delivered the opinion of the court:
The defendant, Veronica Fuller, was charged in the circuit court of Kane County with filing a false report of a vehicle theft, a violation of section 4 — 103(a)(6) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/4 — 103(a)(6) (West 1996)). Before trial, defendant moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that the potential penalty for that offense, a Class 2 felony (625 ILCS 5/4 — 103(b) (West 1996)), was “unconstitutional as applied to the defendant under the facts of this case.” The trial judge agreed with the defendant and dismissed the charge. The State appealed that ruling to the appellate court (145 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)), which, on its own motion, later transferred the cause to this court pursuant to Supreme Court Rules 365 and 603 (155 Ill. 2d R. 365; 134 Ill. 2d R. 603). We now reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand the cause to that court for further proceedings.
The following facts are not in dispute here. On June 12, 1996, at approximately 3:20 a.m., defendant called the Carpentersville police to report that her former husband, Edward Fuller, had stolen her car. Edward was soon apprehended with the car and was arrested. At 5:30 that morning, defendant gave a written statement to the police in which she described the events surrounding the theft of her car. According to the statement, Edward came to defendant’s home at approximately 3:15 a.m., entering through the front door. An order of protection had been issued against Edward, and defendant told him to leave before she called the police. Instead of leaving, however, Edward asked defendant whether he could use her car. Defendant said that he could not. Edward then requested money from the defendant, who replied that she had no money to give him. According to defendant’s statement, Edward then took some money from defendant’s purse, grabbed the car keys, and left, saying that he would return the car in 45 minutes. After Edward drove away, defendant called the police. Defendant concluded her statement by noting that after she called the police, an officer came to her home and had defendant sign a complaint against Edward.
Charges were eventually brought against Edward, and an investigator for the public defender’s office, which was representing Edward, later interviewed the defendant about the preceding events. In a report dated April 8, 1997, the investigator said that, during the interview, the defendant told him that she had lied to the police about Edward’s stealing her car. According to the investigator’s report, the defendant “stated that she has gone to the police station on numerous occasions to make complaints about Edward that were not true. [Defendant] stated that the reason she would report this false information was because she would get mad at Edward for various reasons and file false complaints against him to get back at him.” The investigator’s report further explained that the defendant reviewed her statement to the police from June 12, 1996, and told the investigator that “what was written in the statement was not true and that Edward never came to her apartment without permission and that Edward never took her car without permission.” According to the investigator’s report, the defendant now “simply wanted to tell the truth because it is not fair for Edward to be in jail for something that he did not do.”
In June 1997, defendant was charged by indictment with filing a false report of a vehicle theft, a violation of section 4—103(a)(6) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/4 — 103(a)(6) (West 1996)). Section 4 — 103(a)(6) provides that it is unlawful for “[a] person to knowingly make a false report of the theft or conversion of a vehicle to any police officer of the State.” The offense is a Class 2 felony (625 ILCS 5/4—103(b) (West 1996)), punishable by three to seven years’ imprisonment (730 ILCS 5/5—8—1(a)(5) (West 1996)) and, at the time relevant here, by a fine up to $10,000 (730 ILCS 5/5—9—1(a)(1) (West 1996)). As an alternative to incarceration, a period of probation may be imposed for the offense. 730 ILCS 5/5—5—3(c)(2) (West 1996).
The defendant later moved to dismiss the charge. In her motion, the defendant noted that under the disorderly conduct statute, section 26—1(a)(4) of the Criminal Code of 1961, it is a crime to knowingly make a false report to a police officer that “an offense has been committed.” 720 ILCS 5/26—1(a)(4) (West 1996). At that time, a violation of section 26—1(a)(4) was a Class B misdemeanor (720 ILCS 5/26—1(b) (West 1996)), punishable by a term of imprisonment of up to six months (730 ILCS 5/5—8—3(a)(2) (West 1996)). We note that the penalty for the offense has since been elevated, and it is now a Class 4 felony. See Pub. Act 90—456, eff. January 1, 1998, codified at 720 ILCS 5/26—1(a)(4) (West 1997 Supp.). In the motion to dismiss, the defendant asserted that “a person who makes a false report of a murder, rape, or of an armed hostage situation commits a Class B misdemeanor, while an angry wife who claims that her husband took her car without her permission faces the penalty of a Class 2 felony.” The defendant argued that subjecting her to the penalty of a Class 2 felony, under the circumstances shown here, would violate her rights to due process and equal protection and, in addition, would violate the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11). The defendant asked the circuit judge to declare section 4 — 103(a)(6) unconstitutional “as applied to the defendant in this case.”
