Quinones v. Olmstead Properties, Inc.

Mazzarelli, J.P.

(dissenting). Plaintiff, an electrician by trade, was injured while painting over graffiti on a billboard that was located inside a fenced-in, vacant lot. The billboard was leased from the property owner by defendant Fuel Outdoor, LLC. Plaintiff was employed by nonparty North Shore Neon Sign Co., Inc. (Neon). The area of the billboard’s apron where the graffiti was located was approximately 12 or 13 feet from the ground. The billboard had no catwalks or guardrails that would permit a worker to safely work on it. Plaintiff testified that he had the following devices available to him when he arrived at the site: a cherry picker attached to the truck he used to gain access to the lot, a 24-foot extension ladder, an 8-foot A-frame ladder, and a safety harness. However, he further testified that none of those devices would permit him to safely perform the work. The cherry picker could reach a height of 85 feet, but plaintiff stated that the area of the billboard he needed to reach, which was fronted by concrete blocks and flood lights, was too far from the place where he could position the basket. He explained that he could not position either ladder close enough to the billboard because of the concrete blocks, and that the only way he could have positioned the extension ladder would have left him above the spot that needed to be painted. Further, there was no other worker with him who could have “footed” the ladder. Finally, plaintiff testified that the safety harness he had was useless because there was no place on the billboard or the structure supporting the billboard to which he could have tied off a safety rope.

*91Plaintiff determined that the only way to perform the job was to climb on top of the concrete blocks to paint the billboard. The blocks had apparently been placed there as a counterweight for the structure holding the billboard. The blocks were approximately 2V2 feet deep, and were stacked so that they reached very close to the base of the billboard apron. Plaintiff began painting the billboard using a roller attached to a five-foot-long stick. After about 10 to 15 minutes, he had made his way from the far right to the center of the billboard, and was then standing on a stack of three concrete blocks. While reaching up to loosen one of the straps holding the image to the billboard frame, so that he could paint underneath it, plaintiff lost his balance and fell backwards to the ground.

Plaintiff testified that he had been trained in fall protection through his union, which sent him to a 10-hour OSHA course, and that he knew to tie off when at risk of a fall. The harness he had that day had a lanyard, and was in good condition. The A-frame and extension ladders in the truck were also in good working order, as was the truck itself.

James Taggart, vice president at Fuel, testified at a deposition that the billboard had been physically constructed by Neon. Neon was also the contractor that changed the copy displayed on the billboard’s sign. Taggart had seen a Neon worker changing the sign’s copy using a boom truck with a cherry picker. The truck had been parked outside the chain link fence, and the worker had performed his work from inside the basket. Taggart received a complaint that the Fuel billboard had been tagged with graffiti, so he contacted Neon to have the sign painted. He stated that he did not have any understanding as to how Neon would paint over the graffiti, he gave Neon no instructions, and he made no evaluation as to whether there was a safe place from which a painter could work.

Plaintiff moved for summary judgment on his claim pursuant to Labor Law § 240 (1). In support he provided an expert affidavit by a certified safety executive. The expert averred that plaintiff was “not provided with Fall Protection which was ‘so constructed, placed and operated as to give proper protection,’ ” such as a proper walkway/catwalk with safety rails, or other passive fall protection system. The expert further averred that, while plaintiff was provided with an active fall protection system, i.e., the harness and lanyard, that device was not appropriate for the situation because there were no designated *92anchorage or tie-off points, and the fall distance was such that plaintiff would have hit the ground before the system engaged. The expert also stated that the cherry picker was not proper protection, because it did not allow plaintiff to properly access the work area, the A-frame ladder could not be used due to the presence of the concrete blocks, and the extension ladder required a second worker to secure the ladder at the bottom.

In opposition, Fuel argued that plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of the accident, since he decided not to use any of the multiple safety devices provided to him. It too provided an affidavit by an expert, a professional engineer, who opined that any of the safety devices available to plaintiff would have prevented his fall. With respect to the safety harness, he stated that

“there were numerous locations on the billboard and its frame where the plaintiff could have tied off, including but not limited to the tubing and piping out of which the billboard frame was constructed, the pieces of kindorf from which the billboard lights were supported and the straps on the face of the billboard.”

Plaintiff submitted a reply affidavit by his expert, who observed that Fuel’s expert did not state precisely what plaintiff should have tied onto, whether the suggested general locations were appropriate, given the free fall distances implicated, and whether, in any event, the proposed tie-off locations were capable of safely supporting plaintiff’s weight.

The motion court granted plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment pursuant to Labor Law § 240 (1), on the grounds that plaintiff was engaged in an elevation-related risk and was injured because of the failure of a safety device. The court found Fuel’s argument that plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of his accident unpersuasive since there was “no evidence in this case to demonstrate that plaintiff was provided with the kinds of safety devices which could be utilized under the particular circumstances facing plaintiff.” Regarding Fuel’s expert’s statement that plaintiff could have tied off on the billboard components, the court observed that there was no proof in the record that the suggested locations were strong enough to support plaintiff.

