dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. In my view, the appellate court properly affirmed the circuit court’s order granting defendant’s motion to suppress.
Section 11 — 501.2(c)(2) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11 — 501.2(c)(2) (West 2002)) is unambiguous. “The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature ***.” People v. Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d 435, 443 (1997). To determine legislative intent, a court should first look to the plain language of the statute and accord the language its plain and commonly understood meaning. Department of Public Aid ex rel. Davis v. Brewer, 183 Ill. 2d 540, 554 (1998); Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d at 443; People v. Phelps, 211 Ill. 2d 1, 15 (2004).
The introductory clause of section 11 — 501.2(c)(2) provides: “[notwithstanding any ability to refuse under this Code to submit to these tests or any ability to revoke the implied consent to these tests ***.” 625 ILCS 5/11— 501.2(c)(2) (West 2002). The plain language of this clause clearly indicates the legislature’s recognition of the right to refuse to submit to chemical testing. The remaining clause of section 11 — 501.2(c)(2) provides:
“[I]f a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a motor vehicle driven by or in actual physical control of a person under the influence of alcohol, other drug or drugs, or intoxicating compound or compounds, or any combination thereof has caused the death or personal injury to. another, that person shall submit, upon the request of a law enforcement officer, to a chemical test or tests of his or her blood, breath or urine for the purpose of determining the alcohol content thereof or the presence of any other drug or combination of both.” (Emphasis added.) 625 ILCS 5/11 — 501.2(c)(2) (West 2002).
The plain language of this clause means exactly what it says. Section 11 — 501.2(c)(2) specifically authorizes non-consensual chemical testing of a suspected impaired driver only when a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe the intoxicated driver has caused death or personal injury to another. Thus, the plain language of section 11 — 501.2(c)(2) mandates nonconsensual chemical testing only under those two specific circumstances.
Even if I accepted the majority’s position that the statute is ambiguous (214 Ill. 2d at 194-95), I disagree with the majority’s refusal to apply the well-known aid of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, meaning “the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.” Black’s Law Dictionary 581 (6th ed. 1990). Although expressio unius est exclusio alterius is not a rule of law (214 Ill. 2d at 201), it is, however, an aid of statutory interpretation. Metzger v. DaRosa, 209 Ill. 2d 30, 44 (2004). When a statute makes specific references, it is to be inferred that all omissions are understood as exclusions. Burke v. 12 Rothschild’s Liquor Mart, Inc., 148 Ill. 2d 429, 442 (1992). “This rule of statutory construction is based on logic and common sense. It expresses the learning of common experience that when people say one thing they dó not mean something else.” Metzger, 209 Ill. 2d at 44.
Here, section 11 — 501(c)(2) explicitly authorizes non-consensual chemical testing when a suspected impaired driver has caused death or personal injury to another. It does not expressly authorize nonconsensual chemical testing in any other circumstance. Accordingly, under the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, by enumerating the specific circumstances when a suspected impaired driver can be subjected to nonconsensual chemical testing, the legislature implicitly excluded circumstances not involving death or personal injury to another.
Moreover, in applying rules of statutory construction, a statute should be read as a whole and construed so that no word, phrase, or section is rendered meaningless or superfluous. People v. Ellis, 199 Ill. 2d 28, 39 (2002). As the majority notes, prior to the enactment of section 11 — 501.2(c)(2), nonconsensual chemical testing of a suspected impaired driver was permissible in all circumstances. 214 Ill. 2d at 195, 199. In order to give the subsequent enactment of section 11 — 501.2(c)(2) meaning, it must be interpreted as changing the prior law.
Since nonconsensual chemical testing was already permissible before enactment of section 11 — 501.2(c)(2), the legislature’s subsequent enactment of section 11— 501.2(c)(2) must be construed to prohibit nonconsensual testing of a suspected driver in situations not involving death or bodily injury. Conversely, the majority’s interpretation renders section 11 — 501.2(c)(2) meaningless surplusage and enactment of the statute pointless.
Additionally, the legislative debates negate the majority’s conclusion that section 11 — 501.2(c)(2) applies when no death or personal injury to another occurs. “Valuable construction aids in interpreting an ambiguous statute are the provision’s legislative history and debates, and the purposes and underlying policies.” Advincula v. United Blood Services, 176 Ill. 2d 1, 19 (1996). On May 20, 1994, during the third reading of House Bill 3094 in the Senate, Senator Raica stated:
“What House Bill 3094 does is provides [sic] that if a police officer has probable cause to believe that a vehicle is being driven by a person who’s under the influence and that individual has caused the death or personal injury, the officer can require the person to submit to a drug, breath, or urine test.” 88th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, May 20, 1994, at 110 (statements of Senator Raica).
On June 14, 1994, during the House debate on House Bill 3094, the following exchange occurred:
“Deering: Senate Amendment #1 as I understand it, requires a driver to submit to a breath or urine test under stated circumstances, what are those circumstances?
Dart: They’ve killed somebody or they’ve caused major injury to them.
Deering: So it’s not if they get pulled over for suspected DUI?
Dart: Correct, correct. There has to be probable cause that the death of the person was based upon their actions or that the severe injury was.
Deering: Thank you.” 88th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, June 14, 1994, at 116 (statements of Representatives Deering & Dart).
Thus, the legislative debates show that the legislature did not intend the result obtained by the majority.
Finally, the majority is inconsistent when it asserts “[w]e do not suggest that a DUI arrestee’s lack of a right to refuse chemical testing under section 11 — 501.2(c)(2) permits law enforcement officers to use physical force in obtaining blood, urine, and breath samples.” 214 Ill. 2d at 201. Essentially, the majority concludes that a suspected impaired driver does not have the right to refuse chemical testing, yet law enforcement officers do not have the right to compel nonconsensual testing. If law enforcement officers may not employ compulsion, how does the majority suggest law enforcement officers obtain the samples?
In sum, Jones was arrested for driving under the influence and the alleged violation did not result in death or personal injury to another. It was, therefore, statutorily improper for the law enforcement officer to order blood and urine samples to be taken over Jones’ objection. For these reasons I would affirm the circuit court and appellate court rulings suppressing the test results. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.