During the hearing on the dismissal motion, defense counsel tendered to the court the statement the defendant had originally given to the police and the investigator’s report discussed above. Defense counsel also stipulated that the defendant made a false report of a vehicle theft. In argument before the court, counsel noted that the defendant had been charged in another case with disorderly conduct for having falsely accused her former husband of rape; counsel observed that the potential punishment for that offense was less than the potential punishment for the present charge.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial judge stated:
“All right. Based upon the stipulations and case law, I am going to grant the motion to dismiss. I am sure the Appellate Court will give us a well-reasoned opinion.”
The court also entered a written order, which provided, in its entirety:
“This case coming on to be heard for Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss based on disproportionate penalties, the court having heard argument, the defendant’s motion is granted.”
The State appealed the circuit court’s ruling to the appellate court. 145 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1). After the parties had filed their briefs, the appellate court entered an order transferring the cause to this court. The order stated:
“On the court’s own motion, the appeal in General No. 2—97—1261 is hereby transferred to the Illinois Supreme Court pursuant to Supreme Court Rules 365 and 603.
Where, as here, the trial court rules that statutory penalties violate the proportionate penalties provision, the appeal is taken directly to the Supreme Court under Rule 603. See, e.g., People v. Davis, 177 Ill. 2d 495, 497-98 (1997); People v. Lewis, 175 Ill. 2d 412, 414 (1996); People v. Miller, 171 Ill. 2d 330, 331 (1996). This is true even where the trial court’s ruling employs an ‘as applied’ analysis. See Miller, 171 Ill. 2d at 331-33; see also People v. Shephard, 152 Ill. 2d 489, 493 (1992).
The clerk of the court is directed to transmit to our supreme court the record on appeal, the briefs, all other papers filed in this appeal, and this order of transfer.”
We permitted the parties’ appellate briefs to stand as their briefs before this court.
I
At the outset, we consider on our own motion our jurisdiction over the present appeal. Although the parties have not raised any question regarding this court’s jurisdiction, it is appropriate that we consider the issue, given our independent duty as a reviewing court to consider our appellate jurisdiction. Franson v. Micelli, 172 Ill. 2d 352, 355 (1996); Ferguson v. Riverside Medical Center, 111 Ill. 2d 436, 440 (1985); Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Barth, 103 Ill. 2d 536, 539 (1984).
The appellate court concluded that jurisdiction properly lies in this court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 603 and, on that basis, transferred the cause according to Supreme Court Rule 365 (155 Ill. 2d R. 365 (authorizing courts of review to transfer cases that have been appealed to the wrong court)). Rule 603 provides that “[ajppeals in criminal cases in which a statute of the United States or of this State has been held invalid *** shall lie directly to the Supreme Court as a matter of right.” 134 Ill. 2d R. 603. Thus, we will assume jurisdiction over the present appeal only if the circuit judge held the statute involved here, section 4 — 103(a)(6) of the Vehicle Code, “invalid” as required by Rule 603.
The phrase “held invalid,” found in Rule 603, also appears in Supreme Court Rule 302(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 302(a)). See 134 Ill. 2d R. 603, Committee Comments, at 395 (noting that the provision in Rule 603 for direct appeal to the supreme court when a statute is held invalid is “the same provision” that appears in Rule 302). Rule 302(a) applies in civil cases and provides, in pertinent part, that “[ajppeals from final judgments of circuit courts shall be taken directly to the Supreme Court (1) in cases in which a statute of the United States or of this State has been held invalid.” 134 Ill. 2d R. 302(a). Because the two rules are similar in scope, effect, and purpose, we believe that case law interpreting Rule 302(a) is also pertinent in this criminal appeal.
In Rehg v. Illinois Department of Revenue, 152 Ill. 2d 504 (1992), overruled in part on other grounds, Wilson v. Department of Revenue, 169 Ill. 2d 306 (1996), this court drew a distinction, for jurisdictional purposes, between a circuit court order that holds that a statute is incapable of any constitutional application and, hence, is invalid “on its face,” and an order that holds that a statute is unconstitutional “as applied” in a particular case. Rehg held that, under Rule 302(a), this court has no jurisdiction over a circuit court order that merely holds a statute unconstitutional “as applied.” Such an order, Rehg explained, “does not declare a statute unconstitutional; it simply declares that application of that statute would violate a particular defendant’s constitutional rights. An appeal from such an order is properly brought in the appellate court pursuant to Rule 301 (134 Ill. 2d R. 301).” Rehg, 152 Ill. 2d at 508-09.
