specially concurring:
Until 1986, the subject property was owned by Halove Abram, whose title to the property was recorded. When Abram died in 1986, her sister Chappel Cummings inherited the property. Because Cummings was incompetent, however, Cummings’ daughter Agnes Lee was authorized to act on Cummings’ behalf with respect to the property.3 In 1989, Lee entered into an agreement to sell the property to Alfred Smith, pursuant to which she gave him a warranty deed. Smith did not record this deed.
In 1993, the property was sold at a tax sale to Fitz Corporation, which sold its interest to Loop Mortgage Corporation (Loop). Loop filed a petition for tax deed and notified Cummings, Lee, and Smith of the redemption period. In 1995, Lee entered into a contract to sell the property to Murray Williams. Williams notified Smith that Lee had decided to rescind her contract with Smith. Lee gave Williams power of attorney to act on her behalf with respect to the redemption. As Lee’s agent, Williams redeemed the property before the expiration of the redemption period.
Loop filed a petition to expunge the redemption on the basis that Williams had no right to redeem the property as Lee’s agent because the deed Lee gave to Smith extinguished her interest in the property. Williams responded that the transfer to Smith was invalid because Smith obtained the deed by fraud. After an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court expunged the redemption because it found that Lee had conveyed the property to Smith.
Pursuant to Williams’ appeal, the appellate court reversed the circuit court. The appellate court held that the holder of record title to a piece of property has a right to redeem that property from a tax sale, even without legal or equitable title to the property. According to the appellate court, Lee therefore had the right to redeem the property at issue in this case, and Williams had the power to redeem it on her behalf. Although it upheld the redemption, the appellate court expressly refused to decide the validity of Lee’s transfer to Smith. The court explained that this issue involved a determination separate from that concerning redemption rights and should be addressed in a quiet title action.
The majority affirms the appellate court’s judgment upholding the redemption. However, it rejects the appellate court’s conclusion that Williams was entitled to redeem the property on Lee’s behalf. According to the majority, a party who has record title, but not legal or equitable title, to property sold at a tax sale has an insufficient interest in the property to entitle her to redeem under section 21 — 345 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/21 — 345 (West 1996)). The majority concludes that, because Lee conveyed a warranty deed to the property to Smith, she is not an “owner or person interested” with redemption rights under the Code. Despite its determination that Lee had no right to redeem the property, the majority finds that Williams’ redemption of the property was valid because his agreement to purchase the property from Lee gave him his own redemption rights.
Although I join in the majority’s holding that the redemption of the property in this case was valid, I cannot agree with the majority’s analysis. Contrary to the majority, I believe that, even absent legal or equitable title to a piece of property, the owner of record of that property has an interest sufficient to entitle her to redeem the property from a tax sale. Consequently, Williams’ redemption of the property on Lee’s behalf was proper. In addition, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Williams’ own interest in the property may serve as a basis for upholding the redemption.
I cannot agree with the majority that Lee had no redemption rights as a result of the warranty deed she conveyed to Smith. As an initial matter, the validity of this transfer is in dispute. Throughout these proceedings, Williams has maintained that Smith procured the warranty deed by fraud. The majority fails to address this argument. Instead, the majority assumes the validity of Lee’s transfer to Smith and relies on the warranty deed to support its holding that Lee had no right to redeem the property. As the majority itself recognizes, however: “Tax deed proceedings are not designed, nor are they the appropriate forum, for trying substantial disputes as to title.” 185 Ill. 2d at 437, citing In re Application of Du Page County Collector, 98 Ill. App. 3d 950, 953 (1981). Based on this principle, it is improper for the majority to premise its determination of Lee’s redemption rights on her transfer of the property to Smith when there is a dispute as to the validity of this transfer.
In addition, even assuming the validity of Lee’s conveyance to Smith, I cannot agree with the majority’s holding that she had no right to redeem the property. According to the majority, an owner of record title has no right to redeem a piece of property absent legal or equitable title to that property. This holding is contrary to the plain language of the Property Tax Code and the Illinois Constitution.
