concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in the majority’s holding that the condition of probation barring J.W. from going to South Elgin fails to conform strictly to the requirements of the statute and is an overly broad and unconstitutional condition of probation. Although I agree with the majority that adjudicated juvenile delinquent sex offenders are required to register as sex offenders, I respectfully dissent in part because I disagree with the majority’s interpretation of the Illinois Sex Offender Registration Act (Registration Act) (730 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 2000)) as requiring J.W to register as a sexual predator for the rest of his life. Moreover, I believe that an interpretation requiring a 12-year-old child to register as a sexual predator for the rest of his natural life offends principles of substantive due process. Finally, I dissent because of the majority’s unnecessary factual description of the sexual conduct between J.W and the minor victims.
The primary purpose of statutory construction is to determine and give effect to the legislature’s intent, while presuming the legislature did not intend to create absurd, inconvenient, or unjust results. In re D.D., 196 Ill. 2d 405, 418-19 (2001). The best indication of legislative intent is the language of the statute. In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (2000). If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to other aids of construction. D.L., 191 Ill. 2d at 9. A statute is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation. In re B.C., 176 Ill. 2d 536, 543 (1997). In ascertaining legislative intent, it is proper to compare statutes that concern the same subject matter and to consider statutes on related subjects. See Anderson v. City of Park Ridge, 396 Ill. 235, 244 (1947).
The parties disagree on the interpretation of the Registration Act as applied to juvenile sex offenders and acknowledge that the Registration Act is subject to differing reasonable interpretations. A statute is ambiguous when it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more different senses. People v. Jameson, 162 Ill. 2d 282, 288 (1994). Here, the Registration Act is clearly subject to more than one reasonable interpretation and is thus ambiguous. See B.C., 176 Ill. 2d at 543 (a statute is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation). Accordingly, we must employ aids of statutory construction to determine legislative intent, while avoiding absurd, inconvenient, or unjust results. See D.D., 196 Ill. 2d at 418-19.
The legislature created two categories of sex offenders. Section 2(A) of the Registration Act defines a “sex offender” and section 2(E) defines a “sexual predator.” Section 2(A — 5) defines “juvenile sex offender.” An adjudicated juvenile delinquent sex offender is a specific type of sex offender. In fact, the recent amendments to the Registration Act deleting the “juvenile sex offender” definition from section 2(A — 5) and adding a subsection (5) to section 2(A) supports the inference that the legislature intended adjudicated juvenile delinquent sex offenders to be a specific category of sex offender. See Pub. Act 92 — 828, eff. August 22, 2002 (amending 730 ILCS 150/2, 3, 4, 5, 5 — 5, 6, 7, 8 — 5, 10 (West 2000)).
Nonetheless, I agree with the majority that J.W falls within the definition of a “sex offender” because he was adjudicated a juvenile delinquent as a result of committing aggravated criminal sexual assault, an offense specified in section 2(B) of the Registration Act. I disagree, however, with the majority that a juvenile sex offender can be classified as a “sexual predator.”
A reading of section 2(A — 5) of the Registration Act and section 105 of the Sex Offender and Child Murderer Community Notification Law (Notification Law), together with section 2(E) of the Registration Act, makes it clear that a “juvenile sex offender” cannot be classified as a sexual predator. Both sections 2(A — 5) of the Registration Act and 105 of the Notification Law specifically define a “juvenile sex offender” as one who commits any of the offenses specified in items “(B), (C), or (C — 5)” of the Registration Act, and neither definition makes any reference to item (E) of the Registration Act that would result in the classification as a “juvenile sexual predator.”
Section 2(E), on the other hand, specifically defines a “sexual predator” as one who is convicted of any of the offenses specified in items (1), (2), or (5) of section 2(E), or certified as a sexually dangerous person, or found to be a sexually violent person. 730 ILCS 150/2(E)(1), (E)(2), (E)(3), (E)(4), (E)(5) (West 2000). Section 2(E) contains no reference to section 2(A — 5) or any indication that a “juvenile sex offender” may also be classified as a “sexual predator.” In fact, there are absolutely no references to juveniles as “sexual predators” in either the Registration Act or the Notification Law.
