specially concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part. I agree that the circuit court correctly reviewed the Secretary’s decision under a common-law writ of certiorari. However, I disagree with the standard of review applied by the majority and the result reached by the majority. Here, the standard of review is not the manifest weight of the evidence because there are no issues of fact. The standard for review of the certiorari action is de novo. Callahan v. Department of State Police, 223 Ill. App. 3d 1081, 1085, 586 N.E.2d 381, 384 (1991). Moreover, the Secretary’s decisions on questions of law are not binding on this court. Village of Downers Grove v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 221 Ill. App. 3d 47, 53, 581 N.E.2d 824, 828 (1991); see also Richard’s Tire Co. v. Zehnder, 295 Ill. App. 3d 48, 56, 692 N.E.2d 360, 366 (1998).
Applegate was clearly discharged because he received two statutory summary suspensions. The grievance review panel’s recommendation, in which the Secretary concurred, stated:
“Based on Order 3 — 1, Chapter 8 — C, of IDOT’s Personnel Policy Manual, we find that the discharge was proper in accordance to the above provisions. However!,] we, the panel, find the existing provisions of the aforementioned Chapter 8 need to be revised to clarify the length of time between suspensions and revocations of driver’s license and that before the Department takes final action, [it] should take into consideration the judicial process in its totality.”
The panel and the Secretary clearly recognized the fact that Apple-gate’s discharge ignored the judicial process, in direct contradiction of the Illinois Department of Transportation’s personnel policies manual. That manual recognizes the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/1 — 100 et seq. (West 1998)) and the Secretary of State’s rules and regulations governing statutory summary suspensions. The policy at issue here is in fact entitled “Statutory Summary Driver’s License Suspension” and permits first offenders a 90-day unpaid leave for the term of the statutory summary suspension. The policy also provides that a second suspension results in discharge. However, nowhere in the manual is “first offense” or “statutory summary suspension” defined. Since the Secretary has recognized the Secretary of State’s process set forth in the Illinois Vehicle Code, it is bound by its definitions.
Applegate, at the time of his initial discharge, was actually a first offender because his first suspension had been rescinded:
“For the purposes of interpreting Sections 6 — 206.1 and 6 — 208.1 of this Code, ‘first offender’ shall mean any person who has not had a previous conviction or court[-]assigned supervision for violating Section 11 — 501, or a similar provision of a local ordinance, or a conviction in any other state for a violation of driving while under the influence or a similar offense where the cause of action is the same or substantially similar to this Code or any person who has not had a driver’s license suspension for violating Section 11— 501.1 within 5 years prior to the date of the current offense, except in cases where the driver submitted to chemical testing ***.” 625 ILCS 5/11 — 500 (West 2000).
See also People v. Eidel, 319 Ill. App. 3d 496, 504, 745 N.E.2d 736, 744 (2001), citing People v. Focia, 287 Ill. App. 3d 767, 769, 679 N.E.2d 121, 123 (1997) (the rescission of the summary suspension undoes the administrative summary suspension, at least prospectively). Applegate was, therefore, also entitled to take a 90-day unpaid leave and was not subject to discharge for cause based on two suspensions. To hold otherwise would invalidate the underlying judicial proceeding that rescinded the statutory summary driver’s license suspension and dismissed the DUI. As a matter of law, Applegate’s discharge was wrong.
While this court recognizes the employer’s need for its employees to possess a driver’s license, this court also recognizes the need for the Secretary to follow its own manual, the laws of this state, and the rulings of our courts. For these reasons, I would affirm the circuit court and reverse the ruling of the Secretary.