Section 21 — 345 of the Property Tax Code provides in relevant part:
“Any redemption shall be presumed to have been made by or on behalf of the owners and persons interested in the property and shall inure to the benefit of the persons having the legal or equitable title to the property redeemed, subject to the right of the person making the redemption to be reimbursed by the persons benefited.” 35 ILCS 200/ 21 — 345 (West 1996).
This language indicates that persons entitled to redeem and persons with the legal or equitable title to the redeemed property are two different groups. It follows that a party may have a redeemable interest in property without legal or equitable title to the property. Similarly, with respect to the constitutional tax redemption provisions, the use of the “ ‘more informal phrase “persons interested in the real estate” rather than a more precise phrase such as “persons having a legal or equitable interest in the real estate” ’ ” indicates that “ ‘strict legal or equitable interests’ ” were not intended. In re Application of County Collector, 49 Ill. App. 3d 1048, 1054 (1977) (holding that an individual who had transferred her interest in property to another for security for the payment of a loan had a redeemable interest), quoting In re Application of the County Treasurer, 16 Ill. App. 3d 385, 390 (1973).
The majority’s holding that an owner of record has no right to redeem absent legal or equitable title to the property is also inconsistent with the manner in which Illinois courts have previously interpreted the redemption laws. Courts in this state have held that, for public policy reasons, the redemption laws should be liberally construed in favor of redemption. See, e.g., Franzen v. Donichy, 9 Ill. 2d 382, 387 (1956); People v. Hess, 7 Ill. 2d 192, 198-99 (1955); In re Application of the County Collector, 265 Ill. App. 3d 485, 492 (1994); Monreal v. Sciortino, 238 Ill. App. 3d 475, 478 (1992). Indeed, this court has previously held that, although a complete stranger to a piece of property has no constitutional or statutory right to redeem that property, a party needs only an “undefined ‘interest’ in the real estate” to be entitled to redeem the property from a tax sale. See Hess, 7 Ill. 2d at 197.
Pursuant to this precedent and the express language of the Property Tax Code and Constitution, therefore, the fact that Lee may not have had legal or equitable title to the subject property is not determinative of her redemption rights. So long as she had an “undefined interest” in the property, she had a right to redeem it. Given that the redemption laws are to be construed in favor of redemptions, I cannot conclude, as the majority does, that Lee’s status as the owner of record of the property did not give her at least an “undefined interest” in the property. Unlike the majority, I would hold that Lee was entitled to redeem the property and that Williams properly redeemed it on her behalf.
My disagreement with the majority also extends to its decision to uphold the redemption based on Williams’ own redemption rights. In my view, it is inconsistent to reject Lee’s right to redeem on the basis that she had no interest in the property, yet find that Williams does have redemption rights based on a contract to purchase the property from Lee. In addition, given that Williams was acting as Lee’s agent when he redeemed the property, I question the propriety of upholding the redemption based on any interest he may have had in the property himself. Because Williams redeemed the property on Lee’s behalf, the validity of his redemption should depend on Lee’s right to redeem, not on any independent right of redemption Williams may have possessed. Significantly, in his brief before this court, Williams argues that the redemption was proper because of Lee’s interest in the property, and he does not argue that he himself had a right to redeem the property.
For these reasons, I cannot join in the majority’s opinion.
JUSTICES BILANDIC and NICKELS join in this special concurrence.
To avoid complicating the discussion in this case, I will, like the majority, refer to Lee as if she were the owner of record in this case. Although she is in fact the representative of the heir (Cummings) to the owner of record (Abram), there is no dispute as to Cummings’ ownership of Abram’s interest in the property or as to Lee’s authority to act on Cummings’ behalf (see People v. Hess, 7 Ill. 2d 192, 199 (1955)).