Moreover, although the term “convicted” is given the same meaning as “adjudicated” for purposes of section 2(A), section 2(E) contains no similar pronouncement. Based upon section 2(E)’s silence on adjudications, the legislature must have intended that the term “sexual predator” apply only to persons who have actually been “convicted” in adult court of a specified offense.
Any other interpretation leads to unjust and absurd results. For instance, the majority’s interpretation would subject so-called “juvenile sexual predators” of any age to such reporting requirements, while a sex offender or a sexual predator who is convicted of first degree murder of a child must be at least 17 years of age to be subject to lifetime reporting requirements. See 730 ILCS 150/2(C— 5), (E)(2) (West 2000). The legislature surely did not intend consequences so inconsistent with reason, logic, and common sense.
Equally important, the State never has contended that and, indeed, it concedes in its brief that J.W. should not be required to register as a “sexual predator” and that his registration is limited to a period of 10 years. The State itself expresses concerns over the propriety of requiring a 12-year-old child to register as a sex offender for the rest of his life, remarking that,
“As a sex offender, the registration of the minor is limited to 10 years. A 10-year requirement *** strikes a fair balance between Respondent’s desire for a limited registration time and the People’s concerns for protecting the public.”
The State further acknowledges in its brief that the trial court ordered J.W to register as a “sex offender,” not as a “sexual predator.” The State also acknowledges that the appellate court mistakenly determined, sua sponte, that J.W must register as a “sexual predator.”
JW was not convicted as an adult in a criminal court and cannot be treated as an adult in every aspect of sex offender registration and community notification. Juveniles convicted as adults are classified as either “sex offenders” or “sexual predators” based upon their specific convictions. Such convictions are founded on determinations of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, subject to the protections of the fourth, fifth, and sixth amendments to our federal constitution. However, under the majority’s statutory interpretation, a juvenile who was not treated as an adult in criminal court but was adjudicated a juvenile delinquent sex offender in juvenile court cannot have the advantage of such protections. While some registration requirements such as the 10-year limitation may be justified, a juvenile delinquent sex offender can only be classified as a “sex offender” and cannot be classified as a “sexual predator.”
This statutory interpretation is consistent with current practice and the official guides that are widely disseminated by the Illinois State Police. See A Guide to Sex Offender Registration in Illinois, Prepared for: Illinois Criminal Justice Agencies, at 6, 31, 33 (October 1, 2002) (“Adjudicated juvenile delinquent sex offenders are required to register effective July 1, 1999. Adjudicated juvenile delinquent sex offenders are not predators” (emphasis added) and “[adjudicated juvenile delinquent sex offenders cannot be classified as sexual predators (emphasis in original)”); see also A Guide to Sex Offender and Child Murder Community Notification Law in Illinois, Prepared for: Illinois Criminal Justice Agencies (October 1, 2002).
This interpretation of the statute is also consistent with the fact that juveniles who engage in sexually inappropriate behavior do not necessarily pose a long-term risk of reoffending. “In many instances, sexually improper behavior by such young children [under age 14] is more a reflection of inadequate adult supervision, immaturity, inappropriate media exposure, or a prior history of emotional abuse than it is of irremediable sexually predatory inclinations.” In re Registrant J.G., 169 N.J. 304, 340, 777 A.2d 891, 913-14 (2001). Accordingly, I believe that while the trial court properly ordered J.W to register as a juvenile sex offender, this registration requirement is limited to 10 years from the date of adjudication.
I agree with the majority that information concerning J.W cannot be disseminated to the public, placed on the Internet, or made available to the public except when public safety is threatened. The majority does not make clear, however, that for purposes of community notification, the adjudicated juvenile delinquent sex offender should continue to be treated as a juvenile, even though he or she reaches the age of 18.
