from evicting the plaintiff from premises in an action wherein the ultimate relief sought is the specific performance of a contract to convey the premises, is a final order from which an appeal may be prosecuted.”
*540(Decided August 16, 1957.)That case contains a review of the development of the law on this subject.
In the ease of Wioland v. Mayflower Motors, Inc., 80 Ohio App., 310, 75 N. E. (2d), 443, the syllabus is as follows:
“An order dissolving a temporary restraining order, which latter order was issued to restrain the defendant from selling a specific article of personal property, the ultimate relief sought being specific performance of a contract to purchase the personal property, is a final order from which an appeal may be prosecuted.”
For the reasons above set forth it appears that the order appealed from is a final order within the meaning of the statute, and the motion to dismiss, therefore, is not well taken and must be overruled.
Motion overruled.
Petree, P. J., and Miller, J., concur.