A plaintiff demonstrates his entitlement to summary judgment on a claim under Labor Law § 240 (1) when he establishes that the statute was violated and that the violation was a *93proximate cause of his injuries (see Blake v Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of N.Y. City, 1 NY3d 280, 289 [2003]). However, if adequate safety devices are provided and the worker either chooses, without justification, not to use them, or misuses them, then the defendant is not liable under section 240 (1) (see Gallagher v New York Post, 14 NY3d 83 [2010]; Robinson v East Med. Ctr., LP, 6 NY3d 550 [2006]; Cahill v Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth., 4 NY3d 35 [2004]).

A safety device need not be inherently defective to be deemed inadequate. So long as the device is not suited to the task at hand, it is not adequate for purposes of Labor Law § 240 (1) (see Felker v Corning Inc., 90 NY2d 219 [1997]). In Felker, the plaintiff, a painter, was provided with a functioning ladder. However, he needed to reach out over a height in order to complete the task of painting an alcove wall. Since the ladder was insufficient to protect the plaintiff from the risk of having to reach out over the alcove, the Court of Appeals found that no device had been provided to protect against that risk (see also Alonzo v Safe Harbors of the Hudson Hous. Dev. Fund Co., Inc., 104 AD3d 446, 449-450 [1st Dept 2013] [plywood cover over hole was inadequate to protect workers from falling through]; Hernandez v Argo Corp., 95 AD3d 782 [1st Dept 2012] [scaffold that required workers to travel across an unguarded gap of three feet was inadequate]).

Here, plaintiff made a prima facie showing that none of the devices furnished to him were adequate to the task at hand. He testified that neither the A-frame ladder nor the extension ladder could have been used due to the presence of the concrete blocks at the base of the sign, and Fuel offered no evidence to the contrary. Fuel’s expert stated in only a bare, conclusory fashion that the ladders were adequate for plaintiff to perform his work. Further, even if, as Fuel argues he should have, plaintiff had called the office to ask for someone to be sent to foot the ladder, the helper would not have constituted an adequate safety device (see McCarthy v Turner Constr., Inc., 52 AD3d 333 [1st Dept 2008]).

Fuel also failed to raise an issue of fact as to whether plaintiff’s failure to use the cherry picker made him the sole proximate cause of the accident. Plaintiff’s testimony that the basket could not have reached the appropriate angle to make the painting feasible was unrebutted by Fuel. To be sure, as the majority points out, Taggart, Fuel’s witness, testified that he had seen, on more than one occasion, a worker changing the *94advertising copy on the billboard from a cherry picker. However, the majority fails to account for the absence of evidence that the cherry picker that was available to plaintiff was the same or similar to the lifts that Taggart saw being used. Moreover, the majority ignores that Fuel did nothing to obviate the likely fact that changing copy is a substantially different task from, and requires different positioning than, painting over a small section of graffiti at the bottom of the billboard apron. Indeed, Taggart testified that he had never seen a worker painting on the billboard face. Further, Fuel’s expert did not explain how plaintiff could have safely employed the cherry picker to reach the section of the billboard where the graffiti was located.

Plaintiff also established prima facie that the safety harness was inadequate because there was nothing that he felt would safely hold the weight of his body if he tied off to it. I disagree with the majority that Fuel’s expert’s barebones statement that “there were numerous locations on the billboard and its frame where the plaintiff could have tied off” created an issue of fact. It was insufficient for the expert to merely itemize the things to which plaintiff could have attached his safety harness. Rather, the expert was required to state, for each of those things, that it had the physical properties necessary to support plaintiff’s weight if he fell, and to set forth the steps that he took on his site visit to reach that conclusion (see Miglionico v Bovis Lend Lease, Inc., 47 AD3d 561, 565 [1st Dept 2008]; Cordeiro v TS Midtown Holdings, LLC, 87 AD3d 904 [1st Dept 2011]). Further, the expert failed to address at all plaintiff’s expert’s opinion that, in any event, the fall distance was such that plaintiff would have hit the ground before the safety harness and rope system engaged.

Because Fuel was required to offer more than the barebones and conclusory statements it submitted as to how the four devices available to plaintiff could have prevented the accident, it failed to raise an issue of fact as to whether plaintiff was the sole proximate cause. Accordingly, I would affirm the grant of partial summary judgment to plaintiff on his claim pursuant to Labor Law § 240 (1).

Sweeny and Saxe, JJ., concur with Andrias, J.; Mazzarelli, J.R, and Richter, J., dissent in an opinion by Mazzarelli, J.P.

*95Order, Supreme Court, New York County, entered November 26, 2013, reversed, on the law, without costs, and the motion denied.