Later, in In re Marriage of Lappe, 176 Ill. 2d 414 (1997), this court held that, even in an “as applied” case, jurisdiction may be proper under Rule 302(a) if the circuit court “in effect” holds a statute unconstitutional with respect to an identifiable category or group of individuals. Lappe, 176 Ill. 2d at 420-22; see also Lumpkin v. Cassidy, 184 Ill. 2d 116 (1998). By determining that jurisdiction may be found in “as applied” rulings that effectively embrace more than an individual litigant, Lappe substantially qualified the holding of Rehg. After Lappe, the “as applied” rule of Rehg would apparently preclude direct review under Rule 302(a) only when the scope or effect of the circuit court order is truly limited to a single litigant.
In the present case, the trial judge ruled that the statute challenged here, section 4—103(a)(6) of the Vehicle Code, was unconstitutional “as applied” to this defendant. Because the record in this case is relatively meager, and the judge below made the ruling without much elaboration, there is some difficulty in identifying what, if any, category of persons would be affected by the ruling. There is no clear category of persons affected by this ruling, unless it consists of persons who falsely report vehicle thefts in retaliation against the supposed thieves. Thus, the facts of this case do not easily fall within the rationale of Lappe. Consequently, under Rehg, this court would not have jurisdiction to consider the State’s appeal.
Lappe substantially undermined the logic and rationale of Rehg, and we now conclude that Rehg, as modified by Lappe, no longer provides an effective means of determining this court’s jurisdiction under Rule 302(a) or Rule 603. We see no principled reason to deny a direct appeal from the circuit court to this court when the “as applied” ruling affects a single defendant, as Rehg would require, but to allow a direct appeal when the “as applied” ruling affects only a small or indeterminate number of persons, as Lappe permits (see, e.g., Lumpkin, 184 Ill. 2d 116). Accordingly, to the extent that Rehg would preclude our assumption of jurisdiction in this case, that decision is overruled.
II
As a preliminary matter, we note the presumption of validity that attaches to legislation, including enactments that define offenses and prescribe penalties. People v. Dunigan, 165 Ill. 2d 235, 244 (1995). A party who is challenging the constitutionality of a statute has the burden of establishing its invalidity. People v. Burpo, 164 Ill. 2d 261, 264 (1995). Accordingly, “[i]t is a court’s duty to construe a statute so as to affirm the statute’s constitutionality and validity, if reasonably possible.” People v. Shephard, 152 Ill. 2d 489, 499 (1992).
In support of the trial court’s ruling, the defendant argues that, under the facts of this case, imposing the penalty of a Class 2 felony for falsely reporting a vehicle theft would violate article I, section 11, of the Illinois Constitution. Commonly referred to as the proportionate penalties clause, section 11 of article I provides, in pertinent part, “All penalties shall be determined *** according to the seriousness of the offense ***.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11.
This court has explained that review under the proportionate penalties clause may take three different forms:
“First, the proportionate penalties clause is violated where the punishment for a particular offense is cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community. [Citations.] Second, the proportionate penalties clause is violated where similar offenses are compared and conduct that creates a less serious threat to the public health and safety is punished more harshly. [Citations.] Third, the proportionate penalties clause is violated where identical offenses are given different sentences. [Citations.]” People v. Davis, 177 Ill. 2d 495, 503-04 (1977).
See also People v. Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d 462 (1998).
The defendant contends that the Class 2 felony penalty for the charged offense is, in the circumstances shown here, disproportionate under the first and second forms of analysis listed above; she makes no claim under the third form of analysis that the charged offense is identical with another offense that carries a less severe sanction.
