specially concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree that the defendant was properly convicted of armed violence in this case. However, I believe that the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant as a Class X offender. In my opinion, the defendant’s crime constituted a Class 2 felony.
The defendant was convicted of count I of the indictment, which charged the defendant with armed violence in that “while armed with a dangerous weapon, a Crossman .357 .177 caliber pellet gun *** [the defendant] shot [the victim] in the eye, thereby causing great bodily harm to the [victim]” in violation of section 33A — 2 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (the Code) (720 ILCS 5/33A — 2 (West 1992)). At the time of the instant offense, the operative statute provided as follows:
“(a) ‘Armed with a dangerous weapon’. A person is considered armed with a dangerous weapon for the purposes of this Article, when he carries on or about his person or is otherwise armed with a category I or category II weapon, (b) A category I weapon is a pistol, revolver, riñe, shotgun, spring gun, or any other firearm, sawed-off shotgun, a stun gun or toser as defined in paragraph (a) of Section 24 — 1 of this Code, knife with a blade of at least 3 inches in length, dagger, dirk, switchblade knife, stiletto, or any other deadly or dangerous weapon or instrument of like character, (c) A category II weapon is a bludgeon, blackjack, slungshot, sand-bag, sand-club, metal knuckles, billy or other dangerous weapon of like character.” (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 5/33A — 1 (West 1992).
Under rules of statutory construction, we should hold that the subject air pistol constituted a category II weapon rather than the category I weapon that the majority found. As argued by the defendant, the doctrine of ejusdem generis is applicable here. This well-settled rule of statutory construction provides that where general words follow particular and specific words in a statute, the general words must be construed to include only things of the same kind as those indicated by the particular and specific words. People v. Rutledge, 104 Ill. 2d 394, 472 N.E.2d 438 (1984).
In the case subjudice, the majority holds that the general language “any other deadly or dangerous weapon or instrument of like character” which appears at the end of subsection (b) (720 ILCS 5/33A — 1(b) (West 1992)) applies to the entire subsection. Opining that an air pistol is an “instrument of like character” to the firearm-type weapons listed in the initial part of subsection (b), the majority concludes that an air pistol is a category I weapon. I believe this interpretation is incorrect. Under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, the general language that appears at the end of subsection (b) should be construed to apply only to the specific blade-type weapons that immediately precede the language, i.e., a “knife with a blade of at least 3 inches in length, dagger, dirk, switchblade knife, stiletto.” 720 ILCS 5/33A — 1(b) (West 1992). It cannot reasonably be said that an air pistol is an instrument of like character to such weapons. Because an air pistol is neither a firearm nor a blade-type weapon, I do not believe it is included in subsection (b). Accordingly, it is not a category I weapon.
In its alternative argument, the State correctly notes that the instant air pistol can be considered a category II weapon because it is a dangerous instrument like a “slungshot” (more commonly called a “slingshot”). Both can be used as weapons and both propel projectiles at dangerous velocities, threatening serious bodily injury. I believe this is the correct analysis.
Accordingly, I would hold that the air pistol used by the defendant in this case constituted a category II weapon. At the time of this offense, armed violence with a category II weapon was a Class 2 felony. 720 ILCS 5/33A — 3(b) (West 1992). Because the defendant was sentenced for a Class X felony, I would remand the cause for resentencing.