I further disagree with the majority’s analysis that subjecting a 12-year-old child to lifetime registration requirements as a “sexual predator” comports with principles of substantive due process. To comply with substantive due process, a statute must bear a reasonable relationship to a public interest to be served, and the means adopted must be a reasonable method of accomplishing the desired objective. People v. Adams, 144 Ill. 2d 381, 390 (1991).
In Adams, this court found that the State has an interest in protecting the public from sexual offenders and that the Registration Act bears a reasonable relationship to that interest. Adams, 144 Ill. 2d at 391. However, in Adams, this court only reviewed the registration requirements in the adult context. The majority fails to acknowledge that adjudicated juvenile delinquent sex offenders do not enjoy the same panoply of rights and safeguards as adults and juveniles prosecuted as adults in criminal court. Requiring a 12-year-old child to register as a sexual predator for the rest of his life is an unreasonable means of furthering the state’s interest. The majority misses this obvious conclusion and, unfortunately, ignores the State’s concession of that point.
Although this court has recognized that recent amendments to the Juvenile Court Act have resulted in juvenile proceedings that are “similar” to adult criminal proceedings (In re A.G., 195 Ill. 2d 313, 317-19 (2001)), there remain fundamental differences between the juvenile and criminal justice systems that militate against holding a 12-year-old child to an adult standard of registration and reporting for the rest of his life. Children have lesser levels of maturity and, because of their corresponding inability to control their behavior or to comprehend fully the consequences of their actions, their criminal acts are generally considered less culpable than those of an adult, and they are seen as more amenable to treatment and rehabilitation. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835, 101 L. Ed. 2d 702, 718-19, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2698-99 (1988) (plurality op.). In fact, the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 distinguishes between juveniles over and under the age of 13. Under the provisions of the Juvenile Court Act, a juvenile court judge may enter an order permitting a minor 13 years of age or older to be prosecuted under the criminal laws of the state if the judge finds “that it is not in the best interests of the public to proceed under this Act.” 705 ILCS 405/5— 805(3) (a) (West 2000). There is no similar provision for the transfer of minors under the age of 13. “It is clear that the purpose of a transfer proceeding is to balance the best interests of a juvenile offender, particularly as the offender’s interests relate to his potential for rehabilitation, against society’s legitimate interest in being protected from criminal victimization perpetrated by minors.” People v. Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d 404, 424-25 (2001). The transfer provisions of the Juvenile Court Act reflect a clear legislative determination that a child under the age of 13 is simply too immature as a matter of law to be tried as an adult, no matter how serious the offense:
It is indisputable that J.W. could not have been prosecuted as an adult for his conduct. To treat him as an adult by requiring him to comply with lifetime registration requirements cannot seriously be considered a “reasonable” means of furthering the state’s interest. I can conceive of no legitimate rationale for subjecting a juvenile delinquent under the age of 13 to lifetime registration requirements. Accordingly, I believe that subjecting juvenile delinquents to a lifetime registration requirement violates principles of substantive due process as it is an unreasonable method of accomplishing the state’s desired objective, and is therefore unconstitutional as applied to juvenile delinquents. See Adams, 144 Ill. 2d at 390 (to comply with substantive due process, a statute must bear a reasonable relationship to a public interest to be served, and the means adopted must be a reasonable method of accomplishing the desired objective).
This court now puts juveniles, regardless of age, on equal footing with their adult counterparts without affording them equal constitutional rights and protections. After today’s decision, children under the age of 12 who are adjudicated of certain sex offenses will be forever labeled as “sexual predators” and subjected to lifetime registration requirements.
Finally, I am troubled by the majority’s detailed description of the sexual conduct between J.W. and his victims, including identifying the minor victims by initials. This court should be especially sensitive to protecting the identity of the juveniles and respecting the privacy of the juvenile victims. It is apparent from the record that many people in the community of South Elgin already know the identity of J.W. and his involvement in sexual conduct with other juveniles, but these people may not have known the identity of the victims or the exact nature of the sexual conduct. Given that J.W. pled guilty, such specific and graphic details are unnecessary to the disposition of this case and are, in my opinion, inappropriate.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent in part.