The defendant’s contention that a Class 2 felony penalty is disproportionate under the first form of proportionality review need not detain us long. This court has previously explained that “the constitutional command that ‘penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense’ would justify interference with the legislative judgment only if the punishment was ‘cruel,’ ‘degrading’ or ‘so wholly disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of the community.’” People v. Gonzales, 25 Ill. 2d 235, 240 (1962), quoting People ex rel. Bradley v. Illinois State Reformatory, 148 Ill. 413, 421 (1894). The false report made in the present case subjected an innocent person to the uncertainty and expense of being erroneously accused of a serious crime, and we cannot say that classification of the defendant’s offense as a Class 2 felony is disproportionate to the conduct involved. See People v. Farmer, 165 Ill. 2d 194, 210 (1995) (upholding sentencing provisions imposing felony penalties for possession of contraband in penal institution); cf. People v. Morris, 136 Ill. 2d 157, 167-68 (1990) (Class 2 felony penalty for knowingly possessing an altered temporary registration permit for a vehicle one owns held disproportionate, in part because alteration did not affect any third party).
We next consider whether the classification of the defendant’s offense as a Class 2 felony is disproportionate under the second form of analysis listed above, involving a comparison of the charged offense with similar, but not identical, offenses. The offenses to which the defendant would compare the present charge are found in the disorderly conduct statute, section 26—1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/26—1 (West 1996)). In support of this contention, the defendant argues that several offenses found in the disorderly conduct provisions are more serious than her offense of falsely reporting a vehicle theft, but that the penalty for each of those offenses is less onerous than the Class 2 felony penalty for the present offense. For example, the defendant cites section 26—1(a)(4), which prohibits knowingly making a false report to a police officer that “an offense has been committed.” 720 ILCS 5/26—1(a)(4) (West 1996). A violation of section 26—1(a)(4) was, at the time relevant here, a Class B misdemeanor (720 ILCS 5/26—1(b) (West 1996)); we note that the legislature has since reclassified the offense, making it a Class 4 felony. According to the defendant, if she had falsely reported to the police that someone had committed a murder, rape, arson, or other crime more serious than stealing an automobile, she would have faced only the penalty for a Class B misdemeanor, rather than that for a Class 2 felony. The defendant also cites the offense of knowingly reporting a false bomb threat, classified under the disorderly conduct statute as a Class 4 felony (720 ILCS 5/26—1(a)(3), (b) (West 1996)). The defendant contends that the punishment that may be imposed for the offense charged here violates the proportionate penalties clause because, when compared with the preceding offenses in the disorderly conduct statute, the present charge imposes a more severe penalty on conduct that creates a less serious risk to public health and safety. We do not agree that the present statute violates the proportionate penalties clause.
This court has previously explained that, before different offenses and their penalties may properly be evaluated under comparative proportionality review, it must first be shown that the statutory purposes of the offenses are similar or related. Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d at 475-76; Davis, 177 Ill. 2d at 506. This preliminary examination of statutory purposes is designed to afford proper deference to the legislature’s constitutional role in determining penalties for criminal conduct. “By declining to compare the penalties of offenses with distinct purposes, we avoid making unnecessary subjective judgments as to the seriousness of offenses or the severity of penalties, thereby minimizing the risk of violating separation of powers principles.” Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d at 480. Necessarily, our focus here is on the legislature’s purpose in its classification of the challenged offense, rather than on the individual offender’s motive in his or her commission of the underlying misconduct.
In the case at bar, the defendant seeks to compare, for purposes of proportionality review, the offenses of falsely reporting a vehicle theft and disorderly conduct. We believe, however, that these crimes have distinct and unrelated statutory purposes and that a comparative proportionality analysis is therefore not appropriate.
The false report of a vehicle theft statute is located in the portion of the Illinois Vehicle Code relating to antitheft laws. 625 ILCS 5/4—100 through 4—109 (West 1996). Grouped under this broad rubric are a number of offenses involving motor vehicles, including possession of a stolen vehicle (625 ILCS 5/4—103(a)(1) (West 1996)), alteration of a vehicle identification number (625 ILCS 5/4—103(a)(2) (West 1996)), and vehicle theft conspiracy (625 ILCS 5/4—103.1 (West 1996)), as well as offenses relating to possession of title and registration (625 ILCS 5/4—104 (West 1996); see People v. Tolliver, 147 Ill. 2d 397 (1992)). This court has held that the antitheft provisions of the Vehicle Code serve several functions, including protecting “ ‘automobile owners against theft’ ” and protecting “ ‘the general public against the commission of crimes involving stolen automobiles.’” People v. Morris, 136 Ill. 2d 157, 162 (1990), quoting People v. One 1979 Pontiac Grand Prix Automobile, 89 Ill. 2d 506, 510 (1982). This court has also observed that the antitheft provisions seek to prevent “fraudulent conduct involving vehicles” as well as “theft-related, ‘chop-shop’ or organized criminal activity.” People v. Johns, 153 Ill. 2d 436, 444, 446 (1992). It is apparent that the offense charged here, falsely reporting a vehicle theft, falls within the broad purposes of the Vehicle Code’s antitheft measures.
