dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. The trial court did not err in finding section 3 — 707 of the Code creates an absolute liability offense. Section 3 — 707 imposes absolute liability because there is both clear evidence that the legislature so intended and an important public policy favors absolute liability. Section 3 — 707 of the Code, and a host of other corresponding or cross-referenced sections, including sections 7 — 601 and 7 — 602 and other sections found in the same chapter, all reflect, in their plain language, the legislature’s intent to create absolute liability offenses. See 625 ILCS 5/3 — 707, 7 — 601, 7 — 602 (West 1998). These sections also espouse important public policies in favor of highway safety and financial responsibility.
Sections 7 — 601 (required liability insurance policy) and 7 — 602 (insurance card) are located in article VI (mandatory insurance) of chapter 7 (Illinois Safety and Family Financial Responsibility Law) of the Code. 625 ILCS 5/7 — 601, 7 — 602 (West 1998). These statutes, as well as those contained in the same chapters and articles, reflect in their plain language the legislative intent to create absolute liability offenses, as well as the important public policies of highway safety and financial responsibility. Illinois courts have often recognized that the public policy behind, or the purpose of, the insurance requirement is protection of the public. See State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Universal Underwriters Group, 285 Ill. App. 3d 115, 120-21, 674 N.E.2d 52, 55 (1996).
Section 3 — 707 could not be clearer: “No person shall operate a motor vehicle unless the motor vehicle is covered by a liability insurance policy in accordance with [s]ection 7 — 601 of this Code.” (Emphasis added.) 625 ILCS 5/3 — 707 (West 1998). Section 7 — 601 further specifies not only that one shall not operate, register, or maintain registration of an uninsured motor vehicle, but an owner may not permit someone else to do so. Section 7 — 602 then requires any operator of a motor vehicle to carry proof of insurance — very specific types of proof.
Moreover, section 3 — 707 creates a rebuttable presumption that anyone who cannot provide that very specific proof of insurance shall automatically be deemed to be operating an uninsured motor vehicle. However, the operator may rebut that presumption in court by producing proof that insurance existed at the time of the arrest. Nothing is said in the statute about knowledge or inadvertence.
The legislature has set forth the specific Code violations that are intent crimes. For example, under sections 7 — 602 (display of false insurance) and 7 — 603 (making or selling invalid or counterfeit insurance cards) (625 ILCS 5/7 — 602, 7 — 603 (West 1998)), knowledge is required; and violation of section 7 — 602 is a Class A misdemeanor and violation of section 7 — 603 is a Class 4 felony. Knowledge is clearly an element required to prove display of false insurance:
“No person shall display evidence of insurance to a law enforcement officer, court, or officer of the court, knowing there is no valid liability insurance in effect on the motor vehicle as required under [s]ection 7 — 601 of this Code or knowing the evidence of insurance is illegally altered, counterfeit, or otherwise invalid as evidence of insurance required under [s]ection 7 — 602 of this Code. If the law enforcement officer issues a citation to a motor vehicle operator for displaying invalid evidence of insurance, the officer shall confiscate the evidence for presentation in court.
Any person convicted of violating this [s]ection is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.” (Emphasis added.) 625 ILCS 5/3 — 710 (West 1998).
Knowledge or intent is not an element required to prove a violation of section 3 — 707. The legislature was clear. A vehicle cannot be driven without insurance. Vehicle insurance is mandatory. The legislative policy is set forth throughout these statutes and can be gleaned from their titles, for chapter 7 of the Code “Illinois Safety and Family Financial Responsibility Law” (625 ILCS 5/7 — 100 through 7 — 708 (West 1998)), as well as the plain language of the statute. The public is disserved by ignoring the evident legislative intent to promote safety and family responsibility here.
Moreover, in Nunn, 77 Ill. 2d at 251-52, 396 N.E.2d at 30-31, the supreme court found that the offense of leaving the scene was not an absolute liability offense; however, not because the offense failed to implicate an important public policy such as highway safety. The case did not address this issue because that statute, in its language and history, clearly required knowledge of the driver that there had been a collision. There is no such language in 3 — 707 to indicate that the driver must know or be aware that there is no insurance on the vehicle. In fact, the driver has an affirmative duty to see that there is proof of insurance in the vehicle.
Similarly, vehicles are required to be registered and licensed with the Secretary of State and proof of registration and display of license plates are required to be carried and exhibited upon demand.
“(a) Every registration card for a vehicle of the second division weighing more than 8,000 pounds or any vehicle of the second division weighing 8,000 pounds or less towing a trailer, except pole trailer or semitrailer shall at all times be carried in the vehicle to which it refers or shall be carried by the person driving or in control of such vehicle who shall display the same upon demand of a police officer or any officer or employee of the Secretary of State.
(b) The provisions of this [s]ection requiring that a registration card be carried in the vehicle to which it refers or by the person driving the same shall not apply when such card is used for the purpose of making application for renewal of registration or upon a transfer of registration of said vehicle.” 625 ILCS 5/3 — 411(a), (b) (West 1998).
Similarly, no person shall operate a vehicle with a cancelled, suspended, or revoked registration, although an owner must not knowingly permit such a vehicle to be operated upon a highway:
“(a) No person shall operate, nor shall an owner knowingly permit to be operated, upon any highway:
(1) A vehicle the registration of which has been cancelled, suspended!!,] or revoked; or
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(b) No person shall use, nor shall any owner use or knowingly permit the use of any Illinois registration plate, plates or registration sticker, or any Illinois Reciprocity Permit or Prorate Decal which has been cancelled, suspended[,] or revoked.” 625 ILCS 5/3 — 702(a)(1),(b) (West 1998).
The operator (as opposed to an owner) of the vehicle is subject to absolute liability for this offense, which is also a Class A misdemeanor. 625 ILCS 5/3 — 702(c) (West 1998).
The statutory scheme and language set forth in the Code evince both legislative intent to create absolute liability and an important public policy — highway safety and financial responsibility — favoring absolute liability. I would affirm the trial court.