dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. I would hold that the 10-year period within which an extended sentence could be imposed had expired and remand for a new sentencing hearing.
I agree that the date of “conviction” is the date of entry of the sentencing order. The final judgment in a criminal case is the pronouncement of sentence. People v. Allen, 71 Ill. 2d 378, 381, 375 N.E.2d 1283, 1284 (1978); People v. Talach, 114 Ill. App. 3d 813, 818, 448 N.E.2d 638, 642 (1983).
In the present case the defendant was sentenced, albeit only to probation, on February 26, 1985. That order was a final judgment, with all the attributes of a final judgment. If defendant had been convicted of a similar or lesser felony within 10 years of that date, excluding time spent in custody, defendant could have been sentenced to an extended term on the basis of the February 26, 1985, conviction. 730 ILCS 5/5—5—3.2(b)(1) (West 1996). That is to say, if defendant had been convicted of such a felony by February 26, 1995, the original conviction would form a sufficient predicate upon which to base an extended term. In contrast, in the Lewis case, relied upon by the majority, it was ultimately held that the original conviction was never a basis for imposing an extended-term sentence.
The majority ignores the defendant’s 10-year exposure to an extended-term sentence and chooses to begin the running of the period a second time, on October 31, 1996, the time when defendant’s probation was revoked and defendant was sentenced to 54 months in the Department of Corrections. (The maximum length of a period of probation is four years, but that time may be extended if defendant violates a condition of probation, such as leaving the State without the consent of the court. 730 ILCS 5/5—6—2(b)(1), 5—6—3(a)(4) (West 1996).)
Section 5—5—3.2(b)(1) clearly states that the 10-year period begins to run on the date of “the previous conviction,” and once the period begins to run it expires 10 years later, “excluding time spent in custody,” not a factor here. 730 ILCS 5/5—5—3.2(b)(1) (West 1996). Nothing in section 5 — 5—3.2(b)(1) justifies beginning the running of the period a second time. There was a resentencing, but defendant was not convicted of any new crime after 1985. The majority argues that we should not “ignore defendant’s purposeful violation of his probation.” 303 Ill. App. 3d at 262. That 1996 conduct, however, was not the basis of any conviction here. Resentencing following probation revocation is for the original offense, not for the conduct which was the basis of the revocation. People v. Young, 138 Ill. App. 3d 130, 142, 485 N.E.2d 443, 450 (1985).
We should not ignore the language of the statute in order to carry out what we see as “the policy considerations embodied” in it. 303 Ill. App. 3d at 261. It is not our function to cure any anomaly that may exist in section 5—5—3.2(b)(1). People v. Bole, 155 Ill. 2d 188, 198-99, 613 N.E.2d 740, 745 (1993). The surest and most reliable indicator of legislative intent is the language of the statute. Bole, 155 Ill. 2d at 198, 613 N.E.2d at 745. If the legislature had wanted to provide a special rule in probation cases it could easily have done so. See Bole, 155 Ill. 2d at 198, 613 N.E.2d at 745.