In contrast to the antitheft provisions of the Vehicle Code, the disorderly conduct statute is not concerned with motor vehicle theft or other criminal activities involving stolen vehicles. Instead, the disorderly conduct statute is intended to prevent activities performed in an unreasonable manner that “ ‘ “would tend to disturb, alarm or provoke others. The emphasis is on the unreasonableness of the conduct and its tendency to disturb.”’” In re B.C., 176 Ill. 2d 536, 548 (1997), quoting People v. Raby, 40 Ill. 2d 392, 397 (1968), quoting Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 38, par. 26—1, Committee Comments—1961 (Smith-Hurd).
It should be clear from the preceding discussion that the purposes of the two statutes the defendant seeks to compare are distinct and unrelated. The disorderly conduct statute has as its primary goal the protection of the right “not to be molested or harassed, either mentally or physically, without justification.” 720 ILCS Ann. 5/26—1, Committee Comments —1961, at 337 (Smith-Hurd 1993). In contrast, the false report of a vehicle theft statute is one of a group of provisions that are broadly designed to reduce fraud or criminal activity involving motor vehicles. Because the purposes of these provisions are distinct, “we presume that the legislature considered different factors in establishing the penalties for these offenses and defer to its judgment in doing so.” Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d at 480. For these reasons, we conclude that comparative proportionality review of disorderly conduct and falsely reporting a vehicle theft is not warranted.
Ill
The defendant makes the alternative argument that, under the facts of this case, prosecuting her for a Class 2 felony for falsely reporting a vehicle theft violates the due process clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2). Citing People v. Morris, 136 Ill. 2d 157 (1990), the defendant contends that, in the circumstances present here, the classification of the offense as a Class 2 felony does not bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest and thus violates her right to substantive due process.
The legislature’s power to establish criminal penalties, while broad, is subject to the limitation that a person’s liberty may not be deprived without due process of law. People v. Johns, 153 Ill. 2d 436, 444 (1992). “This court has interpreted the due process guarantee of section 2 to require that penalty provisions be reasonably designed to remedy the particular evil which the legislature has selected for treatment under the statute in question.” People v. Steppan, 105 Ill. 2d 310, 319 (1985). The focus of this inquiry is “on the purposes and objectives of the enactment in question.” Johns, 153 Ill. 2d at 445. Because the statute at issue in this appeal does not involve a fundamental right, it “will be upheld if it bears a rational relation to a legitimate legislative purpose and is neither arbitrary, nor discriminatory.” People v. Hamm, 149 Ill. 2d 201, 216 (1992).
In support of the present argument, the defendant relies primarily on People v. Morris, 136 Ill. 2d 157 (1990). In Morris, the defendant was convicted of knowingly possessing an altered temporary registration permit, a violation of section 4—104(a)(3) of the Illinois Vehicle Code and a Class 2 felony (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95½, pars. 4—104(a)(3), (b)(2)). The defendant in that case had altered the expiration date on the licensed-applied-for sticker on his vehicle. In a post-judgment motion, the defendant argued that, as applied to the facts in his case, classification of the offense as a Class 2 felony violated due process and the proportionate penalties clause. The trial judge agreed with the defendant and granted the motion. On direct review, this court noted that the offense of knowingly possessing an altered temporary registration permit was part of the antitheft provisions of the Vehicle Code, whose purpose “ ‘is to protect automobile owners against theft and to protect the general public against the commission of crimes involving stolen automobiles.’” Morris, 136 Ill. 2d at 162, quoting People v. One 1979 Pontiac Grand Prix Automobile, 89 Ill. 2d 506, 510 (1982). Morris observed that the vehicle involved was the defendant’s own, and that no evidence showed that the defendant’s conduct had “contributed in any way to any vehicle theft-related crime.” Morris, 136 Ill. 2d at 162. The Morris court concluded:
“A Class 2 penalty for a person who alters a temporary registration permit for a vehicle which he or she owns or to which he or she is legally entitled is not reasonably designed to protect automobile owners against theft, nor is it reasonably designed to protect the general public against the commission of crimes involving stolen motor vehicles. Such a penalty is violative of the due process clause of our constitution, and may not stand.” Morris, 136 Ill. 2d at 162.
A similar result was reached in People v. Hamm, 149 Ill. 2d 201 (1992). The defendants in Hamm were charged with a number of offenses, including failing to have a license tag properly affixed to a fishing device and failing to have a fishing license in their possession and available for immediate inspection while fishing. Because the defendants were involved in commercial fishing, and because they caught over $300 worth of fish, those two offenses were elevated to Class 3 felonies under section 2.4 of the Fish Code of 1971 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 56, par. 2.4(a)). The defendants filed motions to dismiss the felony charges, arguing that section 2.4 was unconstitutional on a number of grounds. The trial judge granted the defendants’ motions, and a direct appeal to this court followed.
Addressing the defendants’ due process challenge to section 2.4, this court observed that the purpose of section 2.4 was “to prevent the illegal widespread destruction of natural resources,” including “the illegal taking of great amounts of fish from Illinois waters.” Hamm, 149 Ill. 2d at 217-18. This court further noted that, to deter and punish conduct that assisted or resulted in the illegal widespread destruction of natural resources, the legislature had elevated certain minor offenses to Class 3 felonies when the offenses were committed during commercial fishing and when over $300 worth of fish was taken. The court concluded that failing to have a license tag on a net and failing to have a license in one’s immediate possession while fishing did not “assist[ ] or result[ ] in the illegal widespread destruction of the State’s resources.” Hamm, 149 Ill. 2d at 218. The court stated:
“We conclude that a Class 3 felony penalty for a person otherwise legally commercially fishing and taking over $300 worth of fish, but who fails to have a tag on his net as proof that the net is licensed, or fails to have in his immediate possession his fishing license to prove he is licensed, is not reasonably designed to protect the citizens of Illinois from depleting our natural resources. Such a penalty violates the due process clause of the Illinois Constitution and cannot stand.” Hamm, 149 Ill. 2d at 218.
The defendant contends that a similar result must obtain here. We believe that the present matter is fundamentally different from Hamm and Morris, cases in which this court found the classification of certain offenses to violate due process. In Hamm, the defendants simply failed to have with them evidence of their compliance with certain requirements of the Fish Code; their underlying conduct, with respect to the offenses found unconstitutional, was not illegal. See Hamm, 149 Ill. 2d at 217-18. In Morris, the defendant had altered his own license-applied-for sticker. In both cases, the prohibited offenses were essentially victimless crimes. Here, in contrast, the defendant’s false report did claim a victim: her former husband, who undoubtedly suffered some harm in having been falsely accused of auto theft.
The defendant emphasizes, however, that her conduct in the present case was intended only to harass her former husband, and that her actions did not implicate the purposes that underlie the Vehicle Code’s antitheft measures. According to the defendant, imposing the penalty of a Class 2 felony in these circumstances does nothing to advance the state’s interest in combating fraudulent conduct or other criminal activity involving stolen vehicles.
We are unable to conclude that application of that provision in the circumstances shown here violates the defendant’s right to due process under article I, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution. In People v. Hickman, 163 Ill. 2d 250 (1994), this court described the deference normally paid to legislative determinations of this nature. The court explained:
“Our constitution empowers the legislature to declare and define criminal conduct and to determine the type and extent of punishment for it. The legislature, as an institution, is more aware than the courts of the evils confronting our society and, therefore, is more capable of gauging the seriousness of various offenses. Accordingly, although [the due process and proportionate penalties clauses] of our constitution’s bill of rights restrain somewhat the powers of the legislature to establish criminal penalties, courts are reluctant to invalidate penalties that the legislature has prescribed. [Citation.]” Hickman, 163 Ill. 2d at 259.
We agree with the State that the defendant’s reasons for filing the false report may be relevant to the determination of the particular sentence she might receive for her misconduct, but that her motives do not render the classification of her offense unconstitutional as applied to her. As we noted earlier, in discussing the defendant’s argument under the first form of proportionality review— whether the punishment for the crime is “cruel, degrading, or so wrongly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community” (People v. Davis, 177 Ill. 2d 495, 503 (1997))—the defendant’s actions exposed an innocent person to the uncertainty and expense that will result from being falsely accused of a crime. We do not believe that the defendant’s motives for making that false accusation invalidate the legislature’s determination that her offense may be categorized as a Class 2 felony.
* :}:
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County is reversed, and the cause is remanded to that court for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.